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Human longevity in England and Wales has increased markedly in the past 50 years. But this 
increase has come at some very significant financial and social cost. More and more of us are 
having to care for our elderly parents ourselves. Careers are either put on hold or lost 
altogether; family incomes are much reduced; and, leisure time is lost, never to be recovered. 
All this care is administered without any legal entitlement to any compensation or reward. 
Given that the need for informal social care will rise yet further in the next few decades as the 
‘baby boomer’ generation moves into old age, what can be done for this legion of family carers 
who hold our social care system together? Many writers have attempted to highlight this 
growing problem, but few, if any, have produced any viable solutions to what is an impending 
social crisis.  
This thesis investigates how English law might respond to ‘the longevity conundrum’. Through 
the concerted analysis of existing material, it explores, but ultimately discards, the proposal 
that informal carers should have the right to apply for financial provision under existing family 
provision legislation. It, similarly, refutes claims that informal carers might have a remedy 
under the law relating to unjust enrichment or through the imposition of a constructive trust 
on the care-receiver’s estate. Instead, it proposes – and seeks to justify – a legislative solution 
in the form of a mediated ‘family care contract’.  Such a contract would not be a mere private 
affair. In practice, state funding for informal carers would need to underpin these 
arrangements, but, ultimately, that funding could be recovered from the private property 
(principally, housing) wealth that is a feature of our modern society, and the thesis then 
proposes how this might be done.  At this point, research was undertaken through the use of 
semi-structured interviews to ascertain whether this process might find support from informal 
or ‘family’ carers. Although that research revealed an almost universal desire for change to 
our existing social care system for the elderly, there was little consensus over how such reforms 
should be funded and less what these reforms might look like. Some reflection was undertaken 
and comparisons were draw with certain other countries who had successfully introduced such 
reforms before it was concluded that public support for such reforms is unnecessary given that 
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As things stand, those in England and Wales who dedicate themselves to the care of an elderly,1 
disabled,2 parent or other remoter relative, often incurring significant financial hardship and 
emotional suffering in doing so, have no right in law to any form of compensation, reward or any other 
significant financial incentive in return for their efforts.3  Any real commitment on the part of an 
‘informal carer’4 to a long-term, intensive social care programme for someone who needs ministering 
to in this way will usually come at a price. Careers will be sacrificed, opportunities for emotional 
happiness with others will be turned down, serious economic disadvantage may well result and, in 
many instances, lives will be put ‘on-hold’ while this much-needed care is delivered. Some may say 
that such compensation or rewards are solely matters for the care-receiver.5 Yet, in reality, there may 
 
1 In this thesis, ‘elderly’ is defined as over 65 years of age. This definition is consistent with the definition of 
‘elderly population’ adopted by the OECD – see: https://data.oecd.org/pop/elderly-population.htm (accessed: 
06/09/17). As a result of increased longevity in the developed world in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, the term ‘old elderly’ has now been coined to describe those in excess of 85 years of age. 
 
2 Regrettably, increasing old age often brings with it the inability to perform vital daily tasks. When it does, an 
elderly person often needs help in the form of social care. In this thesis, the phrase ‘elderly disabled’ is used to 
refer to elderly people who are unable to perform two or more ADLs (activities of daily living). 
 
3 This thesis uses the words ‘compensate’ and ‘reward’ interchangeably to describe the obligation on a parent 
to make financial recompense to a child who has devoted a significant period of time to their care and support 
in the parent’s latter years.  
 
4 The term ‘informal carer’ is used to describe anyone who provides social care to another on a gratuitous basis 
– see: the definitions of ‘carer’ and ‘care-receiver’ discussed in chapter one, section 1.2.1, in Brian Sloan, 
Informal Carers and Private Law, (Hart, 2013). ‘Informal carers’ are also known as ‘family carers’ and these two 
terms will be used interchangeably throughout this work. 
 
5 For example, see: J. C. Tate, ‘Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom’, University of California, 





be many reasons why a parent, or indeed remoter relative,6 omits to make significant financial 
provision for an informal carer. Some people choose to die intestate because they are unable to 
contemplate their own mortality by making a will.7 Some will also die leaving a will that provides for 
their several children in equal measure without any regard to what one child had done for them over 
and above anything done by that child’s siblings. That may be because the will was made sometime 
before care was needed and the care-receiver simply never found the time to amend that will. It may 
be because the care-receiver was too ill, lacking the necessary testamentary capacity to make a new 
will that would acknowledge what the informal care had done for him/her. It may be because the 
care-receiver cannot assess the value of care that has been provided and wishes their children to ‘sort 
that matter out’ between them. Sometimes, an elderly parent has died leaving a will which has made 
no financial provision at all for an adult child who has provided a significant amount of care for them 
in the latter stages of their life, giving other reasons why they have decided not to make any financial 
provision (or, at least, financial provision which acknowledges the sacrifices that have been made) for 
the child, or other remoter relative, who has cared for them for many years.8 Life, for those on the 
receiving end of such decisions, will seldom be seen as ‘fair’. 
Indeed, whichever way these events have unfolded for an adult child who may have provided this 
informal nursing care over many years, he/she is often left to start anew. For some, this has meant 
seeking employment in circumstances where they have been out of the workplace for some time 
whilst caring for their now deceased parent. For others who were living in their parent’s home whilst 
providing care, it has meant looking for alternative accommodation in addition to a new job. In some 
instances, these ‘informal carers’ have given up their friends, their careers and even their own homes 
in order to care for an elderly parent. In the absence of a right in English law to any form of 
compensation, reward or other form of financial provision in return for this caring, one is left with a 
 
6 This thesis refers to the adult child carer of an elderly, disabled parent, but the relationship could equally be a 
nephew or niece caring for an elderly, disabled uncle or aunt if the uncle or aunt has not married and/or has 
not had any children.  
 
7 See:  The Administration of Estates Act 1925, ss. 46 and 47. Intestacy, of course, leads to an equal division of 
the care-receiver’s assets between their children if they die without leaving a surviving spouse and this fails to 
acknowledge what one child may have done for the parent (such as sacrificing much to care for the elderly, 
disabled parent) over and above what other children may have done. 
 
8 See: Espinosa v Bourke [1999] 2 FLR 747, where the claimant had given up her job at her father’s request and 
had provided accommodation and care for him over a number of years, in circumstances where he was plainly 
in need of such care, only to be ‘disinherited’ by her father when he disapproved of the life-style that she was 




deep sense of injustice over the way in which these people have been treated. Yet, in practice, our 
social care system depends almost entirely on their continuing willingness to make these sacrifices. 
This social care system referred to is, of course, the English, and to a lesser degree, the Welsh social 
care system. Remarkably, the provision of social care by the state in the UK is divided on national 
grounds. Spending in England continues to fall well behind spending in Wales and in Scotland. In May 
2019, the BBC reported that an analysis produced by the Health Foundation showed that spending in 
England on social care for the elderly and disabled amounted to £310 per annum. Yet, in Wales the 
same figure was £414 per person per annum and in Scotland it was £445 with personal care provided 
free to everyone assessed as being entitled to such care. In fact, the same analysis shows that, in 
England, spending per head of the population actually fell by somewhere between 8% and 10% 
between 2010-11 and 2016-17 once inflation was taken into account notwithstanding an increase in 
the longevity of the elderly over the same period.9  If the increase in the general population during 
this period is taken into account, that fall has been calculated at 13.5 %; and, if the relative rise in the 
age of the population is also inserted into this equation, the decrease in spending is greater still.10 So, 
it is England that appears to bear the greatest burden in relation to social care, and it is in England 
where the projected rise in the need for such care will hit hardest.11  
Unfortunately, there is little sign that this under-provision will be arrested in the foreseeable future. 
Against the background of a decade of austerity in public spending and tax-cuts for other less-needy 
sections of society,12 what we, as a nation, are spending on social care represents as little as 
 
9 See: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-48438132 (accessed 08/01/20) which puts the figure at 10% and 
Institute of Fiscal Studies, Briefing Note BN200 Public Spending on Adult Social Care in England - 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/BN200.pdf (accessed: 08/05/18) which puts the same figure 
at 8%. 
 
10 See also: Adult Social Care Funding (England), House of Commons briefing paper number CBP07903, 23 
October 2017, p. 11 et seq. - http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7903/CBP-7903.pdf 
which confirms this trend (accessed: 30/12/17); 
 
11 Wittenberg, Raphael, Pickard, Linda, Comas-Herrera, Adelina, Davies, Bleddyn and Darton, Robin (2001) 
Demand for long-term care for older people in England to 2031. Health Statistics Quarterly (12). pp. 5-17. 
Projections suggest that England will see a 60% increase in the numbers of people aged 65 and over between 
1996 and 2031, and an 88& increase in the numbers of people aged over 85 in the same period. 
 
12 Corporation Tax, for example, has fallen from some 28% in 2010-11 to 19% in 2017-18 and will further fall to 
a rate of 17% by April 2020. – https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/corporation-tax-to-17-in-
2020/corporation-tax-to-17-in-2020 (accessed: 30/12/17). Alongside this, the introduction of the main 







approximately 1% of our GDP, with the result that the number of people aged over 65 who access 
publicly funded social care has fallen by at least 26 per cent over the past six years.13 Yet, in practice, 
this makes little sense; the older we get as a generation, the more we need social care. It is now 
estimated that between 2015 and 2025, the number of people aged 65 years and older in the UK will 
increase by 19.4% from 10·4 million to 12.4 million;14 and, that rise is set to continue at the same rate 
for at least another ten years beyond 2025.15 
In reality, increased life expectancy and greater numbers of elderly will surely result in a significant 
increase in demand for social care. Already, research by Age UK in 2016 has indicated that some 1.2 
million older people in England were not receiving the social care they need – an increase of 48% from 
2010.16 Moving forward, more recent research funded by the British Heart Foundation indicates that, 
between 2015 and 2025, the number of people living with a disability will increase by 25% from 2.25 
million to 2.81 million. Over the same period, total life expectancy at the age of 65 years will increase 
by 1.7 years, from 20.1 years to 21.8 years. Disability-free life expectancy at the age of 65 years will 
increase by 1 year from 15.4 years to 16.4 years. However, life expectancy with disability will increase 
even more in relative terms, with an increase of roughly 15%.17 What does this all mean? In simple 
terms, Maria Guzman-Castillo et al. claim that, ‘[t]he number of older people with care needs will 
expand by 25% by 2025, mainly reflecting population ageing rather than an increase in prevalence of 
disability. Lifespans will increase further in the next decade, but a quarter of life expectancy at age 65 
years will involve disability.’18 
Recent minor increases in UK Government spending will surely do very little to ensure that the 
projected increase in demand for social care will be met. At present, the UK Government spends some 
£58.55 billion on health and social care for the elderly, taking into account the funding for the NHS 
that is spent on the elderly and the money used for attendance allowance. Yet, the so-called ‘precept’ 
 
13 https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/autumn-statement-2016 (accessed: 09/01/18). 
14 Maria Guzman-Castillo et al., Forecasted trends in disability and life expectancy in England and Wales up to 
2025: a modelling study, www.thelancet.com/public-health Vol 2 July 2017  file:///G:/Lancet%20article.pdf 
(accessed: 30/12/17) 
15 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-38292363 (accessed: 30/12/17) 
16 Adult Social Care Funding (England), House of Commons briefing paper number CBP07903, 23 October 2017, 
p. 15  - http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7903/CBP-7903.pdf (accessed: 30/12/17). 
 
17 fn.14, supra. 
 




– the ability of local authorities to increase council tax by up to 2% to raise money for social care costs 
– raised only £383 million, even though most local councils took up the option of increasing council 
tax rates. An improved Better Care Fund is set to provide additional social care funds of around £1.4 
billion per annum between 2017/18 and 2019/20. And, finally, a new Adult Social Care Support Grant 
is expected to provide £240 million to local authorities in 2017/18. Yet, in real terms this is only a small 
fraction of the present cost of providing social care for the elderly, not to mention those who need 
that care but are unable to persuade their respective local authorities to meet that need. 
Notwithstanding this increased expenditure, 1.2m older people with care needs will continue to get 
no help at all, another 1.5m must rely on family and friends and an estimated 500,000 will need to pay 
for their own care.19 Clearly, the burden on family and friends to provide informal social care for the 
disabled elderly can only increase in the coming years - what with increased longevity, medical 
progress and rising care costs - and that increase is likely to be very significant indeed.  
 
In England and Wales, there is another division that also helps to force the care of the elderly into the 
hands of their immediate family and this is the distinction between health care and social care.20 Since 
the introduction of the National Health Service (‘NHS’) in 1948, health care has been provided ‘free at 
source’, but social care has not.21 Indeed, the two regimes are ‘based on fundamentally different 
philosophical, organisational funding and eligibility requirements’.22 Many have argued for the 
abolition of this distinction.23 Yet, it remains, with over 90% of our social care is supplied by 
organisations – profit-making organisations – who lie outside of the State. The result is that it is 
estimated that there are one million people with social care needs who are not receiving any support 
at all because they cannot afford to pay for such care.24 Many more must rely on their immediate 
 
19 fn.14, supra. 
 
20 As John Coggon remarks in his work, What Makes Health Public? (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at p. 2: 
‘… conceptions of health are necessarily value-laden’. Historically, government policy has drawn a marked 
distinction between health care and social care. That distinction, it is submitted, is unsustainable. The need for 
social care is a product of old age; and, old age is a context of health. 
 
21 See: http://www.nhshistory.net/shorthistory.htm (accessed: 19/10/17). 
 
22 See: Beresford, Slasberg and Clements, From Dementia Tax to a Solution for Social Care, Soundings, Number 
68, Spring 2018, pp. 78-93 (16) 
 
23 For example, Jonathan Herring, Caring and the Law, (Hart Publishing, 2013) pp. 137-8. Indeed, in the article 
referred at fn. 22 supra, Professors Beresford and Clements raise the question whether medicating someone is 
social care or health care.  
 




family for such support. In fact, notwithstanding a significant increase in the elderly population in 
England and Wales over the past 30 years, the number of people who are supported by the social care 
system has fallen from 2 million in 1992 to just 1.3 million today.25 The gap has, of course, been bridged 
by informal caring but only at a significant cost to those who have to provide that care. 
That said, our society also remains committed – it seems – to the nurture and continuing care of its 
members, but particularly the elderly and infirm.26 And, many more people are now living much longer 
lives than those in preceding generations. What will be the consequences of this new-found longevity? 
Who is going to care for this increasingly older generation? How are the costs of this care going to be 
met? The financial crises of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have cast grave doubts 
over the idea that ‘the welfare state’ can continue to provide for its members ‘from the cradle to the 
grave’.27 Indeed, more recent events have only served to show that those in, and those seeking, power 
in this country seem to be deeply divided over the question of social care for the disabled elderly.28 
These phenomena raise some very searching questions.  If society is going to continue to be heavily 
reliant on informal carers to provide the care that an increasingly older generation will need, should 
it not encourage them in their devotions by the provision of some form of financial incentives in return 
for the commitments that many of them will need to make? Can English law be adapted to give 
informal carers a right to if not full compensation but perhaps some form of financial 
acknowledgement of the work they do? If English law as it stands cannot be adapted, might legislation 
provide the answer? If so, what form would that legislation take? Whom would it affect and how? 
What machinery would be needed in order to ensure that an elderly, disabled parent is cared for by 
an adult child (or remoter relation) in an appropriate manner? From these thoughts, the idea for the 
present thesis was born. 
In these circumstances, this chapter begins exploring the extent of the concerns voiced by those who 
are actively looking into the challenges that increasing longevity in an ageing population will bring. 
And, one must acknowledge, here, that the developed world as a whole must find a solution to these 
 
25 Ibid. p. 84. 
 
26 This commitment can be seen in the establishment, and continuance, of the National Health Service and in 
the provision of the State Pension to those (presently) over 65 years of age, as well as the limited availability of 
social care funding. 
 
27 http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/brave_new_world/welfare.htm (accessed: 
06/09/17). 
 
28 https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/articles/political-crisis-nhs (accessed: 05/03/20). 
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problems not merely England and Wales, albeit those solutions may differ from nation to nation.29 In 
essence, the process lays bare a future where any continuing economic prosperity depends on finding 
answers to what is later described as ‘the longevity conundrum’. It then ends by looking at the 
methodology of the research that that underpins this thesis together with other solutions that have 
been put forward to the threat posed by the ‘demographic time bomb’ that some believe now awaits 
us.30 Chapter two (which takes the form of a literature review) begins by analysing the work of a 
number of prominent academic and social commentators who have expressed considerable disquiet 
in recent years over the plight of the elderly and what their future might hold.  In essence, this analysis 
is intended to demonstrate how the ideas generated in the final chapters of this thesis build upon, 
and add to, existing thinking on the subject. In a similar vein, the second half of this chapter will 
investigate the role of various actors – the State, the family and society itself – in either providing or 
encouraging the provision of social care for the disabled elderly, establishing the moral case for action 
to further encourage the caring of adult children for their parents. Chapter three takes a broader look 
at how the elderly, disabled function within our society. It serves to highlight the difficulties that 
surround dealing with this section of society, difficulties that will need to be addressed by anyone 
seeking a solution to the challenge that lies ahead. Chapters four and five will then consider whether 
English law can be easily adapted in some way in order to provide financial recompense for the work 
that informal carers do. Here, the focus is on our family provision legislation, and the twin concepts of 
estoppel and undue enrichment as potential alternative remedies for the informal carer. And, in 
chapter six, one particular proposal will be presented, and its practicality assessed, in an effort to show 
how English law might need to change in order to provide this body of people with what many 
proponents of social justice would describe as their ‘just entitlement’. That particular proposal is then 
reviewed in chapter seven, the concluding chapter in this work. 
 
29 In 1960, less than one person in ten in the developed world was over 65 years of age. By 2030, that figure 
will have risen to almost one in four – source: OECD (1996).  The term ‘the developed world’ denotes a group 
of 23 countries comprising the membership of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) from 1973 – 1993.  In the UK, life expectancy is expected to rise to the late 80s by 2030 –
https://www.nhs.uk/news/medical-practice/uk-life-expectancy-expected-to-rise-to-late-80s-by-2030/ 
(accessed: 19/11/17). 
30 See: fn. 20, supra, at p. 84. See further: Pat Thane, Social Histories of Old Age and Aging, Journal of Social 
History (Vol. 37, issue 1), Sept. 2003, OUP, which charts the increase in the percentage of the population of 
England that is over 60 years of age from 6% in the nineteenth century to 18% at the end of the twentieth 
century. With the progress of medical science, improved diets and an understanding of the benefits of exercise 
this rise – which must be placed alongside the rise in the country’s population from 53 million in 1960 to a 
projected figure of over 70 million in 2026 (see: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/artic
les/overviewoftheukpopulation/mar2017 (accessed: 10/01/20)) – is set to continue sharply the deeper one 




* * * * 
 
1.2    CENTRAL CONCERNS  
Those living in the developed world in the latter half of the twentieth century – and, now, in the first 
two decades of the twenty-first century – have experienced something of a cataclysmic event. 
“Global life expectancies have grown more over the last fifty years than over the previous five 
thousand. Perhaps two-thirds of all the people who have ever lived to the age of 65 are alive 
today.”31 
In a matter of a little more than half a century those of us who are fortunate to reside in these parts 
are now anticipating living a good deal longer than our forebears did a mere 50 to 60 years ago.32 
Closer to home, the numbers of people in the UK aged 65 and over are projected to rise by almost 
50% (48.7%) in the next 20 years to something over 16 million.33 Today, a man aged 65 who is living 
in the UK can expect to live to the age of 86, and by 2050 this expectation will have risen to 91;34 
similarly, a woman aged 65 who is living in the UK can expect to live to the age of 89, while her 
counterpart aged 45 can expect to live to the age of 91.5.35 The most significant increases in life 
 
31 Peter G. Peterson, Gray Dawn: How the Coming Age Wave Will Transform America and the World, (Barnes 
and Noble, 1999).  
32 Between 1960 and 2010, life expectancy in England and Wales increased by 10 years for men and by 8 years 
for women. In 2010, the most common (modal) age of death in England and Wales was 85 years for men and 
89 years for women; see: the Office for National Statistics - 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/articles/mortality
inenglandandwales/2012-12-17 (accessed: 05/11/16). 
 
33 At present, there are some 10 million people over 65 in the UK, with 1.5 million of those over 85. These 
figures are expected to rise sharply in the coming years – see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-18610954 
(accessed: 13/11/16). By 2020, in the UK as a whole, people over 50 years of age will comprise almost a third 
of the workforce and almost one half of the total adult population; see: ‘Improving Opportunities for Older 
People’ - https://www.gov.uk/Government/policies/improving-opportunities-for-older-people (accessed: 
06/09/17).  
 
34 See: https://www.nhs.uk/news/medical-practice/uk-life-expectancy-expected-to-rise-to-late-80s-by-2030/ 
(accessed: 04/09/17). 
 
35 The gap between the average life expectancy of men and women is falling and could equalize as early as 
2030 – http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/images/uploads/publication-pdfs/Tomorrows_World_-




expectancy may be found in the ‘oldest old’, those aged 85 years and above. In mid-2016, there were 
some 1.6 million people aged 85 and over living in the UK; yet, by mid-2041 this figure is projected to 
double to 3.2 million.36 Where will the funding for the social care needs of these elderly come from? 
By 2020, so the UK Office for National Statistics predicts, people over 50 will comprise almost a third 
(32%) of the workforce and almost one half (47%) the adult population of the UK.37 And, by 2021 there 
are set to be more over-65s than under 16s in the UK.38 In light of these statistics, a number of 
respected institutions have voiced serious concern over the ability of the country to provide the social 
care that its ageing population will need in the next few decades.39 Indeed, there is now some real 
anxiety that projected figures significantly under-estimate life expectancy. One commentator has 
recently claimed that ‘[l]ife expectancy is an average … if you take the average number, one in ten of 
us should budget living for ten years longer.’40 
These statistics are also reflected on the other side of the Atlantic. In the United States, individuals 
who are 65 years of age and over presently make up around 12 to 13 per cent of the population. 
However, it is predicted that this figure will rise to approximately 20 per cent by 2030.41 By 2050, those 
aged over 65 will represent some 88.5 million; and, those over the age of 85 will triple from 5.7 million 
(in 2010) to 19 million in 2050.42 Again, there are grave concerns over the ability of the country to 
cope with an ageing population.43  
 





37 ‘Improving Opportunities for Older People’ - https://www.gov.uk/Government/policies/improving-
opportunities-for-older-people (accessed: 10/09/13). 
 
38 See: The Office for National Statistics, Social Trends, 2008. 
 
39 The Institute of Fiscal Studies, ‘UK health and social care spending’, - 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/budgets/gb2017/gb2017ch5.pdf (accessed: 16/11/17). 
 
40 Ibid. at p. 17, referring to an observation made by Steven Baxter, a partner with Hymans Robertson LLP, 
investment consultants and actuaries.  
 
41 These figures are taken from information supplied by the Federal Interagency forum on Aging-Related 
Statistics, Older Americans 2000: Key Indicators of Well-Being, app. A, table 1B, and cited in Peggie R. Smith, 
‘Elder Care, Gender and Work: The Work Family Issue of the 21st Century’, 25 Berkeley Journal of Employment 
& Labor Law, 351 (2004), at p. 352. 
 
42 Thomas P. Gallanis and Josephine Gittler, ‘Family Caregiving and the Law of Succession: A Proposal’, 45 






Similar trends can be identified in Europe. In the EU-28, the median age of its citizens increased by 4.3 
years between 2001 and 2016.44 In Italy and Germany, for example, there are approximately three 
people of working age for every person over the age of 65; however, far more seriously, it is predicted 
that by 2030 the ratio of working taxpayers to non-working pensioners in these two countries will be 
as low as one to one.45 On the back of these and other similar statistics, the EU has warned that the 
age pyramid across the EU-28 is being transformed by low birth rates and higher life expectancy.46 In 
other words, the proportion of citizens of working age is shrinking, while the number of those who 
are retired is expanding; and, in these circumstances, the burden on those of working age to provide 
for the health and care services will increase markedly in the next few years.47  
It is this expanding, and increasingly needy,48 section of our society that is the central concern of this 
thesis. How is society going to provide for the demands of the disabled elderly when those demands 
are growing and the working population who will be asked to meet those demands is diminishing?49 
In the media, stories abound over the numbers of care workers who leave their jobs each year.50 Now, 
with clear indications from the UK Government that immigration will be severely reduced following 
the country’s departure from the European Union, questions are beginning to be raised in regard to 
how the UK’s public sector might meet the present level of demand for social care, never mind the 
 
 
44 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_ageing (accessed: 
07/09/17).  The median age of citizens living in the 28 states (‘the EU-28’) comprising the EU rose from 38.3 
years to 42.6 years between 2001 and 2012. 
 
45 fn. 44, supra, p. 14.  
 
46 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_ageing (accessed: 
19/11/17). 
 
47 fn. 41, supra. 
 
48 fn. 42, supra, at p. 763. 
 
49 In fact, this country has already reached a point where there are more people over state pension age than 
there are children; see: ‘Later Life in the United Kingdom’, published by Age UK in September 2015, at p. 3 – 
available at: http://www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/EN-GB/Factsheets/Later_Life_UK_factsheet.pdf?dtrk=true 
(accessed 27/ 09/15). 
 
50 ‘The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England’, published by Skills for Care (2015), at 
http://www.skillsforcare.org.uk/Document-library/NMDS-SC,-workforce-intelligence-and-innovation/NMDS-
SC/State-of-2014-ENGLAND-WEB-FINAL.pdf which puts the figure at 300,000 per year, some 25.4% of the 




projected increase in demand that puts the number of disabled elderly who will require social care by 
2025 as high as 2.8 million.51 
How demanding might the disabled elderly be? Counter-arguments have suggested that the demands 
of this section of society are being over-stated.52 With the recent increase in the numbers of elderly 
people has come, it is claimed, an increase in the health and well-being of this ever-growing group. 
This means, so they say, that the ‘old-age dependency ratio’, which has governed political thinking on 
future social policy as it affects the elderly, and which predicts that the elderly will become a growing 
burden on society, is outmoded and unreliable. Spiyker and McInnes develop these ideas in an article 
in The British Medical Journal published on 12 November 2013.  If the life expectancy of the general 
population is growing, so they argue, we should expect people to remain healthier and economically 
productive for longer. In other words, ‘… rising life expectancy makes these older people “younger,” 
healthier, and fitter than their peers in earlier cohorts.’53 The suggestion is therefore that, when 
considering social policy issues relating to later life, attention should be focused on not on those over 
the age of 65, but on those within 15 years of the average life expectancy figures for our society at 
any given time.  
On one level, the point is well made. If one is considering the levels of state expenditure that may be 
required in treating the elderly in society in the next few decades, the fact that such treatment is likely 
to be needed later in life than it was in previous generations is clearly a relevant consideration. In fact, 
one might say that the recent pushing back of the age at which the state pension may be drawn is an 
implicit acknowledgement of this trend. Nevertheless, Spiyker and McInnes make no real predictions 
about the levels of disability this section of society will encounter and the cost of treating the same.54  
Indeed, it is all too apparent that people age in different ways, some rapidly, some slowly, and those 
who do age rapidly will feel the effects of ageing as soon as, if not earlier than, their parents. In fact, 
 
51 This is a projected increase of 25% on the figure for 2015 for those elderly in need of care –
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2132521-think-the-uk-has-a-social-care-crisis-now-just-wait-until-2025/  
 
52 J. Spiyker and J. McInnes, ‘Ageing Population: The Time-Bomb That Isn’t’, British Medical Journal, 16 
November 2013, at p. 1 et seq.  
 
53 Ibid. at p. 2. 
 
54 Indeed, Spiyker and McInnes go on to note that the present picture appears to be a complex one, and appear 
to contradict their headline message in doing so, where they say: ‘Age specific disability rates seem to be falling, 
yet recently born generations have a worse risk factor profile than older ones. For example, current obesity 
trends may have a big effect on public health through related diseases such as diabetes. Ageing related diseases 
like osteoarthritis are predicted to increase and start at a younger age. This may not only result in an increased 
risk of cardiovascular and other chronic diseases, it also suggests that the ageing process can speed up as well 
as slow down, with obvious implications for public health policy’ – ibid. at p. 6. 
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logic surely dictates that greater numbers of disabled elderly are bound to put a greater burden on 
the public purse in comparison with their forebears, particularly where the numbers of those of 
working age are falling.55 What is more, the projected increase in numbers of ‘old elderly’, who have 
a far greater propensity for needing social care, only reinforces the conclusion that the financial cost 
of providing social care for the disabled elderly, and the manpower that is needed to service that care, 
is set to rise markedly in the next decade and beyond.56 
In these circumstances, the rationale that underpins our continuing focus on those over the age of 65 
remains.57 Spiyker and McInnes are not suggesting that the demand for care will no longer be there. 
Indeed, the rapid increase in demand on adult social services in England and Wales in the past 10 – 20 
years is already well-documented.58 And, it remains the case that research still suggests that around 
three-quarters of elderly people will develop a social care need at some point in their lives.59  
Other more recent studies paint a much bleaker picture.  Foremost of these is a paper in The Lancet 
published in July 2017 in which ten leading doctors predict that, ‘… between 2015 and 2025, the 
number of people aged 65 years and older will increase by 19.4% from 10.4 million to 12.4 million and 
 
55 And, of course, life expectancy has risen much faster than the state pension age. 
 
56 On a general level, life expectancy in England is projected to continue increasing; with life expectancy at 
birth for females projected to be 85.1 years by 2026 and 86.6 years by 2036. Males are also projected to live 
longer, increasing to 82.1 years by 2026 and 83.7 years by 2036 – see: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/artic
les/overviewoftheukpopulation/july2017 (accessed: 10/01/20). 
 
57 This postponement of the need for social care may not be confined to care for physical disabilities; in fact 
the prognosis is improving for disabilities caused by mental states such as Alzheimer’s disease. Recent research 
published on 19 April 2016 by the University of Cambridge indicates that the UK has seen a 20% fall in the 
incidence of dementia over the past two decades, mainly in men, as a result of greater awareness of how 
lifestyle affects mental as well as physical health, yet there are still approximately 210,000 new cases of 
dementia per year in the UK – https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/news_article.php?newsID=2590 
(accessed: 28/04/16) 
58 This is acknowledged in two recent BBC news items on adult social care for the elderly by Alison Holt and 
Nick Triggle, one at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-31001151 (accessed: 07/09/17), ‘In the past 10 years, 
the number of people aged 65 and over in England has increased by 1.4 million, a 17% rise. Many of them will 
be enjoying fit and active later years, but there has also been a 17% increase in people reaching their 80th 
birthday. They are more likely to be living with complicated conditions that mean they need support.’ (Alison 
Holt), and the other at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-31015807 (accessed: 07/09/17), ‘Spending on care 
for people aged 65 and over has fallen by a fifth in England over the last 10 years, an analysis by the BBC 
shows. The research - based on official data - showed £1,188 was being spent in 2003-4 per person over the 
age of 65. By 2013-14 that had fallen to £951 once inflation is taken account - a drop of 20% - prompting 
experts to warn that vulnerable people were being failed’ (Nick Triggle). 




the number living with disability will increase by 25% from 2.25 million to 2.81 million’.60 On the basis 
of this data, coupled with their findings on the impact of the most common age-related conditions on 
the disabled elderly as a section of society, the authors go on to demand a more wide-ranging 
response from government: 
‘In the context of the rapid and continuing rise in the number of older dependent people in the 
UK, the government needs to give urgent consideration to options for more cost-effective 
health and social care provision in all its forms. First, national capacity for institutional care 
needs to increase. Second, informal and home care requires stronger policy support, for 
example by means of tax allowances or cash benefits. Affected individuals and their families pay 
an estimated 40% of the national cost of long-term care from income and savings.27 Notably, 
the disadvantage of older people on lower incomes unable to live independently will increase if 
the shortage of caregivers and the precarious state of institutional and domiciliary care 
provision is not addressed.’61 
This is perhaps a more realistic portrayal of what the future holds. What we clearly have in store is 
growing section of society with ever-increasing social care needs set against a picture of successive 
governments intent on following policies of economic austerity when it comes to public sector 
spending. Indeed, Sir Michael Marmot, Director of the Institute of Health Equity at University College 
London has warned that the rise in life expectancy rates in the UK has begun to slow and that 
government austerity measures may be to blame.62  
If we accept that the elderly as a group include those most likely to be in need of social care, and that 
a significant portion of this group are unlikely to earn sufficient income,63 or have sufficient accessible 
 





62 http://www.bmj.com/content/358/bmj.j3473 (accessed: 19/11/17) 
 
63 In 2012, nearly 10% of people aged 65+ said they are having difficulty or struggling to manage their income – 







savings,64 to pay for that care over the latter part of their ‘extended’ lifetimes,65 then who is to bear 
the costs of this care? Of course, some people within this group will fund their own social care through 
a combination of income, whether from remaining in work or from private pensions or investments, 
and capital, whether in the form of savings or other property that can be realised by sale.66 Wherever 
this money is to come from, significant sums are likely to be involved.67.  
In the UK, successive governments have provided some encouragement for those beyond the age of 
65 to continue to be income-producing by the fairly recent removal of ‘the default retirement age’.68 
However, this has been off-set by the recent projected increase in the state pension age to 66 and the 
anticipated further increase of this age to 67 by 2028.69 Those who are planning for, and looking 
forward to, giving-up work altogether as they move into their sixth decade, are now considering 
‘phased-retirement’ or undertaking part-time work in order to bridge the gap between their 
 
64 20% of people aged 60+ in Great Britain (2.8 million people) owe money. 7% (nearly 1 million) have 
outstanding mortgage debt, 12% (nearly 1.7 million) owe money on credit cards, and 3% (about 400,000) have 
a bank loan; see: ‘Later Life in the United Kingdom’, ibid. at p. 20. 
 
65 ‘On average, life expectancy at birth increased across all local areas in England and Wales by 1.5 years for 
males and 1.1 year for females between 2006–08 and 2011–13’ –‘Later Life in the United Kingdom’, ibid. at p. 
6.  
 
66 This can be done by ‘trading down’ one’s home. 
 
67 One pressure that an increasingly ageing population will bring is a greater demand for state pensions, 
particularly in circumstances where private pensions have been under-funded due to a general failure to 
appreciate the effects of increasing longevity. For the Channel 4 television programme, ‘Dispatches’, shown in 
2015, actuaries estimated that in order to meet ‘average’ living costs whilst in retirement a person over the 
age of 65 would need an income of £17,800 per annum over a twenty year period and that this would require 
a ‘pension pot’ of at least £300,000 which was described as ‘out of reach for many of us’ - 
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/ (accessed: 14/07/15). 
68 According to information published by the UK Government in October 2014: ‘Nearly a quarter of a million 
more people aged 65 and over [had] opted to stay in work since the default retirement age … was abolished 
on 1 October 2011. As at [October 2014], there were 1,103,000 workers aged 65 and over in work compared 
to 874,000 in the quarter October to December 2011 – an increase of 229,000’ –
https://www.gov.uk/Government/news/older-peoples-day-1-million-in-work-over-65-3-years-since-end-of-
default-retirement-age (accessed: 27/09/15). Nevertheless, this has come at a price as, up until April 2013, 
those over 65 were entitled to a larger personal allowance for income tax than the rest of society, but that has 
now been lost, something that, together with the rise in the age at which one is entitled to receive one’s State 
pension, is perhaps indicative of measures that have been introduced to combat the costs of this rise in life 
expectation mentioned earlier - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17463473 (accessed 27/09/15). 
69 From December 2018, ‘the age at which an individual becomes entitled to receive their ‘state pension’ will 
start to increase for both men and women to reach 66 by October 2020. The Government is planning further 
increases, which will raise the state pension age from 66 to 67 between 2026 and 2028’, see:  




anticipated retirement age and the date of their actual retirement.70 For the elderly over the age of 
65, whose financial resources cannot bear those costs, much of that burden is placed on the shoulders 
of the spouse or children of those elderly who are in need of care.71 And, indeed, the continuing 
devotion of adult children to the welfare of their elderly parents is one of the most significant features 
of the social care system presently in place in England and Wales. Recent figures suggest that the 
burden of providing such care is almost equally split between the care-receiver’s spouse or partner 
and the care-receiver’s adult children.72 
The provision of informal social care is also something over which emotions often run deep. Consider, 
for a moment, the following observation on adult children caring for their older relatives in this 
country at the turn of the twenty-first century: 
“ … it is … unfair that … a son or daughter is caring for their elderly relatives and parents  in the 
family home, and, perhaps foregoing part of their own lives for a number of years … the elderly 
person may get so infirm that it is no longer possible for the carer to work. Having put in all that 
time and energy, not only do they not get thanked for it, but if they are not actually thrown out 
of the house that the elderly person owned, a charge is made on it and they are, in effect, 
penalised for … taking on the Government’s role, the major caring role for that time.”73 
The maker of this statement clearly feels that the burden placed on informal carers is a heavy one; 
and, one which often appears to go unrewarded.  Here, the talk is of unrequited personal sacrifice 
and, ultimately, of social injustice.   And, the blame for this situation is then placed firmly at the feet 
of ‘the Government’.   
 
 
70 In recent studies, ‘phased-retirement was been found to be better for the well-being of employees 
approaching retirement age’ – http://www.hrmagazine.co.uk/article-details/phased-retirement-better-for-
wellbeing (accessed: 07/09/17). 
 
71 Norman Daniels, Am I my Parents’ Keeper? (OUP, 1998) p. 79, where the author notes that, ‘About 80 
percent of long-term care in our society is provided by families to their elderly relatives.’ There is no reason to 
believe that the figure is any different over this side of the Atlantic.  
 
72 L. Pickard, ‘A Growing Care Gap? The supply of unpaid care for older people by their adult children in England 
to 2032’, Ageing and Society, April 2014, at p. 2 – in fact, the figures related by Pickard indicate that slightly more 
disabled elderly receive care from the adult children rather than their spouse. 
 
73 ‘With Respect to Old Age: Long Term Care – Rights and Responsibilities’, a Royal Commission Report on Long 






1.3 THE CONTINUING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
As noted earlier, in the UK there is a marked distinction between health care, on the one hand, and 
social care, on the other, albeit that the boundaries between these two forms of care have been 
known to be somewhat indistinct and confusing.74 Health care is free at source, and that source is the 
NHS. The only charges are those levied for prescriptions (medicines), and many people are exempt 
from these charges.75 In somewhat stark contrast, social care – care in washing, dressing, bathing, 
feeding, assistance in using toilet facilities and the like – is not freely provided. In fact, the social care 
that is provided by the State is provided by local authorities and not central government; and, here, it 
is both means-tested76 and, where available, heavily-rationed.77 In fact, some local authorities in 
England in Wales are currently only meeting social care costs where the applicant’s care needs are 
assessed as ‘critical’. Elsewhere, the majority of local authorities will only cover those costs where 
these needs are assessed as ‘substantial’; only rarely is there any further provision.78  
 
74 ‘Vulnerable Elderly Forced to Pay for Medical Care’, BBC News Online, 28 September 2010 - 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-11429779 (accessed: 16/11/17). 
 
75 Exemptions include those over 60, those under 16, those 16-18 and in full time education, in-patients in 
hospital, those with long-term medical conditions and who are in need of treatment, those on State benefits 
and those on low incomes who get help paying the prescription charges - 
http://www.nhs.uk/nhsengland/Healthcosts/pages/Prescriptioncosts.aspx (accessed: 05/11/16). 
 
76 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-18610954 (accessed: 05/11/16) People needing help at home have to 
pay for their own care if they have savings of more than £23,250.  Where they have savings of £14,250 or more 
but less than £23,250, they are required to contribute to social care costs. When a person needs full-time 
residential care, the value of their home may also be taken into account. 
 
77 http://www.publicfinance.co.uk/feature/2016/10/care-conundrum (accessed: 05/11/16) and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7394362.stm (accessed: 05/11/16). 
78 Councils currently assess the needs of people needing care as either ‘critical’, ‘substantial’, ‘moderate’ or 
‘low’. But there is little consistency across the categories and many councils provide support only for people 
with ‘substantial’ care needs with a few restricting eligibility to the ’critical’. Studies have shown that in 2013: 
(i) the vast majority, 130, had a threshold at substantial; (ii) only three councils provided social care to people 
falling in to all the bands; (iii) 16 provided care to those with moderate needs and above; and (iv) three 
councils only provided care for those with critical needs – https://www.gov.uk/government/news/social-care-
users-will-be-guaranteed-a-minimum-level-of-council-help-under-new-plans (accessed: 13/11/16) 
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In England and Wales the vast majority of those who are most regularly provided with domiciliary care 
receive that care from informal carers, principally their spouse or their adult children.79 Of those who 
receive informal social care from an adult child or spouse, slightly more disabled elderly receive such 
care from their children.80 Moreover, the English social care system’s reliance on adult children caring 
for their elderly, disabled parents will continue notwithstanding the passing of the Care Act 2014, 
which followed the UK Government’s acceptance of many of the proposals set out in the Dilnot 
Report.81  Indeed, where the care-recipient’s social care needs are already being provided for by a 
carer, there is no duty for their local authority to do anything more.82 In contrast, where someone is 
assessed to be in need of social care and has no carer, if the person so assessed asks for care and the 
eligibility conditions are satisfied, his/her local authority is now under a duty to provide that care.83 If 
the means of a care recipient are assessed to be in excess of the means-test threshold,84 the local 
authority has a power to charge for such services.85 In other words, those people who fall outside the 
means-test that is presently in place, and are not being cared for by a carer, are expected to pay for 
their own social care – at least where their need for the same is not attributable to illness and 
consequently treatable through the NHS. In very broad terms, this is the social care system presently 
in place in England and Wales, and it has been widely acknowledged that the system is heavily 
dependent on the provision of care by informal carers.86 
 
79 In England, approximately 1.4 million older people living at home with significant care needs receive unpaid 
care and, of these, 85% receive that care from either an adult child or their spouse – Linda Pickard et al., 
‘Mapping the Future of Family Care: The receipt of informal care by older people with disabilities in England to 
2032’, Social Policy and Society, Vol. 11, 4, at pp. 533-45. 
 
80 fn. 72, supra, p. 2. 
 
81 ‘Fairer Care Funding: The Report of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support’ (July 2011), commonly 
known as ‘the Dilnot Report’. 
 
82 The Care Act 2014, s. 18(7). 
 
83 The eligibility conditions: 1, 2 and 3 set out at ibid, s. 18(2)-(4). 
 
84 This currently stands at £23,250 for capital. If your savings are above this limit, you will be charged the full 
cost of your care. If your available capital is below this sum, but above £14,250, you must contribute £1 for 
every £250 above this limit. If your savings are below this bottom limit, your contribution will be nil. There are 
also provisions in regard to income, but these will only bite where the care-receiver has a significant income 
over and above their state pension. 
 
85 The Care Act 2014, s. 14(1)(a) and (b) and s. 18(1)-(4). 
 
86 The House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee on Adult Social Care, Ninth Report, 
2016-17, parag. 105, at p. 44 - 




To a large extent, this system is a product of history. Through the ages, the medical profession has 
always treated ‘the sick and the lame’, but often no more. Conventionally, physical disability in old age 
has never been regarded as ‘sickness’; indeed, there is presently no known cure (beyond the 
replacement of a hip or knee) for the immobility and the decline in mental capacity that often 
accompanies extreme old age. In England and Wales, it has long been accepted that there is only so 
much that the medical profession can be expected to do, and the provision of social care has always 
been something beyond that limit, whether for doctors or for specialist nurses. In simple terms, 
providing social care has traditionally been thought of as merely doing for someone else what most 
others can do for themselves.  And, in an industrial society driven by capitalist values, there has been 
a stigma attached – at least from Victorian times – to those ‘unable to stand on their own two feet’.87 
As a result, such people have often had to endure a life of poverty and shame; and, those who are left 
to care for them appear to have been tainted by the misery that society has inflicted on those in need 
of such care.  
 
Can the distinction between health care and social care be justified in any significant way? It is said 
that health care involves ‘the treatment, control or prevention of a disease, illness, injury or disability’, 
and the care or aftercare of a person with needs that relate to one or more of these conditions.88 Social 
care, on the other hand, is focused on providing assistance with activities of daily living, and other 
incidental benefits which allow the care-recipient to play a more meaningful role in society.89 Stated 
thus, the distinction seems fairly clear. Yet, the deeper one looks, the more that distinction becomes 
blurred.90 At a basic level, health care alleviates or at least manages ‘suffering’. Yet, the elderly suffer 
with their disabilities as much as anyone else. If the task of government is to respond to the legitimate 
concerns and needs of its citizens, the distinction appears to be anomalous and, for that reason, 
unsustainable.91 
 
87 The stigma of poverty is still very-much with us in twenty-first century Britain –
http://www.poverty.ac.uk/tags/stigma (accessed: 02/05/18). 
 
88 The National Framework for NHS Continuing Healthcare, Practice Guidance Notes, at p. 51, para. 2.1, -
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213137/
National-Framework-for-NHS-CHC-NHS-FNC-Nov-2012.pdf (accessed: 25/06/18). 
 
89 Ibid, at parag. 2.2. 
 
90 R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213, where the Court of Appeal 
dismissed an appeal against an earlier judgment granting a claimants’ application for judicial review of her 
local health authority’s decision to characterise her continuing care as a tetraplegic as ‘social care’. 
 





Whether one agrees with this or not, the social care system that has been in place for the past eighty 
years and more has not been able to escape its origins. Indeed, there is a strong consensus across the 
country that, if it was ever ‘fit for purpose’, that system is now broken.92  Yet, there is no clear idea 
how it might be mended, nor is there any unified vision of how our social care system should look in 
the future. In January 2018, Jeremy Hunt became the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, 
when the brief for social care was added to his existing portfolio.93  Since then, senior backbenchers 
are reported to have signed a cross-party letter to the Prime Minister urging her to establish a 
parliamentary commission into the future of health care, and she has responded by promising to 
devise a long-term plan for the funding of the health service.94 Lord Darzi’s interim report for the 
Institute of Public Policy Research, published in April 2018, suggests that the NHS requires £50 billion 
additional funds by 2030, and the report is said to have the backing of many senior Conservative and 
Labour MPs.95 
Since the community reforms of the early 1990s, the UK Government has consistently promoted the 
care of the elderly at home by informal carers – often the adult children of those who are being cared 
for – as a better alternative to institutionalised care.96 In 2014, the UK National Audit Office estimated 
that the value of social care provided informally – i.e. without payment – in England, in the year 2011, 
was some £55 billion.97 While the public purse has, undoubtedly, benefited from this approach, it is 
these adult carers as a group who have had to bear the real cost. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
cost of long-term accommodation of the elderly in care homes (residential and nursing) largely fell on 
the tax-payer.98 At this point in time, the availability of social security funding for those entering care 
 
92 ‘The State of Social Care in Great Britain in 2016’, published by Leonard Cheshire (reg. charity) 
http://cdn.basw.co.uk/upload/basw_55214-6.pdf (accessed: 24/07/17) and ‘10 Charts that show what’s gone 
wrong with social care’, BBC News, - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-39043387 (accessed: 24/07/17). 
 
93 Since writing, the post has now been passed to Matt Hancock MP. 
 
94 https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/936902/NHS-crisis-theresa-may-funding-revolt-34-mps-sign-letter-
urging-action and www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43558878 (accessed: 26/04/18) 
 
95http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-43898963 and https://www.ippr.org/files/2018-04/1524670994_lord-
darzi-review-interim-report.pdf  (accessed: 26/04/18). 
 
96 The White Paper Caring for People: Community Care in the next Decade and Beyond, 1989. 
 
97 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, ‘Adult Social Care in England: An 
Overview’, 13th March 2014, at p. 4. 
 
98 Until the coming into force of the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 (‘the NHSCCA’) in 1993, private 
residential and nursing home care could be paid for by the DHSS from uncapped ‘supplementary benefit’ 
payments. This effectively ceased with the introduction of the NHSCCA which reinforced the distinction between 
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homes was widespread and this funding was available without any form of ‘needs assessment’ taking 
place.99 Nevertheless, with the rapid increase in life expectancy that was seen in the latter part of the 
twentieth century, and the difficult financial climate of the late 1980s and early 1990s,100 it was quickly 
apparent to those on both sides of the political spectrum that this cost was simply too much for the 
ordinary tax-payer to bear.101 In fact, it has recently been estimated that the UK Government needs 
to spend another £9 billion in England alone in order to cover the social care costs for those already 
within in the established critical and substantial needs categories.102 
In regard to the funding of social care, it is interesting to note that, in 2011, the average length of stay 
in a UK care home was computed at 801 days.103 Indeed, the fact that this figure has been falling over 
the past twenty years or so can be seen as a testament to the success of the UK Government’s policy 
to encourage the disabled elderly to remain in their own homes, or to take up residence with their 
children, in the face of the inability of the state purse to fund care home costs for this growing section 
of society. In short, the longer a disabled elderly person is cared for at home, the shorter is his or her 
stay in a care home. Care homes also appear to be faring poorly under UK Government policy. In May 
2016, the BBC news service reported that more than a quarter of care homes in the UK were in danger 
of going out of business within three years.104 The financial pressures under which care homes operate 
come from many sources,105 but a significant feature is the complaint that the fees provided to 
 
health and social care, placed the responsibility for funding such social care arrangements squarely onto the 
shoulders of Local Government and provided them with a limited budget in order to do so. 
 
99 The Kings Fund, ‘Paying for Social Care Beyond Dilnot’, R. Humphries, May 2013, at p. 5. 
 
100 This was something which saw the NHS on the verge of bankruptcy in 1987. 
 
101 fn. 72, supra, p. 3.  
 
102 This figure comes from the King’s Fund which has estimated that a further injection of £9 billion pounds is 
needed immediately simply to meet the present demand for social care for those with substantial or critical 
needs, which represents a 50% increase on current costs – http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-
and-families/health-news/raise-taxes-to-give-free-social-care-to-elderly-and-chronically-ill-says-think-tank-
9709805.html  (accessed: 05/11/16); and, see: the earlier conclusions of the Barker Commission (established 
by the King’s Fund to look at the future of health and social care in England): 
https://www.healthinsurancedaily.com/health-insurance/incoming/article447981.ece (accessed: 05/11/16). 
 
103  J. Forder and J-L Fernandez, ‘Length of Stay in Care Homes’, (2011), a report commissioned by BUPA Care 
Services, PSSRU Discussion Paper 2769, Canterbury, p. 3. 
 
104 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36200855 (accessed 11/05/2016). 
 
105 These pressures include the new national living wage and the return that investors demand from their 





operators by local authorities for residents for whom they are responsible are often insufficient to 
meet the cost of providing that care.106 In the event that the threatened closure of a significant portion 
of the care homes comes to pass, this will throw a considerably greater burden on to the shoulders of 
those who must care for the disabled elderly. But, what, then, is this care and who provides it? 
Care is something that is provided to all of us at some stage of our lives; often, it is provided at several 
stages – invariably in childhood and commonly at the end of life stage. Care delivered outside the 
medical profession is described as ‘social care’. And, ‘adult social care’ has been defined in English 
legislation as including ‘… all forms of personal care and other practical assistance for individuals who 
by reason of age, illness, disability, pregnancy, childbirth, dependence on alcohol or drugs, or other 
similar circumstances, are in need of such care or assistance’.107 Another significant feature of care is 
that it involves labour on the part of the carer,108 often skilled, but commonly undervalued.109 It is the 
provision of ‘adult social care’ to the disabled elderly that is the central focus of this thesis; nothing 
herein should, therefore, be taken as applying to the care of children or adults who are disabled, 
physically or mentally, but who are under the age of 65. Defined in the terms set out in section 9(3), 
it is anticipated that ‘adult social care for the disabled elderly’ would exclude items such as 
‘companionship’ as the need for such help is not specific to the disabled elderly. The provision of adult 
social care in the home of the care recipient makes the service provided one of ‘domiciliary care’. 
In light of recent austerity, pressure is undoubtedly mounting on a system that relies so heavily on 
informal care by adult children of working-age. Fewer people are now receiving publicly-funded care 
than in 2008.110 Despite this, the numbers that make up the section of the population aged 85 years 
 
106 Support for this comes from John Stowbridge, the managing director of Avery Health Care Group, which 
operates 47 care homes across England - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36200855  (accessed: 11/05/2016). 
 
107 The Health and Social Care Act 2008, s. 9(3), This definition was also adopted in the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012, s. 65(4)(a). Interestingly, the Law Commission’s Report on Adult Social Care (Report 326, Law 
Commission, 2011) was reluctant to adopt this definition, suggesting that the only practical, albeit rather 
unhelpful, way of defining ‘adult social care’ was to say that it was ‘… the care and support provided by local 
social services authorities pursuant to their responsibilities towards adults who needed extra support’ – parag. 
1.5. 
 
108 This is acknowledged by Virginia Held in her book, The Ethics of Care – Personal, Political and Global (OUP, 
2006) at p. 30, where she remarks that: ‘A seemingly easy distinction to make is between care as the activity of 
taking care of someone and the mere ‘caring about’ of how we feel about certain issues … care involves work 
and the expenditure of energy on the part of the person doing the caring’. 
 
109 ‘Caring activities are devalued, underpaid and disproportionately occupied by the relatively powerless in 
society’, Joan Tronto, cited in Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care – Personal, Political and Global (OUP, 2006) p. 
18. 
 




and over have increased by more than 20%.111 And, over the past decade, the number of those 
providing unpaid care of 50 hours or more per week has increased by some 26%.112 More often than 
not, this burden has fallen on women;113 and this burden is increasing with increasing age.114 The long-
term prognosis for this sizeable section of society is bleak. Projections indicate that the numbers of 
elderly people living at home in England with some form of dependency will increase from a figure of 
2.1 million in 1996 to some 3.4 million in 2031 if one assumes that age-specific dependency rates 
remain unchanged.115 While it may be that some of this pressure will be released due to rising life 
expectancy rates in elderly males,116 it is still predicted that the numbers of adult children providing 
informal unpaid care to older parents will increase from approximately 675,000 in 2007 to over one 
million in 2032.117 Much of this will be down to what is likely to be a sharp rise in the numbers of older 
disabled elderly people, i.e. those aged 75 and more, who are, as a class, projected to increase by 
some 85% between 2007 and 2032. Of this increase, it is further projected that 200,000 of these would 
have to be ‘working age’ adults if supply is going to continue to meet demand. If our social care system 
could be funded properly, this demand could be met by the commercial sector, provided, of course, 
that the market is able to supply sufficient numbers of care workers following the country’s departure 
from the EU. Yet, at present, that funding seems to be well out-of-reach and the further burden that 
this will place on informal carers seems to be inevitable.  Where are these informal carers going to 
come from? In fact, the demand for unpaid care from adult children is predicted to exceed supply as 
early as 2017 and this informal, unpaid ‘care gap’ is set to increase significantly from that point on.118 
 
111 Ibid. p. 9. 
 
112 Ibid. at p. 9. 
 
113 In 2011, there were 5.41 million people who provided unpaid care in England. Of these, there were around 
3.12 million females (58%) and around 2.29 million males (42%) providing unpaid care, representing 11.8% of 
the total female population and 8.9% of the total male population in England – see: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/detailed-characteristics-for-local-authorities-in-england-
and-wales/sty-unpaid-care.html (accessed: 30/4/14). 
 
114 Those aged 50 to 64 provide the most care and this was also the age group with the greatest gender inequality 
with 24% of women aged 50 to 64 providing unpaid care, compared with 17% of men in the same age group – 
Ibid. fn. 37. 
 
115 Linda Pickard et al, ‘Relying on Informal Care in the New Century?’, Informal care for elderly people to 2031’, 
Ageing and Society, 20(6), 756. 
 
116 See: fn. 99, supra, p. 2; and, ibid. p. 761. 
 
117 See: fn. 99, supra, p. 15. 
118 Ibid. at p. 19. See also: the BBC News website at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-34841592 which, on 
the 17th November 2015, reported that: ‘There will be a shortage of nearly 200,000 care-workers in the UK 
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If supply is to keep pace with demand, this can only be achieved, it seems, at some significant financial 
cost. Back in 2007, a report by Liverpool Victoria Friendly Society put that cost at some £21 billion per 
annum. Surveying over 2,000 adults, the report disclosed that adult children who care for their elderly 
parents provide, on average, more than 33 hours per month of unpaid care;119 and, so the argument 
goes, this time and energy is productivity which is lost to the national economy. Indeed, current data 
demonstrates a clear link between the provision of unpaid social care, on the one hand, and the 
provider’s withdrawal from the labour market on the other.120 Moreover, as we move further into the 
twenty-first century, there is considerable doubt whether this ‘care gap’ will ever be bridged as the 
propensity of adult children to provide unpaid social care for their elderly parents is relatively 
uncertain as things presently stand.121 Indeed, what society has seen in recent times is the rise of ‘the 
sandwich generation’;122 in short, in addition to maintaining themselves one section of society is being 
called upon to pay for not only the care of their disabled parents but also some part of the costs of a 
university education for their own children.123 This section of society is now said to be ‘sacrificing [their 
own] retirement prospects’ to care for their elderly parents, falling into debt and cutting back 
expenditure on essential items in order to do so.124 In the words of Helena Herklots, the Chief 
Executive of Carers UK, ‘Caring has always been part of life, but demographic change means that 
today’s families face very different pressures than previous generations.’125 
 
within the next five years, according to a study from the charity 'Independent Age' and the International 
Longevity Centre. The report says that plans to curb the number of lower-paid migrant workers, along with the 
squeeze on care funding, will make it difficult to recruit enough staff’ (accessed 19/11/15). 
119 http://www.privatehealth.co.uk/news/september-2007/elderly-get-21-billion-of-unpaid-care-220/ - 
(accessed: 30/6/14). 
 
120 D. King and L. Pickard, ‘When is a carer’s employment at risk? Longitudinal analysis of unpaid care and 
employment in midlife in England’, Health and Social Care in the Community (2013), 21 (3), pp. 303 - 314 – 
and, this burden is likely, again, to fall on women as the main care-providers. 
 
121 See: fn. 72, supra, at p. 20. 
 
122 In 1981, Dorothy A. Miller coined the term “sandwich generation” to signify people caring for aging parents 
while supporting their own children –  https://www.retiredhealthchoices.com/index.php/tag/sandwich-
generation/  (accessed: 23/12/ 14). 
 
123 While Higher Education fees are, for the most part, covered by ‘the student loan’, wealthier parents are 
expected to make a significant contribution to the accommodation and living costs of their children while they 
take their under-graduate courses. 
 
124 Carers UK, Caring and Family Finances Inquiry (full report) (2014) at http://www.carersuk.org/for-
professionals/policy/policy-library/caring-family-finances-inquiry (accessed: 08/09/17). 
 
125 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/elder/10615380/Baby-boomers-sacrificing-retirement-prospects-




Although GDP for England is predicted to rise over the next fifteen to twenty years,126 it seems 
impractical to expect the rising costs of social care for these disabled elderly to be paid for entirely by 
the public purse. In reality, such costs are likely to far outstrip any money that can be comfortably 
raised for this purpose from general taxation.127 Unpalatable as it may seem, the UK Government is 
likely, therefore, to place even greater store by the care and support adult children are able to offer 
their parents.128 Such care is often regarded as not only more cost-effective, as it reduces demands on 
central funds, but it is also considered to be significantly more efficient, as certain ‘care activities’, 
such as shopping, making meals, washing and cleaning, etc., may well contain incidental benefits for 
the carer, particularly if he/she is living with the care-receiver; what is more, the carer will commonly 
know what the care-receiver needs and will therefore be able to target his/her care more efficiently.129 
If, at one point, the perception was that the younger generation was no longer caring for their parents, 
in the words of Norman Daniels, ‘… sociologists have [now] debunked [that] myth’.130 Yet, 
notwithstanding the benefits that such care may bring for both the care-receiver and society, English 
law, whether private or public, still appears to afford adult children little by way of financial 
recompense in return for what they do. 
Thus far, the focus of this initial section of this work has been on social care provided to the disabled 
elderly by their adult children. However, it must be acknowledged that not everyone who lives into 
their ‘third age’131 will have adult children who are able to provide that care. Some will, of course, be 
 
126 The predicted growth in GDP of 2.25% per annum made by the Treasury in 2000 has largely been borne out 
by the performance of the UK economy in the years since the turn of the century – see: H.M. Treasury: Building 
Long-Term Prosperity for All, Pre-Budget Report; November 2000, H.M. Treasury, London 2000; Wittenberg, R. 
et al, ‘Demand for Long Term Care for Older People in England to 2031’, Health Statistics Quarterly, Winter 2001; 
and, see http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2009/nov/25/gdp-uk-1948-growth-economy (accessed: 
14/05/2014) which reports an average growth in UK GDP of 2.06% per annum since 2000. 
 
127 See: chapter 2, infra, for a more extensive discussion of this issue. 
 
128 Again, the picture is very similar over the other side of the Atlantic where it is estimated that 22.5 million 
people presently care for an elderly person; by 2020, this is expected to rise to some 40 per cent of the 
national workforce – Martha Lyn Craver, Growing Demand for Elder Care Benefits, Kiplinger Business Forecasts, 
May 29, 2002, cited in Peggie R. Smith, ‘Elder Care, Gender and Work: The Work Family Issue of the 21st 
Century’, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. Law 351 (2004) at p. 352. 
 
129 D. A. Wolff, ‘The Family as Provider of Long-Term Care: Efficiency, Equity and Externalities’, J. Aging Health 
1999: 11, at p. 360. 
 
130 See: fn. 71, supra, at pp. 36-37, where the author also notes that the care offered to the elderly by their 
children is, ‘… usually a type, quantity and quality of care that the public sector is unlikely to ever provide a 
substitute for’. 
 
131 ‘Third Age is an emerging life stage, running roughly from ages 50 to 75, made possible by our longer life 




married or cohabiting with a partner. And, it has already been acknowledged that this section of 
society already supply almost half of the social care needs of the disabled elderly as a group;132 indeed, 
in many instances elderly couples (whether married or not) will share their respective social care 
burdens, each one helping the other. In the absence of care from their children, they – and, of course, 
those elderly without either partners or children – are likely to represent an increasing burden on the 
public purse, which in turn must provide for their social care needs of those who need such assistance.  
Statistics indicate that, in 2012, there were some 580,000 people aged between 65 and 74 who were 
without children to care for them in their old age.133 This figure is set to increase to more than one 
million by the year 2030.134 And, of course, there are those aged 75 and over who are also without 
children and therefore dependent on the State for social care insofar as they are unable to meet the 
cost of such care from their own resources. The Office of National Statistics has indicated that, in 2017, 
there were as many as 3.8 million people aged 65 and over living alone in the UK.135 By 2030, it has 
been estimated by the Institute of Public Policy Research that there will be some two million people 
in the UK over the age of 65 and without children.136 How the needs of this group – the childless 
disabled elderly – will be met is not directly addressed in this thesis and much further research will be 
required if any meaningful proposals are to be formulated.  Notwithstanding this, the final chapter of 
this thesis does acknowledge that there is little or no reason not to extend the proposals made therein 
to friends and neighbours who might be persuaded to take on the burden of caring for this group. 
Moreover, any solution one might find to the issue of adult children caring for their elderly disabled 
parents may well free up public funds that may be directed towards those who do not have adult 
children to care for them in their old age.137  
 
132 Ibid. at p. 15.  
 
133 The Office for National Statistics, Statistical Bulletin: Families and Households 2017, (released: 8 November 
2017).  
134 The Institute for Public Policy Research’s report, ‘The Condition of Britain, The Generation Strain: Collective 
Solutions to Care in an Ageing Society,’ April 2014, p. 14. 
 
135https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/bulletins/fa
miliesandhouseholds/2017 (accessed: 15/03/18). 
 
136 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-43898963 and https://www.ippr.org/files/2018-
04/1524670994_lord-darzi-review-interim-report.pdf  (accessed: 26/04/18).  
 
137 Institute of Fiscal Studies, Briefing Note BN200 Public Spending on Adult Social Care in England - 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/BN200.pdf (accessed: 08/05/18). See also: Adult Social Care 
Funding (England), House of Commons briefing paper number CBP07903, 23 October 2017, p. 11 et seq. - 







1.4 CULTURAL NUANCES 
While the whole of the developed world must find an answer to the challenges thrown up by an ageing 
population and their need for social care, as a consequence of cultural and ideological differences a 
solution to ‘the longevity conundrum’ adopted by one country may be in stark contrast to one 
fashioned by another. Research has shown that there are marked divisions between the UK, on the 
one hand, and Japan, on the other, in the way in which each society looks at the relationship between 
social care and inheritance.138 Until the late 1940’s, Japan’s laws of succession provided that only the 
eldest male child would inherit the family home, but that was accompanied by a deep-rooted moral 
responsibility to care for his parents in their old age, a task usually delegated to his wife. Although 
these succession laws have since been repealed, and latterly replaced with a scheme of compulsory 
insurance as a means of meeting the social care costs of the elderly, this tradition still lives on in many 
divisions of Japanese society.139 Compare this with how the UK population looks at inheritance and 
social care. Here, research has established that there is no real link between the two.140 In times past, 
UK testators – perhaps as a consequence of shorter lifespans than their Japanese counterparts – have 
passed down family wealth to their children somewhat earlier in their lives and ‘inheritance’ was 
therefore seen as a means of setting a child up in life rather than something that came with reciprocal 
obligations towards the donor. In modern-day UK, testators – even though they are largely free to 
choose which child should inherit – tend to favour equality of distribution of wealth as between their 
children, often leaving the children as a group to sort out the question of compensating a child who 
has provided social care to the testator rather than to tackle that question themselves.141  
 
 
138 See: Misa Izuhara, Housing, Care and Inheritance (Routledge, 2009). 
 
139 Ibid. at pp. 110-112. Moreover, even where modern inheritance laws have provided for an equal 
distribution of wealth between the children it is not uncommon in Japanese society for daughters to 
‘voluntarily’ give up their share in a deceased parent’s estate in favour of her ‘senior’ male sibling who has 
cared for that parent and will continue to care for the surviving parent, ibid. at p. 101. 
 
140 Ibid. at p. 114. And, see further: Misa Izuhara, ‘Negotiating Family Support? The Generational Contract 
between Long-Term Care and Inheritance’, Journal of Social Policy 33(04):649 – 665, October 2004. 
 
141 Ibid. at p. 119; and see: Brian Sloan, ‘Testamentary Freedom and Caring Adult offspring in England & Wales 
and Ireland, a chapter in The Future of Family Property in Europe, Katharina Boele-Woelki, Jo Miles and Jens M. 
Scherpe (eds), (Intersentia, 2011). 
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This cultural and ideological divide is also reflected on mainland Europe.142 In northern Europe, 
children tend to leave the family home as soon as they achieve sufficient economic autonomy and 
once this happens parental support is significantly reduced; yet, in southern Europe parents will often 
maintain their children much longer with several generations living in the same household and 
children providing care to their parents as and when such care is required.143 If we look somewhat 
closer into how different countries in northern Europe have approached the care of the elderly, 
disabled citizens and are, presently, dealing with this ‘problem’ we can see even more marked 
divisions from one nation to the next.  In Sweden, where twenty per cent of its inhabitants have 
already reached 65, and where this figure is projected to rise to twenty three per cent in the next 
twenty years or so, most elderly social care is funded by local municipalities with the aid of 
government grants. Some charges are levied where the recipient has the income to pay for these 
services, but there is a financial cap on their liability to contribute to the cost of their own social care, 
calculated on a monthly basis.144 Overall, the level of provision is considered to be generous and 
almost wholly funded by the tax system.145  
In most other northern European countries, the family is expected to do more to provide the elderly, 
disabled with the social care that they need. In England and Wales, the introduction of ‘direct 
payments’, where the needs of an elderly, disabled care-receiver are assessed by his/her local 
authority, and a budget for the costs of this care is calculated where the recipient qualifies for such 
provision, has attempted to put a lid on such spending. Here, the Government has declared direct 
payments to be its ‘… preferred mechanism for personalised care and support [as such payments] 
provide independence, choice and control by enabling people to commission their own care and 
support in order to meet their eligible needs’,146  and has explained that the use of direct payments 
made to adult service users ‘... is designed to be used flexibly and innovatively and there should be no 
unreasonable restriction placed on the use of the payment, as long as it is being used to meet eligible 
 
 
142 Giuseppe A. Micheli, ‘Two Strong Families in Southern Europe? Re-Examining the Geography of Kinship 
Regimes Stemming from the Reciprocity Mechanisms between Generations’, European Journal of Population, 
Vol. 28, No. 1 (February, 2012), pp. 17-38. 
 
143 Ibid. at pp. 23-24. 
 
144 See: https://sweden.se/society/elderly-care-in-sweden/ (accessed: 19/01/20). 
 
145 Ibid. Statistics show that in 2014 only 4% of social care costs for the elderly in Sweden were funded by the 
recipients of such care. 
 
146 Paragraph 12.3 of the draft Care and Support Statutory Guidance issued under the Care Act 2014 by the 




care and support needs.147 That said, regulations also provide that direct payments cannot be used to 
purchase care services from a close family member living in the same household, except in exceptional 
circumstances.148  
This is in stark contrast to the position in some other north European states. In the Netherlands, for 
example, those who require care services and who opt to receive direct payments in lieu of state-
provided care are permitted to use these payments to pay relatives to perform these services 
regardless of whether they are living in the same household as the care recipient.149 There are 
conditions that must be satisfied before the care recipient can engage someone living in the same 
household as a carer. In order to be eligible to receive these direct payments from care recipients, 
household members (including partners) must show that the caring duties that they have performed 
on an informal basis ‘overstrain’ them; if they are able to do so, they can be paid for the care they 
provide through the use, by the care recipient, of these direct payments under a formal contract, if 
the care recipient can justify their engagement.150 In this way, family members can become ‘care 
workers’, albeit without subsidiary employment rights such as sickness and holiday pay.151 In Germany, 
where the provision of care services are funded through hypothecated social insurance contributions 
from employers and employees which are fixed by Federal Law, those who require care services may 
either receive these services from a provider organisation or take a lower value cash allowance and 
arrange their care informally, i.e. paying relatives to provide the care they need.152 Typically, the lower 
cash value allowance is a little over one half of the commercial cost of these services.153 
 
147 Ibid. at parag. 12.35 – 12.36. 
 
148 The NHS suggests that the use of direct payments in this manner may be permitted where only the family 
member could fulfil the role of care provider due to ‘… religious reasons, language difficulties or specific health 
problems’ and perhaps other reasons, which it does not specify but which it does acknowledge may exist. The 
Care and Support (Direct Payments) Regulations 2014 do permit local authorities a general discretion to give 
prior consent to pay a close family member living in the same household in return for providing management 
and/or administrative support to the direct payment holder. 
149 E. Grootegoed, ‘Relatives as paid care-givers: how family carers experience payments for care’, (2010) 
Ageing and Society, 30, pp. 467-489. 
 
150 Although 5% of the annual direct payments budget may now be used to pay family members living in the 
same household as care recipients without this justification - ibid. at p. 487. 
 
151 Ibid. at p. 470. 
 
152 C. Glendinning, et al., ‘Funding long-term care for older people: lessons from other countries’, (2004), The 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
 
153 J. Keefe et al., ‘Financial payments for family carers: policy approaches and debates’, in A. Martin-Matthews 
and J. Phillips (eds.), Ageing at the inter-section of work and home life: Blurring the boundaries, (New York, 
Lawrence Eribaum, 2008) at pp. 185-206.  
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Against these distinctive cultural and ideological backgrounds, it is therefore unlikely that a solution 
to the on-going care of the disabled elderly in England and Wales is going to be the same as the answer 
to the ‘longevity conundrum’ that is adopted in some of its European neighbours, still less, say China 
or Japan. Moreover, the need for a solution is urgent.  Research indicates that burden on the care-
recipient’s family to provide whatever social care in needed has grown very significantly since the early 
years of the twenty-first century.154 Indeed, evidence suggests that it will grow further as time moves 
on with suggestions that we will be facing a sizeable ‘care gap’ before very long,155 and the problems 
associated with this ‘care-gap’ are not confined to England and Wales. Fertility rates across Europe 
and North America are dropping. The elderly constitute an ever-growing proportion of society; yet, 
the number of tax-payers in these countries is shrinking.156 And, there is little, if any, evidence that this 
will change in years to come.  In the USA, in most of mainland Europe, and in China and Japan, the only 
concerted help for the elderly, disabled community is often their immediate family with the State 
providing only the most basic of safety-nets should the family be unable or unwilling to become 
involved.157 In these circumstances, there is a clear need for a new vision for the provision of social 








154 Since 2001, the growth in the number of carers has outstripped population growth by 16.5% and the 
number of people providing 20-49 hours of care a week has increased by 43%, Carers UK, Valuing Carers 
(2015) - https://www.carersuk.org/for-professionals/policy/policy-library/valuing-carers-2015 (accessed: 
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1.5 INITIAL CONCLUSIONS 
Rarely does a month pass without the question of the future of ‘social care for the elderly’ making 
another appearance in the UK media. At the time of writing, the latest suggestion, coming on this 
occasion from the Resolution Foundation, proposes that a tax – in the form of increased national 
insurance contributions – should be levied on the over-40s in an effort to raise the funds that are so 
sorely needed to maintain our social care system.158 The funding of the UK social care system is, of 
course, a matter that is entirely separate from the solutions proposed in this thesis. Those solutions 
are only intended to be partial ones. Care and carers will be needed by those who do not have adult 
children – or, indeed, any other relatives or friends – who might be on hand to offer their services. 
Their needs have to be met in some form or another. The solutions that appear later in this thesis 
must go hand-in-hand with other recommendations for change in order that any new social care 
system can be built on firm foundations. The suggestion for a new hypothecated tax – already 
described as another ‘dementia tax’ – has the distinct disadvantage of taxing those who are already 
having to bear the financial burden of caring for their elderly parents, the 40-65 year olds that already 
form ‘the bank of mum and dad’, sometimes re-mortgaging their own homes in order to pay for their 
children’s University education.  Of course, in almost any proposal for funding there will be winners 
and losers.  
In the solutions proposed in this thesis, it is ‘the family inheritance’ that is under attack. Those who 
feel that family ‘property wealth’ should be capable of being handed down from one generation to 
another may not take kindly to the idea that, under the proposals set out in this thesis, this property 
wealth may need to be mortgaged to the State in order to pay for the costs of the owner’s social care.  
But, that consequence may be avoided by those who are to inherit providing the required social care 
themselves or perhaps paying others to do so. What will fund the proposed scheme – at least in the 
more affluent parts of the country – will be the untaxed increase in property wealth from which many 
of the elderly (and, those who will shortly fall into this category) have benefited.  Public money will 
need to support the scheme before what is paid out in social care costs can be recovered from this 
property wealth. And, that will require a degree of ‘quantitative easing’, through the purchase, or even 
the creation, of gilts and the like, out of which central government will be able to raise the funds 
necessary to pay informal carers something that might resemble a ‘living wage’. Yet, what will result 
is a fairer, more meritocratic society, where wealth is not simply handed down from generation to 






There will be those who will fall outside the proposals that are to be put forward. Those disabled 
elderly who have no adult children, friends or family who either wish or are able to provide them with 
domiciliary care will need to rely on commercial care market, if they are able to do so, to meet their 
social care needs or else look to the State to provide them with the care they need, albeit that the 
costs of such care would be recoverable by the State from their estate on death. Where they are not 
financially able to pay for the costs of their social care, the State must provide that care, and do so at 
a level that is far higher it does at present. Society, through its agent the State, is morally responsible 
for meeting the legitimate needs of its members.159 And, what could be more of a legitimate need 
than the maintenance of one’s dignity and general health in old age? 
However, in light of the differences in approach to the problem in hand perhaps the first point to 
consider is whether there is any legal or moral obligation on a care-receiver to compensate or reward 
one or more of his/her adult children for any informally-provided social care that may have been 
administered by him/her/them to their elderly, disabled parent over what may be a protracted period 
of time and which may have involved considerable sacrifice on their part?160 This is a wide-ranging 
concern that has produced a significant amount of published literature over recent years. Its subject 
matter has attracted not only legal and moral philosophers but also many others besides. While the 
review that follows can only capture the basic ideas that have been put forward on this and other 
related issues, it does, nevertheless, serve to focus our attention clearly and distinctively on what lies 
ahead.  









159 See: chapter two, infra. 
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2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The central concern of this thesis has attracted the thoughts of an array of academic writers in recent 
years, from moral philosophers to health economists and political agitators of many creeds. Although 
the inquiry set out in later in this chapter broadens out and considers how several of the leading 
strands of ethical theory might respond to the proposition that adult child carers should receive 
greater financial incentives for the work they do in caring for their elderly, disabled parents, the initial 
part of this review largely focusses on the response of legal academics.   Foremost in this category of 
authors over on this side of the Atlantic are Brian Sloan and Jonathan Herring.  
In his monograph, Informal Carers and Private Law,161 Sloan considers the scope for the development 
of private law remedies in England and Wales which might be used to generate financial compensation 
for those who provide social care for elderly relatives on an informal basis. While presenting the 
reader with an insightful analysis of how such claims might be framed in various diverse areas of the 
law, such as proprietary estoppel, testamentary promises, unjust enrichment and the inheritance 
family provision legislation, together with a measured and thought-provoking review of the hurdles 
that litigants must jump in order to be successful in those claims, Sloan provides the reader with what 
is largely  a dispassionate account of how informal carer claims have been considered by the courts. 
His intent is not to provide the reader with solutions, but rather to identify, explain and rationalise the 
difficulties that may face carers in attempting to place their claims within the framework of existing 
English law.162   
 
161 See: Brian Sloan, Informal Carers and Private Law, (Hart, 2013). 
 




Perhaps the one instance where Sloan does attempt to consider the future development of such law 
appears in section 5.3.5 under the title: ‘A ‘Carer’ Category for England and Wales?’163 Here, Sloan 
floats the idea that informal carers might one day become a separate category of claimants under the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (‘the 1975 Act’) through their addition to 
the list that appears in section 1(1). In doing so, he acknowledges that this would produce a category 
of claimant that is diametrically opposed to most other categories. Save for the two spousal 
categories, all others seem to be based on some form of financial dependency on the deceased or on 
some other type of financial need which arises out of the applicant’s particular financial 
circumstances.164 In most cases, a typical informal carer will have had an entirely different relationship 
with the deceased, one in which they have expended much time and money to the advantage of the 
deceased but have received little or nothing in financial terms in return for what they have done.165 
Why they have received nothing from the care-receiver is, of course, open to many explanations. It 
may be that the deceased’s wealth was locked up in investments that were difficult to realise during 
his or her lifetime or indeed after his/her death as a result of the claims of others on that wealth.166 
Equally, it may be that that the deceased feels that it is the duty of his/her children to look after their 
parent in their old age. Or, it may be that the deceased felt that it was up to his children to agree what 
was ‘fair’ for the caring child to receive over and above what his/her siblings would be entitled to.  
For his part, Sloan does not entirely dismiss this idea of a new category of applicant, a ‘carer 
category’,167 but he does accept that, for the time being, it is unlikely to be taken any further.168 To 
Sloan, this is a matter of regret given the more enlightened approaches adopted in New South Wales 
and elsewhere.169 In the event, Sloan concludes that: ‘Even if a ‘carer’ category were introduced in 
 
163 Ibid. See: section 5.3.5. ‘A Carer Category for England and Wales?’ at pp. 172 et seq.  
 
164 See: the analysis set forth in chapter 4, infra. 
 
165 See: the analysis provided in section 1.1 and in the following paragraph. 
 
166 And, this difficulty may be as much emotional as practical – see: Lorna Fox Mahoney, ‘Home Equity and 
Ageing Owners’, (Hart, 2012), in particular, chapter 5, ‘Housing as Home: Ageing in Place’, at pp. 125-138. 
 
167 And, he also acknowledges that the idea is not entirely original to him by referring to the hints that Kerridge 
has given to a possible reform of the 1975 Act by the addition of a carer’s category in R. Kerridge, in Parry and 
Kerridge: The Law of Succession, 12th edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), section 8-79 et seq. where the author 
does not overtly suggest the creation of a ‘carer’s category’ but does contrast the virtues of those who have 
cared for the deceased with what he describes as ‘lame duck’ applicants. 
 
168 See: The Law Commission, Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on Death, (Law Com No. 331, 2011) at 
[6.92], which rejected such a proposal. 
 




England and Wales, the link with a need for future maintenance would probably remain.’170  In itself, 
this causes further difficulties as, in what Sloan describes as ‘pure carer’ cases, such a need may be 
absent, at least in financial terms. Claimants outside the spousal categories also have their claims 
limited to ‘maintenance’171 which, although widely interpreted by the courts, is not assessed through 
concepts such as ‘compensation’, ‘deserving’ or ‘reward’ but through the medium of ‘need’. As Sloan 
acknowledges,172 claims made by adult children under the 1975 Act seem to rest solely on this basis 
and are tempered by the observation made by a number of senior judges that able-bodied adult 
children should look not to their parents but to themselves when it comes to satisfying such need.173  
Sloan then examines comparable legislation in New South Wales as a way in which to resolve the 
financial claims of informal carers on the estates of their now deceased parents and finds that ‘The 
balanced approach [exemplified in that legislation] between those who provide care and cannot 
demonstrate the need and those who do not provide care but have the need has much to commend 
it.’174 His final conclusion seems to be that the creation of a ‘carer category’ in the 1975 Act is, arguably, 
the way forward for carers’ claims, albeit perhaps an imperfect one.175 If such a provision were to be 
introduced, this should obviate, he suggests, the need for informal carers to consider other ways in 
which their claims might be brought, such as on the basis of unjust enrichment or proprietary 
estoppel.176 But, would it? If carers’ claims are to be limited by the concept of maintenance,177 these 
carers might well consider other ways in which to frame their claims. Moreover, the potential 
availability of these other claims, and the difficulties inherent in the assessment of any award under 
the 1975 Act, which is heavily dependent on findings of fact and the exercise of judicial discretion,178 
 
170 See: fn. 161, supra, at p. 174. 
 
171 See: the 1975 Act, at s. 1(3). 
 
172 See: fn. 161, supra, at p. 176. 
 
173 Oliver J in Re Coventry [1980] Ch. 461 at p. 475. 
 
174 See: fn. 161, supra, p. 203. 
 
175 Ibid. at p. 205. 
 
176 Sloan describes his proposal as ‘a modest compromise between public and private provision’ thereby 
suggesting that he continues to see the State playing a significant role in the provision of financial and perhaps 
other  incentives for informal carers – ibid. p. 147. 
 
177 Sloan acknowledges this, ibid. at p. 174. 
 
178 Under the umbrella of ‘judicial discretion’, something which involves judges making ‘value judgments’ on 




would only serve to encourage litigation and, ultimately, to tear apart families who may be at odds 
over the merits and financial value of such claims.179 It is perhaps unfortunate that, while 
contemplating (in his words) ‘… the potential need for a fundamental change’,180 Sloan neglects to 
consider what impact the amendment of the 1975 Act to permit claims by informal carers might have 
on family relationships already under strain by the loss of a senior patriarchal or matriarchal figure. 
Sloan also considers alternative avenues along which a carer might tread in order to secure some form 
of financial benefit in return for time and labour expended in caring for an elderly, infirm parent or 
relative. Absent a specific promise of reward by the care-receiver, English law, it seems, does nothing 
for the informal carer. In these circumstances, the English law of unjust enrichment is dealt with in a 
fairly perfunctory manner. Sloan’s focus is more on the more enlightened Canadian approach to claims 
of this nature. Also absent is any prolonged consideration of inter vivos claims by informal carers under 
English law. Instead, Sloan turns his attention to Australian models, specifically registration-based 
schemes where the courts are given wide powers to make financial adjustment orders where there is 
a breakdown of a registered ‘caring relationship’. These are, of course, difficult areas. Yet, even 
schemes that provide only a post mortem remedy for informal carers from the estate of the care-
receiver must grapple with the fact that, in the absence of any secured rights over the deceased’s 
property, a carer may find their claim defeated by the care-receiver giving away, or otherwise 
disposing of, his/her property before their death and leaving him/her with nothing against which to 
make their claim. Inter vivos dealings cannot therefore be ignored entirely. In this respect, Scotland 
has adopted a more distinctive approach to this problem where there is an inter vivos breakdown of 
the relationship between the informal carer and the care-receiver, who are cohabiting as if they are 
husband and wife, with the introduction of a more wide-ranging set of remedies on the breakdown of 
non-marital relationships.181 
In putting these ideas forward, Sloan presents us with a case for providing a financial remedy for 
informal carers without first considering the initial question: ‘Is there a filial obligation to care for one’s 
parents?’ If such a duty exists, then, ‘What is the nature, if any, of this responsibility?’. Moreover, 
‘Does anyone have a right to expect anything in return for ‘doing their duty?’ Questions such as these 
are simply not explored. What is more, apart from floating the idea of a carer category, or, 
 
179 See: The Daily Mail, 31st December 1998, which contains an ex post facto article on the consequences of the 
litigation in Espinosa v Bourke [1999] 2 FLR 747. 
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alternatively, some form of unjust enrichment claim, Sloan does little to indicate what a viable remedy 
might be. Nor, does he consider a case for making some form of financial support available during the 
caring period. 
Jonathan Herring takes a more expansive look at society’s response to the problems of providing care 
for the elderly and infirm in his 2013 work, Caring and the Law.182 For Herring, ‘care’ is inescapable – 
‘Everyone cares. Everyone is cared for.’183 His task is not to consider whether informal caring should 
be encouraged through the provision of financial incentives to provide such care. Instead, Herring lays 
before the reader a comprehensive account of how English Law deals with informal carers without 
commenting on whether that dealing is just and appropriate in today’s society.184 One aim that Herring 
makes explicit is his intention to explore how ‘an ethic of care’ approach might be applied to generate 
legal rights and obligations for both the informal carer and the care-recipient.185  In doing so, he 
explores the theoretical foundations for the imposition of such rights and obligations which, in his 
eyes, should be accompanied by a more wide-ranging remodelling of law and society that will put 
caring at the centre of almost all we do. 
In saying this, Herring attempts to contrast prevailing neo-liberal themes of liberty, autonomy and 
independence with the more pluralist approach of care ethicists and communitarians and, having 
done this, proceeds to rationalise these seemingly diverse approaches by introducing a discussion 
centred on ‘relational autonomy’.186 He makes the point (it seems) that individual autonomy will never 
provide an answer to society’s ills because it is essentially ‘anti-society’. There, he claims, is the fallacy 
in the idea of ‘liberalism’ as a guide for one’s ‘life-plan’. We live in a society that demands that we 
undertake relationships with others. Therefore, we need to take others into account. And, ‘obligations 
that flow from those relationships [must be] given due weight’.187 In these circumstances, ‘… the 
starting-point for relational autonomy is not the free unencumbered self, but rather a person who is 
integrated into a network of relationships’ and thus ‘[t]hese relationships and the obligations and 
 
182 See: Jonathan Herring, Caring and the Law, (Hart Publishing, 2013). 
 
183 Ibid. at p. 1. 
 
184 In fact, Herring often makes his own views on this subject known to the reader – ibid. pp. 64-68 and again 
pp. 319-320. 
 
185 Ibid. at p. 5. 
 
186 Ibid. at pp. 71-74. 
 




restrictions on choice that flow from them are constitutive of autonomy, rather than being seen as 
restrictive of it.’188 
What Herring fails to explore is whether there is any specific obligation on adult children to provide 
social care for their elderly disabled parents or whether there is a corresponding duty of any sort on 
care-recipients to pay for that care even where it is given on a voluntary basis. Indeed, it was never 
his aim to do so. After making observations on the nature and ethics of care, he continues by providing 
the reader with a detailed account of what little the State does for informal carers and how their 
claims are treated under general law. That is the pattern to which the book conforms.189 There is no 
concerted plan for dealing with the difficulties that an ageing population will bring for society, merely 
an observation that the State should do more. 
So, where does one turn in order to explore the series of questions that have just been raised? At the 
close of the twentieth century, two American authors made a notable contribution to this quest, 
Norman Daniels190 and Jane English.191 Yet, the views of each have come in for some concerted 
criticism too.192 In essence, both Daniels and English claim that adult children do not owe any 
obligation to their parents whether to look after them in their old age or otherwise. For Daniels, this 
conclusion is simply part of a wider theory of health and intergenerational justice that draws, 
serendipitously, (as Daniels himself puts it)193 on the writings of John Rawls.194  One of the foundations 
of modern liberal theory – and Rawls is firmly in the vanguard of this movement – is the principle of 
‘fair equality of opportunity’ in terms of one’s ability to access positions of authority and/or financial 
benefit.195  Those who care for elderly disabled parents, it is argued, are denied this ‘fair equality of 
 
188 Ibid. at p. 73. 
 
189 Indeed, the book, Caring and the Law, can be seen as an expansion of chapter four of Herring’s early work, 
Older People in Law and Society, (OUP, 2009). 
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Philosophical Problems in Gerontology, (Springer, 1991), at pp. 147-154.  
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Philosophy, 38(4) (2013): 388-399. 
 
193 N. Daniels (2001) Justice, Health, and Health Care, The American Journal of Bioethics, 1, pp. 2-16. 
 
194 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, 1972). 
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opportunity’. Daniels demands that ‘positive social measures’ be implemented in an attempt to 
compensate for any lack of such opportunity that is not one’s own fault.196 And, he justifies these 
‘positive social measures’ – for example, providing social care for the elderly and infirm – on the basis 
that treating people differently at different stages of their life is not treating people unequally. This is 
so, he argues, because we all go through each of these stages of life, if we are fortunate enough to do 
so, and all may therefore claim to benefit from the resources available at each stage equally.197 How, 
one must ask, does this allow us to respond to the various questions that were raised earlier? If the 
State is responsible for the provision of this social care because this is one of the consequences of a 
just allocation of resources over one’s lifetime, then (so the argument goes) surely anyone who 
undertakes these responsibilities in place of the State is surely entitled to financial compensation, or 
at least provision of some description, for doing so? This is clearly supported by arguments made in 
other quarters that the State should take responsibility for the provision of social care for the elderly; 
in more recent times, these arguments have been put forward by writers such as Martha Fineman and 
Maxine Eichner.198 Indeed, similar conclusions have been drawn by Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum in promoting the ‘capability approach’ to questions of justice and ethics.199  
Of course, it is relatively easy to put the obligation to provide all the social care that any elderly 
disabled person needs onto the broad shoulders of the State, but the costs will inevitably come from 
the public purse and is likely, without more, to result in much higher rates of general taxation.200 This 
begs the question: ‘Should those who can afford to pay for their own social care be able to claim the 
cost from the State?’. If not, should those who provide informal social care on a voluntary basis be 
able to claim financial provision from the care-receiver for their time, skill and labour in circumstances 
where the care-receiver would otherwise have needed to pay for that care him/herself? To all intents 
and purposes, these are practical questions that neither Sloan nor Herring contemplate in their 
 
196 See: fn. 190, supra, at pp. 2-3. 
 
197 This forms the basis of the idea of the prudential allocation of resources over a person’s lifetime that is 
championed by Daniels in Am I my Parents’ Keeper? (OUP, 1998)  
 
198 Maxine Eichner, ‘Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman’s The Autonomy Myth’, (2005) 
California Law Review, Vol. 93, issue 4, article 6, - 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1296&context=californialawreview (accessed: 
02/06/16), where Eichner puts forward a view of how the State should intervene that contrasts with that of 
Fineman but, nevertheless, firmly advocates State intervention.  
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published works.  Nevertheless, they remain highly significant for both legislators and the general 
public.  
At one point, the UK Government attempted to address these and other related issues in an effort to 
provide the country with a clearly defined approach to social care for the elderly in the form of the 
Care Act 2014.201 However, following representations by local government, made principally on 
financial grounds, the implementation of most of the significant parts of this Act for present purposes, 
including the cap on social care costs, was, at least initially, postponed until 2020.202 Now, there is 
every indication that these provisions will never be brought into force.203 Indeed, it seems that the UK 
Government’s approach to the challenges that the Care Act 2014 was designed to meet has already 
changed, for the Conservative Party’s manifesto for the 2017 election proposed not a ceiling or cap 
on social care costs but what the manifesto described as ‘a capital floor’, such that all those who have 
to pay social care costs would be able to retain assets to the value of £100,000.204 In practice, any 
momentum for reform appears to have slowed and, in reality, new solutions need to be found. 
Two writers who have contemplated where these solutions might lie in England and Wales are Sarah 
Nield and Mika Oldham.205 In the first of her two publications in this field, Nield looks at the 
enforcement of testamentary promises in England and Wales and contrasts the country’s formality-
laden approach with the more enlightened philosophy adopted in New Zealand under its Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Act 1947 (as amended). In a precursor to the more extensive work later 
performed by Sloan, Nield considers how English courts have sought to enforce specific testamentary 
promises through the law of contract and estoppel, concluding that, ‘It is … disappointing that the 
courts continue to favour testamentary freedom, or fickleness, over the morality of taking advantage 
of the services and trust of others.’206 In her second published contribution to this debate, Nield 
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considers exactly how far the law of contract, the law of equitable estoppel and the law of restitution 
in England and Wales might go to meet ‘the objective of economic recognition of unpaid care.’207 In 
each case, an informal carer’s claim for financial recompense is limited by the nature and extent of 
the testamentary promise if, indeed, any such promise is made, and ultimately that marks the 
boundaries of the legislative solution adopted in New Zealand.  In truth, Nield’s second article largely 
represents an expansion of the points made in the first and makes little headway towards identifying 
a practical solution for informal carers, save possibly those to whom specific promises of recompense 
have been made. Nevertheless, it does contain an important observation on how a solution to what 
she accepts as the ‘legitimate policy objective’ of rewarding informal care-giving, namely, that a 
statutory response to the problem ‘… tends to cut through the moral tensions presented by balancing 
the exploitation of carers against the certainty often demanded in dealings with property and freedom 
of testamentary disposition.’208  
For her part, Mika Oldham starts with the premise that State provision of social care for the disabled 
elderly will never be adequate; the financial burden of such care – a burden that we are only now fully 
appreciating – is not one that the public purse can possibly bear, nor, indeed, does society wish to 
shoulder the burden of these costs.209 While, at one level, this is a sad indictment of our modern 
society that many on the left would be anxious to reject, yet it also represents a pragmatic 
acknowledgment of how individual aspiration has largely overtaken collective loyalties since the dawn 
of the Thatcher Government in the 1980s. Oldham therefore proposes a form of public and private 
partnership in the provision of social care for those in ‘the third age’. This partnership would be one 
in which a form of ‘successional priority’ is conferred on all informal carers as a means of rewarding 
them for the sacrifices that they have undertaken in providing care to another member of the family. 
In support of this proposal, Oldham maintains that: 
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‘Under such a scheme, any family member who maintains or cares for an elderly relative 
would be given a right to eventual compensation out of the estate of that relative, such right 
to take priority over distribution to other successors. 
This proposal is novel and its adoption would involve a radical departure from the underlying 
philosophy of the law of succession and its central principle of absolute freedom testation. 
Significant inroads into that basic philosophy have already been made, however, with the 
statutory creation of judicial discretion to vary the express wishes of testators in the context 
of family provision.’210 
Whether such a scheme is ‘novel’ is open to dispute.  Legislation along these lines was first introduced 
in Illinois as long ago as 1988.211 Nor, indeed, might this proposal be regarded as ‘a radical departure’ 
from the concept of absolute freedom of testation if claims by carers under legislation are regarded 
as claims for the recovery of a debt. Still, Oldham’s conclusions represent a significant jumping-off 
point for an analysis of the issues that this thesis seeks to resolve. And, indeed, the proposals put 
forward in chapter six largely represent a modification of the ideas that she puts forward, albeit a 
significant one. 
Several American academics have put forward similar lines of thought. Frances Foster has suggested 
that a behaviour-based approach should be taken to succession law, linking inheritance rights to a 
beneficiary’s conduct towards the deceased.212 In this way, informal carers would be rewarded for 
their care of the deceased. These suggestions reflect recent changes to the law of inheritance in China. 
These changes give Chinese courts a broad discretion to readjust the distribution of a deceased’s 
estate on intestacy – but, curiously, not where the deceased dies testate – in  order to recognise 
contributions to the deceased’s welfare made by family members, relatives by marriage and even 
friends and neighbours.213 Thomas Gallanis and Josephine Gittler prefer to see greater certainty and 
propose that a family member who has cared for a deceased should be entitled to an elective share 
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of the deceased’s estate in much the same way as many US statutes provide for the deceased’s 
spouse’s ability to take an elective share in the event that the deceased’s will fails to make adequate 
provision for his or her.214 For her part, Heather M. Fossen Forrest proposes rolling-out the Illinois 
Probate Act, section 18-1.1, across other US states, but at the same time removing the restrictions 
inherent in the section that prevent many worthy claimants from succeeding in their statutory 
custodial claims.215 One common thread to all of these suggested reforms is that the solution needs 
to be a legislative one. Claims based on quasi-contract and/or unjust enrichment require judicial 
intervention that goes well beyond what can be expected of the judiciary in common law 
jurisdictions.216 
Another common thread is that compensation for informal carers should come from the estates of 
care-receivers. The private law right that these academic commentators wish to introduce is a claim 
against those estates which can only be enforced after the care-receiver has passed away. Regrettably, 
these proposals fail to acknowledge that informal carers suffer financial hardship during the caring 
period; allowing recovery only after the care-receiver’s death may be for some too little and for others 
too late.217  What this thesis therefore proposes is a public-private partnership where the State takes 
on the burden for providing compensation for informal care-giving during the caring period but is able 
to recover what is paid out as a debt from the deceased care-receiver’s estate after they have passed 
away.218 In essence, the solution is designed to tap into much of the property wealth of the country 
but without putting the continuing ability to occupy that property as one’s home at risk. It requires 
substantial public funding, but this is funding that may be recovered by taxation at a later date. The 
detailed provisions of the care contract are for the carer and the care-receiver. But, the design is that 
this will be a rolling, mediated contract built to suit the two parties, but ultimately under the control 
of the court. Of course, one can never properly evaluate a proposed solution before one sees the 
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detail of what is being put forward. However, before that point is reached, it is necessary to consider: 
(i) whether the present State subsidies that are available for informal carers are adequate; (ii) whether 
informal carers should be entitled – on the basis of moral arguments – to payment for the work they 
do; and, if so, (iii) whether that payment might be made available through amendments to the present 
law of England and Wales rather than through more radical statutory intervention. It is only once these 
issues are resolved that one can begin to look more carefully at any legislative proposals for the 
solutions that are being advanced.  In these circumstances, items (i) – (iii) above provide the focus of 
the following four chapters of this three before the proposed solutions are formulated in chapter six. 
Yet, before we begin this journey, we need to consider where the moral responsibility for the provision 
of such social care really lies. It is only when it has been established that the State bears some, if not 
all, of this responsibility that we can justify placing some, or all, of the burden of meeting the costs of 




2.2 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL CARE? 
In February 2016, the Channel 4 television programme, ‘Dispatches’ indicated that there are widely-
held reservations in our society concerning the extent to which we can expect the State to be 
involved.219 Some 49.1% of people surveyed for that programme said that the UK Government should 
be more responsible for meeting the social care needs of the disabled elderly in our society. On its 
face, that appears to leave a bare majority holding the view that either the present system is 
acceptable or that there are others who must do more.  On the basis of this data, society seems 
peculiarly divided on this issue.  
So, what of the UK Government’s position in this debate? Over the past decade, support for the 
wholesale reform of the social care system has rather waxed and waned depending on the priorities 
of the government of the day. But, in essence, its preference seems to be for some form of partnership 
between the State, on the one hand, and the care-recipient’s family on the other.  One can see this 
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most readily in a statement made by Norman Lamb as the Health Minister in the Coalition Government 
of 2010-2015: 
‘The truth is that the Government has an absolute responsibility to ensure that older people 
get the care that they need so that they can grow old in dignity and respect, and it means that 
we have to fund the carers that are available to look after those people. … Part of it will be 
the families’ responsibility. We all, of course, take responsibility for our loved ones but the 
State is there to ensure that the State works effectively and people get the support they need, 
but also to provide support where family isn’t available and where people wouldn’t otherwise 
get the care they need.’220 
 
The statement ‘We all take responsibility for our loved ones …’ indicates that the speaker’s position is 
that such responsibility is both ‘natural’ and ‘expected’. In other words, everyone is obligated by some 
form of shared moral code to step in and provide care whenever one’s parents need that care; and, 
therefore, whether one is called upon to provide that care is simply one of the vicissitudes of life, some 
are lucky that their parents either do not need that care or can pay for it themselves and others are 
not.221 Nevertheless, the question arises: ‘Is this a fair reflection of how such responsibility is, or should 
be, allocated in regard to the provision of social care for our disabled elderly?’ Or, is there a more just 
approach to be had? 
 
In some countries, the obligation to provide care for one’s parents is a legal one. In France l’obligation 
alimentaire imposes a legal duty on every citizen to support his/her family members who are in 
immediate financial need. This obligation is based on both ties of blood and ties of marriage.  Under 
French law, the duty to support direct ascendants is without limit, so one is obligated in law to support 
not only one’s parents but also one’s grandparents and great-grandparents, but only to the extent 
that that their parents are unable to provide the necessary support. The obligation is further qualified 
by the principle that one’s primary duty is to support one’s spouse and one’s children and their support 
must take priority over any obligation to support more distant relations. Given that the obligation, as 
enshrined in the Code Civil, livre 1, chaptaire V, also extends to the family of one’s spouse, the French 
courts have also recognised a ‘natural’ obligation to assist any siblings who may be in immediate 
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financial need.222 Now, the idea that one is under a financial obligation to provide care for one’s 
parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, and one’s siblings, still less one’s in-laws and their parents, 
grandparents and great-grandparents is very harsh on the sensibilities of someone who has been 
brought up in the common law tradition,223 but the notion also needs to be considered in light of the 
succession rights of children in French law that guarantee that a portion of a parent’s estate will pass 
to them on the parent’s demise.224 Elsewhere in Europe, public acceptance, if not support, for such 
‘forced inheritance’ seems to be relatively strong. To date, European governments in general have not 
sought to interfere with the allocation of the ‘compulsory share’ of a testator’s estate to his/her 
children on which the obligation to care for one’s parents is based.225 In Italy, a recent attempt to do 
– based on the equivalent of a private members’ bill claiming that any interference with testamentary 
freedom was unconstitutional – was short-lived.226 That said, if the compulsory share is sacrosanct 
across Europe, this does not necessarily mean that carers must go unrewarded. In Germany, for 
example, legislation has intervened in the form of a law in force from 1 January 2010 which allows 
descendants who have cared for a deceased to recover the expenses which were incurred in providing 
that care from the other beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate before that estate is distributed.227 
 
The German approach is also reflected in approximately one half of the various states across the US 
in relation to the estates of former residents of state mental institutions.228 Typically, statute will 
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authorise the recovery of some costs incurred in the care of the deceased from those who might be 
described as ‘responsible relatives’. Who falls into this category in any given instance is a matter for 
the courts; yet, in all such cases, the question remains: ‘Why should one person be ‘responsible’ for 
the care of another?’ If any person who is held to be a ‘responsible relative’ is entitled to a significant 
financial benefit from the deceased’s estate, then some form of moral – if not a legal – argument may 
well arise that they should pay. After all, the deceased’s estate has been enhanced because these 
costs were not paid by him/her during his/her lifetime. If those costs should properly have been paid 
by the deceased, it is unjust (so the argument goes) that his/her beneficiaries should enjoy the 
deceased’s estate free from this obligation and be enriched by the deceased’s failure to pay. These 
arguments are not uncommon in common law jurisdictions, based – as they are – on principles of 
unjust enrichment.229 On the other hand, if a relative does not benefit from the deceased’s estate, 
why should they be ‘responsible’ for the costs of the deceased’s care? This leads us to ask: ‘Is there a 
moral obligation on adult children to care for their elderly, disabled parents when those parents are 
in need of care?’ 
 
In the UK, public opinion on the moral responsibility of adult children to care for their elderly, disabled 
parents seems confused. In the OASIS survey of 2003 only 47% of UK participants said that children 
should make sacrifices for their parents, and even then it was unclear whether these sacrifices should 
amount to providing social care for one’s parents. If there was a publicly recognised duty to provide 
this care, one would expect that a clear and perhaps overwhelming majority of people would 
recognise that duty. What that duty might entail is, of course, a matter of debate. Similarly, only 41% 
of UK participants felt that elderly parents should be able to rely on their children for support. This 
was markedly the lowest figure under this category of all the countries surveyed – the participants in 
the same survey in Germany, Spain, Israel and Norway all felt that parents were entitled to rely on 
their children to a much greater degree. This is significant. It demonstrates that nations must design 
their own support services for their disabled elderly; in other words, there is no global response that 
is right for all. Some 31% of all participants in the survey felt that adult children should live close to 
their parents. That falls well short of any consensus that adult children must always be on hand to 
administer the social care that their parents might need in their old age. However, 76% of these 
participants felt that adult children should give practical or emotional help to their parents. Perhaps, 
therefore, it is only this lesser degree of care, or less costly type of care, that is really what adult 
 




children can be expected to give.230 From this evidence, Jonathan Herring concludes that ‘… normative 
limits in filial obligation can, essentially, be defined as lying where, in the words of Aboderin,231 
‘providing support begins to exceed an adult child’s capacity to do so without jeopardising their 
conjugal family’s present needs or their ability to service their welfare in the future’’.232 In a legal 
context, this surely makes the drawing of the line beyond which one can be forced to contribute in 
some measure to the welfare of one’s parents, and below which one has no responsibility to do so, a 
truly impossible task. 
 
In his highly influential essay on justice across the generations, Norman Daniels concludes that there 
is no historical evidence of ‘family caring’ as a ‘social norm’ in Western society, and he goes on to 
present parental care-giving as something in the nature of a gift, albeit one made for a number of 
often diverse reasons.233 Jane English agrees, concluding that the duties of grown children to their 
parents are like those of friends to one another; they are the natural consequence of the love and 
respect felt by a child for his/her parents, and not something that arises out of the parents’ earlier 
sacrifices in bringing up their children.234  In sum, these reasons characterise parental care-giving as 
something that is done as much for the good of parents as their children, with parents getting an 
emotional return on their physical and financial investment in bringing up their children from ‘seeing 
a job well done’ or, at least, seeing their ‘project’ completed however it turns out. As Daniels points 
out, ‘If I choose to give to charity, the recipients of this charity have no reciprocal obligation to give to 
me simply because I have given to them.’ In this way, parental care is characterised as a ‘pure gift’.235  
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This reasoning is also accepted by many commentators on this side of the Atlantic. Jonathan Herring, 
for one, reaches a similar conclusion, when he acknowledges that ‘… unless an adult child has 
specifically undertaken an obligation to care for their parent there is no duty to rescue [the parent 
from his/her predicament]’.236 In doing so, he firmly rejects the idea that there is a responsibility to 
care for one’s parents because they have cared for you as an infant.  Such care is, in reality, impossible 
to measure. Yet, if such a duty existed, surely the duty to care for one’s parents would have to depend 
on the degree and/or extent of the care they had lavished on you. That, in turn, would suggest that 
the more that a parent spends on a child’s upbringing, the greater the responsibility of the child to 
care for that parent. Even those who claim the existence of a duty to care for one’s parents would 
struggle to justify such an arbitrary response to a claim for filial support. In practice such notions do 
not serve society well because those parents who have spent the most are often those who have had 
the most to spend. Yet, it is these parents who are most likely to be able to afford to pay for their own 
social care, and therefore have no need of the obligation that is said to exist. In the UK, there is, of 
course, a legal obligation to care for one’s children until they reach their majority and this obligation 
must, to some small extent, qualify these statements that parental care-giving should be seen as a 
gift;237 perhaps, therefore, the ‘gift’ is one of life, but, in making that gift, the donor also takes on a 
legal obligation to care for his/her child until that child is of full age. Yet, that cannot justify an 
obligation to care for one’s parents; in the former there is something of a choice, yet in the latter there 
is none. 
 
Some people claim that caring for our parents is merely the way in which we should all honour and 
respect our parents.238 Honouring and respecting one’s parents is all well and good, but it is still not 
clear that these virtues should manifest themselves in a duty to supply an appropriate degree of social 
care to one’s parents should the need arise. Why should the payment of money on the social care that 
is required for one’s parents be seen as a necessary expression of gratitude or honour? In practice, 
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this expenditure would depend, more often, on the adult child’s ability to pay for, or his/her ability to 
labour in the provision of, care rather than the performance of any moral duty to his/her parents. For 
others, the care of a parent can be seen as the manifestation of the ‘special bond’ that exists between 
a parent and child. Yet, with many dysfunctional families there is no such ‘special bond’. Some have 
described care as a ‘special good’ that only parents and children can supply.239 But, in reality, that does 
not stand up to scrutiny either. There is nothing ‘special’ about the money that an adult child might 
choose to spend on the care of his/her parents; and, equally, there is nothing ‘special’ about the labour 
that they can provide. ‘Care specialists’ are in a position to provide a better and more efficient service; 
they have the knowledge and expertise to do so. In these circumstances, Maria Stuifenberg and 
Johannes Van Delden have chosen to describe this ‘special good obligation’ as a duty to care about 
one’s parents and not for one’s parents.240 
 
In any event, parenting a child is something that is radically different, in many ways, from caring for 
one’s elderly parents. As Peggie R. Smith notes: 
 
‘Research indicates, for example, that relative to child care, elder care involves more 
unanticipated caregiving situations, is more complicated to manage, and causes greater levels 
of stress for the care provider. These and other differences call into question the extent to 
which worker-family initiatives, premised on child care, are appropriate for thinking about 
how to help workers cope with elder-care related concerns.’241 
 
Quite simply, children and child care can be planned for, while care for elderly, disabled parents 
generally cannot. Indeed, there is often no ‘free choice’ in the decision to care for one’s elderly 
disabled parents: in many countries, the State does not provide that care and therefore the family 
must, and the only question is: who?242 Moreover, as one goes through the process of child care, 
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obligations usually become lighter and easier to manage, yet caring for one’s elderly disabled parent 
or parents does not; in fact, parents tend to become more needy with time.243 Children go off to school 
and, with this, there is a short respite from the hourly caring that a parent (usually the mother) has 
given their young offspring since birth; in contrast, the health of the disabled elderly parent will 
naturally decline, more intensive, time-consuming, emotionally demanding, care will be required and 
the process will only end with the death of the parent or parents in question.244  Until that event 
occurs, caring for a disabled, elderly parent often has a serious, adverse effect on the carer’s career, 
his/her financial circumstances, his/her lifestyle and lifestyle choices, and the lives of his/her close 
family.245 
 
Why, in these circumstances, should adult children be responsible for the care of their parents? Having 
undertaken a review of cultural traditions in the West and beyond, Daniels maintains that there is no 
moral basis for imposing such an obligation. He opens his analysis by remarking that: ‘Duties and 
obligations generally impose specific burdens. They have limits that allow us to say when they have 
been discharged. Filial obligations should be no exception’.246 Yet, when these so-called obligations 
are closely examined, Daniels discovers that there are no specific burdens. He, therefore, concludes 
by saying: 
 
‘Those who do believe they owe their parents extensive care may insist that others who do 
not believe are immoral shirkers of duty. Those who do not believe that they have such 
obligations will resist believers trying to impose obligations through legal sanctions …. 
…. The diversity of cultural traditions, which frustrated the Traditionalist, may well explain 
some of the diversity in current beliefs. Similarly, the absence of well-established moral 
foundations for filial obligations also explains the variety of views. Whatever the explanation, 




243 Ibid. at pp. 365-366. This is the subject of the data analysis carried out in chapter seven, infra. 
 
244 Ibid. at p. 366. 
 
245 Ibid. at pp. 366-372. 
 
246 See: fn.178, supra, p. 23. 
 




Of course, there is a powerful argument here to the effect that that, absent those specific burdens 
over which there is universal agreement – and, in fact, there may be no burden or burdens on which 
all are agreed – there is no moral obligation to care for one’s parents.248 Indeed, given the increasingly-
common patterns of modern ‘family life’ that separate families (or what one might describe, outside 
the institution of marriage, as ‘quasi-family units’) geographically and fragment them through 
separation and divorce, there seems little prospect of any return to the traditionalists’ view of family 
and family responsibilities which now seem to be distant echoes from a by-gone age.249 
In any event, do parents commonly reward those of their adult children who make sacrifices to care 
for them in their old age? In Wills, Inheritance and Families,250 Finch et al. acknowledge that the search 
for data to support a conclusion on this issue cannot lie in the care-receiver’s last will. Of its very 
nature, a will only operates ‘post-death’. Most wills contain no explanation of why gifts are made; 
more still contain no explanation why the testator refuses to make a gift or, in our case, provide a 
particular person with financial compensation in recognition of services rendered. Indeed, even where 
there is a will which contains no such gift, but one is aware that care has been provided, it is still 
impossible to conclude that this is a case where compensation has been denied for the testator may 
have rewarded the carer through the making of life-time gifts. In short, any picture that a care-
receiver’s will may paint, even when considered together with other records, such as the receipt of 
carer’s benefits by an adult child of the deceased, is likely to be substantially incomplete.  
There are occasions recorded in reported case law where a deceased has, quite deliberately, failed to 
make financial provision for his/her informal carer and an adult child’s care of their aged parent has 
gone unrewarded.251 Nevertheless, in the absence of specific data on the propensity of parents not to 
compensate their adult children for the care that they have received from them, one might sensibly 
 
248 Even Christ’s ‘Parable of the Prodigal Son’ is liable to divide modern public opinion on whether the father 
should have welcomed the return of the prodigal son, as he did, with a feast, new clothes, new shoes and a 
ring, when the prodigal son had spent the past few years squandering the inheritance that he had previously 
demanded from his father, when convention required him to wait until his father’s death before making any 
such demands. To some, the prodigal son is a wastrel who is undeserving of any further attention from his 
father, and their reaction is very much the reaction of the older son to his brother’s return – Luke 15: 11-32. 
 
249 This is so even in China where adult children have become geographically separated from their parents –
http://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/loneliness/he-was-one-of-millions-of-chinese-seniors-growing-old-alone-
so-he-put-himself-up-for-adoption/ar-AAwFL58?ocid=ientp (accessed: 21/05/18). 
  
250 J. Finch et al, ‘Wills, Inheritance and Families’, (OUP, 1996) p. 68. 
 
251 Espinosa v Bourke [1999] 1 FLR 747; [1999] 3 FCR 76 - the second plank of the claimant’s claim in Espinosa 
was really a ‘dependency claim’ and the claimant’s final award was calculated, not on the value of the care she 




ask, ‘In what situations might even the most well-meaning of parents fail to make provision for their 
offspring who have provided them with social care?’ The most obvious instance of such failure is a 
parent who does not make a will. The law of intestacy makes no distinction between those who may 
have cared for the deceased and those who have not ;252 moreover, the Inheritance (Provision for 
Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (‘the 1975 Act’) does not, without more, entitle an informal carer 
to provision over and above what he/she may be entitled to under the intestacy of his/her parent. In 
these circumstances, the very failure to make a will can produce what many would see as a significant 
injustice.253 What the informal carer receives is just the same as his/her siblings have received and 
cannot therefore be described as ‘compensation for caring’. The second is the parent who leaves a 
will but that will was made sometime before the care in question was provided. It goes without saying 
that such wills will regularly fail to compensate the care provider for what he/she has done for the 
deceased through what might be many years of self-sacrifice. The third illustration is the case of the 
parent who cannot bring him/herself to do anything other than to treat his/her children equally 
because they have concerns about their ability to do make the ‘right’ judgment over the degree of 
further provision that should be given to the carer child. Of perhaps equal concern in such situations 
is what their children may think of them when they are gone should they make such a decision which 
does not satisfy all of them. There may well be a propensity in such circumstances to shrug one’s 
shoulders and say: ‘The children will sort it out between them after I’ve gone’. But, do they? Most 
contentious probate litigation is a consequence of the inability of the deceased’s children to agree the 
distribution of their parent’s estate; indeed, a similar remark can be made in relation to what may well 
be a majority of 1975 Act claims. A fourth situation is where the parent is incapable of making a will 
through lack of testamentary capacity. While, in these circumstances, a statutory will may be made 
for a patient,254 such wills do not commonly reward the meritorious conduct of adult children who act 
as carers.  The obligation to reward such activities is not yet part of the psyche of the English judiciary. 
In the absence of specific rights in a deceased parent care-receiver’s estate which acknowledge the 
financial hardship that has, in many instances, been suffered as a result of the sacrifices made caring 
for the parent is it not time for such rights to be granted if we wish to encourage such caring? And, 
 
252 See: The Administration of Estates Act 1925, ss. 46 and 47. 
 
253 The author has recently been informed of a case where a person, who was informally adopted as a child, 
stayed with their adopted parents, while the natural children of these parents went out into the world and 
made their fortunes. When the survivor of these parents died without leaving a will, intestacy law dictated 
that their estate was to be divided equally between the natural children and the informally adopted child 
received nothing despite dedicating herself to the care of her adoptive parents in their later years. 
 




given the growing need of social care for the disabled elderly, adult children should be encouraged to 
care for their parents. If that encouragement is to be given, what form should it take? Should it be 
through the acquisition of some form of general right to financial compensation from their deceased 
parent’s estate? Or, should they acquire proprietary rights in assets that are preserved from sale by 
the sacrifices made by them in caring for their elderly disabled parents in circumstances where those 
assets would otherwise be sold to pay for care and care-related costs?  Could the 1975 Act be 
amended to provide informal carers with a right to make a claim under that Act, and, if so, how would 
such a claim be judged? Similarly, might the law of unjust enrichment be developed to assist claims of 
this nature? These are some of the ideas that will be developed in the following two chapters of this 







At one level, this thesis is concerned with what the law is, if only to lay bare its defects. To this extent, 
the approach that is adopted is a doctrinal one. And, it concludes, as one might expect, with proposals 
for reform which are born of the analysis of the black-letter law research that appears in chapters four 
and five. That said, the analysis that is presented throughout the thesis is a value-laden one.255 And 
the proposals for reform that are presented are based on a concept of social justice that is firmly 
grounded in what might be simply described as a shared responsibility to help people who are unable 
to help themselves.  The alleviation of suffering in our disabled elderly is therefore treated as a public 
‘good’, something that needs to be part of a political solution to an issue which is, most decidedly, a 
public one.256 Nevertheless, the claims made in this thesis are not dependent on any adherence to any 
particular, defined set of standards or rules.  Even where our existing laws are put under the 
microscope, the examination that is undertaken in this thesis goes beyond a mere search for mere 
 
255 As John Coggon remarks in his work, What Makes Health Public? (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at p. 2: 
‘… conceptions of health are necessarily value-laden’. Historically, government policy has drawn a marked 
distinction between health care and social care. That distinction, it is submitted, is unsustainable. The need for 
social care is a product of old age; and, old age is a context of health. 
 




internal consistency, rationality and coherence. Instead, the inquiry leans more towards matters such 
as orientation, moral evaluation and efficacy. 
So, at another level, the approach to the task in hand may be characterised as one that is grounded in 
critical theory. It challenges existing legal and societal norms– in particular, the common law’s 
approach to the concept of testamentary freedom and society’s reliance on the family unit in the 
provision of informal social care to the disabled elderly – and seeks to provide answers that will 
ameliorate a good deal of the injustice that surrounds the provision of informal social care to the 
disabled elderly in England and Wales.257 As such, it goes beyond the mere accumulation of 
knowledge, and seeks social transformation in the form of a ‘new deal for carers’. In acknowledging 
that these answers will require a significant change in the public perception of the relationship 
between society and the disabled elderly, this thesis will be considered by many to be overtly political 
in nature; and, indeed, at its heart, it strikes at the hegemony that presently defines how social care 
is provided to those who are unable to meet the financial demands of its continuing cost in the market 
place. Yet, it is also confined by reality and pragmatism. With this in mind, it looks to reform the 
existing system for social care in England and Wales, proposing evolution and not revolution. 
In addition to an overtly doctrinal, but critical approach, this thesis also relies on some comparative 
law analysis in order to underpin its conclusions. Where the task is to discover the existence of a 
proprietary right, or indeed rights of an equitable nature, the value such an approach is self-evident.258 
Research of this nature enlightens the reader and leaves him/her all the better-informed as a potential 
reformer of the law. This course of action also necessitates the use of comparative law research tools. 
The greater longevity in humankind that has characterised the end of the twentieth and beginning of 
the twenty-first centuries is not limited to these shores, but is the product of medical and 
environmental advances that reach across the globe. How other jurisdictions are reacting to what may 
be characterised as ‘the longevity crisis’ is, therefore, of immense interest to the modern 
researcher.259 Functionalist comparative law is seen as ‘factual’, focussing on events and their effects, 
and, ‘grounded in society’, such that its objects must be understood in light of their functional relation 
 
257 Kerry E. Howell, an Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology (Sage, 2013) at pp. 76-77. 
 
258 This is acknowledged by Martin Dixon in ‘A Doctrinal Approach to Property Law Scholarship’, which forms 
chapter 1 in Susan Bright and Sarah Blandy, ‘Researching Property Law’ (Palgrave McMillan, 2016) at pp. 1 – 
10, but, in particular, at p. 7. 
 
259 D. I. Kiekbaev, ‘Comparative Law: Method, Science or Educational Discipline?’, European Journal of 




to society.260 Consequentially, this comparative study is seen as evaluative in nature.261 In a similar 
way to doctrinal research, it may ‘provide material for the legislator’ as well as being ‘an instrument 
of interpretation’ and ‘of significance for the supranational unification of law’.262 Seen in this light, the 
comparative method is very well-suited to the tasks that are set for chapter six of this thesis as it may 
help to avoid the mistakes of the past made by legislators in other jurisdictions who are trying to find 
answers to the same set of problems.263 
Finally, chapter seven this work comprises an analytical study of the responses of twenty-one informal, 
family carers to a series of questions put to them by the author, in the form of a semi-structured 
interview, on their experiences of caring, the value of family caring, the merits and demerits of our 
existing social care system and their thoughts on how this system might be reformed and further 
funded given that the numbers of those who will be in need of such care is likely to increase markedly 
in the not too distant future. With the support of this data, the author then attempts to draw some 
meaningful conclusions which in combination with the other reforms suggested earlier in this work, 
will point the way forwards towards a better, more efficient and more humane social care system for 
England and Wales as a whole. 
In summary, the methodology adopted in this thesis might be described as ‘diverse’, a synthesis of 
approaches fashioned towards a particular end. That is not entirely unconventional. Different 
methodologies may be used to advance a single hypothesis and may support each other in achieving 
that given aim. The reader may wish to judge the success of this approach. 
As regards the scope of this thesis, while its premises are plainly directed towards the protection of 
adult children who render caring services on an informal basis to their elderly, disabled  parents – 
which is a premise that other authors on this subject have repeatedly clung on to264 – it is expressly 
 
260 R. Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’, taken from, ‘M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, 
‘The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law’ (OUP, 2006), p. 339 et seq. 
 
261 See: fn. 259, supra. 
 
262 K. Zeigert and H. Hotz, ‘Introduction to Comparative Law’ (Pearson Publishing, 1998) at p. 32. Although 
whether the latter aim is achieved through comparative study has been doubted - see: R. Sacco, ‘Legal 
Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 
1-34 at p. 2, where he claims: ‘… history provides no evidence that uniformity is achieved through comparative 
legal study’. 
 
263 Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World, 3rd edition, (Routledge Cavendish, 2007) at p. 222 et 
seq.  
 
264 Mika Oldham, ‘Financial Obligations within the Family – Aspects of Intergenerational Maintenance and 




acknowledged in chapter six that the remedies that are put forward to protect adult children who 
deliver this care can equally be developed to accommodate informal care that is administered by those 
who have no blood ties to the care-receiver. Significant, here, would be the development of some 
form of registration for the carer so that he/she is acknowledged as the primary carer over and above 
members of the care-receiver’s family.265 With this in mind, all references to adult children as informal 
carers should not be seen as limiting the relief that is proposed for this section of society at the close 
of this thesis. There is little, good reason why friends and neighbours cannot take on a long-term 
informal caring role and receive the same benefits as adult children would do under any proposed 
scheme.266 Similarly, the suggested reforms are not dependent on the ability of central government 
to recover any sums that may be paid to an informal carer from the estate of the care-receiver in the 
form of state benefits. If the care-receiver owns their own residential property, the proposal is that 
central government will take a charge over that property in order to secure the recovery of these 
payments, but if no such property exists, no such charge can be taken. In this event, the repayment of 
any sums advanced to an informal carer will form a debt recoverable from the care-receiver’s estate, 
and measures will need to be put in place in order to prevent people avoiding this payment; but, if the 
care-receiver’s estate does not have the resources to repay that debt, the debt will have to be written-











265 And the further development of an appeal system so that members of the care-receiver’s family could 
appeal this registration where they believe it to be wrong, would also be a useful addition to any proposals for 
the resolution of society’s growing need for the work done by informal carers. 
 
266 Although, some form of negotiated contract and registration would be needed in order to allow the care-
receiver’s adult children to consider the impact of this care on their own expectations in relation to their 
parent’s estate on his/her death, and strict control mechanisms would need to be in place in order to avoid 













The provision of social care introduces both the care-giver and the care-receiver to a number of 
different statutory regimes. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and explain these regimes and 
to analyse their potential impact on the informal care-giving relationship with which this thesis is 
concerned. The object of this exercise is to better understand not only the regulations that confine 
and restrict that relationship but also what assistance is available from third parties to sustain and 
develop that relationship. 
‘Care’ comes in various forms. One form of care that is closely related to social care is health care. In 
England and Wales health care is provided free at source by the National Health Service (‘NHS’) while 
social care is not.267 Instead, the statutory obligation to provide social care lies on local authorities, but 
that obligation is a qualified one. Where a care-recipient’s social care needs are already being provided 
for by a carer, there is no duty for the local authority to do anything.268 Where someone is assessed to 
be in need of social care and has no carer, if the person so assessed asks for care and the eligibility 
conditions are satisfied, local authorities now have a duty to provide that care if that person is resident 
in their locality.269 If the means of a care recipient are assessed to be in excess of the means-test 
 
267 Of course, that statement is a very broad one. There have been, and will continue to be, many instances 
where social care has been provided without charge because the recipient has no means to pay for such a 
service; equally, the prescription charges that many people have to pay for the provision of medicines on the 
NHS give the lie to the claim that all health care treatment is free.267 Nevertheless, on a general level the 
observation is valid. 
 
268 See: The Care Act 2014, s. 18(7). 
 




threshold,270 the local authority has a power to charge for such services.271 In other words, those 
people who fall outside the means-test that is presently in place, and are not being cared for by a 
carer, are expected to pay for their own social care - at least where their need for the same is not 
attributable to illness and consequently treatable on the NHS. The distinction between treatment on 
the NHS and the provision of social care is thus a very stark one and somewhat difficult to justify. It is 
said that, on the one hand, health care involves ‘the treatment, control or prevention of a disease, 
illness, injury or disability’, and the care or aftercare of a person with needs that relate to one or more 
of these conditions.272 In contrast, social care is more focused on providing assistance with activities 
of daily living, and other incidental benefits which allow the care-recipient to play a more meaningful 
role in society.273 Stated thus, the distinction seems fairly clear. Yet, the deeper one looks, the more 
that distinction becomes blurred.274 At a basic level, health care alleviates, or at least manages, 
‘suffering’. Yet, the elderly suffer with their disabilities as much as anyone else. If the task of 
government is to respond to the legitimate concerns and needs of its citizens, the distinction appears 
to be anomalous and perhaps, in the long-term, unsustainable.275 
 
The social care system that we now have in England and Wales is largely a product of history. While 
the medical profession has always treated the ‘sick and the lame’, physical disability in old age has 
never been regarded as an illness if only because (beyond the replacement of a hip or a knee) there is 
no known cure for the immobility and decline in one’s mental faculties that often accompanies more 
advanced old age. This has now left the provision of social care largely in the hands of those outside 
that profession.  And, given that social care has traditionally been thought of as merely doing for 
 
270 This currently stands at £23,250 for capital. If your savings are above this limit, you will be charged the full 
cost of your care. If your available capital is below this sum, but above £14,250, you must contribute £1 for 
every £250 above this limit. If your savings are below this bottom limit, your contribution will be nil. There are 
also provisions in regard to income, but these will only bite where the care-receiver has a significant income 
over and above their state pension. 
 
271 The Care Act 2014, s. 14(1)(a) and (b) and s. 18(1)-(4). 
 
272 The National Framework for NHS Continuing Healthcare, Practice Guidance Notes, at p. 51, para. 2.1, -
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213137/
National-Framework-for-NHS-CHC-NHS-FNC-Nov-2012.pdf (accessed: 25/06/18). 
 
273 Ibid, at parag. 2.2. 
 
274 R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213, where the Court of Appeal 
dismissed an appeal against an earlier judgment granting a claimants’ application for judicial review of her 
local health authority’s decision to characterise her continuing care as a tetraplegic as ‘social care’. 
 




someone else what most others can do for themselves, those who work in this industry have been left 
undervalued and often forgotten, particularly where much of the work is provided gratuitously by 
families and friends. That is the social care system presently in place in England and Wales, and it has 
been widely acknowledged that the system is heavily dependent on the provision of care by informal 
carers.276 Moreover, there is now a strong consensus across the country that, if it was ever ‘fit for 
purpose’, that system is now broken.277  Yet, there is no clear idea how it might be mended, nor is 
there any unified vision of, or even any broad measure of agreement over, how our social care system 
should look either in the immediate future or beyond. 
 
How to fund a viable social care system is clearly a crucial issue in the on-going debate over the future 
of such a system. For the most part, the burden of providing social care in England and Wales has fallen 
almost exclusively on the care-recipient’s family. Indeed, until the obligation to provide such care was 
abolished in 1948 that burden was, at least theoretically, a legal one.278 Although that legal obligation 
is now only a moral one, research indicates that this burden has grown very significantly since the early 
years of the twenty-first century.279 And, indeed, evidence suggests that it will grow further as time 
moves on with suggestions that we will be facing a sizeable ‘care gap’ before very long.280 These 
problems are not confined to England and Wales. Across the globe, younger members of the family – 
often the wives of eldest sons – have provided social care for their elderly relatives and have done so 
with considerable personal sacrifice on their part.281 And, there is little, if any, evidence that this will 
change as time marches on.  In the USA, in Europe, and in China and Japan, the only concerted help 
 
276 See: The House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee on Adult Social Care, Ninth 
Report, 2016-17, parag. 105, at p. 44 - 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmcomloc/1103/1103.pdf (accessed: 26/04/18). 
 
277 ‘The State of Social Care in Great Britain in 2016’, published by Leonard Cheshire (reg. charity) 
http://cdn.basw.co.uk/upload/basw_55214-6.pdf (accessed: 24/07/17) and ‘10 Charts that show what’s gone 
wrong with social care’, BBC News, - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-39043387 (accessed: 24/07/17). 
 
278 See: S. 1 of the National Assistance Act 1948 which abolished the old Poor Law obligation which required 
sons to support their parents and grandparents throughout their lifetimes; daughters had the same obligation 
but could avoid it by marrying. 
 
279 Since 2001, the growth in the number of carers has outstripped population growth by 16.5% and the 
number of people providing 20-49 hours of care a week has increased by 43%, Carers UK, Valuing Carers 
(2015) - https://www.carersuk.org/for-professionals/policy/policy-library/valuing-carers-2015 (accessed: 
26/04/18). 
 
280 See: fn. 276, supra, at parag. 104, p. 44. 
 
281 Martha A. Fineman., ‘Responsibility, Family and the Limits of Equality: An American Perspective’, in C. Lund, 




for the elderly, disabled community is their immediate family with the State providing only the most 
basic of safety-nets should the family be unable or unwilling to become involved.282 In these 
circumstances, there is a clear need for a new vision for the provision of social care for the elderly, not 








3.2 SOCIAL CARE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
The creation of the NHS in July 1948 very much confirmed the idea that health care is a legitimate 
concern of the State.283  Hence, the NHS is largely funded by general taxation.284 In contrast, social care 
is funded either by local authorities or by the care-receiver; and, in an age where central funding for 
local authorities has been regularly declining, and the opportunities for such authorities to raise 
income locally has been severely restricted, the money spent on the provision of social care has been 
diminishing notwithstanding that more and more elderly are now in need of such provision.285 In these 
circumstances, successive governments have come under increasing pressure to reform the social care 
 
282 A. Hashimoto ‘Aging in Japan’, at https://www.pittmag.pitt.edu/sep94/s94classes.html (accessed: 
22/02/17) and F. Russo, Caring for Aging Parents: Should there be a law?’ -
http://healthland.time.com/2013/07/22/caring-for-aging-parents-should-there-be-a-law/ (accessed: 
22/02/17). 
   
283 Is public health a proper concern of the State or should one’s health be a matter of personal choice? If 
personal choice is unrestricted, to what degree should the burden of that choice be borne by the general 
public? These are, in essence, philosophical issues on which there has been considerable debate in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. And, of course, arguments have been advanced in support of a ‘just 
minimum of health care’ as a basic human right – ‘a special social good’ whose absence operates to deny ‘fair 
equality of opportunity’ to those who suffer from illness and disease. See: Lawrence O. Costin and Madison 
Powers, ‘What Does Social Justice Require for the Public’s Health?’ Public Health Ethics and Policy Imperatives, 
Health Affairs, vol. 25, no. 4, (2006) at p. 1053 et seq. And, see also: Norman Daniels, Just Health, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). A summary of Daniels’ arguments can be found in his article, Justice, Health and Health 
Care, - https://muse.jhu.edu/article/178853 (accessed: 04/09/18). Those arguments support the idea that 
‘compensation for caring’ should be available because the caring process denies the carer ‘fair equality of 
opportunity’ in regard to access to jobs, offices and the like. 
 
 
284 See: https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/projects/nhs-in-a-nutshell/how-nhs-funded (accessed: 02/02/20). 
 




system. Perhaps the most significant development of the early part of the twentieth-century was the 
decision of the Coalition Government to set up the Commission on Funding of Care and Support in 
2010, now known as ‘the Dilnot Commission’. The Dilnot Commission recommended, inter alia, the 
capping of an individual’s social care costs at a figure of no more than £50,000 so that, once this sum 
had been paid, the State would pick up pay the balance of those costs.286 Although it did not accept 
the level of the cap, the Coalition Government’s response was to very largely adopt the principles of 
the funding model that the Dilnot Commission had put forward – i.e. capped institutionalised social 
care costs, an extended means test for those without the necessary capital reserves to pay the capped 
sum and a universal system of deferred payments for any residential care that might be needed.287 
In February 2013, the Coalition Government formally introduced its long-promised raft of social care 
reforms by promising to bring in a ‘capped care model’ from April 2017 onwards. One month later, in 
the March budget, this date was brought forward to 2016 and the maximum sum that any individual 
would be asked to pay towards the funding of his/her social care needs was set at £72,000. In March 
2014, this Bill became law and was set to come into force in April 2015. The cap on care costs was due 
to be brought into force a year later. In the event, the introduction of phase two of the Care Act 2014 
was postponed. On 17 July 2015, just two months after the 2015 General Election, the new 
Conservative administration announced its decision to delay the implementation of phase two until 
April 2020. Phase two includes not only the much-vaunted cap on care costs but also the proposed 
changes to capital limits for savings that would have resulted in a more generous means-test for those 
who are entitled to receive state support for the funding of their social care.288 In addition, the new 
Conservative Government also postponed, until April 2020, the proposed duty on local authorities to 
meet the needs of self-funding occupants of care homes at their request – albeit, in such 
circumstances, the local authority involved would have the right to recoup those costs by levying 
charges on the self-funder in question. The main reasons that were provided for this delay were two-
fold.289 Firstly, the cost of introducing such provisions was considered to be too high in the present 
economic climate; and, secondly, the Government further referred to the lack of products presently 
 
286 See: https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/field/field_publication_summary/social-care-




288 This would have increased the upper capital limit for support from £23,250 to £118,000 for care home 
residents whose property is included in the means test and from £23,250 to £27,000 in all other cases. 
 
289 These reasons appear in the UK Government’s written statements to the House of Lords and to the House 
of Commons made on the 17th and 20th July 2015 in response to a letter from the Local Government 




available in the private insurance market that would encourage people to protect themselves against 
the future costs of their own social care and thereby limit the exposure of the State to fund the reforms 
that the Care Act 2014 was to introduce. 
In the publicity that heralded the arrival of the Care Act 2014, it was estimated that the financial limits 
on care costs that were due to be introduced by this Act would have benefited some 80,000 people.290 
Yet, whether these benefits would accrue to those in most need of them remains open to doubt.291 In 
any event, whether the proposed cap on social care costs will ever be introduced must now be called 
into question.292 In order to bring the proposed reforms into force, the UK Government would have to 
find some £6 billion over the next five years and commit to spending in the region of £2.4 billion on 
social care costs in 2024/25.293 In these circumstances, while the postponement of phase two will have 
disappointed many,294 this decision received a cautious welcome from many diverse sources, such as 
Care England295 and Carers UK,296 on the one hand, and the Local Government Association,297 on the 




tation_Accessible_All.pdf  (accessed: 30/06/14). 
 
291 N. Hopkins and E. Laurie, ‘Social Citizenship, Housing Wealth and the Cost of Social Care: Is the Care Act 
2014 ‘Fair’’? Modern Law Review (2015) 78(1) pp. 112-139. 
 
292 Nick Triggle: ‘Is the Cap on Care Costs Doomed?’ at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-33624728 
(accessed: 16/11/17). 
 
293 Carers UK: ‘Delayed implementation of Care Act phase two’, Policy Briefing, August 2015, at p.7. 
 
294 In particular, because this policy had been part of the Conservative Party’s election manifesto in 2010 and 
again in 2015. 
 
295 M. Green, CEO of Care England was reported as saying, ‘[We] must now, once and for all, use this time to 
develop a long-term and sustainable funding solution for social care. If the government refuses to address the 
issue of funding, we will have a care system in crisis and the NHS unable to cope with the pressure.’ – See also: 
BBC News, ‘Care Costs Cap delayed until 2020’ - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-33552279 (accessed: 
26/05/16). 
 
296 Carers UK: ‘Delayed implementation of Care Act phase two’, Policy Briefing, August 2015, at pp. 6-7. 
 
297 The first call to implement a delay in the bringing-in of the cap came from the Local Government 
Association (the ‘LGA’). In early July 2014, the LGA suggested that the reforms in phase two should be delayed 
and the £6 billion which would be saved by doing so should be injected into the present adult social care 
system in an effort to keep it afloat - ‘Adult Social Care Funding: 2014 State of the Nation Report’, by the Local 
Government Association’s Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, October 2014, - see: 
http://www.local.gov.uk/documents/10180/5854661/Adult+social+care+funding+2014+State+of+the+nation+




Act may reflect not only growing doubts over the economic practicalities of the scheme but also its 
overall ‘fairness’ as an instrument of social justice.298  
Whether any ‘justice’ can be delivered to care-receivers in perhaps one thing; whether such justice 
will ever be provided for informal carers is quite another. As things stand, the UK Government makes 
some small provision for informal carers in the form of a ‘carer’s allowance’.299 The word ‘allowance’ 
is an ill-judged description of such a payment.300 It rather suggests that the payer is getting nothing in 
return for what is being paid out; that, in turn, seems to indicate that there is no moral or other 
obligation on the State to pay for what is being provided. In fact, that is how the word ‘allowance’ is 
used elsewhere in the UK benefits system, as if it corresponds to what we give our children and 
dependants so they may learn how to manage money or to provide themselves with a few ‘home 
comforts’ where these are not supplied directly by the head of the household.301 Unfortunately, the 
description, ‘carer’s allowance’, only serves to exemplify the way in which informal carers are – and 
have always been – treated by successive governments. While these governments have often been 
quick to heap praise on informal carers for the work that they do, they have also consistently 
disavowed any responsibility for paying – or even providing significant financial encouragement – for 
the supply of social care to the disabled elderly across the board.302  In fact, one can see how the 
‘carer’s allowance’ is thought of at government level when one realises that, once a carer is entitled 
 
298 Indeed, as Nicholas Hopkins and Emma Laurie were quick to note, the implementation of the ‘cap’ on social 
care costs that is contained in the Care Act 2014 would operate ‘… to reinforce the expectation of leaving housing 
wealth as an inheritance which perpetuates inequalities across generations. (See: fn.              supra) In other 
words, the proposed ‘cap’ enables an individual’s housing wealth to be protected against the dissipation of that 
wealth that would result from any requirement that it be used to pay for that individual’s social care costs (which 
is required under the present system) thereby enabling those who have such wealth to pass it on to their children 
or other relations on their death. Put in these terms, the so-called ‘fairness’ of the Care Act 2014 is called into 
question as something that is contrary to the modern conception of ‘social citizenship’, which is at one point 
connected with the provision of basic services and benefits by the welfare stare which are designed to be 
accessed by the poorest in society, and, at the opposite end of the spectrum, with a more equal distribution of 
wealth across that society. (See: pp. 113 and 118) 
 
299 https://www.gov.uk/carers-allowance (accessed: 16/11/17). 
 
300 Some may regard it as demeaning.  
 
301 Cf. the ‘Jobseeker’s Allowance’, ‘Attendance Allowance’ and even ‘the Marriage Allowance’ in our Income 
Tax system. 
 
302 The UK Government’s ‘position’ is that the ‘carer’s allowance’ is not intended as a wage and therefore no 
comparison with, say, ‘the national living wage’ would be a fair comparison – see: HM Government, Carers at 
the Heart of the 21st Century Families and Communities, (The Stationery Office, 2008) -
.https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136492/carers_at_the_hea




to a state pension on reaching pension age, the sum he/she receives for the ‘carer’s allowance’ is likely 
to diminish given the means-tested nature of the payment, yet the demands of the work remain the 
same.303 
Notwithstanding this, the UK Government continues to seek the support of family units in order to 
deliver the social care that many elderly citizens so desperately need.304 Tomorrow’s social care for 
the elderly is set to continue, it seems, as a form of partnership between public and private 
provision.305  This was the position adopted by the Coalition Government in 2012.  And, it remains, it 
would appear, the position of the present Government too.306 Despite increasing recognition of the 
seriousness of this issue,307 and some small attempts in recent years to introduce additional funding 
for local authorities in order that they might better perform their statutory duties in regard to the 
provision of social care,308 the idea of a partnership between the family and the State in an effort to 
meet the challenge that an ageing population is being touted by many, particularly in the centre and 
on the right of our political spectrum, as the only viable solution.309 And, it is the family that is expected 
to play the dominant role in this partnership.  
Partnerships are, of course, consensual arrangements. Yet, if care is not provided by the care-
receiver’s immediate family, the absence of a properly-funded social care system has meant, and will 
 
303 See: The House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee on Adult Social Care, Ninth 
Report, 2016-17, fn. 197, supra, parag. 119, p. 48. 
 
304 David Mowatt, Care Minister in the Conservative Government in 2017, reported at 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jan/31/take-care-of-your-elderly-mothers-and-fathers-says-tory-
minister and http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/31/parents-responsible-care-elderlymothers-fathers-
much-children/ (accessed: 25/07/17). 
 
305 Jeremy Hunt, Health Minister in the Conservative Government in 2015, - 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/personal-responsibility (accessed: 25/07/17). 
 
306 There seems to be no significant change of the Government’s position on social care in the wake of the last 
general election in December 2019; the partnership theme remains. 
 
307 Whether this has been reflected in government circles is another matter. Between 2010 and 2016 social 
care funding in England alone diminished by some £4.6 billion; see: the Association of Directors of Adult Social 
Services’ Budget Survey, 2016 - https://www.adass.org.uk/adass-budget-survey-2016-full-report (accessed: 
27/07/17). 
 
308 See: the introduction of the ‘adult social care precept’ in the Budget Statement of Autumn 2015 which 
allowed local authorities to raise council tax charges by 2% to fund adult social care in their area and the 
‘Improved Better Care Fund’ in the same Budget Statement which is designed to ‘incentivise and transform 
the integration of health and social care services’ –
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7903/CBP-7903.pdf (accessed: 27/07/17). 
 
309 http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2017/05/loanna-morrison-social-care-should-really-become-




continue to mean, that some of our disabled elderly will suffer real hardship and deprivation. That 
only increases the pressure on families to provide that care at their own expense.310 As a society in 
control of its Government through our democratic processes, the very least we should demand is that 
it provides such social care as may be required by the disabled elderly to any would-be service user 
who is unable to pay for such services from their own resources. Where recipients are able to pay for 
their own social care, new initiatives are needed to encourage them to do so without imposing 
financial burdens on them that are unfair when compared with those whose needs must be met 
directly. Nevertheless, before we can take a look at what might be done for all those in need of care, 
we must consider what is presently being done for informal carers. It is only to the extent that what is 
being falls short of satisfying the demands of social justice in the twenty-first century that a case may 









3.3 SOCIAL CARE IN THE PRESENT DAY – THE CARER’S LOT  
In many respects, the Care Act 2014 has kept faith with the existing process of delivering social care in 
England and Wales by reinforcing the two main pillars of the existing system, ‘the assessment’ and 
‘the personal budget’. Service users will continue to be assessed on the appearance of their needs 
without regard, at first, to their financial resources or to any assistance that they might already receive 
from informal carers.311 In this context, a carer is defined as an adult who provides or intends to 
provide care for another adult.312 This ‘carer-blind’ assessment of needs will produce the service user’s 
‘personal budget’ which can generate a cash payment from the local authority to either the service 
user or a family member or friend who will manage that payment on their behalf.313 While for some 
 
310 That is to say, expense in terms of the care-giver’s time and labour but also ‘at the expense’ of the care-
giver’s career prospects and mental well-being. 
 
311 See: The Care Act 2014, s. 9. 
 
312 Ibid. s. 10(11), which makes it clear that care includes the provision of practical or emotional support. 
 
313 See: section 2.5, infra. 
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this presents the service user with a freedom to purchase whatever he or she most desires from the 
market,  to many others a service user’s needs are ‘commodified’ and ‘depersonalised’.314 
Concurrently with this service users’ assessment, local authorities must now carry out a carer’s 
assessment in order to measure the impact of any informal social care that is being provided by the 
carer on the well-being of the service user and on the outcomes that the informal carer wishes to 
achieve.315  That assessment will look to see what support might be offered by the local authority to 
satisfy these outcomes.316 In carrying out this assessment, the local authority is required to have regard 
to whether the carer works or wishes to work and whether the carer is participating in education, 
training or recreation, or wishes to do so; and, it must involve the carer and the service user in the 
assessment.317 This unrestricted duty on local authorities to carry out a carer’s assessment is new.318 
And, the assessment must take place regardless of the carer’s need for support and without regard to 
their financial resources or those of the service user.319 Thus far, the introduction of these support 
measures seems to be ‘good news’ for informal carers whatever their situation may be. 
Regrettably, this may not be the case across the board. These assessments are not, in themselves, 
‘gateways’ to the provision of care services by local authorities. Once these assessments have been 
carried out, and the local authority has found that there is a need for either care or support on the 
part of an adult would-be service user, it must then decide whether any of his/her needs satisfy ‘the 
 
 
314 As Lucy Series and Luke Clements remark: ‘The process by which ‘need’ is commodified (as opposed to the 
response to that ‘need’) is generally referred to as ‘personalisation’ and the price put on that need, as a ‘personal 
budget. If a personal budget consists of a cash payment to the disabled or elderly person (or family member / 
friend on their behalf) then this, at law is ‘direct payment.’ – L. Series and L. Clements, ‘Putting the Cart before 
the Horse: Resource Allocation Systems and Community Care’, Journal of Social and Welfare Law 35(2), pp. 207-
226 at p. 210. 
315 The duty on local authorities to carry out a carer’s assessment is new; and, the assessment must take place 
regardless of the carer’s need for support and without regard to their financial resources or those of the 
service user. Local authorities have had power to carry out such assessment since 2000, but have never been 
under a duty to assess the needs of carers. 
 
316 The Care Act 2014, s. 10, and, in particular, s. 10(5). 
 
317 Ibid. at s. 10(5), (6) and (7)  
 
318 Local authorities have had power to carry out such an assessment since 2000, but have never been under a 
duty to assess the needs of carers save in very limited circumstances. These circumstances were where the 
carer in question provides or intends to provide a substantial amount of care on a regular basis for the relevant 
person and asks for or requests an assessment pursuant to the Carers (Recognition and Services) Act 1995, s. 
1(1), or the Carers and Disabled Children Act 2000, s. 1. 
 




eligibility criteria’ applicable to service-users.320 Similarly, where some of the carer’s needs meet the 
eligibility criteria for carers’ support following the making of a carer’s assessment, the local authority 
is under a like duty.321 A carer will meet the eligibility criteria applicable to carers  if his/her needs arise 
as a consequence of providing care for an adult and the effect of those needs is that the carer is unable 
to provide some of the care that is necessary or the effect of the carer’s needs is that the carer’s 
physical or mental health is deteriorating or the carer is unable to achieve certain specified outcomes 
and, as a consequence, there is, or is likely to be, once again, a significant impact on the carer’s well-
being. If some of the carer’s needs meet the eligibility criteria, all that the local authority is required 
to do at this point is to ‘consider what could be done to meet those needs’.322  
S. 20(1) of the Care Act 2014 then imposes a duty on local authorities to meet a carer’s need for 
support.323 Having made a determination of needs under s. 13(1), a local authority must meet a carer’s 
needs for support, where the carer is caring for an adult needing care in its area,324 if it has found the 
existence of needs that meet the eligibility criteria. These needs are to be met either by the provision 
of support to the carer or through the provision of care and support to the adult needing care. Again, 
there are similar conditions that must be met in regard to the adult service user and carer’s financial 
resources in order to trigger the duty of meet the carer’s need for support;325 and, local authorities 
are able to charge for the services that they provide if these financial conditions are not satisfied. If 
there is no duty on a local authority to meet a carer’s needs, the local authority is given a power to do 
 
320 See: The Care Act 2014, s. 13(1) and (7). Under the Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations 2014, 
(which came into force on the 1st April 2015) a service user’s needs will only meet the criteria if they are 
caused by a physical or mental impairment or illness and will result in the service user being unable to achieve 
a ‘specified outcome’ with the result that there is, or is likely to be, a significant impact on the adult service 
user’s well-being.320 In this event, the local authority must consider what can be done to meet these needs. 
 
321 See: The Care Act 2014, s. 13(4). 
 
322 The Care Act 2014, s. 13(4)(a). 
 
323 This is similar in form to the duty placed on a local authority to meet the needs for care and support of 
adults that are ‘ordinarily resident in its area’ - ibid. s. 18(1).  
 
324 Whether the adult service user in question is in need is determined, inter alia, by reference to ‘the financial 
condition’ - The Care Act 2014, s. 18(2). 
 
325 Ibid., s. 20(1)(b) and (c) and (2) – (5), ibid.; these provisions are a little more complex than the s. 18 




so.326 There is also a similar power for local authorities to meet the needs of adult service users where 
there is no duty on them to act.327 
One of the steps that a local authority must take where it is required to meet an adult service user’ or 
carer’s needs or where, in the absence of a duty to do so, it decides to exercise its power to meet those 
needs is to prepare a care plan, or alternatively a care and support plan, as the case may be;328 another 
such step is the preparation of an independent personal budget for the adult service user.329 Amongst 
other things, a support plan for carers will specify the needs that have been identified following the 
completion of the carer’s assessment, specify to what extent those needs meet the eligibility criteria, 
specify the needs that the local authority will meet and how it proposes to meet them, and provide 
the carer with advice and information on what can be done to meet or reduce those needs and what 
can be done to prevent or delay the development of needs for care and support for the adult service 
user and/or support  for the carer in the future.330 Unfortunately, and rather perversely, these 
demands are proving to be too costly for local authorities who are increasingly starved of funds by 
Central Government. In fact, it has been observed that there is a clear disincentive for local authorities 
to identify carers and to carry out an assessment of their needs.331 
Although these new duties and powers are in some ways extensive, and include a raft of ‘overarching 
duties’ which local authorities must comply with in the delivery of care and support services to those 
in their locality,332 on closer inspection one can see, once again, the ‘safety-net approach’ in  operation. 
 
326 Ibid. at s. 20(6) 
 
327 Ibid. at s. 19(1) 
 
328 Ibid. at s. 24(1)(a) 
 
329 Ibid. s. 24(3) and, see: ibid. s. 26(1), for the definition of ‘personal budget’. 
 
330 Ibid. s. 25(1) 
 
331 See: The House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee on Adult Social Care, Ninth 
Report, 2016-17, parag. 108, p. 45, noting the evidence of Councillor Rory Palmer, the Deputy City Mayor and 
Lead Member for Adult Social Care at Leicester City Council, -
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmcomloc/1103/1103.pdf (accessed: 29/04/18). 
 
332 These duties on local authorities comprise: ‘the well-being principle’ (a duty to promote the well-being of 
service users and carers and to take their views, wishes, feelings and beliefs into account when doing so); a 
duty to ‘prevent reduce and delay needs for care and support’ in its area; a duty to exercise its functions by 
integrating care and support provision with health provision and health-related services where that is in the 
best interests of service users or carers with needs; a duty to provide information and advice relating to care 
and support provided by the authority to both service users and carers; a duty to promote diversity and quality 
in the provision of care and support services in its area, including the promotion of ‘the efficient and effective 
operation of a market’ for those services;  and, a general duty to co-operate with its service providers in 
carrying out its functions under the Act. 
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The State is only prepared to step in when there is a danger of family support failing in some degree. 
In these circumstances, while informal carers can expect to receive some incidental benefit from these 
changes, their overall impact on ‘the carer’s lot’ remains uncertain.  That the Care Act 2014 represents 
only the first steps towards the provision of an ‘effective safety-net’, and nothing more, for the 
disabled elderly who will be in need of social care in the years to come is most keenly emphasised by 
a report from the King’s Fund which centres on the funding of such social care as we move further into 
the twenty-first century.333 In essence, the 2014 report from the King’s Fund considers the economic 
challenges that the Care Act 2014 will bring and explores some of the solutions to these challenges 
from a Central Government standpoint.334 As the authors of this report note, the £72,000 cap on 
lifetime costs of social care provided by the State applies only to ‘eligible needs’ – in other words, 
needs that a local authority assesses are ‘necessary’ (which is likely to depend on the resources 
available to a local authority as much as anything else) - for a particular applicant.335  The report further 
concludes that what is ‘necessary’ is likely to correspond to the demands of those with ‘critical needs’ 
or ‘substantial needs’, which represent the two most serious categories in the four recognised 
categories of care that local authorities use in order to determine whether or not they should pay for 
such care.336 There is, therefore, still a very significant need for adult children to continue to involve 
themselves in the care of their disabled elderly parents.337 What is more, as noted earlier, that need is 
projected to grow, not diminish.338  And, with that need, there remains the question: should the 
provision of such social care be incentivised to the extent that adult children have the legal right to 
recover some or all of the costs expended by them (including the value of their labour) in providing 
 
 
333 K. Barker, ‘A New Settlement for Health and Social Care: A Final Report’, the King’s Fund, 2014, which at 
page ix of its introduction, States that the estimates presented in that report suggest that an additional £3 
billion will be needed initially to make social care free for those regarded as having critical or substantial needs 
and that this figure will rise to £ 5 billion by 2025. 
 
334 It is interesting to consider that, as noted in the 2014 report, the Local Government Association has 
calculated that there will be a £1.9 billion shortfall in local authority budgets for the cost of adult social care as 
at the end of the next financial year – ibid. at p. 17. 
 
335 Ibid. at p. 3; 
 
336 Ibid. at p. 3; 
 
337 As noted at p. 2 of the 2014 report: ‘Population projections suggest that the numbers of older people 
needing care will continue to grow significantly – the number of people aged over 80 is expected to double to 
6 million by 2037’ – and it is this section of society that will be most in need of social care; yet, as noted at 
page 4 of the 2014 report: ‘Only around half of the social care spending goes on those aged over 65’. This more 
than demonstrates the very significant role played by informal carers in the English social care system; 
 




that social care for an elderly parent from the parent’s estate at his or her death? Without this 
incentivisation, it would seem that the funding of social care for the elderly will continue to be an 
intractable problem for the UK Government for many years to come at a time when pressure on the 







3.4 PAYING FOR THE COST OF SOCIAL CARE – DIRECT PAYMENTS 
Where the Care Act 2014 may have some small impact on ‘the carer’s lot’ is in relation to the use that 
adult service users might be able to make of ‘direct payments’. Such payments have been in use in the 
context of adult and social care in England and Wales since the mid-1990s; and, the UK Government 
has declared direct payments to be its, ‘… preferred mechanism for personalised care and support [as 
such payments] provide independence, choice and control by enabling people to commission their 
own care and support in order to meet their eligible needs’.339  At paragraphs 12.35 – 12.36 of the 
Care and Support Statutory Guidance issued under the Care Act 2014, the Government has explained 
that the use of direct payments made to adult service users, ‘... is designed to be used flexibly and 
innovatively and there should be no unreasonable restriction placed on the use of the payment, as 
long as it is being used to meet eligible care and support needs.340 Having said this, the Government 
has held true to one of its main principles in regard to adult social care, namely, that these direct 
payments cannot be used to purchase care services from a close family member living in the same 
household, except in exceptional circumstances.341 While holding true to this idea, the Care and 
Support (Direct Payments) Regulations 2014 do permit local authorities a general discretion to give 
 
339 Paragraph 12.3 of the draft Care and Support Statutory Guidance issued under the Care Act 2014 by the 
Department of Health, June 2014. 
 
340 Ibid. at parag. 12.35. 
 




prior consent to pay a close family member living in the same household in return for providing 
management and/or administrative support to the direct payment holder.342 
What ‘exceptional circumstances’ might merit direct payments being used to pay a close family 
member living in the same household as the adult service user for the provision of care services? The 
NHS suggests343 that the use of direct payments in this manner may be permitted where only the 
family member could fulfil the role of care provider due to ‘… religious reasons, language difficulties 
or specific health problems’ and perhaps other reasons, which it does not specify but which it does 
acknowledge may exist.344 Permission to use direct payments in this way is firmly in the hands of the 
local authority making the payment. And, in practice, this power is only used, it seems, in the rarest of 
circumstances.  
Other European states take a different approach. In the Netherlands, for example, those who require 
care services and who opt to receive direct payments in lieu of state-provided care are permitted to 
use these payments to pay relatives to perform these services regardless of whether they are living in 
the same household as the care recipient.345 There are conditions that must be satisfied before the 
care recipient can engage someone living in the same household as a carer. In order to be eligible to 
receive these direct payments from care recipients, household members (including partners) must 
show that the caring duties that they have performed on an informal basis ‘overstrain’ them; if they 
are able to do so, they can be paid for the care they provide through the use, by the care recipient, of 
these direct payments under a formal contract, if the care recipient can justify their engagement.346 In 
this way, family members, in the Netherlands, can become ‘care workers’, albeit without subsidiary 
employment rights such as sickness and holiday pay.347 In Germany, where the provision of care 
services are funded through hypothecated social insurance contributions from employers and 
employees which are fixed by Federal Law, those who require care services may either receive these 
 
342 See: fn. 339, supra, at parag. 12.36.  
 





345 E. Grootegoed, ‘Relatives as paid care-givers: how family carers experience payments for care’, (2010) 
Ageing and Society, 30, pp. 467-489. 
 
346 Although 5% of the annual direct payments budget may now be used to pay family members living in the 
same household as care recipients without this justification - ibid. at p. 487. 
 




services from a provider organisation or take a lower value cash allowance and arrange their care 
informally, i.e. paying relatives to provide the care they need.348 349 Typically, the lower cash value 
allowance is a little over one half of the commercial cost of these services.350 
In some respects, it is disappointing that in enacting the Care Act 2014 the UK Government has not 
chosen to follow the path followed by our European neighbours. That said, it must be acknowledged 
that State provision of financial support for carers, whether provided directly or indirectly, has 
provoked a good deal of philosophical and even moral debate.351 Should the state provide such 
support? Is such support the best way of supporting carers financially? Is such support in the best 
interest of care-receivers? There is some feeling abroad that state provision of financial support for 
carers, ‘… can entrap women into caregiving roles by offering financial support in place of other care 
options’.352 While some initial research in Canada has only concluded that, ‘… financial support policies 
[can be] but one approach to the development of a supportive community policy’,353 and that ‘a more 
complex and comprehensive framework for sorting through these layers [i.e. the support options 
available in each case] is needed in order to develop responsive polices’,354 other research in the 
Netherlands, albeit limited in scope, has produced a much more favourable response, with 
interviewees describing the introduction of cash payments as ‘positive and motivating’355 and 
researchers concluding that ‘… payments for care help to create a situation of balanced give-and-take, 
particularly in very demanding and intense long-term care relationships’.356 
 
 
348 C. Glendinning, et al. ‘Funding long-term care for older people: lessons from other countries’, (2004), The 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
 
349 J. Keefe, et al. ‘Financial payments for family carers: policy approaches and debates’, in A. Martin-Matthews 
and J. Phillips (eds.), Ageing at the inter-section of work and home life: Blurring the boundaries, (New York, 
Lawrence Eribaum, 2008) at pp. 185-206. 
 
350 Ibid. at p. 200. 
351 Jean C. Blaser, ‘The Case Against Paid Family Caregivers: Ethical and Practical Issues’, in M. Holstein P. and 
Mitzson (eds.), Ethics in Community-Based Elder Care, (Springer Publishing Company, 2001). 
 
352 See: fn. 349, supra. 
  
353 J. Keefe and B. Rajnovich, ‘To Pay or Not to Pay: Examining Underlying Principles in the Debate on Financial 
Support for Caregivers’, Canadian Journal on Ageing, 26, pp. 77-89, p. 86. 
 
354 Ibid. at p. 87. 
 
355 See: fn. 345, supra, p. 483. 
 









3.5 PAYING FOR THE COST OF SOCIAL CARE – THE ‘CARER’S ALLOWANCE’ AND ‘CARER’S 
BENEFIT’ 
While the support that can follow a carer’s assessment may provide some small relief for informal 
carers, in ordinary circumstances this relief will not be financial in nature. It is therefore necessary to 
look at what financial provision is presently available for carers. In essence, this relief can be found in 
‘the carer’s allowance’ and ‘the carer’s benefit’.  
The modern-day ‘carer’s allowance’ is derived from s. 70 of the Social Security Contributions and 
Benefits Act 1992 and the various statutory regulations made thereunder.357 At the time of writing in 
March 2020, this allowance stands at £66.15 per week or, on average, almost £300 per month.358 The 
benefit is payable to those who look after others who have ‘substantial care needs’359 but there are 
many qualifying conditions that a claimant must satisfy before being entitled to this payment and, if a 
claimant is paid the carer’s allowance, such payment may affect the state benefits to which the care 
recipient is entitled.360 These restrictions are in place because ‘carer’s allowance’ is seen as an income-
 
357 Latterly, these include the Social Security (Disability Living Allowance, Attendance Allowance and Carer’s 
Allowance) (Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations 2011 and the Social Security (Disability Living Allowance, 
Attendance Allowance and Carer’s Allowance) (Amendment) Regulations 2013. 
358 https://www.gov.uk/carers-allowance (accessed: 11/11/17). There are approximately six million carers in 
the UK. However, huge numbers don't claim. Benefits charity Elizabeth Finn Care estimates 300,000 people 
who are eligible do not claim carer's allowance. 
359 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/social-care-users-will-be-guaranteed-a-minimum-level-of-council-
help-under-new-plans which explains that the latest draft regulations pitch the new eligibility criteria  under at 
the equivalent of ‘substantial’ under the old four-fold needs assessment for the provision of social care used 
by local authorities over the past few years – see also: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/209595/National_Eligibility_
Criteria_-_discussion_document.pdf  (both accessed: 30/05/16). 
 
360 If a care recipient is paid ‘severe disability premium’ with any of the following benefits, namely, (1) income-
based job seeker’s allowance; (2) income support; (3) employment and support allowance; (4) pension credit; 
or, (5) housing benefit, and a claimant makes a successful claim for ‘carer’s allowance’, then the care 
recipient’s severe disability premium will stop and any council tax reduction that they may be entitled to could 




replacement benefit and not a payment for services rendered; under the over-lapping benefit rule a 
claimant is not permitted to claim two income-replacement benefits.361 There is also a residence 
qualification that needs to be satisfied before this benefit can be paid.362 Added to this, there are also 
a number of exclusions. In particular, claimants must be earning less than £102 per week (net of tax, 
care costs and 50% of one’s pension contributions) from any other employment that they might be 
undertaking and must not be in full-time education or studying for 21 hours or more each week. What 
is more, payment of the carer’s allowance may be restricted if a claimant is entitled to and claims other 
benefits listed at https://www.gov.uk/carers-allowance/eligability. Finally, as the carer’s allowance is 
a seen as an income-replacement benefit, the care recipient’s financial situation must be such that 
he/she is unable to pay a commercial rate for his/her care. Therefore, in order for the claimant to 
receive the carer’s allowance, the care recipient must receive one of the following benefits: (i) the 
personal independence payment daily living component; (ii) the disability living allowance (at the 
middle or highest care rate); (iii) attendance allowance; (iv) constant attendance allowance at or above 
the normal maximum ate with an industrial injuries disablement benefit at basic (full day) rate with a 
was disablement pension; or (v) an armed forces independence payment. In these circumstances, 
carer’s allowance cannot be seen as a payment for services rendered by an individual in place of the 
State, but as an income supplement for those who would, otherwise, be unable to provide care for 
others on account of their own straightened circumstances. Mercifully, for many carers, the Welfare 
Reform Act 2012 made no impact on the ‘carer’s allowance’ which now lies outside the universal credit 
system. 
In order to claim carer’s allowance a claimant must, of course, deliver ‘substantial and regular care’ to 
someone who is in need of such care. This phrase, ‘substantial and regular care’, has no statutory 
definition. However, the Department of Health in its guidance notes advises not only that a wide 
interpretation be given to the phrase ‘substantial’ but also that any interpretation of this requirement 
should have a subjective as well as objective element and should be concerned, primarily, with the 
impact that the caring role has on the carer; in addition, the word ‘regular’ should be interpreted, so 
say these guidance notes, as meaning merely ‘on-going’ and nothing more.363 Moreover, carer’s 
 
361 Although, if this is the reason why a claimant cannot claim carer’s allowance’ he/she will have an 
‘underlying entitlement’ to carer’s allowance, which means that he/she could receive the carer’s premium in 
any jobseeker’s allowance or income support to which he/she is entitled or the ‘extra support for carers’ 
payment within any pension credit he/she may receive. 
 
362 Claimants must have spent two of the last three years resident in Britain.  
 





allowance is only payable where someone is providing at least 35 hours of otherwise unpaid care to a 
person receiving a relevant disability benefit.364 Given these stringent restrictions, the take-up of 
carer’s allowance has been very limited. Carers UK estimate that over 300,000 of carers fail to claim 
their statutory entitlement to benefits.365 
 
Carers’ benefit is an additional state benefit and is payable where the person cared for is entitled to a 
particular state benefit such as Incapacity Benefit. Entitlement to the benefit is a complex affair. It is 
estimated that approximately £740 million in Carer’s Benefit goes unclaimed each year. Carer’s Credit 
is available where a person gives up employment to care for a child and is designed to mitigate the 
negative impact on the carer’s pension that follows from the loss of his or her job. A Carer’s Grant is 
available to allow a carer to take advantage of respite services and a reduction in Council Tax can also 
be claimed.  
All of this provision is, of course, valuable. Yet, no one could possibly pretend that it is nearly enough. 
What carers often lose by caring for others over a protracted period of time are their very dreams and 
aspirations. In many respects, no amount of financial or other provision can replace this loss. But, that 
is no excuse for inaction. Those who sacrifice their lives to provide this care should be revered and 
celebrated. On one level this needs to be reflected in the availability of social care services that can be 
accessed by informal carers, some at no charge, and others at perhaps some small cost. And, here the 
evidence seems to be that the level of service that is provided is extremely low and often non-
existent.366 On another level, this needs to be through the proper provision of a range of easily 
accessible ‘financial incentives’ for the work that is done by informal carers, work that is essential now, 





364 https://www.gov.uk/carers-allowance/eligibility and https://www.carersuk.org/help-and-advice/financial-
support/help-with-benefits/carers-allowance (both accessed: 30/05/16). 
 
365 Carers UK, ‘Carers Missing Millions’, Carers UK, 2010, at https://www.carersuk.org/news-and-
campaigns/news/carers-missing-millions (accessed: 16/11/17). 
 
366 See, in particular, the sections entitled ‘services for carers’ and ‘social care services’ at pp. 122-130 in J. 
Herring, Caring and the Law, (2013, Hart) for a  full account of the problems faced by those attempting to 





3.6 MENTAL CAPACITY AND SAFEGURDING THE ELDERLY 
 
The elderly are often seen as ‘vulnerable’. Vulnerable people are susceptible to abuse largely because 
they rely on others. And, the disabled elderly in our society place considerable reliance on those who 
provide their social care.  Any form of threat to withdraw that care by an informal carer would 
ordinarily place untold pressure on any member of this class to adhere to whatever demands were 
attached to that threat. And, there are many reported instances where an elderly, disabled care-
receiver has succumbed to such demands.  But, informal carers too are vulnerable. Although one 
might claim that informal carers provide care on a purely voluntary basis, and are therefore entitled 
to ‘walk away’ at any time, in reality the ties of kinship, of love, of moral duty, and the like, make 
abandoning the care of an elderly, disabled relative an extremely difficult and often impractical option. 
Such a crisis commonly occurs at particular ‘pressure points’. One such point is the loss (or perceived 
loss) of the care-receiver’s capacity to make ordinary day-to-day decisions about their accommodation 
and continuing welfare. In this event, these decisions must be made by someone acting on behalf of 
the care-receiver.367 Similarly with decisions concerning the care-receiver’s financial affairs – for 
example, the realisation of a significant investment or the sale of the care-receiver’s home – these 
decisions will need to be made on behalf of a care-receiver who lacks capacity. If the person who must 
make these decisions is the care-receiver’s informal carer, he/she will quickly find that they must 
engage with certain statutory rules and procedures which have the potential to impact, quite 
significantly, on the caring process.368 
Herring describes the significance of capacity thus, ‘One of the most fundamental distinctions in the 
law is drawn between people with capacity and those without’.369 Yet, this distinction is far from clear, 
nor is capacity an ‘all or nothing thing’.370 Rather, there are differing levels of capacity. A person who 
 
367 If the care-receiver has had the foresight to make a Lasting Power of Attorney in relation to his/her financial 
and/or health care affairs, this can be straightforward; otherwise, an application to the Court of Protection will 
be required for the appointment of a Deputy for the care-receiver. 
 
368 These decisions will fall to be made by the care-receiver’s attorney, appointed under a lasting (or enduring) 
power of attorney or by the care-receiver’s deputy if appointed by the Court of Application where no such 
power of attorney has been signed by the care-receiver prior to his/her loss of capacity.  
 
369 Jonathan Herring, Vulnerable Adults and the Law, (OUP, 2016) at p. 45. 
 




has capacity to do one thing may not have the capacity to do another.371 As life expectancy increases, 
capacity is set to become an issue in more and more disputes and differences over the provision of 
care for, and safeguarding of, the elderly as a whole.  In England and Wales, questions of capacity in 
relation to given acts are determined under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, (‘the 2005 Act’) applying 
the provisions of that Act together with the Code of Practice relating thereto issued by the Lord 
Chancellor.372 Capacity is therefore ‘act and time specific’. Whether an individual has capacity to do 
an act depends on what that act is and at what point in time the assessment of capacity is made; 
capacity fluctuates, particularly with the older elderly.  
As someone who has assumed responsibility for a care-receiver’s day-to-day care, an informal carer is 
placed in what many would describe as ‘an unenviable position’.  They face the question, ‘Does the 
care-receiver have capacity to make a particular decision on a particular day?’ ‘If the answer is ‘yes’, 
they must ask, ‘How can I assist them in the making of that decision?’373 If not, they must ask, ‘How 
can I obtain the care-receiver’s input into the decision which I must then make on their behalf and in 
their ‘best interests’’.374 Fortunately, the full rigour of the law is not visited on Informal carers in such 
difficult circumstances. Informal carers are not required, by law, to have regard to the letter of the 
Code of Practice, but are merely advised to follow its guidance in so far as they are aware of it and 
what it says.375 In addition, chapter 6 of the 2005 Act attempts to provide some protection for those 
who provide care on an informal basis.376 
The 2005 Act begins with a presumption of capacity, thereby shifting the legal burden of proof onto 
the shoulders of anyone who alleges that such capacity was not present at a particular moment in 
time. Informal carers can therefore allow a care-receiver to make a decision themselves and act upon 
 
371 For instance, the capacity to make a will is far more demanding of one’s mental faculties than the capacity 
to make small gift. On the other hand, if one is intending to give away the whole, or a substantial part of one’s 
estate, with concomitant effect on one’s will, the capacity to make this gift is as demanding as the capacity to 
make a will – see: Re Beaney [1978] 1 WLR 770. 
 
372 This legislation replaces Part 7 of the Mental Health Act 1983.  The existing Code of Practice is in the 
process of being revised with the call for evidence for the revision being closed on the 7th March 2019. At the 
time of writing, the revision has yet to be published. 
 
373 The existing Code of Practice simply says that, ‘It is up to the people who are caring / supporting an 
individual to consider how to best support him / her in making the decision that needs to be taken in particular 
cases. In all cases, it is important to find the most effective way of communicating with this individual.’ 
 
374 See: Mental Capacity Act 2005, Code of Conduct, parag. 5.2.1 at p. 75. 
 
375 Ibid. at p. 92 et seq. 
 




it, unless they know, or should be aware, that the care-receiver has no capacity to make that 
decision.377 In essence, capacity is determined using a two-stage test. Firstly, ‘Does the person in 
question have an impairment of the mind or brain or is there some sort of disturbance affecting the 
way their mind or brain works?’ If so, then, ‘Does that impairment mean that the person is unable to 
make the decision in question at the time it needs to be made?’378 In assessing the care-receiver, the 
assessor should ask the following questions, ‘Does the person [in question] have a general 
understanding of what decision they need to make and why they need to make it?’ ‘Do they 
understand the likely consequences of making or not making this decision?’ and ‘Can they understand 
and process information about the decision and can they use it to help them make that decision?’379 
Regardless of the answers to these questions, section 5 of the 2005 Act allows informal carers to carry 
out certain tasks without fear of liability,380 provided that they have reasonable grounds for believing 
that the actions they take are in the care-receiver’s best interests.381 One of these tasks is the spending 
of money on goods and services for the person who lacks capacity. If these goods or services are 
‘necessary’ for the person in question having regard to the standard of living that they enjoyed when 
they had capacity, then any expenditure of the that person’s money on these goods and services will 
be covered by the protection afforded by the 2005 Act, provided that the expenditure does not conflict 
with a previous decision made by the care-receiver’s attorney or deputy in regard to such 
expenditure.382 Similarly, any expenditure of the carer’s own money on these goods and services will 
be recoverable from the care-receiver’s attorney or deputy provided that proof of payment can be 
produced and subject to the proviso set out in the foregoing sentence. 
 
377 See: Mental Capacity Act 2005, Code of Conduct, parag. 6.6 at p. 95. 
 
378 Ibid. at p. 44 et seq. 
 
379 These questions reflect the statutory provisions on a person’s ability to make a decision which provide as 
follows: ‘A person is unable to make a decision if they cannot: (1) understand [relevant] information about the 
decision to be made, (2) retain that information in their mind, (3) use or weigh that information as part of the 
decision-making process, or (4) communicate that decision …..’ (See: s. 3(1) of the 2005 Act). 
 
380 ‘If a person (“D”) does an act in connection with the care or treatment of another person (“P”), the act is 
one to which [the] section applies if — (a) before doing the act, D takes reasonable steps to establish whether 
P lacks capacity in relation to the matter in question, and (b) when doing the act, D reasonably believes—(i) 
that P lacks capacity in relation to the matter, and (ii) that it will be in P's best interests for the act to be done. 
[In that event,] D does not incur any liability in relation to the act that he would not have incurred if P—(a) had 
had capacity to consent in relation to the matter, and (b) had consented to D's doing the act.’ (See: s. 5(1) and 
(2) of the 2005 Act). 
381 See: Mental Capacity Act 2005, Code of Practice, parag. 6.32. 
 
382 This statutory protection under section 7 is, in essence, based on the common law doctrine of necessity - 




Nevertheless, this protection from liability does have its limits and informal carers need to have regard 
to these limits where the care-receiver has lost capacity. Section 6 of the 2005 Act details certain ‘key 
areas’ where the protection is denied if the acts in question involve an inappropriate use of restraint 
on a person who lacks capacity or where that person is otherwise deprived of their liberty.383 In 
essence, any restraint of a person who lacks capacity will not be a protected act unless the person 
acting reasonably believes that the restraint is necessary to prevent harm to the person who lacks 
capacity and amount and type of restraint and the period of time during which it lasts must be a 
proportionate response to the likelihood and seriousness of harm.384  
In its terms, section 6 makes a distinction between the restriction of a person’s liberty and the 
deprivation of a person’s liberty and that distinction is a fine one. Indeed, the European Court of 
Human Rights has described this distinction as ‘one of degree or intensity, not one of nature or 
substance’.385 Any action that amounts to a deprivation of liberty and is not protected is unlawful 
unless prior formal authorisation has been sought and obtained.386 What actions amount to a 
deprivation of liberty?387 There is no exhaustive list of such actions. Nevertheless, there is what has 
been described as ‘the acid test’ which is applied to determine whether a person has been deprived 
of their liberty, and this comprises two questions: (a) is the person in question subject to continuous 
supervision and control, and (b) is he/she free to leave such supervision and control?388 In practice, 
the latter question is judged not on whether the person in question wishes to leave but on how those 
who support him/her would react if they did want to leave. As things stand, these ‘deprivation of 
liberty safeguards’ only apply to those care-receivers who are in a care home, nursing home or 
hospital.389 Were it otherwise, some very difficult questions might arise. For example, would locking 
the house up at night whilst the carer and the care-receiver are, or should be, in bed asleep be a 
 
383 See: section 6(4) of the 2005 Act. The term ‘deprived of liberty’ is defined in article 5(1) of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
 
384 See: Mental Capacity Act 2015, Code of Practice, parag. 6.41. 
 
385 See: HL v The United Kingdom (App. No. 45508/99), judgment 5 Oct, 2004, parag. 89. (Also known as ‘the 
Bournewood case’.) 
 
386 This will be from the Court of Protection. 
 
387 The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards were introduced as an amendment to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
 
388 The ‘acid test’ is taken from P v Cheshire West & Chester Council; P & Q v Surrey County Council [2014] 
UKSC 19. 
 
389 In fact, these ‘deprivation of liberty safeguards’ are due to be replaced by the ‘liberty protection safeguards’ 




deprivation of liberty? Here, the locking of the house is surely designed to prevent others from getting 
in. But, if the care-receiver is physically unable to circumvent these locks – because, for example, the 
keys have been placed out of their reach – is this a deprivation of their liberty?390 On the other hand, 
a care-receiver who is locked away in a room in a building which is under the control of their informal 
carer may still take advantage of the law against false imprisonment. Of course, in this event the care-
receiver may well require the assistance of a third party in order to have recourse to that law. And, 






3.7 ACTING ON BEHALF OF A CARE-RECEIVER WHO LACKS CAPACITY 
The day-to-day process of informal caring may not be strictly controlled, but acting on behalf of a care-
receiver who lacks capacity to act is closely regulated under English law. There are two paths to 
regulation. Firstly, if the care-receiver has had sufficient foresight to execute a lasting power of 
attorney,391 once the care-receiver has lost capacity his/her attorney has authority to act on his/her 
behalf.  In many instances, the attorney is the informal carer, although there is no necessary 
connection between the two activities, merely some forethought on the part of the care-receiver.392 
Under the 2005 Act, there are two varieties of these lasting powers of attorney, one for healthcare 
and welfare decisions, the other for property and financial matters. The powers are quite separate. 
And, the care-receiver may appoint different attorneys, and indeed more than one attorney, for 
 
390 Similarly, is the use of medication to calm the care-receiver, even where it has been prescribed by a doctor, 
a deprivation of liberty, particularly where the care-receiver has indicated an unwillingness to take this 
medication, but it is nevertheless forced upon them? While such medication may be said to be for the care-
receiver’s ‘own good’ is it still depriving them of their liberty to be without that medication and to go freely 
about their business as they might wish? 
 
391 Lasting Powers of Attorney replaced Enduring Powers of Attorney in October 2007. 
 
392 The Government’s own web pages provide some very useful information on the decisions that need to be 





each.393 In acting on behalf of donees of these powers, all such attorneys are bound by the 2005 Act 
and its Code of Practice, and the authority given to them requires them to act in the donor’s best 
interests at all times. In the event that they do not, and their action is continuing, an attorney may be 
restrained by injunction from continuing to act contrary to this requirement by the Court of Protection 
on an application by a third party.  In addition, a property and financial affairs attorney must keep an 
up-to-date set of accounts setting out what he/she has done with the donor’s property and assets 
during the course of his/her appointment and retain their own monies quite separate from those of 
the donor. Once executed by the donor, whose execution must be independently witnessed,394 these 
lasting powers of attorney should be registered with the Court of Protection.395 In the event of a 
significant mismanagement of the care-receiver’s affairs on the part of the attorney, he/she may be 
found guilty of ‘abuse of position’ under s. 4 of the Fraud Act 2006.396 
In practice, the limits of an attorney’s authority are dictated by the power that appoints them to their 
office. A property and financial affairs attorney has the power to make decisions on behalf of a donor 
who lacks capacity in regard to matters such as buying, selling and maintaining property, paying a 
mortgage, investing money, collecting state benefits and paying bills (such as utility bills, council tax, 
and the like). A healthcare and welfare attorney will make decisions relating to where the donor might 
live, what medical care is appropriate for the donor to receive, what diet the donor should be given, 
who the donor may see and when and what form of social activities the donor might engage in.397  
These latter-mentioned powers can also specify whether or not the donee is able to make decisions 
concerning life-saving treatment for the donor.398 Whether or not such authority is provided for all 
healthcare professionals who are aware of the power ‘must consult the attorney and seek his/her 
 
393 Paid carers should never be appointed as attorneys for fear of a conflict of interest in the event that a 
decision needs to be made whether or not the care-receiver needs to go into nursing home accommodation or 
the like. 
 
394 The witness must also certify that the donor understands the purpose of the lasting power of attorney 
(‘LPA’) and that no undue pressure has been used to persuade the donor to make the LPA. 
 
395 The present cost of registration is £82 for each power that is registered. 
 
396 See: R v TJC [2015] EWCA Crim. 1276. 
  
397 Neither form of attorney can makes decisions about an attorney cannot make decisions about consenting 
to marriage or a civil partnership, consenting to a decree of divorce (or civil partnership dissolution) based on 2 
years’ separation, or consenting to sex. 
 
398 Health and welfare attorneys cannot make decisions where the donor has capacity to decide, where the 
donor has made an advanced decision to refuse treatment, where the attorney has not been given power to 
consent to or refuse life-sustaining treatment and where the donor has been detained under the Mental 




consent in the same way as they would with a patient who had the capacity to consent’.399 This 
produces a response system which is more flexible than any advance directive such as those contained 
in ‘living wills’. In the event that there is a disagreement between those treating the donor of the 
power and the attorney an application will need to be made to the Court of Protection for directions 
as outlined below. 
If no such powers of attorney exists, adults who lack capacity may be the subject of a ‘best interests 
meeting’ where members of his/her family, informal carers and medical personnel consult on aspects 
of the care-receiver’s immediate care needs. But, this will be a ‘needs only’ meeting, and in the event 
that long-term and more serious decisions are necessary an application to the Court of Protection will 
be required. The Court of Protection determines questions of capacity and makes decisions affecting 
those who lack capacity where no one has been appointed to act on such a person’s behalf or where 
there is disagreement over what course of action to follow.400 In addition, it will appoint a deputy or 
deputies to act on the care-receiver’s behalf in making the day-to-day decisions that need to be made 
in circumstances where there is no such conflict. Where necessary, it will also decide questions about 
the validity of lasting powers of attorney. Before the Court of Protection releases an order for the 
appointment of a deputy it will require the deputy to put in place a security bond, the level of which 
will be set by the court and which will depend on the extent and value of the care-receiver’s assets, 
his/her income and his/her outgoings, and the deputy’s level of experience of holding such a position. 
An annual payment is usually payable from the care-receiver’s own funds in order to secure this bond; 
occasionally, if the risks are small because the value of the care-receiver’s income and property is 
limited, a one-off payment may suffice. The aim of these bonds is to insure the care-receiver’s assets 
against any misdemeanours by the appointed deputy. As a method of protecting the care-receiver 
against financial abuse, they do, of course have their place, but, in reality, the opportunity for such 
abuse is always there whether or not a deputy has been appointed. Indeed, donees of powers of 
attorney have similar opportunities to take advantage of the authority that has been given to them 
and any regulation of their activities is largely ex post facto, but, at least here, the donor care-receiver 
has chosen who their attorney might be and has decided to trust the named individual or individuals 
 
399 Mental Capacity Act 2015, Code of Practice, paragraph 6.16. 
 
400 This disagreement might be amongst family members or between family members and medical personal 




with a set of wide-ranging powers which, when applicable, can govern almost every aspect of their 
daily lives.401 
In these circumstances, donees of lasting powers of attorney are given a real say in both the clinical 
treatment of a donor care-receiver and significant authority over decisions that need to be made 
regarding the donor’s daily welfare. This imposes considerable responsibility on them, often leading 
to high stress and anxiety levels. Whether the donor has discussed what he/she would like to happen 
in the event of the donee having to make these difficult decisions is another matter. Lasting powers 
of attorney are regularly executed where the donor is ‘on the edge’ of capacity and the need for 
execution is urgent. Indeed, there is no separate, formal test to determine whether or not someone 
has the capacity to execute a lasting power of attorney.402 What is more, these powers are also seen 
as ‘all-or-nothing’ documents, so much so that, once a power has been executed and registered, the 
donee assumes complete authority over the donor’s life.403 A person’s ‘best interests’ is not an easy 






3.8 THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO SAFEGUARDING 
For many years, the judiciary has shown a marked reluctance to allow carers who are not members of 
the care-receiver’s close family to secure any form of significant financial advantage from their 
relationship with those for whom they have cared. Indeed, that reluctance is most clearly apparent in 
 
401 Of course, as every decision which needs to be made is task specific, it may well be that the donor of such a 
power is capable of making some decisions but not others. In these circumstances, the donee of the power 
needs to establish that the donor lacks capacity for each decision that he/she needs to take on their behalf 
before that decision is made. Where the donee takes the view that the donor is able to make a decision, the 
consequence is that the donee must permit the donor to make decisions that are, in fact, unwise. 
 
402 That said, there was judicial guidance in regard to whether or not someone had the capacity to execute an 
enduring power of attorney, which may be used to resolve this issue. 
 
403 Curtice, Katuwawela and McCollum, Lasting powers of attorney: implications for clinicians, Advances in 




relation to paid carers. In fact, the courts have employed a number of devices over the years to prevent 
paid carers securing excessive financial benefits from their relationship with the care-receiver. In Re 
Davey,404 the court went as far as to make a statutory will in order to defeat the claim of a male nurse 
who was employed by, and who had married the care-receiver in, a nursing home in which the care-
receiver, who was 92 and mentally infirm, was residing. Nevertheless, there also appears to be some 
judicial acceptance that many people act as informal carers in concert with professional / paid carers 
in an effort to not only improve the care-receiver’s quality of life but also in an effort to reduce the 
burden of care costs on the care-receiver’s estate. Indeed, the Office of Public Guardian has recently 
acknowledged this, and the entitlement of informal carers to be paid for the work they do by the care-
receiver’s attorney, using the care-receiver’s estate to meet such cost.405 In turn, this was referred to 
with approval by the court in the recent case of Re HH,406 with the proviso, of course, that such 
payments represent a significant saving on the cost of professional care and fairly reflect the input of 
the informal carer who must provide care that is reasonably needed, of a reasonable standard and is 
affordable by the care-receiver having regard to his/her age, resources and life expectancy.407 If an 
informal carer is provided with such payments during the care-receiver’s lifetime, this would naturally 
preclude any claim to further financial reward following the care-receiver’s death, unless that claim 
was based on some form of agreement or estoppel. Instead, this thesis focusses on situations where 
there is no agreement between care-receiver, or his/her attorney or deputy acting on their behalf, 
and the informal carer in regard to the provision of social care, but where there has been significant 
sacrifice on the part of the carer in providing such care. 
In regard to such situations, most of the contests that take place in the courts take place after the 
death of the care-receiver and, in the absence of any statutory provision as hereinafter suggested,  
relate to the care-receiver’s will. In Poole v Everall408 the rather sceptical approach of the courts 
towards benefits received by professional carers was acknowledged by the solicitor who was acting, 
 
404 [1981] 1 WLR 164; see also: In Re Stott deceased [1980] WLR 246, where the court refused to strike out a 
challenge to the validity of a will made in favour of the nursing home proprietor in whose property the 
testatrix was residing when she made the will in question made on the basis that the allegations which were 
made to support a plea want of knowledge and approval were, in fact, a disguised plea of undue influence. The 





406 [2018] EWCOP 13 
 
407 See: Re HC [2015] EWCOP 29 and Public Guardian v CC [2015] EWCOP 29. 
 




prior to the deceased’s death, as his deputy,409 and who was advising him in regard to the preparation 
of his will.410 When the deceased executed his last will, which left the bulk of his estate to his 
professional carer, and then subsequently passed away, the validity of that will was challenged by the 
deceased’s remaining family.  In the event, the circumstances surrounding the preparation of that will, 
the role that the professional carer played in putting the will together, the radical departure made by 
that will from the terms of earlier wills, and the extent of the benefit received by the professional 
carer from what was a substantial estate, persuaded the trial judge that he bore the burden of proof 
that the will had been made with the ‘knowledge and approval’ of the deceased. On the evidence 
before the court, the professional carer was unable to discharge this burden and the will was therefore 
declared invalid.  
Nevertheless, it is always possible that the court will support the claims of paid care-receivers where 
there is clear evidence that the care-receiver intended them to benefit and that the care-receiver’s 
decision to confer that benefit on them was a full, free and informed one. This can be seen in the case 
of Carapeto v Good411 where the Carapetos, who had been engaged for many years as the deceased’s 
housekeeper, chauffer and, ultimately, her carers, successfully resisted a claim made by the 
deceased’s nephews for the court to declare invalid a will that contained a substantial residuary gift 
in their favour on the basis of their undue influence. Here, there was evidence going back many years 
that the deceased intended to confirm a significant benefit on the Carapetos at her death in return 
for what they had done, and were continuing to do, for her. For this reason, and in the absence of any 
direct evidence of undue influence, the court was unable to infer that the will had been procured on 
this basis.  
Perhaps in contrast to this, the court’s attitude to informal carers, and their entitlement under the 
care-receiver’s will, has very much depended on the circumstances of each case. A significant factor 
here seems to be the quality of the relationship that the deceased care-receiver had with his/her 
family and any previous expression of testamentary intent on the part of the care-receiver to confer 
benefits on those who have ultimately been excluded from his/her last will. Where that relationship 
 
409 Initially, the solicitor was appointed as the deceased’s receiver but, following the commencement of the 
MCA 2005, he became his finance and property deputy under that Act. 
 
410 The solicitor expressed caution over the deceased’s proposals to make gifts to his professional carer at 
regular intervals, doubtless, due to the fiduciary relationship that would have existed in law between the pair 
and the extent of the influence that the professional carer might have over the deceased, who was described 
as a ‘suggestible’ individual as a result of the brain injuries that he had suffered in a motor bike accident earlier 
in his life. 
 




was strong, and there is a will-making pattern in favour of those who have been subsequently 
excluded, the courts have treated the evidence of informal carers with caution, demanding convincing 
evidence that the deceased’s last will was made when he/she possessed a ‘sound, disposing mind and 
memory’, knew and approved of its contents, and was free from any improper influence on the part 
of his/her carers. Yet, where such relationship was weak, and where the informal carer had expended 
a great deal of their own time and labour looking after the deceased on an entirely voluntary basis, 
the courts have defended the deceased’s right to make provision for them even on a generous basis 
and notwithstanding that the same has been at the expense of the deceased’s family.  
The second of these propositions is supported by the case of Perrins v Holland, In re Perrins deceased412 
where the Court of Appeal upheld a decision made at first instance that a will in which the deceased 
had given his entire estate to his carer in preference to his son was valid on the basis that the deceased 
had testamentary capacity at the time he gave instructions for the preparation of that will and, when 
executing the same knew that he was executing a will for which he had given prior instructions, even 
though at that point he had ceased to have testamentary capacity.413 The deceased’s decision to leave 
his estate to his carer was clearly a rational one given that there was a romantic attachment between 
them, that they were cohabiting together in the deceased’s bungalow and that the bungalow was the 
only significant asset in the deceased’s estate. Indeed, this approach is most recently illustrated by the 
case of Walters v Smee.414 Here, Mr and Mrs Walters, who had been the deceased’s carers for a good 
many years, and who had been named as the principal beneficiaries of the deceased’s will made in 
1998, challenged a will that had been made by the deceased just a month before her death in October 
2004. That will removed Mr and Mrs Walters as beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate and replaced 
them with two of her long-standing friends, Mr and Mrs Smee. On the evidence, this appears to have 
come about in consequence of certain misapprehensions – which the judge also characterised as 
‘delusions’ – on the part of the deceased as to Mr Walters activities in or about her property. As a 
result, the court found that the deceased did not have testamentary capacity when she made the 2004 




412 [2009] EWHC 1945; [2010] EWCA Civ. 840. 
 
413 Such a will is valid under the rule in Parker v Felgate (1883) 8 PD 171, the rule being expressly approved in 
that case. 
 









In providing social care to a parent or remoter relation an informal carer is subject to a raft of laws 
and related regulations that are not easy to navigate and which represent substantial traps for the 
unwary, who often have little, if any, experience in dealing with such matters.  All of this must be dealt 
with in circumstances where the care that needs to be given may be demanding on their time and on 
their resources. Yet, under our present system, they are largely left to fend for both themselves and 
the care-receiver as best they can. While the focus of this thesis is on the financial need of informal 
carers, the contents of this chapter amply demonstrate that advice and support is also required 
elsewhere, from the execution and registration of powers of attorney, where such powers are 
needed,415 to making claims for benefits such as ‘attendance allowance’ and negotiating continuing 
health care assessments with the local NHS, and everything in between. At present, the only real 
assistance that is provided for informal carers is available through the various charitable organisations 
that are active in this area. This surely needs to change as society gets more and more reliant on the 
work that informal carers do. 
Governments can find money where it is desperately needed as recent health crises show. The 
provision of support to informal carers is one of those instances where not only does society need the 







415 The costs of registering each lasting power of attorney - and in most cases people will need two – is £82 per 
power. Of course, in many instances those who need to execute these powers will also need legal advice on 









CARERS’ CLAIMS UNDER THE INHERITANCE  





In the face of a valid will that fails to provide an informal carer with ‘reasonable financial provision’ 
from the estate of a care-receiver parent, and absent any claim for relief founded on the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel,416 or some other remedy grounded in quasi-contract, the only method of 
securing such financial provision, or additional financial provision,417 for an adult child who has cared 
for that parent over what may have been a protracted period of time is through a claim made under 
the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (‘the 1975 Act’). Leaving aside the 
question of inheritance and other taxes due to the State,418 the payment of the deceased’s debts, 
funeral and administration expenses, and the effect of public policy,419 the 1975 Act currently 
 
416 This potential cause of action for adult child informal carers is further considered in chapter five, infra. 
 
417 This recognises that some demands for compensation made by adult child carers will be made where the 
carer has been given the same provision under a deceased parent’s will or intestacy that has been bestowed 
on a non-caring sibling; in short, no recognition is accorded to the child that has sacrificed their time, energy, 
personal lives and even careers to provide the care that the deceased required. This point is further illustrated 
in section 4.4, infra, in a case taken from the author’s legal practice. 
 
418 It is, of course, arguable whether any tax arising on death – inheritance tax, capital gains tax, or any other – 
represents an impingement on testamentary freedom. Such taxes – the burden of which typically falls on the 
testator’s residuary estate – are taken into account before the distribution of a testator’s estate in accordance 
with his/her will and, therefore, seldom affect the destination of property comprised in the estate, but more 
the amount received by, in most cases, the residuary beneficiaries. 
 
419 Under ‘public policy’ one can also group conditions in wills that are void for other diverse reasons – see: 
Theobald on Wills, 15th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), chapter 45, and Williams on Wills, 6th ed. (Butterworths, 
1987), chapter 40. 
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represents the only significant limitation on the concept of testamentary freedom in England and 
Wales. As Lord Hughes JSC has recently acknowledged in the only case under the 1975 Act or any 
predecessor legislation to go before the highest court in the land, ‘… English law recognises the 
freedom of individuals to dispose of their assets by will after their death in whatever manner they 
wish’.420 
Set against this concept of ‘freedom of testation’, the 1975 Act provides at least the prospect of a 
remedy for spouses, cohabitees, children and dependants alike, where the deceased has failed to 
make reasonable financial provision for any one or more of them on his/her death. The remedy is a 
discretionary one. At present, although the categories of applicant who may make a claim under the 
1975 Act include the children of the deceased,421 there is no separate ‘carer category’. Similarly, the 
factors that influence the exercise of the court’s discretion do not include any reference to the care 
that has been administered by an adult child carer, or anyone else, or the effect that the same has had 
on their lives, and the lives of the members of their family, over the course of the caring period.422 If 
the 1975 Act provides a remedy for informal carers, it is only because they are entitled to relief on 
some other grounds, such as their own straightened financial circumstances or their financial 
dependency on their now deceased parent. In these circumstances, the 1975 Act can only ever 
operate as an arbitrary, and substantially incomplete, remedy for anyone who, on an informal basis, 
has undertaken significant financial, emotional and time-consuming sacrifices in order to care for a 
now deceased parent.423 
One way in which a remedy might be provided for adult child carers who have devoted themselves to 
caring for an elderly, disabled, parent is to amend the 1975 Act so that such persons are clearly 
identified as a distinct category of applicant. In this way, an adult child carer could claim reasonable 
financial provision from the estate of their parent when he/she passes away and thus be afforded 
some form of monetary recognition of the hardship that they have had to endure throughout the 
 
 
420 Ilott v The Blue Cross and others (on appeal from Illot v Mitson (No. 2)), [2017] UKSC 17; [2018] A.C. 545 at 
[1]. 
 
421 ‘Children’ includes those who are treated by the deceased as members of his/her family – see: section 
1(1)(d) of the 1975 Act for the full definition of this expanded category. 
 
422 See: Jonathan Herring, Caring and the Law, (Hart, 2013), p. 38 et seq. 
 
423 Where adult child carers can bring themselves within any other category of claimant, they may, of course, 
have a remedy, but the care that they have administered is not a factor that is taken into account in the 
determination of that claim. In these circumstances, a different approach to the meeting of claims by adult 




caring process. This is a suggestion that is ‘floated’ by Brian Sloan in his book, Informal Carers and 
Private Law.424 To some extent, it is also a solution that is already in place in New South Wales.425 
Would this be an acceptable solution for adult child carers in England and Wales who believe that they 
should be entitled to financial recompense for their caring? And, if it would be, is it practical to amend 
the 1975 Act to allow adult child carers, or indeed any other category of informal carer, to make a 
claim for an award under that Act? In the event of the legislature acceding to the idea that adult child 
carers should be permitted to make such a claim, these are questions that will need to be carefully 
considered before any final decision in made. In this chapter, it will be argued that any solution in the 
form of a simple amendment to the 1975 Act to allow informal carers to make a claim for ‘reasonable 
financial provision’ from the estate of a deceased care-receiver would be difficult to sustain in the face 
of existing public opinion and, in any event, even if acted upon, would not provide adult children, or 
any other ‘family carers’, with a clear and practical solution to their present predicament. Instead, 
such claims would tend to bring yet greater uncertainty in the administration of a deceased’s estate, 
more litigation in order to resolve that uncertainty and perhaps greater family disunity in 
circumstances where the deceased’s relatives are struggling to cope with their loss.  In practice, what 
is needed in an effort to meet these claims is to recognise their validity and to provide answers in the 






4.2 INHERITANCE FAMILY PROVISION CLAIMS, A CARERS’ CATEGORY AND TESTAMENTARY 
FREEDOM  
In the eyes of some members of the public, the 1975 Act forms a very real, albeit limited, restriction 
on the freedom of individuals to dispose of their accumulated wealth on their death. Evidence in 
support of this statement is readily apparent in the reaction of the press to the decision of the Court 
 
424 B. Sloan, Informal Carers and Private Law, (Hart, 2013), p. 172, section 5.3.5. ‘A Carer Category for England 
and Wales?’ 
 




of Appeal in the case of Ilott v Mitson in 2012.426 What is more, Baroness Hale explicitly acknowledges 
this support in her speech in the Supreme Court in Illot v The Blue Cross and Others (on appeal from 
Illot v Mitson (No. 2)) [2017] UKSC 17 at para. [53]. Indeed, Oliver J’s statement in Re Coventry 
deceased427 that, “[s]ubject to the courts powers under the [1975] Act and to fiscal demands, an 
Englishman still remains at liberty at his death to dispose of his own property in whatever way he 
pleases …”,428 appears to be the starting-point for many senior judges in their consideration of any 
claim that appears to contradict a valid will.429   And, elsewhere, several notable academics and 
practitioners have continued to acknowledge the centrality of the concept of testamentary freedom 
in the law of England and Wales.430  In these circumstances, not only are there are no laws of automatic 
succession or what is known as ‘forced heirship’431 in English Law, none appear to be wanted, at least 
outside of a spouse’s obligation to support his/or widow or widower, and even here the discretionary 
regime now encapsulated in the 1975 Act has always been the preferred option.432  
With these points in mind, we must accept that a substantial body of public opinion is likely to be 
against any further erosion of the concept of freedom of testation and, with that, the introduction of 
yet another category of applicant who may make a claim for financial provision against the estate of 
 
426 See, for example: The Daily Telegraph’s treatment of the 2015 decision of the Court of Appeal in Illot v 
Mitson [2015] EWCA Civ. 797 at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3176258/Daughter-written-
mother-s-bitter-letter-eloped-37-years-ago-awarded-160-000.html which carried the headline ‘Judges 
say that you will can be ignored’ (accessed: 24/01/19).  
 
427 See: [1980] Ch. 461. 
 
428 Ibid. at p. 473.  
 
429 See: Nourse and Henry LJJ in Re Jennings deceased [1993] EWCA Civ. 10; Mummery LJ in Hawes v Burgess 
[2013] EWCA Civ. 94; and, of course, Lord Hughes SCJ in Ilott v The Blue Cross and others (on appeal from Illot v 
Mitson (No. 2)), [2017] UKSC 17; [2018] A.C. 545 at [1] et. seq. 
 
430 See, for example: (Professor) Rebecca Probert, Exeter University, who describes testamentary freedom as ‘… 
a core principle of English law’, in her book chapter, Disquieting Thoughts: Who Will Benefit When We Are Gone? 
B. Häcker and C. Mitchell (eds.), Current Issues in Succession Law (Oxford: Hart; 2016), pp 31-49, and, Andrew 
Francis, barrister, who describes testamentary freedom as ‘[a]t the heart of the law of England and Wales …’ in 
A. Francis, Inheritance Act Claims: Law, Practice and Procedure, (2006, Butterworths), 1[3]. 
431 Forced succession’ – the common name for the family succession rights that one sees in continental Europe 
– is said to ‘convert private property at death into family property’, thereby serving ‘to protect and maintain 
the family as a social unit’, see: Marius J. de Waal, ‘Comparative Succession Law’, fn. 15, supra. 
 
432 First Report on Family Property: A New Approach (1973) Law Com. No. 61. This option has been preferred 




a deceased that will run contrary to the provisions of his/her will.433  It may therefore be useful to 
consider the idea of testamentary freedom in its historical and social context in an effort to gauge the 
extent of the influence that it continues to exert. 
The origins of the English courts’ statutory jurisdiction to make financial provision from the estates of 
deceased persons for those found to be entitled to the same dates back to the Inheritance (Family 
Provision) Act 1938 (‘the 1938 Act’). In the years leading up to the passing of the 1938 Act, there was 
a good deal of opposition to its appearance on our statute books; and, the notion of ‘testamentary 
freedom’ was the real driving-force behind this opposition. Although, historically, complete freedom 
of testation has rather waxed and waned in England and Wales, its modern appearance is of relatively 
recent origin.434 For the twenty-first century observer, it marks the move from ‘agrarian and proto-
industrial collectivism’ to the ‘individualism’ and ‘self-determination’ of the modern era.435 That said, 
even where this freedom was restricted, those restrictions did not take the shape of the ‘forced 
heirship’ provisions so confining of testators that one finds in continental Europe.  And, therefore, to 
dismiss testamentary freedom as an anomaly as some authors have attempted to do would be do the 
concept something of a disservice.436  
 
433 See: R. Schaul-Yoder, British Inheritance Legislation: Discretionary Distribution at Death, 8 B.C. Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev 205 (1985), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol8/iss1/8 (accessed: 22/12/16) and O. Henry, If You 
Will It, It Is No Dream: Balancing Public Policy and Testamentary Freedom, 6 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Policy. 215 (2011) at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol6/iss1/6 (accessed: 10/09/19). 
 
434 Some commentators date ‘complete freedom of testation’ in England and Wales to the passing of the 
Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1891 (see: Michael Alberry, The Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938, 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1950) and Roger Kerridge, Parry and Kerridge: The Law of Succession, 12th ed., (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2009), at para. 8-01); others take a more practical approach and date that freedom from the passing 
of the Dower Act 1833 (see: Andrew Borkowski, Textbook on Succession, 2nd ed., (OUP, 2002), at p. 258). 
 
435 See: Ronald Chester, Inheritance, Wealth and Society (Indiana University Press, 1982) cited by Rosalind 
Croucher in How Free is Free? Testamentary Freedom and the Battle between ‘Family’ and ‘Property’, [2012] 
Au J Leg Phil 7; (2013) 37 Austl. J Leg Phil 9. 
 
436 See: Michael Albery, The Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1950), p. 1, where he 
says:  “The protection of rights of the family as an essential unit in society is a primary concern of most systems 
of law. Complete freedom of testation, as enjoyed under English law for a brief period of 47 years, is therefore 
by the standards of contemporary jurisprudence an anomaly.” And, see further: R. Schaul-Yoder, British 
Inheritance Legislation: Discretionary Distribution at Death, 8 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev 205 (1985), where he 
observes, “The noted nineteenth-century legal sociologist Max Weber could find ‘evidence of complete or 
almost complete substantive freedom of testation’ only twice in history - in England and in the Republic of 
Rome.” Historians will note that one of the most notable instances of the exercise of testamentary freedom 
occurred when Julius Caesar appointed Octavian (Augustus Caesar) as his heir, an event which, in due course, 
contributed to the fall of the Roman Republic, a protracted civil war which saw the deaths of Pompey, Mark 
Anthony and Cleopatra, amongst others, and eventually led to the establishment of what was to become the 
tyranny of the Roman Empire – see: Andrew Borkowski and Paul du Plessis; Textbook on Roman Law,  3rd ed., 
(Oxford, OUP, 2005) at p. 208. 
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Indeed, in a modern ‘rights-based culture’ where the list of one’s personal rights includes the right to 
hold, and therefore dispose of, one’s property, testamentary freedom is but a manifestation of a 
fundamental right that many of us take for granted.437 And this includes, in the words of Mummery LJ 
in Hawes v Burgess438 the right to make a will in terms which are ‘… hurtful, ungrateful or unfair to 
those whose legitimate expectations of testamentary benefit are disappointed.’439  
Yet, it was not always thus. At one point in our history, a man’s ability to dispose of his personal estate 
on his death in England and Wales to whomsoever he wished was restricted by his legal obligations to 
his widow and children. However, through early post-Medieval times these rights of inheritance 
gradually disappeared across the length and breadth of the country and were only finally lost 
altogether in 1725.440 As for real property, this was almost exclusively kept ‘within the family’ either 
by law or custom. Although the Tenures Abolition Act 1660 meant that all land held in fee simple 
became devisable, most privately-owned land in England was held not in fee simple but on an entail 
within a family settlement and could not therefore be devised by will.441 If a man held freehold land 
outside such a settlement, it was subject to his widow’s rights of dower,442 and these rights continued 
until the passing of the Dower Act 1833.443 In every-day practice, therefore, the idea of testamentary 
freedom in England and Wales, at least before the 18th century, was hardly a deep-rooted national 
 
437 Protocol 1, Article 1, of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In 
Ubbi v Ubbi [2018] EWHC 1396 (Ch.), Master Shuman, at [60] describes such a right as ‘fundamental’. 
 
438 [2013] EWCA Civ. 94 
 
439 Ibid. at [14] 
 
440 For some time following the Norman Conquest, it was possible for a man (women were not permitted, at 
that time, to hold realty) to dispose of both his real and personal property by will. Initially, he was restricted to 
devising only a portion of his personalty; his widow and children had rights to a fixed share of personalty, but 
the extent of these shares differed across the country. In time, these restrictions disappeared. As for the right 
to dispose of reality, most testators failed to exercise this so-called freedom. By the social conventions of the 
time, the testator’s legitimate off-spring had ‘birth-rights’ which society recognised even if a testator did not. 
In any event, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the King’s Court acted to prohibit testamentary gifts 
of land. From that point on, land passed outside a testator’s will under local custom, usually primogeniture. 
And, this situation continued down to the sixteenth century – see, generally: Charles Harpum et al., Megarry & 
Wade’s, The Modern Law of Real Property, 7th edition, (OUP, 2008), 14-002, et seq. and J. Dainow, Limitations 
on Testamentary Freedom in England, 25 Cornell L. Q. 337 (1939-1940) p. 337. 
 
441 C. Harpum et al. , Megarry & Wade’s, The Modern Law of Real Property, ibid. parag.s 3-070 – 3-083. 
 
442 That is to say, the right of a widow to a life interest in one-third of the freehold estates of her husband of 
which he was seised during the marriage and which his issue were capable of inheriting, but excepting any 
such estates held as a joint tenant with another – R. D. Oughton, ed., Tyler’s Family Provision, 3rd edition, 
(Butterworths, 1997) p. 5. 
 
443 For a more detailed and precise account of the history of dower, and the means by which a widow’s rights 




concept. And, even where it did exist, it was limited to little more than one’s everyday possessions, 
for the vast majority of citizens had little else.444   
As an emotive force,445 freedom of testation appears to originate in post-industrial Victorian 
England.446 At the time, it was, doubtless, a useful social construct. The threat of ‘disinheritance’ 
allowed the Victorian paterfamilias some degree of control over the younger generation, using it as 
an incentive to encourage their sons and heirs to greater industry.447 Yet, in modern times, the need 
for such control has very largely gone. In Victorian England, wills made by wealthy testators of full 
capacity were made when one’s mortality was something to consider and act upon even in early 
middle age. In 1837, when Queen Victoria came to the throne, life expectancy for a man of 60 was a 
mere nine years.448 Now, in twenty-first century England, life expectancy at the age of 60 is another 
24 years.449 As a result, nowadays one’s last will and testament is commonly made much later in life.  
A will made nine years before a testator’s death in twenty-first century England is far less likely to 
exhort one’s children to work harder to ensure their prosperity in later life for these children are, in 
most instances, already in middle age, with careers and families to drive their lives forwards, not the 
distant threat of ‘disinheritance’.  Of course, some testators may still attempt to exert some ‘dead 
hand control’ over the younger generation in this way. Yet, the older one gets, the less dependent one 
is on one’s parents and any expected or hoped-for ‘inheritance’. Indeed, the average age at which 
most of us inherit our surviving parent’s estate has recently been estimated at 61.450 Rather than 
 
444 In any event, it was an idea that had no relevance for the vast majority of people in this country from the 
18th century right through to the latter half of the 20th century because, almost invariably, they died intestate. 
 
445 Sloan describes the principle as ‘an important one in the common law world’ – B. Sloan, The Concept of 
Coupledom in Succession Law, Camb. Law J., 70 [2011], pp. 623-648 at p. 624.  And, in similar vein, Lawrence 
Friedman speaks of testamentary freedom as ‘a characteristically modern idea – it was and is rare in simpler 
societies; but it is a leading principle in the United States and in most western countries’ – D. B. Kelly, 
Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, (2013), Scholarly Works, Paper 950, 
Notre Dame Law School, quoting Freidman from The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, a chapter in E. C. 
Halbach, Jnr. (ed.), Death, Taxes and Family Property (St. Paul. West. Pub. Co., 1977).  
 
446 But, its birth was in the intellectual tradition that came out of ‘the Glorious Revolution’ in 1688 and in the 




448 http://www.jbending.org.uk/stats3.htm (accessed: 01/06/18). 
449 http://www.helpage.org/global-agewatch/population-ageing-data/life-expectancy-at-60/; see also: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/lifeexpectancies/bulleti
ns/nationallifetablesunitedkingdom/20132015#life-expectancy-at-older-ages (both accessed: 01/06/18). 
 
450 Laura Gardiner, The Million Dollar Be-question: Inheritances, gifts and their implications for generational 
living standards, published by The Resolution Foundation, December 2017, at 
https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2017/12/Inheritance.pdf (accessed: 02.07/2019). 
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‘setting a child up in life’, inheritances are now more likely to provide for the recipient’s social care 
costs in later life (and, maybe all the more valuable for it, given that these costs need to be met from 
somewhere). In these circumstances, the use of a will to exercise authority over one’s children, or 
alternately to give them a ‘start in life’, is now very largely something from the dim and distant past, 
a creature of Victorian melodrama rather than a reality of modern-day Britain. 
Nevertheless, there is still one clear and solid foundation for our devotion to testamentary freedom. 
In short, ‘’If there are no restrictions on what one can do with one’s property during life, why should 
those restrictions exist at death?’ While the question is a simple one, the proposition on which it is 
based is not entirely accurate. There are, of course, legal obligations in life to provide financial support 
for one’s spouse and for one’s children during their minority. Indeed, if taken literally, the idea of 
testamentary freedom would also reject the idea that part of one’s wealth may be taxed at death. Yet, 
such tax has existed in the form of estate duty/death duty/capital transfer tax/ inheritance tax since 
1796, and seems to have a measure of public acceptance if not support. In fact, there are powerful 
arguments in favour of this form of taxation,451 including its retention as a general measure to correct 
inequality in wealth.452 That said, whatever the merits of these arguments, for our purposes the 
significant point for present purposes is that a deceased person does not have absolute control over 
his wealth at his/her death due to the need to pay inheritance tax and other costs and expenses 
consequent on his/her demise.453 Together, these can be simply described as ‘paying one’s debts or 
dues’ (whether private or to the nation). And, that, it is submitted, provides us with something of a 
‘clue’ as to how any rights that might be given to adult child carers to make a claim for some form of 
financial provision from their deceased parent care-receiver’s estate ought to be couched. 
The concept of testamentary freedom is also held dear across the other side of the Atlantic too.454 
And, here, some people have argued long and hard in its favour. In a lengthy and passionate piece of 
 
 
451 See: commentaries in newspapers and periodicals such as The New Statesman (Stuart White) - 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2008/04/inheritance-tax-stuart-white, (accessed: 18/12/16); The 
Guardian (Will Hutton) - https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/oct/07/comment.inheritancetax, 
(accessed: 18/12/16); and The Spectator (Irwin Stelzer) - http://www.spectator.co.uk/2007/10/listen-to-adam-
smith-inheritance-tax-is-good/ (accessed: 18/12/16). 
 
452 The Economist at http://www.economist.com/node/10024733 (accessed: 18/12/16) where it is claimed 
that: ‘Winston Churchill put the argument succinctly in 1924 when he argued that the tax was “a certain 
corrective against the development of a race of idle rich”.’ 
 
453 And, the need to pay inheritance tax is growing and will grow significantly into the next decade or so – see: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/budget/11484331/Number-of-Britons-paying-inheritance-tax-to-almost-
double-by-2020.html (accessed: 01/01/17). 
 
454 See: O. Henry, If You Will It, It Is No Dream: Balancing Public Policy and Testamentary Freedom, 6 Nw. J. L. & Soc. 
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writing, Joshua Tate maintains that freedom of testation is defensible because it allows elderly care-
receivers to reward family members who have provided care.455 In short, Tate claims that a competent 
testator, rather than a court or the legislature, is in the best position to decide how much care each 
person has provided and to reward caregivers accordingly.456 While inter vivos arrangements for the 
provision of such care are to be encouraged, this is very much a counsel of perfection. Such freedom 
may produce ‘just results’ in some cases, particularly where the care-receiver remains capable of 
making such discerning judgements and acting upon them by making a will shortly before their death. 
Sadly, this is not always the case. There are many reasons why an elderly, disabled care-receiver may 
not be able to make a sound judgement concerning the care which they have received from family 
members. Similarly, there may be many reasons why this same person may choose not to make that 
decision, preferring to leave it to the family to ‘sort these matters out after they have gone’.457 Indeed, 
‘treating children equally’ is a powerful mantra for many parents. Leaving one’s estate to one’s 
children in equal shares demonstrates that one has equal love and respect for them all.458 And, it may 
also be ‘the easy way out’ because then there is no need to make any attempt to value the care that 
one has received.459 
Gallanis and Gittler agree that, in the absence of empirical data to support Tate’s views, what they 
describe as ‘the traditional American approach to the law of succession’ is not an approach that is best 
suited to promote family care-giving.460 Recognising that there are weighty arguments to be put in 
favour of encouraging such care-giving in the United States, they propose that carers should be able 
to receive a share of the deceased care-receiver’s estate in much the same way in which, in some 
 
Policy, 215 (2011) at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol6/iss1/6 (accessed: 01/01/17). 
 
455 See: fn. 5, supra. 
 
456 And, therefore, he says, law reform should concentrate on strengthening testamentary freedom rather 
than reducing it; instead, any reforms should ensure that care-givers are adequately compensated in cases of 
intestacy, not in cases where the deceased has died testate. 
 
457 There is research that supports this which can be found in Misa Izuhara’s book, Housing, Care and 
Maintenance, (Routledge, 2009) at p. 119. 
 
458 Ibid. at p. 114. 
 
459 One only has to read the illustration from practice referred to later in this chapter to realise that testamentary 
freedom cannot always be relied upon to produce a ‘just result’.  
460 Thomas P Gallanis and Josephine Gittler, Family Caregiving and the Law of Succession: A Proposal, 45 U. 





states, a surviving spouse has an elective share of that estate which is protected by statute.461 In this 
manner, they argue in favour of further restrictions on testamentary freedom. Indeed, it is interesting 
to note that arguments against testamentary freedom are gathering pace even in what is now the 
spiritual home of such freedom as a way of responding to the perceived need to provide social care 
for the elderly on an increasing basis as society begins to age at an increasing rate.462 While ‘an elective 
share for carers’ is an interesting solution, it seems to have little connection, if any, to the quality or 
degree of care that has been provided in each case. In many instances, carer X will provide a 
significantly greater amount of care at a far higher standard in return for a one-quarter share of a 
modest estate valued at, say, £200,000, than carer Y will provide to his/her parent in return for a one-
quarter share of an estate valued at £4 million. In these circumstances, the remedy bound-up in the 
idea of an elective share would lead to arbitrary results that have little or no connection with the need 
to ‘do justice’ to the claims of informal carers.  Moreover, one must also have considerable doubts as 
to whether such a solution is at all compatible with the discretionary powers given to our courts under 
the 1975 Act such that it would be impossible for the two regimes to exist side-by-side.463 With this in 
mind, the ‘elective share’ idea in its unrestricted form can only be rejected and we must continue to 
look for a more efficient, effective and just solution. 
Despite the protestations of many of those with right-wing political affiliations, the arguments in 
favour of a wholly unrestricted form of testamentary freedom remain unconvincing. As we know, 
these arguments did not hold sway back in 1938. At that point, it was the view of our law-makers that 
a deceased should not be free to leave either his/her spouse without ‘reasonable financial provision’. 
Indeed, the failure of a deceased to recognise that their wealth was often a product of sacrifices made 
by their spouse and family as much as themselves was considered to be morally wrong. That 
observation is, of course, at its strongest when considered in relation to claims made by spouses. 
Indeed, it has been cited in some quarters as the principal reason why the standard of financial 
provision is all the greater for spouses.464 In the parent-child relationship, such matters are not so 
obvious. While there is, in law, an obligation to provide financial support for one’s minor children, that 
 
461 For example: New York and Florida. 
 
462 See: Frances H Foster., Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999, Wis. L. Rev. 1199, 
1202 (1999); Heather M. Fossen Forrest, Loosening the Wrapper on the Sandwich Generation,: Private 
Compensation for Family Caregivers, 63 Louisiana Law Review (2003) p. 381 and Frances H. Foster, Toward a 
Behaviour-Based Model of Inheritance: The Chinese Experiment, U.C. Davis Law Review 77 (1998). 
 
463 See: sections 4.4 and 4.5, infra. 
 





obligation does not ordinarily continue beyond their majority.465 Save for this, English law does not 
recognise any family property regime that extends to children. That does not, in itself, weaken the 
claims of adult children who have cared for their deceased parents.  Instead, it is suggested that what 
these arguments against ‘forced heirship’ show is that an adult child needs to advance something 
more than the mere existence of a parent-child relationship in order to either maintain a successful 
claim under the 1975 Act or be deserving of financial provision from their deceased parent’s estate 
through some other route.466  
Of course, if an adult child has cared for his/her parent over a significant period of time, and even 
more so where that adult child has suffered some form of detriment in doing so, that ‘something 
more’ will be readily apparent. Whether this would be sufficient in the minds of the judiciary and/or 
the general public to persuade either of them that testamentary freedom should be sacrificed on the 
altar of judicial discretion to admit yet another restriction on testamentary freedom is perhaps 
another matter. But, do ‘testamentary freedom’ and ‘judicial discretion’ really need to be engaged 
here?  
The author suggests not. In fact, the solution that is proposed for adult child carers is that whatever is 
due to an adult child carer as some form of statutorily recognised financial incentive for the care that 
they have provided to their parent care-receiver is due as a debt, incurred in the lifetime of the parent 
care-receiver, but payable after their death.467 Few people would suggest that a deceased person’s 
debts should not be enforceable against their estate following that person’s death. Viewed in this way, 
the proposals to reward adult child carers set out in chapter six should not be seen as a restriction on 
an individual’s testamentary freedom. Moreover, if, as will be suggested in this chapter, the adult child 
carer and the parent care-receiver are able to contract out of this debt – i.e. to make a legally binding 
agreement in which the adult child carer freely acknowledges that that they have no claim under 
statute or otherwise in return for the caring that they have undertaken thus far, or, indeed, will 
undertake in the future – the suggestion that treating such claims as a debt is even less likely to be 
 
465 See: Re Goodchild [1997] 1 WLR 1216. This fails to recognise that a young adult will often be in need of 
financial support for their post-secondary school education and/or training. And, there is some effort to 
redress this in the 1975 Act itself, which can be said to acknowledge this moral obligation - the 1975 Act, s. 
3(3). 
 
466 See: Rebecca Probert, ‘Family and Other Animals’, (2017) L. Q. R. 550 at 554. 
 
467 With the government lending money to informal carers on the security of these rights in the meantime – 




considered an imposition on testamentary freedom.468 Indeed, the ‘contracting-out’ and ‘the family 
care contract’ solutions put forward in chapter six, far from being a further restriction on an 
individual’s freedom of testamentary disposition, have the considerable merit of engaging the care-






4.3 THE INHERITANCE (PROVISION FOR FAMILY AND DEPENDANTS) ACT 1975 IN OUTLINE 
The 1975 Act came into force on the 1st April 1976 and replaced the 1938 Act in full.470 Under the 1975 
Act, as subsequently amended, spouses, civil partners, former spouses and civil partners (who have 
not entered into a subsequent marriage or civil partnership), cohabitants,471 children of the deceased, 
any person who has been treated by the deceased as a child of the family of the deceased,472 and any 
other person not otherwise entitled to make a claim, but who was being maintained wholly or partly 
by the deceased immediately before his death, may make a claim for reasonable financial provision 
from the deceased’s estate on the basis that the deceased’s will, or the operation of the law relating 
to intestacy as it affects the deceased’s estate, or a combination of both, fails to make such provision 
 
468 Mika Oldham, Financial Obligations within the Family: Aspects of Intergenerational Maintenance and 
Succession in England and France, Camb. L.J. Vol 60, No. 1 (Mar. 2001) pp. 128-177 at p. 173 et seq. 
 
469 D. B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, (2013), Scholarly 
Works, Paper 950, Notre Dame Law School, in which the writer argues forcefully in favour of an ex ante 
perspective in considering whether or not to impose restrictions on testamentary freedom as opposed to ex 
post considerations and uses these arguments largely to support the idea of ‘dead hand control’ (or control 
from the grave) which is at the heart of US law of trusts and succession. It is submitted that the solutions 
proposed in chapter six will satisfy both the ex-ante and the ex post perspectives on testamentary freedom. 
 
470 The long title of the 1975 Act describes the Act as making ‘fresh provisions’ empowering courts to make 
financial awards in favour designated persons out of the estate of a deceased person. 
 
471 Cohabitants are defined as persons who, during the whole of the two-year period ending immediately 
before the deceased’s death, were living in the same household as the deceased, as the husband or wife or as 
a civil partner of the deceased – the 1975 Act, s. 1(1A), as amended. 
 





for him/her. Although the court has a discretion whether or not to make an award in the applicant’s 
favour and, if so, what form that award should take, such discretion is strictly controlled by the 
contents of the legislation. Section 3(1)-(6) set out the factors to which the court must have regard in 
the exercise of this discretion at each of the two stages through which an application must pass if it is 
to be successful.473 At each stage, the court is required to consider these factors in determining 
whether the applicant has been successful in making out his/her case, and in considering the nature 
of the award, if any, to make in their favour.474  
It has long been accepted that every application under the 1975 Act involves two distinct issues, 
namely, (i) whether reasonable financial provision has been made for the applicant, and (ii) what, if 
any, provision should now be made for the applicant if no such provision has been made.475 Although 
regularly engaged by judges and practitioners alike, this ‘two-stage test’ as it has become known has 
recently come under a little criticism in the highest of circles.  In Illot v The Blue Cross and others476 
Lord Hughes JSC observed that ‘… in many cases, exactly the same conclusions will answer the 
question whether reasonable financial provision has been made for the claimant and identify what 
that financial provision should be.’ This remark appears to have been made largely to discourage lower 
courts from splitting the hearing of a 1975 Act claim into two distinct parts,  thereby increasing costs 
and permitting respondents ‘two bites at the cherry’.477 Whether there should be a ‘two-stage test’ or 
merely one, it is nevertheless evident that trial judges are able to take something of ‘a broad brush 
approach’ to claims made under the 1975 Act and that appellate courts should be slow to interfere 
 
473 These stages are, firstly, that the claimant must show that the deceased’s will, or the law relating to 
intestacy, or a combination of both, failed to make ‘reasonable financial provision’ for him/her in all the 
circumstances of the case (stage one) and, secondly, that the court should exercise that discretion and make 
an appropriate award in his/her favour (stage two).  
 
474 These factors include the financial resources of the applicant, and of any other applicants and of the 
beneficiaries of the estate, the deceased’s obligations and responsibilities to the applicant, and to any other 
applicants and to the beneficiaries of the estate, the nature and size of the estate, the physical and mental 
disabilities of the applicant, other applicants and beneficiaries, and ‘any other matter, including the conduct of 
the applicant or any other person, which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant.’ – 
See: the 1975 Act, s. 3(1) (a)-(g).  
 
475 Goff LJ in In Re Coventry [1980] Ch. 461 at 487 refers to the stages as comprising two distinct questions, 
describing the first as a ‘value judgment’ and the second as a matter of the court’s discretion. 
 
476 See: [2017] UKSC 17 at [23]-[24]. 
 
477 In the first hearing, the respondents will often claim that reasonable financial provision has been made for 
the applicant, and thus seek the dismissal of the claim, and, if unsuccessful, may then claim, at the second 
hearing, that, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, the applicant should get nothing. In the author’s 




with their decisions, and may not do so simply because, had they been sitting hearing the evidence, 
they would have come to a different conclusion.478 
Indeed, case law shows that a not inconsiderable difference of approach by the courts where the 
applicant is on the one hand a surviving spouse, or civil partner, and where the applicant falls into one 
of the other categories of claimant set out in s. 1(1). To a large part, this is dictated by the terms of 
the 1975 Act. In the case of spouses and civil partners who fall into section 1(1)(a),479 the words 
‘reasonable financial provision’ are defined as ‘such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all 
the circumstances for a spouse or civil partner to receive, whether or not that provision is required for 
the applicant’s maintenance’.480 In all other cases, these words mean ‘such financial provision as it 
would be reasonable in all the circumstances for the applicant to receive for his maintenance’.481 There 
are, therefore, two different standards applicable to claims under the Act – ‘the spousal standard’, 
which is applied to surviving spouses, civil partners and former spouses and civil partners who have 
not remarried,482 and ‘the maintenance standard’ which applies to all other claimants, including adult 
child claimants. Although not covered by the ‘spousal standard’, recent case law appears to suggest 
that the courts are now much more sympathetic to claims made by cohabitees of long-standing than 
other applicants, and are prepared to set aside the demands of testamentary freedom in order to 
ensure that they are properly provided for, thereby reflecting society’s views of what is commonly 
known as ‘common law marriage’.483 However, elsewhere, the courts seem to be rallying around the 
 
478 See: Lord Hughes SCJ at [2017] UKSC 17 at [24]. 
 
479 Save where the marriage of the deceased was subject of a decree of judicial separation and at the date of 
death the decree was in force and the separation was continuing. In that event, the claimant is treated as a 
claimant whose claim is limited in the same way as all other claimants. 
 
480 The 1975 Act, s. 1(2) (a).  
 
481 Ibid.; ‘maintenance’ has been defined as ‘payments which will directly or indirectly enable the applicant in 
the future to discharge the cost of his daily living at whatever standard of living  is appropriate to him’ – Re 
Dennis [1981] 2 All E R 140 at 145 per Browne-Wilkinson J. While, in Re Wynford Hodge deceased [2018] EWHC 
688, (a cohabitant case) this was interpreted so as to include the outright transfer of a house to a claimant, the 
likelihood of such an award in favour of an adult child is remote. 
 
482 If the deceased and his former spouse/civil partner have been though ancillary relief proceedings following 
the divorce, the ancillary relief order will often contain a provision prohibiting the surviving spouse/civil 
partner from making a claim under the 1975 Act against the estate of his former spouse; see: the 1975 Act, s. 
15(1). 
 
483 See: Sir Geoffrey Vos LC, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, in Lewis v Warner [2017] EWCA Civ. 
2182;  Thompson v Raggett, Re Hodge’s Estate [2018] EWHC 688 (Ch.), [2018] WTLR 1027, and Banfield v 




concept of testamentary freedom with increasing regularity.484 And, in practice, this ‘maintenance 
standard restriction’ significantly limits the provision that can be made for adult children, effectively 
precluding, it is suggested, the award of substantial financial provision for caring services rendered 
before the deceased’s death.485 
In considering claims made under the 1975 Act, the court takes an objective approach. The question 
for the court is: ‘Does the deceased’s will or the operation of the law relating to intestacy on the 
deceased’s estate, or a combination of the two, make reasonable financial provision for the 
deceased?’ It is not: ‘Has the deceased acted reasonably in making the provision (if any) that has been 
made?’ ‘Reasonableness’ is not judged as if the court is looking through the eyes of the deceased; it 
is, therefore, not the task of the court to make some form of moral judgment on the provision that 
has been made by the deceased.486 In fact, the question whether or not reasonable financial provision 
has been made by the deceased for the claimant is judged not at the date on which the deceased 
made his/her will, if he/she has made a will, nor, indeed, as at the date of the deceased’s death, but 
at the date of the trial of the claim.487  
In practice, much will turn in applications under the 1975 Act on the weight the trial judge gives to 
‘the section 3 factors’. That depends on his/her interpretation of the evidence that is presented at the 
hearing of the claim. And, this will require the trial judge to make certain findings of fact on that 
evidence in order to either admit the claim or reject it. As a result, it is easy to see how many 
applications under the 1975 Act have ‘turned on their own facts’ and many commentators have 
acknowledged that this makes advising on the merits of an inheritance family provision claim difficult 
for practitioners.488 In addition, it is also difficult to succeed on an appeal under the Act.489 Once 
permission to appeal has been granted, the appellant will face the burden of establishing before the 
appellate court that the decision at first instance was ‘wrong’ in law or in fact or that the exercise of 
 
484 See, for example: Wellesley v Earl Cowley [2019] EWHC 11 (Ch.) 
 
485 This will be further considered in section 4.4, infra. 
 
486 See: Re Hancock [1998] 2 FLR 346. 
 
487 The 1975 Act, s. 3(5). 
 
488 A. Francis, ‘Inheritance Act Claims: Law, Practice and Procedure’, (Jordans, 2006) at 8[9]. 
 
489 Ibid. 15[40] observing that, ‘… appeals are difficult to win … The question will be whether the decision 
below was wrong in the sense that the way in which the judge exercised his discretion cannot be supported. It 




the court’s discretion is one that ‘cannot be supported’.490 In circumstances where the exercise of the 
court’s discretion by the trial judge is very much a ‘value judgement’,491 the appellate court will need 
to determine that no reasonable judge could have exercised his or her discretion in the manner that 
he/she has.492  
Under section 4 all applications under the Act must be made within six months from the date on which 
a grant of representation was first taken out in respect of the deceased’s estate. There is a judicial 
discretion to extend this period in an appropriate case and case law exists as a guide to the exercise 
of that discretion. That matter apart, the claim is decided at a full trial on the evidence before the 
court.493 Given the breadth of the issues and circumstances that might need to be addressed by the 
evidence, it is not uncommon for trials to take up several days of court time.494 That, of course, adds 
to their expense. Those who have sacrificed much in order to care for an elderly, disabled parent over 
many months, if not years, will often struggle to pay the legal costs involved in making such a claim. 
What is more, solicitors are often very wary of taking such claims on a ‘no win, no fee’ basis where the 
outcome of such claims are so difficult to predict. This is likely to leave carers having to fund claims of 
this nature out of their own resources. In many cases, the financial hardship that they have suffered 
in caring for the deceased will have left them without the ability to make such a claim, if, indeed, there 







490 Ibid. at 15[40] 
 
491 Sir Nicholas Wall P in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346 at paragraph [25] referring to Re Coventry 
deceased [1980] Ch. 461 where Goff LJ (at 487A-B) and Geoffrey Lane LJ at 492-4 both acknowledged that the 
court’s decision at stage one of the process is a ‘value judgment’ or a ‘qualitative decision’. 
 
492 See: fn. 488, supra, 15[40]. 
 
493 Applications under the 1975 Act come under CPR Part 57 which provide for certain evidence to be put 
before the court in writing – see: CPR 57.16 (3). 
 





4.4 ADULT CHILD APPLICATIONS – OBLIGATIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND CARE 
In the list of factors that the court is required to take into account under the 1975 Act are ‘… any 
obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards any applicant …’.495 In the realm of 
informal care-giving, this begs the question: could an adult child carer successfully contend that their 
now deceased parent was under an obligation to make financial provision, or enhanced financial 
provision, for him/her in order to either acknowledge the extent of the care that the adult child had 
provided for them in the later stages of their life or to recognise the degree of sacrifice that the adult 
child had undertaken in order to provide that care?  At present, the question remains unanswered. 
Nevertheless, there are some judicial statements that appear to lend some considerable support to 
this idea. In Re Coventry deceased496 Oliver J accepted that had the claimant established, on the 
evidence, that he had given up work ‘… and disabled himself from earning an adequate living in order 
to devote himself to the [deceased] …’ this would have been a significant factor in his favour.497 And, 
in Re Jennings deceased,498 Henry LJ more explicitly acknowledged that ‘… some undischarged 
responsibilities from the past may still be current for instance a child of the deceased might have given 
up a university place to nurse the deceased though his long last illness and now wishes to take up that 
place. The moral obligation there would be both current and clear.’499  On their face, these statements 
clearly reinforce the suggestion that a successful claim could be made by an adult child carer against 
the estate of a deceased parent care-receiver under the 1975 Act, at least in the particular 
circumstances envisaged by Oliver J and by Henry LJ.  
Sitting aside Henry LJ, Nourse LJ, for his part, suggested that the obligations and responsibilities 
referred to in paragraph (d) should, ordinarily, be confined to those that were weighing upon the 
 
495 See: section 3(1)(d) of the 1975 Act which also goes on to include ‘any obligations and responsibilities which 
the deceased had … to any beneficiary of …. [his/her] estate’, and therefore demands that the court should 
balance the applicant’s claim against the claims of any beneficiaries to who the deceased also owed an 
obligation or responsibility. 
  
496 [1980] Ch. 461 
 
497 See: page 477 – this is also reflected in the decision of Arnold J in In Re Wilkinson deceased [1977] 3 WLR 
514, to award financial provision for the claimant, where the claimant agreed to give up her employment at 
her sister’s request, to go and live with the sister and to take care of her where the sister suffered from 
arthritis. 
 
498 [1993] EWCA Civ. 10: [1994] Ch. 286. 
 




deceased immediately before his death.500 And, therefore, any obligations and/or responsibilities that 
may have existed at some earlier point in time, but not at the deceased’s death, may, it seems, be 
treated as having dissipated, even though the deceased may never have met the same during his 
lifetime.501 In many respects, this is an unhelpful statement, and one that seems to have arisen solely 
in order to justify the refusal of the Court of Appeal to endorse the provision that had been made for 
the applicant at the trial of that case. If care has been provided without reward for a significant period 
of time, the obligation to make financial provision for the informal carer should not dissipate over 
time. If care provided for a period of, say, five years immediately before the care-receiver’s death 
creates an ‘obligation’ within the meaning of paragraph (d),  the care provided for the same period 
should create the same obligation even though that care was provided over 10 years before the 
deceased’s death. This may be increasingly relevant if advances in medical science mean that life may 
be prolonged beyond the time where ‘ordinary care’ is sufficient for an elderly, disabled parent, and 
the care-receiver has to enter a nursing home in order to get the specialist nursing care that they need. 
The care that an adult child has provided to an elderly, disabled parent through the care-receiver’s 
80s should be valued in the same way whether or not the care-receiver subsequently spent 10 years 
in a specialist nursing home before passing away at the age of 100 or died peacefully in their own 
home at the age of 90. The ‘key’ to a finding that such an obligation exists should focus more on the 
effect of the provision of care on the care-provider and their family. Did the provision of care cause 
the carer (and/or the carer and their family) to suffer hardship? That seems to be more the question 
at the back of the minds of both Oliver J and Henry LJ. 
The idea that obligations dissipate over time is therefore a troubling one. Having said this, there may 
be an already established exception to what Nourse LJ described as this ‘general rule’ which may, in 
turn, suggest that further exceptions could be admitted.502 There are a number of reported cases 
where the claimant had worked in the deceased’s business for a considerable period of time receiving 
little or no pay but expecting to receive an ‘inheritance’ in the form of a share in that business on the 
 
500 See: Re Jennings deceased [1993] EWCA Civ. 10, per Nourse LJ, who described the obligations relied upon as 
‘long spent and … incapable of founding a claim against … [the deceased] immediately before his death.’ 
 
501 See: Re Jennings deceased, ibid. where the court at first instance (Wall J.) had found that the deceased had 
failed ‘… to honour his moral and financial obligations to the [claimant] during … [his] minority’ (per Nourse LJ) 
and, on that basis, had made an award in the claimant’s favour in the sum of £40,000, from an estate of 
approximately £300,000. This judgment was overturned on appeal. Nourse LJ, with whom the other members 
of the Court of Appeal agreed, took the view that, ‘An Act intended to facilitate the making of reasonable 
financial provision cannot have been intended to revive defunct obligations and responsibilities as a basis for 
making it.’ 
 




deceased’s death.503 In the case of Re Abram (deceased)504, the claimant had worked for some 
eighteen years in the family business on a very low wage expecting that one day the business would 
be his. In the event, once the claimant was married with children, he had to leave the family business 
and go into partnership with someone else because he was unable to support his family on the wage 
that he was earning in the family business.505 And, again, in the case of Re Pearce (deceased)506, the 
claimant had worked on the family farm without pay from the age of 7 to the age of 16 and had been 
told that the farm would be his one day by his father, the deceased, but, on attaining the age of 16, 
he decided to leave working on the farm and seek employment elsewhere, given that the deceased 
could not pay him.507 On the particular facts of these cases, there was no proprietary estoppel claim 
that could be advanced on behalf of the claimant,508 but the court was nevertheless content to hold 
in each case that the obligation and responsibility on the deceased to provide for the claimant was 
still current given the circumstances in which the claimant left the deceased’s employment.509  
Similar circumstances occurred in Espinosa v Bourke,510 where the father’s promise to leave his wife’s 
share of a share portfolio to their daughter, the claimant, was not enforceable via a proprietary 
estoppel claim as the promise had never been made to the daughter, but to the mother, and, in any 
event, the daughter never relied on that promise thereafter. In each instance, the award in favour of 
the claimant was justifiable on the basis that the deceased’s estate had been enriched by either the 
work done by the claimant or, in the latter case, the value of the mother’s share in the share portfolio 
which would never have fallen into the deceased’s estate had the promise not been given. And, it may 
be, therefore, that a form of ‘unjust enrichment’ can justify this exception to the idea that obligations 
 
503 See, for example: In Re Creeney, Creeney v Smith [1984] N.I. 397. 
 
504 [1996] 2 FLR 379 
 
505 In the event, the court awarded provision for the claimant in light of the moral obligation that weighed on 
deceased arising from the work that the claimant had undertaken in the family business in the expectation 
that it would be his. 
 
506 [1998] 2 FLR 705 
 
507 Again, in the circumstances of this case, the court awarded financial provision to the claimant based on the 
moral obligation created by the substantial work that the claimant had done on the family farm as a boy, 
including the making of improvements to buildings and farmland and the carrying out of general ‘farming 
duties’. 
 
508 For such claims generally, see: chapter five infra. 
 
509 The court attached no blame to the claimant in either case for seeking employment elsewhere. 
 




dissipate over time. In the case of claims made by informal carers, this ‘unjust enrichment’ could be 
found in the fact that the care-receiver’s estate is all the more valuable because he/she has not had 
to buy-in care on a commercial basis because it was provided free of charge by the informal carer. 
Indeed, if ‘unjust enrichment’ justifies an exception to the ‘dissipation rule’, then, logically, it should 
lend considerable support to the claim that the provision of care in itself creates an ‘obligation’ to 
make provision for the adult child informal carer as, in the vast majority, if not all, cases, the provision 
of such care on a gratuitous basis will result in some form of financial saving on the part of the care-
receiver. However, there are instances in reported case law where judicial attitudes to the provision 
of care have been a good deal more ambivalent. One such case is Re Rowlands deceased.511 Here, 
there were two claimants. The first claimant was the deceased’s widow, aged 90, who had been 
married to the deceased for some 18 years, but who had been separated from him for the past 43 
years. The second claimant was the deceased’s daughter, who was in her 60s, and had looked after 
her bed-ridden mother in a small cottage that was owned jointly by herself and her father, the 
deceased. Both claimants were in very poor financial circumstances. The deceased was a Welsh hill 
farmer. He had spent his life farming land that he held jointly with the widow and one of his sons. In 
his will, after making a few small bequests, the deceased devised and bequeathed the residue of his 
estate, including his interest in the farm, to his two remaining sons (one son had died in tragic 
circumstances in his youth) and left his widow and daughter nothing at all. At first instance, Anthony 
Lincoln J. upheld the widow’s claim and gave her a lump sum of £3,000 from an estate of just short of 
£100,000. He was satisfied that the deceased owed some ‘small moral obligation’ to his widow 
(despite the long period of separation) in light of the length of their marriage before separation, her 
age and her infirmity; in particular, he went on, the deceased had an obligation to see that her 
accommodation (which he partly owned) was ‘habitable and reasonably modern’. That obligation was 
found to have been discharged in part, but not in whole, by charging the widow what was described 
by the judge as ‘an absurdly low rent of £13 per annum’. No obligation appears to have arisen from 
the care that the widow had taken in bringing up the family while she and deceased were together. 
As regards the daughter, who had based her case at trial partly on the fact that she had been left to 
discharge what was, she claimed, the deceased’s burden of caring for her mother in her mother’s old 
age,512 and partly on her and her husband’s straightened financial circumstances, Anthony Lincoln J 
 
511 [1984] FLR 813 
 
512 The lack of any significant provision for the widow was also a blow for the daughter as she would have no 
significant expectations from the estate of her mother on her mother’s death to recompense her for the care 




simply dismissed that claim and left her to pay her own costs. In answer to the first part of the 
daughter’s claim, the judge found that, ‘the daughter had a moral obligation to look after her 
mother’513 and therefore refused to attach any value to what she had done. In answer to the second, 
he found that the daughter and her husband had received the advantage of the low rent charged to 
the widow (because they were living with and caring for her) which enabled the pair to amass some 
small savings (while spending some of their small income caring for the widow). On appeal, the Court 
of Appeal refused to intervene stating that the trial judge had gone through ‘the weighing process’ 
that is required by the Act in respect of both claims514 and the value judgments that had been made 
by the judge were not, in the words of later cases, ‘plainly wrong’. In many respects, the treatment of 
these two claims by a judge of the Family Division must be regarded as particularly ‘harsh’. Little 
provision was made for the widow, notwithstanding that the deceased had the advantage of using her 
share in the farm for his own farming business for many years, and no provision was made for the 
daughter despite the fact that she had been left to care for her mother without the support that should 
have been forthcoming from her father and she and her husband had been providing that care on a 
very low income and with little capital to fall back on.515 Indeed, what is of perhaps greater concern is 
that Anthony Lincoln J appeared to find that a daughter is under a moral duty to look after her mother 
and the daughter in this case could not, therefore, rely on the fact that she had discharged her own 
moral obligation in support of her case notwithstanding that she had been left to do so by the failure 
of the deceased to provide that support.516 
 
513 [1984] FLR 813 at page 819 
 
514 That is, both the mother’s and the daughter’s claims. 
 
515 This is a case where the daughter’s financial circumstances, perilous although they were, were ignored by 
the court. The almost inescapable inference that one draws from reading the judgment handed down in this 
case is that the judge did not believe that, in the circumstances of the case, the deceased had any obligation to 
maintain his daughter, and therefore her claim had to fail. This is diametrically opposed to the subsequent 
approach of the Court of Appeal in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346 and subsequently at [2015] EWCA Civ. 
797 where the court found no obligation on the deceased to maintain her daughter, the claimant, but looked 
only to her financial circumstances to determine whether she was entitled to an award under the 1975 Act. 
 
516 Anthony Lincoln J’s judgment in Re Rowlands deceased [1984] FLR 813 is almost exclusively focussed on the 
question whether the deceased owed any obligation to support either his widow, the first claimant, or his 
daughter, the second claimant. It may be that the lengthy separation between the widow and the deceased, 
and the fact that the daughter had largely taken her mother’s side in that separation, in his mind, begged the 
question: ‘Does a married man have any obligation to support a wife that has walked out in him?’ And, that 
focussed his mind on the question of obligation rather than the financial circumstances of each claimant. After 
considering the widow’s claim and finding that the deceased was under a moral obligation to make financial 
provision in her favour on his death, Anthony Lincoln then considered the daughter’s claim and said this: ‘As 
for [the daughter] it is said that she, for her part, really discharged the testator’s the testator’s obligations for 
him by looking after her own mother. I do not agree. She discharged her own obligations to her own mother. I 
do not see that the testator owed her any obligation of support, once she had moved off to marriage and to 
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In Riggs v Lloyds Bank plc (unreported)517 the Court of Appeal refused to make an award to a daughter 
who had cared for, and helped, her deceased father throughout her adult life518 in circumstances 
where she had adduced no clear evidence of any need for maintenance.519 This conclusion was drawn 
notwithstanding the observation by the trial judge that the daughter and her husband lived ‘not much 
above subsistence level’.520  Indeed, this was a case where the award made at first instance to the 
daughter by the trial judge was overturned on appeal. The trial judge had found that the deceased 
was under an obligation to provide for his daughter in light of her financial needs, the obligations that 
he had to his son521 and his daughter (and, unfortunately, these were not further defined by the trial 
judge but could well have included an obligation that flowed from the care provided by the daughter 
to her father) and the size and nature of the deceased’s estate. The Court of Appeal allowed the son’s 
appeal, with Dillon LJ, who gave the leading judgment, stating that he could, ‘… see no circumstances … 
for awarding any sum for maintenance to the plaintiff [daughter] on the basis of the case put 
forward …’, and that it was, ‘… not right to use the Act to award her a legacy’.522  Once again, the Court 
of Appeal refused to find that there was any ‘care obligation’, i.e. an obligation arising on a deceased 
parent to make financial provision to an adult child who had cared for him or her as ‘compensation’ 
or ‘reward’ for providing that care notwithstanding that the provision of care by the plaintiff had 
clearly caused a great deal of hardship to her and her husband over the years.523  
 
bringing up a family of her own. It seems to me that that event put an end to the responsibility for 
maintenance.’ Plainly, the Court of Appeal in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346 and subsequently at [2015] 
EWCA Civ. 797 would not agree with these propositions. 
 
517 But, reported in Oughton, R. D. (Ed.), Tyler’s Financial Provision, 3rd edition, (Butterworths, 1997) at pp. 632-
639 et seq. which contains the complete judgment of Dillon LJ with whom Butler-Sloss and Simon Browne LJJs 
agreed. 
 
518 Per Dillon LJ, Tyler Financial Provision, ibid. at p.635. 
 
519 The claimant daughter’s counsel had, apparently, opened her case at trial by acknowledging that the 
plaintiff and her husband were not necessitous but living within their means – see: Per Dillon LJ, Tyler Financial 
Provision, ibid. at p. 635. 
 
520 Ibid. at p. 635. 
 
521 The son was the residuary beneficiary of his father’s will and was defending the claim by his sister for 
provision from his father’s estate. 
 
522 See: fn. 518, supra, at p. 638. 
 
523 This seems to fly in the face of Parliamentary debates that preceded the passing of the 1975 Act. Indeed, 
Tyler’s Family Provision, 3rd edition, Oughton R. D. ed., (Butterworths, 1997) at p. 233, records that: ‘The 
debates in both Houses of Parliament on the 1975 Act demonstrated the concern of MPs and peers for 




Indeed, the provision of care for a deceased has also been relied upon by claimants in other reported 
cases under the predecessor Act, the 1938 Act, but with no evident beneficial consequences. In both 
Re Cook524  and Re Andrews525 the court declined to say that the provision of care had created an 
obligation on the deceased to make provision for the claimant. Whether these cases were decided on 
the basis that the care provided was simply not sufficient in the eyes of the court to create such an 
obligation is difficult to say from the reports of these cases. And, it may be that the decision in Riggs 
v Lloyds Bank plc (unreported)526 on the 1975 Act can be considered on the same basis.  Indeed, while 
the decision in Re Christie deceased527 was extensively criticised following the Court of Appeal decision 
in Re Coventry deceased528 only a year or so later, one observation made by Mr Vivian Price QC sitting 
as a deputy judge of the High Court in this case that has been cited with approval is that acts of ‘natural 
affection between a son and his mother, on the one hand, and a daughter and her mother, on the 
other’ are matters to which the court should attach no importance in considering applications under 
the 1975 Act.529 In order to take into account the care that has been afforded by an adult child claimant 
the courts appear to demand something more than mere ‘filial services’;530 and, it may be that the 
courts expect some degree of care to be rendered in return for little, or no, compensation provided 
by the parent care-receiver. This also seems to be the position presently taken by the Law 
Commission.531  
One further example of this may be seen in the case of Espinosa v Bourke.532 Here, the claimant had 
given up her job at her elderly father’s request and taken him into her home in order to care for him. 
She provided that care over a seven year period, albeit that she was away in Spain for much of the 
 
524 (1956) 106 LJ 466 
 
525 [1955] 3 All E R 248 
 
526 See: fn. 517, supra. 
 
527 [1979] Ch. 168 
 
528 [1980] Ch. 461 
 
529 In the words of Vivian Price QC in Re Christie, an example of such acts that a court would disregard would 
be ‘acts of maintenance and odd jobs around the house’ – [1979] Ch. 168 at 175. 
 
530 See: Re Pearson-Gregory (1957) The Times, 11th October, where Roxburgh J makes a similar distinction. 
 
531 The author of Tyler’s Family Provision (ibid.) had previously observed, at pp. 29-30, ‘[Yet] in the case of 
children caring for aged or infirm parents is virtually ignored by the Law Commission in its two reports; this 
omission must cast doubt on the Commission’s understanding of the realities of family provision legislation.’. 
 
532 [1999] 2 FLR 747; [1999] 3 FCR 76; the author was counsel for the claimant in this case and junior counsel in 




final year of her father’s life. In the event, the claimant put her case, on appeal, on two separate bases. 
One basis on which that case was put was that the father, who was, of course, the deceased, was 
under an obligation to provide for the claimant as a result of the promise that he made to the 
claimant’s mother that he would ensure that the mother’s interest in a share portfolio, jointly held by 
them prior to the mother’s death, would pass on his death to the claimant;533 and, the second basis 
on which the claimant put her case was that she had taken her father into her house and cared for 
him, giving up her job at his request in order to do so, for the last seven years of his life.534 At first 
instance, Johnson J found that the deceased had an obligation to make financial provision for the 
claimant, but that he had repaid the claimant for the care that he had received from her through the 
payment of £16,000 towards the discharge of a mortgage that the claimant had over her property, 
and by meeting the costs of the construction of a small conservatory and the refurbishment of the 
kitchen at that property, over that seven year period.535 In these circumstances, Buxton LJ, on appeal, 
found that, ‘[t]he effect of the judge’s findings is that the testator [the deceased] properly 
remunerated the [claimant] for and acknowledged the care that he had received, bearing in mind in 
particular what he had found to be the displeasing to the [deceased] circumstances of the 
 
533 See: Buxton LJ at p. 93f. 
 
534 As to the caring obligation (as it was characterised by Buxton LJ), see: Butler-Sloss LJ at p. 86e, who found 
that: ‘The appellant was, at the time of the death, of the deceased, wholly dependent on him. She had given 
up any prospect of work, however little it had been in the past, when she assumed full-time care of her father. 
She received a housekeeping allowance from him, a state carer’s allowance for caring for him and a small sum 
from [her son] when he was working. At his death, she lost all those sources of income, and had none to take 
their place’, thereby conflating the caring obligation with the claimant’s dependency on the deceased. Aldous 
LJ in the same case agreed with the approach of Butler-Sloss LJ and the result it gave. Buxton LJ, on the other 
hand, seems to have taken a different approach – see: p. 93g. 
 
535 This brought the father’s expenditure to a total of around £23,000, but (as was remarked in the Court of 
Appeal) some of that expenditure was for his own benefit as he, in particular, enjoyed sitting in the 
conservatory in order to read. To value some seven years of care and sacrifice in the sum of £23,000 seems to 




household.’536 That, with respect, is to greatly undervalue the claimant’s care of the deceased,537 given 
over a lengthy period of time, particularly where it was coupled with the giving up of paid employment 
at the deceased’s request.538 And, it shows that some members of the judiciary are reluctant to value 
care provided by members of the care-receiver’s family on a ‘realistic’ basis, on the basis, one assumes, 
that they believe that there is some form of familial obligation to provide that care. 
With this in mind, any claim that the provision of care automatically generates an ‘obligation’ to make 
financial provision for the carer clearly requires a good deal of further qualification. Indeed, one 
qualification that is readily apparent on the face of Riggs v Lloyds Bank plc (unreported) is the clear 
indication that, unless the applicant can provide evidence of a ‘need’ for maintenance, the court will 
not make any further provision for him/her.  Absence of need on the part of an adult child applicant 
whose application is based on the care that he/she as provided for the deceased will result in the 
dismissal of that claim regardless of the extent of the care provided or the effect the provision of that 
care has had on the applicant themselves or their family. 
One inference that one might, therefore, draw from these decisions is that the courts are very 
reluctant to make any award in favour of an applicant under the 1975 Act simply on the basis that the 
applicant had provided the deceased with what one might describe as ‘mere care’, and this appears 
to be so, whatever the length of time over which this care was provided, however intensive that care 
was in terms of its provision, and whatever it cost the applicant, as the carer, to provide it. Outside of 
these ‘mere care’ cases, there have been some judicial pronouncements and perhaps fewer judicial 
 
536 The ‘displeasing circumstances of the household’ to which Buxton LJ referred were the fact that the 
claimant had spent some seven months or so in Spain with a Spanish fisherman who was considerably younger 
than her and had brought him back to the UK a few months before the deceased’s death to live with her at the 
property. No doubt, the testator was unhappy with his daughter’s choice of paramour, but, to find that he, the 
deceased, had rightly come to the conclusion that he had discharged the obligation that flowed from the 
claimant’s care by making the payments that he had already made to the claimant, and that he was correct to 
do so, introduces, with all due respect to Buxton LJ, a subjective element into the decision-making process. It is 
not whether the deceased believes that he was being reasonable in doing what he did – which was, in this 
case, to make no provision for the claimant – or whether the court agrees with him, but whether the 
deceased’s will or the law relating to intestacy (or a combination of both) had the effect of failing to make 
reasonable provision for the claimant looked at on an objective basis. 
 
537 And, given that the claimant was in receipt of a carer’s allowance for the deceased, she had clearly 
demonstrated to the authorities that the deceased, who was elderly and very frail, needed that care. 
 
538 This was how Butler-Sloss LJ seemed to consider the matter of care – i.e. that it had been provided selflessly 
and at some cost to the claimant over a significant period of time – and that, accordingly, the provision of care 
was a factor that the court was entitled to give weight to in the exercise that s. 3(1) of the 1975 Act required 




decisions that indicate that the provision of social care by a claimant to a deceased parent might be 
significant in some narrowly defined circumstances.  
While it is clear from the words of Oliver J and Henry LJ referred to earlier, and from other judicial 
statements,539 that the provision of informal care may allow an adult child carer who is in need of 
financial provision to make a successful claim against the estate of the care-receiver, in reality there 
are significant difficulties inherent in such claims that make the same both fragile and very difficult to 
predict.  In fact, such are the obstacles raised by these ‘difficulties’ – either individually or collectively 
– that it quickly becomes apparent that any reform of the 1975 Act as a means of providing relief for 
informal carers is far from a workable solution. In Inheritance Claims: Law, Practice and Procedure, the 
author, Andrew Francis, describes these difficulties as largely the product of two features of such 
claims: first, ‘the maintenance test’, and, secondly, the objective nature of the approach to any 1975 
Act claim that the court is required to follow which, of course, excludes all subjective questions of 
‘morality’.540 However, in practice, these ‘difficulties’ go somewhat deeper. 
In referring to ‘the maintenance test’, Francis uses this description in its widest sense to include the 
requirement that a claimant must establish a ‘need for maintenance’.  And, indeed, this approach has 
now been confirmed at the highest level by Lord Hughes JSC in Illot v The Blue Cross and Others.541 
Curiously, there is nothing in the 1975 Act that requires a non-spousal applicant to establish a ‘need 
for maintenance’ as a pre-condition to making a successful claim under that Act.542 This appears to be 
mere ‘judicial gloss’.  That said, it is gloss that is based on some attractive logic; ‘If you do not need 
‘maintenance’, why should the court make provision for it?’ If this is the correct interpretation to put 
on the word ‘maintenance’, then this seems to make the amendment of the 1975 Act to include a 
‘carers’ category’ something of a ‘’false dawn’ for carers.  Many informal carers will not need 
 
539 See, for example: In re Callaghan deceased [1985] Fam. 1 per Booth J and In Re Leach [1986] Ch. 226 per 
Slade LJ. 
 
540 See: Francis, A. ‘Inheritance Act Claims: Law, Practice and Procedure’, (Jordans, 2006) at 7[12], paragraph 
(7). 
 
541 [2017] UKSC 17 at [19), where Lord Hughes JSC states: ‘… all cases which are limited to maintenance … will 
turn largely on the asserted needs of the claimant …. need for maintenance rather than for anything else ….) is 
a necessary [my emphasis] but not a sufficient condition for an order. [However,] [n]eed, plus the relevant 
relationship to qualify the claimant, is not always enough.’ 
 
542 As noted earlier, section 1(1) simply provides that applications under the Act are made ‘on the ground that 
the disposition of the deceased’s estate …. is not such as to make reasonable financial provision for the 
applicant’, and (2)(b) states that ‘reasonable financial provision’ for non-spousal applicants means ‘…. such 




‘maintenance’ because – as their parents are living longer – they are at a stage in life where they are 
able to maintain, and have been maintaining, themselves, at least in financial terms and perhaps with 
a modicum of difficulty, but nevertheless that is where they are.  What they have lost during the caring 
period are ‘opportunities’ – opportunities for advancement in their careers, opportunities to earn 
more, opportunities to enjoy life with their families outside the four walls in which they have been 
confined during the caring period. Financial provision can acknowledge the hardship associated with 
these lost opportunities, but that is nothing to do with the concept of ‘maintenance’. And, in the 
absence of a ‘need for maintenance’ an adult child informal carer’s claim will fail notwithstanding that 
it might otherwise have secure foundations, such as the existence of a moral obligation on the 
deceased to make such provision for the claimant, which is plainly relevant under s. 3(1)(d).543  
As for the second point that Francis makes, the judiciary have been keen to emphasise in recent years 
that the question raised by the 1975 Act is not whether the deceased has acted reasonably in 
excluding, or making inadequate provision for, the applicant, but whether the provision that has been 
made, or lack of it, has produced what can be described as ‘a reasonable result’.544 In other words, the 
exclusion of all ‘questions of morality’ prevents the judge from asking, ‘Is it reasonable for the 
deceased to have failed to make adequate financial provision for the applicant given the years of 
unstinting care that he/she has administered to the deceased?’, and granting the applicant relief on 
that basis. In practice, an applicant’s claim can only succeed if, (i) it is based on some form of ‘need 
for maintenance’, and (ii) if the weighing up of the section 3 factors indicates that the claim should be 
successful. Indeed, this is amply borne out by reported cases where an applicant  has only succeeded 
not on the basis of the care that he/she has provided but very largely because his/her financial 
circumstances, coupled with other circumstances, dictate that it is unreasonable not to make 
provision for him/her.545 
Care has been a somewhat minor, and on other occasions insignificant, factor in a small number of 
other 1975 Act claims; in these cases, more unusual factors seem to have been material in raising the 
 
543 This can be seen in the recent case of Ames v Jones, 2016 WL 04772447, 19th August 2016, County Court 
(Central London), where an application by an adult daughter failed where she had ‘failed to discharge the 
burden of proving her current a future needs’. Similarly, in Christofides v Seddon [2014] WTLR 215, the adult 
son claimant, who was described as having very considerable needs (a need for care and a need for 
accommodation), failed in his claim for greater financial provision from his mother’s estate because he could 
not show that the financial provision that had been made for him (which was an equal provision with the three 
beneficiary defendants and which amount to approximately £125,000)  failed to discharge any obligation that 
the mother had to him to make further provision for him. 
 
544 See: Lord Hughes JSC in Illot v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17 at [16]-[17]. 
 




obligation on a deceased to make provision for the applicant in that case. In Re Callaghan546 the 
applicant and his wife cared for the deceased for approximately four months or so. The applicant was 
a ‘child of the family’. In the event, Booth J found that the deceased’s obligations and responsibilities 
to the applicant547 were greater that those to his sisters (the beneficiaries of the deceased’s Will) and 
awarded the applicant the sum of £15,000. However, the key factor in this decision was that a 
significant part of the deceased’s estate was derived from the applicant’s mother, not that the 
applicant had cared for the deceased.548 It is also interesting in light of Riggs v Lloyds Bank plc that the 
applicant failed to establish any particular need for provision as his financial circumstances were 
compared with those of his three sisters and were held to be comparable. Nevertheless, the applicant 
would be permitted to buy his local authority-owned house (which he rented) in return for the 
payment of the sum of £13,000 and therefore that was his ‘need’. In short, he needed accommodation 
for his maintenance and therefore a capital sum to purchase that accommodation without a mortgage 
was the award that was made to him by the court, even though the applicant was not ‘needy’.549 A 
similar result was reached in the case of Re Leach.550 Here, the applicant had been caring for her father 
for around nine months after the death of his wife, the applicant’s mother, before the father went to 
reside with the deceased. The father then made a will in favour of the deceased and he also married 
her. When the father died his estate went to the deceased, but when she died her estate went to her 
children by a former relationship and the applicant was not provided for. On her application for an 
award out of the deceased’s estate, the court held that the deceased was under a ‘moral obligation’ 
 
546 [1985] Fam 1 
 
547 Which Booth J described as ‘very considerable indeed’ and liken them to ‘the obligations of a widowed 
parent to a dutiful and responsible only child’. Of course, the applicant was not ‘an only child’ vis-à-vis the 
deceased; there were three sisters (who were, in fact, half-sisters). What Booth J seems to be saying is that, as 
regards the part of the deceased’s estate that was derived from the applicant’s mother, the obligations on the 
deceased to the applicant in relation to that part of the estate were similar to the obligations on a widowed 
parent to a dutiful only child. Of course, at this point other courts would argue that no obligation arises from 
being merely a dutiful child. 
 
548 The house in which the deceased lived was originally in the name of the applicant’s mother. The applicant 
was a child of his mother, not by the deceased but by a prior relationship. After the deceased and the 
applicant’s mother married, the applicant’s mother put this house into joint names. On the mother’s death 
intestate, the house passed to the deceased absolutely. 
 
549 In the event, the award was £15,000 – i.e. £13,000 and a further £2,000 for ‘unforeseen emergencies’. 
 




to make provision for the applicant because her estate was derived in part from the applicant’s 
father’s estate.551  
Notwithstanding that an element of care had been present in both Re Callaghan and in Re Leach, it 
would appear that in neither case was it deemed to be significant set against other more weighty 
factors such as ‘the source of the estate’. Although not referred to at all in the ‘section 3 factors’, 
‘source of the estate’ can also be used to explain the case of Espinosa v Bourke referred to earlier.552 
Indeed, this itinerant factor could be used, in somewhat wider terms, to explain the case of In re B 
deceased.553 Here, the deceased was born severely handicapped as a result of medical negligence and 
required constant care. She was awarded the sum of £250,000 in damages in an action against her 
local health authority and her affairs, including the administration of a trust fund comprising this 
award of damages, was placed in the hands of the Court of Protection. The deceased lived with and 
was cared for by her mother, the claimant. In due course, a bungalow as purchased for their joint use 
and occupation, with the mother providing one-quarter of the purchase price and the trust fund 
providing the balance. In these circumstances, this three-quarter share was held in trust for the 
deceased and, when she died, it passed, under the law relating to intestacy, in equal shares to the 
mother and the deceased’s father who had ceased to cohabit with the mother shortly after the 
deceased’s birth. After the deceased’s death, the mother commenced proceedings under the 1975 
Act seeking an order against the father’s share in the bungalow. The mother could only maintain this 
claim if she was dependent on the deceased. She was not a claimant who fell into any other category 
listed in section 1(1) of the 1975 Act. But, she was, of course, a carer who provided her care of the 
deceased on an informal, full-time basis.554 The father applied to strike out the mother’s claim on the 
basis that the deceased had not assumed responsibility for the mother’s maintenance.555 What is 
more, so his counsel’s arguments continued, the mother was not in a position of dependency on the 
 
551 This was supported by evidence of the wishes of the applicant’s father in relation to his share of the 
property that was jointly owned by him and the deceased. His statement that he wanted the applicant to have 
the benefit of this share following the deceased’s death placed the deceased under a ‘moral obligation’ to the 
applicant on the basis that she had encouraged the applicant to think that she would therefore receive a 
substantial amount of money on the deceased’s death. 
 
552 [1999] 2 FLR 747 where part of the estate was derived from the claimant’s mother and only came to the 
claimant’s father with an obligation that it should be handed over to the claimant on the father’s death. 
 
553 See: [2000] Ch. 662. The case is also known as Bouette v Rose in some reports. 
 
554 See: Robert Walker LJ at [2000] Ch. 662 at 666G. 
 
555 This is something that the court is directed to consider on applicants where the claimant claims to have 




deceased, but vice versa.556 In the event, the Court of Appeal was persuaded that an assumption of 
responsibility for the mother’s maintenance could, on the evidence, be inferred from the fact that she 
was, albeit together with the deceased, being maintained by the income from the fund and that the 
deceased’s share of the bungalow met her, the mother’s, need for accommodation, and that this 
maintenance was substantial and not outweighed by or equal to the maintenance of the deceased by 
the mother such that it might be said that the mother’s maintenance of the deceased was provided 
for ‘full valuable consideration’ within the meaning of section 1(3) of the 1975 Act.557 Plainly, the Court 
of Appeal was keen to preserve the claim of such a meritorious claimant. And, the case was hailed as 
a break-through for carers at the time.558 Yet, time has shown that the decision in In re B deceased 
was a decision on its own facts. Indeed, recent cases, albeit largely on the issue of whether a deceased 
who had made a will out in favour of a carer, had the capacity to do so and whether he/she knew and 
approved of the contents of that will, indicate that the courts take a very cautious approach to claims 
made by carers, given that the care-receiver may be in a vulnerable position vis-a-vis the carer.559 
In summary, the response of the judiciary to the provision of care by a claimant to the deceased has 
been, at best, inconsistent and, at worst, lacking any clear rationale. What is more, the relative 
unpredictability of first instance decisions made under the 1975 Act, and the reluctance of any appeal 
court to overturn those decisions, is now compounded by the fact that these first instance decisions 
are regularly heard by High Court Masters, District Judges (at either High Court or County Court 
level),560 or County Court Judges whose decisions are not, ordinarily, reported, notwithstanding that 
significant sums of money are often involved.561 This ‘one bite at the cherry’ approach can leave a 
 
556 See: [2000] Ch. 662 at 665E-G. 
 
557 The effect of s. 1(3) of the 1975 Act is to exclude claims by dependents where such persons were being 
maintained by the deceased for full valuable consideration. This would, for example, exclude claims by 
resident housekeepers who were dependent on the deceased for accommodation but were remunerated for 
their services. 
 
558 See, for example: Bridge, S., For love or money? Dependent carers and family provision, 2000, Camb. L J. at 
p. 248. 
 
559 See: Poole v Everall [2016] EWHC 2126 (Ch.); [2016] W.T.L.R. 1621; compare: Re the Estate of Julie Spalding 
deceased [2014] All E R (D) 73 (Mar) where the deceased was cared for by her son and, so the evidence went, 
promised to leave her bungalow to him on her death as compensation for his services. She did so, but, later, 
fell out with him as a result of developing a personality disorder and made a number of wills in favour of 
others. Here, it was held that the son’s claim succeeded in the face of evidence that the deceased did not have 
the capacity to make the later wills. 
 
560 The High Court and the County Court now have concurrent jurisdiction in all applications under the 1975 
Act, see: s. 25 of the County Courts Act 1984. 
 
561 The reporting of the first instance decisions in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346 and Myers v Myers [2004] 
EWHC Fam 1944 seems to have been exceptional. Myers can certainly be classed as a ‘big money’ case. The 
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bitter taste.  In practice, the relative unpredictability of first instance decisions is very much a product 
of the ‘weighing up’ approach that the courts have adopted when considering the factors set out in 
section 3(1) of the Act. Weight needs to be attached to these factors when placed in the judicial scales 
that will need to tip in favour of the application if the claimant is to be successful and what weight is 
to be attached to each factor is heavily dependent on both the trial judge’s interpretation of the 
evidence before the court and his/her understanding of the content and purpose of the 1975 Act.  As 
can be seen in the following section, the simple inclusion of a ‘carer’s category’ and even a ‘carer’s 
factor’ – i.e. a ‘section 3 factor’ that explicitly requires a court to take into account any care that has 
been administered by a claimant to the deceased as a factor in the claimant’s favour on an application 







4.5 SHOULD A CARER’S CATEGORY BE INTRODUCED? 
In some quarters, it has been suggested England and Wales might introduce a ‘carer’s category’562 into 
the 1975 Act in order to enable informal carers who have not received reasonable financial provision 
from the deceased on his/her death to apply to the courts for such an award. To some extent, this has 
already been attempted elsewhere. In New South Wales, the Succession Act 2006 enables those in a 
‘close personal relationship’ to bring a claim for a ‘family provision order’ under that Act.563  According 
 
estate in this case was valued at £8 million. The claimant was a child by the deceased’s first marriage. The 
deceased had a particularly difficult relationship with her and was concerned to prevent her making a claim 
against his estate after his death. 
 
562 See: Sloan, B., Informal Carers and Private Law, (Hart, 2013), at p. 172, section 5.3.5. ‘A Carer Category for 
England and Wales?’ 
 
563 The Succession Amendment (Family Provision) Act 2008 for New South Wales amended the Succession Act 
2006 for that state by introducing a new family provision regime in place of the New South Wales Family 
Provision Act 1982. See, generally: Lawrence, C., Family Provision Claims in New South at Wales - 
http://www.ebc44.com/wp-content/uploads/Family_Provision_Claims_in_New_South_Wales_-25022016.pdf 
(accessed: 03/01/17). It is interesting to note that family provision statutes in Australia generally have come in 




to the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, the rationale for the amendment was to provide a 
remedy for those who suffer detriment as a result of the care and support they provide to another 
without receiving payment for the same.564 The basis for giving financial provision to those applicants 
who can bring themselves within the ‘close personal relationship’ category is therefore 
‘compensation’; the legislature in New South Wales has explicitly recognised that informal carers 
should be able to obtain ‘compensation’ for the work that they have done, albeit that the award made 
to them is not necessarily linked to the value of that work or the loss that they have suffered as a 
consequence of performing the same, but is at the discretion of the court.565 Section 3(3) and (4) of 
the New South Wales Succession Act 2006 as amended defines the term "close personal relationship" 
as a relationship (other than a marriage or a de facto relationship) ‘between two adult persons, 
whether or not related by family, who are living together, one or each of whom provides the other 
with domestic support and personal care’,566 but not for some form of fee or reward and not where 
the care and support is provided on behalf of another person or some form of government or 
beneficial organisation.  While this is plainly a positive step forward for informal carers in New South 
Wales, the introduction of such a new category of applicant in England and Wales would not be 
without difficulty.  
In the vast majority of cases, the relationship between a care-giver and care-receiver will be a ‘close 
and personal one’. The relationship is often one of inter-dependence.567 One can certainly see this in 
the caring that is present between many elderly spouses or cohabitants. Yet, it is also there in most 
parent and adult child caring relationships too. A ‘carer’s category’ in the list of those who are able to 
make an application under the 1975 Act would thus enable an adult child568 who has cared for their 
now deceased parent to seek financial provision (or further financial provision) from the care-receiver. 
But, in what circumstances might such an application be made under our existing law? 
If the adult child applicant was financially dependent on the deceased, there would be a secure basis 
under the present law for such an application. If, for example, the adult child had ‘returned home’ to 
care for their elderly mother or father that dependency might be reflected in their reliance on ‘free 
 
 
564 See: New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Relationships, (Report No. 113, 2006) [3.21]. 
 
565 See: Sloan, B., Informal Carers and Private Law, (Hart, 2013), p. 167 et seq. 
 
566 These are the words used in s. 3(3) of New South Wales Succession Act 2006 as amended. 
 
567 See: Herring, J., Caring and the Law, (Hart, 2013), at p. 59 et seq. 
 




accommodation’ in the family home. It might also be reflected in the fact that the deceased had been 
paying the household bills. Until the passing of the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014, the 
counter-argument to an application made on this basis was that the relationship between the care-
giver and care-receiver in these circumstances was one where ‘full valuable consideration’ had been 
given on each side; in other words, the care-giver had received rent free accommodation in return for 
his or her care.569 Now, section 6 and schedule 2 to this Act together provide that a person is to be 
treated as being maintained by the deceased (either wholly or partly, as the case may be) only if the 
deceased was making a substantial contribution in money or money’s worth towards the reasonable 
needs of that person, other than a contribution made for full valuable consideration pursuant to an 
arrangement of a commercial nature.570  The words ‘commercial nature’ are here intended to convey 
the idea that the courts should only exclude applications by claimants who are dependent on the 
deceased where the dependency has been created by an arrangement of the nature of a commercial 
bargain between the deceased and the claimant; so, for example, in the case of a freely-negotiated 
bargain where the claimant was specifically engaged by the deceased as a housekeeper whose 
obligations included the provision of social care in return for the provision of, for example, free board 
and lodging in the deceased’s home, the housekeeper would be precluded from making an application 
under the 1975 Act, but a member of the deceased’s family who was living at the deceased’s home in 
order to provide that care and was thereby receiving free accommodation and free board (because 
the deceased was paying the household expenses in full), but in circumstances where there was no 
negotiated bargain underpinning this relationship, would not be so precluded. 
Outside of this ‘dependency situation’, the prospects of an adult child making a successful application 
under the 1975 Act as it presently stands are less clear. In practice, the amendment set out in section 
6 and schedule 2 of the Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Act 2014 has failed to deal with what is a far 
more common situation, particularly where the care-receiver is more elderly than they might have 
been in a similar situation only thirty or forty years earlier, which, of course, is the product of the 
increased longevity in our elderly population that we have experienced over the same period.571 In 
 
569 See: Jelley v Iliffe [1981] Fam 128. 
 
570 This is introduced into the 1975 Act by amending s. 1(3) so that it now reads: “For the purposes of 
subsection (1)(e) above, a person is to be treated as being maintained by the deceased (either wholly or partly, 
as the case may be) only if the deceased was making a substantial contribution in money or money’s worth 
towards the reasonable needs of that person, other than a contribution made for full valuable consideration 
pursuant to an arrangement of a commercial nature.” 
 
571 See: chapter one, supra. As mentioned in chapter one, there is a good deal of concern in government circles 
and in the media over whether those in ‘middle age’ are healthy enough to support their elderly, disabled 
parents in the foreseeable future. Unless these health issues are addressed, the burden on the health and 
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other words, it is more likely now that the elderly parent will go and live with his/her adult child simply 
because that child is more advanced in years than might have been the case thirty or forty years ago. 
He or she will have already made their way in the world; they will have a home, a career and very 
often a family. Indeed, sometimes that family will have already grown-up and left home, leaving ‘spare 
accommodation’ which the elderly parent can therefore occupy; if the adult child is more affluent 
maybe a ‘granny flat’ will be provided. In many cases, the care-receiver will therefore have the benefit 
of accommodation in that home, the outgoings (which have been paid for by the adult child)572 that 
ensures his/her comfortable occupation of the same and the care that the adult child has provided. In 
such a situation, the dependency is not of the adult child on the parent care-receiver, but in the other 
direction. 
Equally, the section and the accompanying schedule do not deal with the situation where the adult 
child carer has not been ‘left without a penny’ under his/her elderly parent’s will or intestacy, but has 
been left precisely the same provision as his/her brothers and sisters. In these circumstances, the adult 
child carer has been financially provided for but not compensated for the financial loss that they will, 
in many cases, have suffered in providing care to their now deceased parent. In other words, although 
provision is made, there is an imbalance of provision as between a sibling who has cared for an elderly 
parent and one or more other siblings who have not. In receiving such provision, the caring sibling has 
been provided for and, given that reasonable financial provision for children is tied to ‘the 
maintenance standard’, he/she may not be in need of any further provision. Yet, as between the 
siblings, the caring sibling has not been treated ‘fairly’ by the care-receiving parent. Existing case law 
under the 1975 Act firmly indicates that such carers in each of these two situations will not, without 
more, receive further provision because, in the much-quoted words of Oliver J in Re Coventry 
deceased,573 ‘[i]t is not the purpose of the Act to provide legacies or rewards for meritorious 
conduct.’574 
The self-sacrifice associated with informal caring is, of course, meritorious conduct par excellence. 
These people are often placed in an invidious situation. On the one hand, they have an elderly, 
 
social services in England and Wales is likely to increase more rapidly than previously anticipated – see: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-38402655 (accessed: 03/01/17). 
 
572 On some occasions, the elderly parent care-receiver might make a small contribution from his/her state 
pension. 
 
573 [1980] Ch. 461 
 




disabled parent who desperately needs the care that only they can provide; yet, on the other they 
have their own lives, their careers and often the demands of their own families to consider. One case 
from the author’s legal practice painfully reveals the dilemma faced by would-be claimants who may 
have cared for an elderly, disabled parent over a protracted period of time. Here, in consequence of 
his mother’s rapidly deteriorating health, E and his wife, W, agreed that they would sell their home 
and move in with E’s mother, J, in order to care for her in her final years. Following the sale of E and 
W’s house in 1999, E and W were left with approximately £25,000, being the equity in this property. 
Much of this money was then used to pay for alterations made to J’s property, so that J could use the 
same more conveniently, together with the costs associated with the general repair and redecoration 
of that property. None of these works increased the value of J’s property in any degree. In the 
meantime, J’s health was now so poor that the care that she needed was intensive, so much so that it 
was described by E as ‘24 hour care, 7 days a week’, and included toileting, clothing, changing beds, 
washing, cooking meals and providing companionship as and when needed. In reality, much of the 
burden of this care fell on W,575 as E was working during the day in his own business.  
Tragically, W died of cancer in 2000, but J, still in poor health, survived her. At this point, a friend and 
neighbour kindly took over the daily care of J without reward, while E preformed ‘night-time duties’. 
In the event, J continued living at the property, cared for by E and the neighbour, until 2003 when a 
place was found for her in a local care home; she died a year later. In her will, which was made many 
years earlier, J’s estate, after some incidental bequests of little value, was left between E and his 
brother, N, in equal shares. In the event, J’s estate comprised little more than the value of her house; 
nevertheless, given the rise in house prices in the latter part of the decade, this provided E with 
something against which he could make a claim for further financial provision, particularly as he had 
spent a significant amount of his own money converting that property to J’s use, and, of course, he 
had provided a significant degree of care for her in her final years.  
Following the making of the claim by E in correspondence, N refused to accept anything less than half 
the proceeds of sale of the property as his entitlement under J’s will. Indeed, in insisting that the 
property should be sold, he was prepared to make his brother homeless, which only served to add to 
E’s misery. At that point, E considered making a claim against J’s estate under the 1975 Act, but, after 
careful consideration, he felt that it was too much of a risk to do so.576 In this case, E was a businessman 
 
575 That the caring burden will usually fall on a woman is noted in chapter one, supra. In this case, E did spend 
many hours sitting with and providing care for his mother in the evenings and therefore his personal 
contribution to the care that she received should not be undervalued. 
 




with his own business; he was not financially dependent on the deceased in any way, he was not now 
in need of accommodation, since he was in a stable relationship, cohabiting with the neighbour and 
friend who had looked after the deceased at home in her final years, and he was, in any event, in 
receipt of half of the net value of her estate. What is more, he plainly had no claim for a share in the 
net proceeds of sale of the house on either a resulting or constructive trust basis.  In these 
circumstances, the claim would have been heavily dependent on the courts accepting the proposition 
that a deceased who is in receipt of significant care from a claimant is under an ‘obligation’ to make 
financial provision for the claimant carer that in some way recognises the provision of that care and/or 
compensates him/her for the time and/or money spent in providing the same; and, as indicated 
earlier, that has, to date, never been a position that the English courts have chosen to adopt.577 
In essence, the risks that E felt were too great to surmount provide us with some of the reasons why 
the introduction of a carer’s category will not enable justice to be done, and for someone in E’s 
situation to receive the compensation which he surely deserved, in cases such as this.578 Yet, as 
indicated at the close of the last section, there are other reasons too.  For example, if an adult child 
carer was to die before his/her claim is adjudicated on by a court, the claim would cease because 
claims under the 1975 Act do not survive for the benefit of the claimant’s estate. Of course, on the 
present state of the law, a care-giver in such a situation can never be compensated, and one might 
well say that, in events such as these, ‘justice’ is impossible. If a complete remedy is to be provided, it 
can only be provided by legislation which makes inter vivos provision for the carer; that is to say, some 
form of financial provision for the carer while the care-receiver is still alive. This point will be explored 
further in chapter six. But, this matter apart, even if a carer who predeceases a care-receiver cannot 
be compensated, their family can. Denying that remedy to the carer’s family creates injustice, 
particularly when one considers that the effect of caring for an elderly relative is often felt outside the 
carer. In many cases where the carer is the filling in the sandwich generation, the carer’s family – their 
husband, wife, daughter(s) and son(s) – suffer as well. Yet, there is no compensation for such suffering 
under the 1975 Act. 
At the close of the previous section, it was contended that there are indeed other reasons why the 
inclusion of a ‘carer’s category’ and even a ‘carer’s factor’ will not provide informal carers with a 
 
577 In fact, as will be maintained in chapter six, the courts will need to go further than this in some cases if 
justice is to be achieved and say that this obligation overrides other factors, such as financial circumstances. 
 
578 Indeed, this story has many of the echoes surrounding the observation set out at the beginning of chapter 
one; echoes of unrequited personal sacrifice on the part not only of E, but also W (who passed away in the 
course of providing care for J), and, indeed, the neighbour, both of whom received nothing.  
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remedy that produces what one might describe as ‘just results’ across the board. One such reason – 
which links in with the observations made and the end of the foregoing paragraph – is that, under 
section 3(5) of the 1975 Act, the time for adjudicating such claim made under the Act is the date on 
which those claims are heard by the court. This emphasises that, in considering such claims, the court 
is looking forward and nothing more. In short, the court seeks to alleviate future need not to 
compensate a claimant for what has gone before. In some cases, this can have a positive dimension, 
such as in the case of Re Hancocks deceased579 where the court was able to do justice as a result of 
being able to take into account a ‘windfall’ that the deceased’s estate had received between the date 
of his death and the date of the hearing of a claim for reasonable financial provision made by his adult 
daughter. Yet, for adult child carers, who perhaps have found a way back into paid employment after 
many years out-of-work caring for the deceased,580  having the court consider their claim at that point 
and not as at the deceased’s death might well be a disadvantage, particularly if their financial situation 
has improved since that time.581 In this situation, the court will  not compensate them for the ‘lost 
years of suffering’ but will look to their financial circumstances at the date of trial in order to determine 
whether they are in need of an award or what that award should be.582 
For similar reason, it has been held that a claimant’s claim under the 1975 Act will die with him/her 
and cannot be maintained by his/her estate.583 The 1975 Act looks to provide for the claimant’s future 
needs, not to afford compensation for his/her past good deeds. And, for that reason too, the suffering 
 
579 [1998] 2 FLR346 (CA) 
 
580 And, this may be at a level far lower that the level at which they worked prior to having to give up their job 
in order to care for the deceased; nevertheless, going back to work will almost always count against them 
because it will either remove or reduce their need for maintenance from the deceased’s estate. 
 
581 In Espinosa v Bourke [1998] 2 FLR 747, the claimant’s financial situation had changed, but, thankfully for the 
claimant, the Court of Appeal was unable to say whether it had changed for the better or the worse. In 
Espinosa, the claimant, who had lost the financial support that her father had been providing her, had decided 
to sell the house in which they had been living and invest the proceeds of sale in the purchase of a business in 
an effort to provide herself with an income. In so doing, she had exchanged the certainty of having ‘a roof over 
her head’ (which she had as a result of her father, the deceased, discharging the small mortgage that the 
claimant had retained on the property which she owned) for the uncertainty of a business which could either 
succeed or fail. The purchase of the business had been arranged with the benefit of a loan from the claimant’s 
bankers. If that loan were to be called in at any point, the claimant would lose not only her business but also 
her residential accommodation as that accommodation comprised a small flat above the shop from which the 
business was conducted. 
 
582 This is emphasised in the next section, section 4.5, where ‘need’ is considered to be the primary 
determining factor of all non-spouse applications for reasonable financial provision under the 1975 Act. 
 




experienced by the would-be claimant’s family – which can be considerable as we saw in E’s case 
above – is simply ignored. 
Nevertheless, these are perhaps minor points when set against the primary reason why adult child 
carers will never receive a sufficient financial incentive for what may be many years of caring for an 
elderly, disabled parent which is that all awards for non-spouse applicants are limited to provision for 
their ‘maintenance’ and nothing more. Therefore, the court’s focus, perhaps inevitably given the 
language of the 1975 Act, is on how a claimant was being maintained before the deceased’s death, 
for it is that death and nothing more that has brought about the claim. As we saw in section 4.2 above, 
the rationale that underlies both the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 and its successor the 
1975 Act584 is that it provides a ‘safety-net’ for those who have been left in financial difficulties as a 
result of the death of the deceased. Save for the surviving spouse, the primary duty on the court is to 
ensure that these people – who otherwise qualify for an award under the 1975 Act – are provided 
with ‘maintenance’585 from the estate of the deceased in so far as that estate will allow.  Where there 
is no evidence that there is any need for maintenance, the claim will not succeed.586 And, as we have 
seen, this is a particular problem where the adult child carer has cared for their elderly disabled parent 
in the child’s, own home. In essence, ‘maintenance’ claims made under the 1975 Act are often in two 
parts, one for accommodation, and the other for income. If the caring is done in the adult child’s own 
home, there will be no accommodation claim. Any claim for ‘maintenance’ will not compensate the 
carer for the loss which they have suffered during the caring process which will often be far more 
extensive than limits to which the courts have been prepared to go in providing maintenance. Indeed, 
where the courts have been prepared to interpret ‘maintenance’ in a liberal and progressive manner, 
and to provide a claimant with a house in which his/her body and soul can be maintained,587 this will 
be of no practical benefit for those adult child carers, of which there are many, who will already have 
 
584 The 1975 Act is an Act that makes ‘fresh provisions for empowering the court to make orders for the 
making out of the estate of a deceased person of provision for the spouse, child, child of the family or 
dependant of that person; and for matters connected therewith’ (long title). 
 
585 See: s. 1(2)(b) of the 1975 Act. 
 
586 See: Riggs v Lloyds Bank plc (unreported) 27th November 1992, Court of Appeal. 
 
587 See: Illot v Mitson [2015] EWCA Civ. 797, where the award comprised, inter alia, the sum of £143,000 which 
was needed by the claimant to purchase her home in which she was a tenant of the local authority. Given that 
an application by an adult child under the 1975 Act is one where he/she can only ever receive an award for 
his/her maintenance, it is unclear why the Court of Appeal made such an award in the claimant’s favour in 
preference to an order which would require the property in question to be purchased and thereafter held on 
trust by the claimant for her life with remainder to the charities otherwise entitled under the residuary gift 
contained in the deceased’s will, such that the charities would, at least, benefit from the proceeds of sale of 
this property once the claimant had passed away. 
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such accommodation. In these circumstances, the only claim will be for ‘income maintenance’. And, 
where the child is of full working age, perhaps with qualifications, the most that the claim may be for 
is for income while the adult child is looking for work. What is more, as we have seen, even this will 
be lost where the adult child finds suitable employment before his/her claim is heard. 
In our list of reasons why the addition of a carer’s category to the 1975 Act will not provide most adult 
child carers with a remedy is yet another difficulty that will sometimes arise with competing siblings. 
This is that ‘the primacy of need’ will often dictate that the carer will lose out in competition with 
those whose financial needs are extensive. Consider the case where an ailing, elderly parent goes to 
live with sibling X, because sibling X has had a successful career, has acquired a large house and is 
therefore able to accommodate them in their own home, rather than sibling Y who has been less 
successful in life and who remains in smaller, rented accommodation. Sibling X may have spent many 
years caring form their elderly, disabled parent. He/she may have had to give up the prospect of 
advancement in their career. On some occasions, he/she may have even been forced to give up a well-
paid job altogether in order to care for their parent. How would their application for ‘reasonable 
financial provision’ be considered in circumstances where, after the parent’s death, there is no real 
evidence of any need for such provision because their prospects are, nevertheless, even after years of 
sacrifice on their part, significantly better than sibling Y’s prospects? The answer is that sibling X’s 
claim would not fare well in the absence of need because need has now become the primary reason 
for making an award under the 1975 Act and where need cannot be established no award will be 
made. While a more extensive analysis of the leading case law must await the following section of this 
chapter, it suffices to say, for the moment, that this analysis indicates that, unless the deceased’s 
estate is a large one, any award, in these circumstances, is very likely to be made in favour of the 
sibling whose financial circumstances, including their prospects of improving their present situation, 
suggest that they are in need of financial provision. And, where the estate is not a large one, the effect 
of this will be to preclude any provision being made for the carer. In these circumstances, the 
rewarding of ‘lame ducks’588 at the expense of those who deserve compensation will cause an injustice 
in the eyes of many people, but that injustice is dictated by how the courts have interpreted the 1975 
 
588 The phrase ‘lame duck’ is used by Roger Kerridge in Kerridge, R., Parry and Kerridge: The Law of Succession, 
12th edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) at paragraph 8-62 who expresses the opinion that the ‘the problem with 
‘lame duck’ cases is the potential unfairness towards children, such as the son in Re Jennings [1994] Ch. 286 
who, having led virtuous lives, are then treated less generously than their prodigal brothers and sisters’. This is 
a view with which the author would agree. And, it represents one of the planks on which the argument which 
is put forward in this thesis that a more just solution to the conundrum of obtaining compensation for adult 
children who care for their elderly, disabled parents is that the compensation should be treated as a debt. If it 
is not so treated, an adult child carer is likely to lose out to a profligate sibling who has not cared for the parent 




Act. And, this provides yet another reason why the search for a remedy must now head off in a 
different direction, a direction that acknowledges the provision of care over a significant period of 





4.6 THE CONTINUING FOCUS ON DEPENDANCY AND NEED  
If an adult child claimant has no disability,589 there is only one factor in the list of general factors set 
out in section 3(1) of the 1975 Act, that focusses the court’s attention on the claimant’s and his/her 
individual circumstances, and that is general factor (a), ‘the financial resources and financial needs 
which the [claimant] has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future.’ Unless the adult child claimant 
wishes to assert that the deceased was under some form of obligation or had a responsibility to make 
financial provision for him/her,590 there is no need to adduce any further evidence in support of his/her 
application. While Oliver J in Re Coventry deceased591 once stated that ‘… it cannot be enough to say 
‘here is a son of the deceased; he is in necessitous circumstances; there is property of the deceased 
which could be made available to assist him but which is not available if the deceased’s dispositions 
stand; therefore those dispositions do not make reasonable provision for the applicant.’ There must, 
as it seems to me, be established some form of moral claim by the applicant to be maintained by the 
deceased…’592 some courts have, periodically, made substantial awards in favour of adult child 
applicants solely on the basis of financial need.593 Section 3(1)(g) does, of course, refer to, ‘any other 
matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person, which in the circumstances of the 
case the court may consider relevant’. But, unless the claimant’s conduct has created an obligation to 
make provision for him/her, it is unlikely to be significant unless it has a negative effect on the 
 
589 And, s. 3(1)(f) of the 1975 Act is thereby irrelevant. 
 
590 Which is relevant under s. 3(1)(d) the 1975 Act. 
 
591 [1980] Ch. 461 
 
592See:  [1980] Ch. 461 per Oliver J at page 475. 
 
593 Reference here can be made to what are known as the ‘big money’ cases such as Gold v Curtis [2005] WTLR 




application, whereupon the claimant will have no interest in adducing evidence as to his/her conduct 
save, of course, to rebut any evidence adduced by those who oppose the claim.594  
In any event, at least until very recently,595 it has long been said by the courts that conduct – whether 
of the claimant, the deceased or anyone else – is not considered to be, in most cases, a factor that 
carries any great weight with the court, unless it is of a particularly striking nature and may, therefore, 
justify a failure to make provision, or further provision, for the claimant.596  Even the conviction of the 
claimant for the manslaughter of the deceased in the case of Re Land deceased597 did not preclude 
the court making an award in the claimant’s favour. Moreover, in Re Jennings deceased598 Nourse LJ 
declared that, if conduct is relied upon in support of a claim for reasonable financial provision under 
the 1975 Act, but that conduct has not created an obligation or responsibility on the deceased, 
relevant under paragraph (d), to make provision for the claimant it ‘cannot be prayed in aid under a 
general provision such as paragraph (g)’.599   
If conduct is of little, or of very limited relevance in most cases, and the claimant’s case is not based 
on an assertion that the deceased had some form of obligation or responsibility to make provision for 
him/her, what therefore has an able-bodied claimant to put before the court other than his/her 
evidence of need? Evidence (if any) relevant to the general factors listed in section 3(1), paragraphs 
(b) and (c), will be adduced by other parties to the litigation. The deceased’s personal representatives 
will adduce evidence of the ‘size and nature of the net estate of the deceased’ under paragraph (e). 
In many cases, therefore, there is little else for a claimant to say in support of his/her application and, 
therefore, unless those who oppose the application wish to adduce evidence going to the other 
general factors listed in section 3(1), the focus of the court will be on the claimant’s financial 
 
594 See: Oughton R. D. ed., Tyler’s Family Provision, 3rd edition, (Butterworths, 1997) at pp. 252-3 ‘…while 
‘meritorious conduct’ by an adult child will not in itself justify an award of provision, misconduct is capable of 
preventing an otherwise justified claim from succeeding.’ 
 
595 See: section 4.7 infra. 
 
596 The detailed examination of the parties’ conduct towards each other has been described as ‘distasteful’ in 
the context of ancillary relief proceedings on divorce – see: Lambert v Lambert [2003] 1 FLR 139 – and must 
therefore be equally distasteful if attempted in the course of an application under the 1975 Act –see: Francis, 
A., Inheritance Act Claims: Law, Practice and Procedure, (Jordans, 2006 ) at paragraph 7[15] footnote 4. 
  
597 See: [2007] 1 All E R 324. 
 
598See: [1994] 1 FLR 536. 
 




circumstances. In recent years, this has created what might be described as ‘the primacy of need’ as 
the main feature of most, if not all, adult child claims made under the 1975 Act. 
One case which illustrates this is the decision in Ilott v Mitson.600 Here, an adult daughter claimed that 
her mother’s will had not made reasonable financial provision for her. In fact, her mother had left 
most of her estate to charity and had made no provision whatsoever for her daughter, who was aged 
43 at her mother’s death and living in ‘straightened circumstances’. The relationship between the 
mother and daughter throughout the daughter’s adult life had been a difficult one. When she was just 
17 years of age, the daughter formed a relationship with a young man of whom the mother strongly 
disapproved. In the event, the daughter, still aged 17, moved out of her mother’s house and went live 
with this man at his parents’ house. Five years later, they married, but the mother was not invited to, 
nor informed of, the wedding. In fact, there had been no contact between mother and daughter over 
these five years. During the following years, there were three attempts at reconciliation, but none 
were successful. The first was instigated by the daughter and it did last for about a year. Yet, the 
relationship between the mother and the daughter’s husband was problematic throughout and ended 
with the mother reporting the husband’s behaviour to the police. The second and third attempts 
followed two chance or accidental meetings. There was an exchange of correspondence following 
each meeting, but on each occasion the attempted reconciliation came to nought, principally, it 
seems, due to the intransigence of the mother.601 Following the breakdown of the final attempt, the 
mother executed her last will, together with a letter of wishes, in April 2002.602   She then informed 
her daughter of what she had done. The letter of wishes stated that her executors should defend any 
claim made by her daughter under the Act on the grounds that she had hardly seen her daughter over 
the years following her daughter’s departure and that the daughter was not financially dependent on 
 
600 See: [2011] EWCA Civ. 346; [2012] 2 FCR 547(CA (Civ. Div.)) and [2015] EWCA Civ. 346; [2012] 2 FLR 170 (CA 
(Civ. Div.) This case eventually went to the Supreme Court as Ilott v The Blue Cross and Others, and is reported 
at [2017] UKSC 17. 
 
601 These facts are related because general factor (g) invites the court to consider the conduct of the applicant 
towards the deceased and, inferentially, vice- versa. 
 
602 This was not the first will that had the effect of excluding the daughter. There was an earlier will in March 




her but had chosen to make her own way in the world.603 Instead of providing for her daughter, who 
was her only child, the mother’s will left the bulk of her estate to charity.604  
As for the daughter’s financial circumstances, at hearing of her claim for financial provision under the 
1975 Act, the daughter lived with her husband, and the youngest four of their five children, in 
accommodation that was rented from the local authority and situate in a remote village in 
Hertfordshire. The daughter had not been in employment since the birth of her eldest child. Indeed, 
most of their family income was derived from state benefits.605 At first instance, before District Judge 
Million, the daughter made a claim and was awarded the sum of £50,000 from an estate of £486,000. 
On appeal, before Eleanor King J., this decision was overturned. The daughter then appealed from 
that decision and the Court of Appeal held that the appeal from the first instance decision had been 
wrongly decided. What is more, as the daughter had lodged a cross appeal on quantum, which had 
been wrongly dismissed by Eleanor King J., once the decision from this judge allowing the executors’ 
appeal was rescinded, the daughter was entitled to be heard on the cross appeal. The Court of Appeal 
then remitted the daughter’s appeal to the High Court. In the event, that cross appeal was successful 
and, in July 2015, the daughter was awarded the sum of £164,000 as reasonable financial provision 
from her mother’s estate by a second Court of Appeal.606 The burden of this increased award was 
carried by the mother’s residuary bequest in favour of charity, and therefore several of the charities 
appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. In the event, the Supreme Court overturned the decision 
of the second Court of Appeal on the quantum of the daughter’s award, and reinstated the original 
award made by District Judge Million. 
Was the decision in Illot v Mitson on liability really based on need alone? Given that the claimant was 
an adult child, District Judge Million should have begun with the proposition put forward by Oliver J 
in Re Coventry deceased set out in the opening paragraph of this section and subsequently adopted 
by members of the Court of Appeal in the same case. Indeed, this starting-point appears to have been 
accepted by Sir Nicholas Wall P. in his assertion that, ‘… necessitous circumstances cannot in 
 
603 The mother had no spouse for whom she might have made provision. Her husband, the daughter’s father, 
had died while the daughter was a child. 
 
604 In fact, there was no evidence before the court that the mother had any connection with these charities 
during her lifetime or had any particular affiliation with their objects – see: Sir Nicolas Wall P. at parag. 1 of his 
judgment, reported at [2011] EWCA Civ. 346. 
 
605 On the first appeal before Eleanor King J, the court was informed that 75% of the family income was derived 
from state benefits – see: Eleanor King J., parag. 31, of her judgment, reported at [2009] EWHC Civ3114 (Fam.). 




themselves be the reason to alter the testator’s dispositions.’607 In these circumstances, in the words 
of Sir John Knox in Re Hancocks deceased,608  ‘… there must be some reason for the court to decide 
that the scales fall in favour of the conclusion that there has been a failure to make reasonable 
financial provision’. What, therefore, was the reason for the courts’ conclusion in Illot v Mitson that 
the mother’s will did not make reasonable financial provision for the daughter?609 
On closer analysis, the Court of Appeal struggled to lay their hands on any such reason. Sir Nicholas 
Wall P appeared to rely on District Judge Million’s finding that it was reasonable for the daughter to 
remain at home in circumstances where she still had two children of school age (11 and 16) and that, 
even if she did find paid work outside the home, she would be likely to remain in some financial need 
for her earnings would only be able to support her ‘to a limited extent’, in order to reach the 
conclusion that there was something beyond the daughter’s mere financial need to tips the scales in 
favour of the application. Having related these findings in an effort to support District Judge Million’s 
conclusion that the mother’s will had not made reasonable financial provision for the daughter, he 
concluded that, ‘these factors can either be viewed as elements in the discretion exercised by the 
District Judge or as section 3 factors.’610 Yet, in reality, these findings cannot be separated from the 
daughter’s financial need. The daughter’s financial need was greater because she decided to stay at 
home while she still had children of school age.611 And, that need would have continued to exist had 
she gone out to work because the daughter would have struggled to find work that provided her with 
 
607 Parag. [33] of his judgment in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346, quoting from Butler-Sloss LJ in Espinosa v 
Bourke [1999] 3 FCR 76; [1999] 2 FLR 747. 
 
608 See: [1998] 2 FLR 346. 
 
609 Roger Kerridge and A.H.R. Brierley ask substantially the same question in the latest edition of Parry and 
Kerridge: The Law of Succession (13th ed., 2016, Sweet & Maxwell). On the matter of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision on liability, the authors say: ‘The case is a good example of one where the daughter was competing 
with charities who themselves had no particular call on the testatrix’s bounty. But what is not clear … is what 
was really the basis on which this daughter succeeded, above and beyond the fact that she was a daughter, 
and was in need.’ (parag. 8-62 at p. 213) The analysis of the Court of Appeal’s decision which follows 
substantiates, and rationalises, this opinion. 
 
610 See: paragraph [57] of his judgment in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346. 
 
611 Reasonably so in the eyes of District Judge Million, although he did add that he considered that it would 
also be ‘reasonable for the claimant to attempt to support herself by some paid work in the course of the next 
few years’ – see: paragraphs [76] and [77] of his judgment, an extract from which is annexed to the report of 
the 2015 appeal in the Court of Appeal. None of the Court of Appeal appeared to demur from these findings. 
Indeed, Arden LJ referred specifically to this finding as a ‘value judgment’ and concluded that, in reaching it, 
the District Judge could not be said to be ‘plainly wrong’ – see: paragraph [67] of her judgment in in Illot v 




even a modest income.612 These are nothing more than explanations of the reasons underlying the 
daughter’s financial need, both present and future.  They cannot be explained as separate factors that 
have some relevance under section 3(1)(g). 
Arden LJ was also concerned to justify District Judge Million’s conclusion that the mother’s will did not 
make reasonable financial provision for the daughter. In her view, the District Judge reached his 
conclusion on a combination of, ‘the … [daughter’s] financial circumstances, the size of the estate, the 
absence of countervailing demands for financial help from the testatrix and the unreasonable conduct 
of the [mother] towards … [the] daughter’, which meant, in her words, ‘… that reasonable financial 
provision had not been made for the … [daughter]’.613 These factors, she stated, ‘… outweighed other 
factors, such as the … [daughter’s] own conduct towards the testatrix.’614 So, in Arden LJ’s opinion, 
there were other factors that had weight in that case, namely, the size of the estate and the mother’s 
unreasonable conduct615 - factors over and above the daughter’s financial need - that meant that a 
court was able to reach the conclusion that the mother’s will had not made reasonable financial 
provision for the daughter.616 Yet, on further analysis this is also unconvincing. Firstly, any reliance on 
‘the size of the estate’617 alone in order to justify an award is tantamount to saying that there is one 
law for large estates and another for small estates, and such a proposition would surely be impossible 
to justify on any logical basis.618 And, indeed, one must ask, ‘where does that leave those of us with 
estates of ‘modest size’? Secondly, ‘conduct’ – although present in paragraph (g) as a factor that the 
court must take into account – has never been accorded any significant weight in past cases.619 Indeed, 
 
612 She had no qualifications and given that she lived in a remote village and would have had to rely on public 
transport to get her to and from any job that she might obtain – see: Black LJ at paragraph [78] of her 
judgment in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346. 
 
613 See: Arden LJ in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346 at paragraph [66]. 
 
614 Ibid. at paragraph [66] 
 
615 Arden LJ’s reference to ‘… the absence of countervailing demands for financial help from the testatrix’ as a 
factor that should have any weight in this or any other application under the 1975 Act is very difficult to 
fathom – see: paragraph [66]. 
 
616 At paragraph [69] of her judgement, Arden LJ states: ‘The financial circumstances of the appellant need to 
be considered against all the other factors in the case. It is in that sense that need alone is not enough.’ 
 
617 Which is a section 3 factor – but one must remember that these factors must be taken into account in the 
first and second stages of an application – and the size of the estate is plainly relevant to the second stage. 
 
618 See: Myers v Myers [2004] EWHC 1944 (Fam), referred to at the end of this section. 
 
619 See: Francis, A., Inheritance Act Claims: Law, Practice and Procedure, (Jordans, 2006) at paragraph 7[15] 
where the author warns that: ‘In most cases conduct is not only irrelevant, but also often unhelpful to the 
party putting it forward, boring and wasteful of costs.’ He then asserts that conduct is only relevant (i) where it 
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in this case, District Judge Million found that there was some element of fault on each side in regard 
to who was responsible for the estrangement between the mother and the daughter.620 In these 
circumstances, the conduct of the mother alone could not surely justify a departure from the principle 
related in Re Coventry deceased referred to at the beginning of this section.621 Despite this, Arden LJ 
concluded that, ‘[t]he financial circumstances of the … [daughter] need to be considered against all 
other factors in the case. It is in that sense that need alone is not enough.’622 Yet, on this analysis, 
these ‘other factors’ must be of little, if any, significance. They could not, in themselves, justify an 
award in the daughter’s favour, if need alone would have been insufficient for the court to find in her 
favour. And, indeed, if these ‘other factors’ are merely ‘conduct’ (which they seem to be) unless such 
conduct has created, in the words of Nourse LJ in Re Jennings deceased referred to earlier, ‘… an 
obligation or responsibility on the deceased, relevant under paragraph (d), to make provision for the 
claimant’, such conduct cannot be relied upon in favour of the application by bringing it in under 
section 3(1)(g). Yet, this is precisely what Arden LJ seems to do. 
The third member of the Court of Appeal, Black LJ, gives us a little more of the daughter’s 
circumstances in paragraph [78] of her judgment, but her judgment is particularly unhelpful when it 
comes to discerning what the factors took this case beyond the applications based on mere financial 
need which were referred to by Oliver J. She appeared troubled that District Judge Million considered 
the reasonableness of the mother’s conduct rather than the reasonableness of the result produced by 
the mother’s will, and rightly so.623 But, in the event, she was content to find that there was enough 
 
is of a striking nature, (ii) where it is relevant to the deceased’s obligations and responsibilities, and (iii) where 
it sheds light on why a provision (if any) falls short of what is reasonable financial provision. The ‘key’ to 
conduct seems to be: ‘Does it affect the determination of what is reasonable financial provision for a claimant 
at either stage one or two?’ If it does, it is relevant; if it doesn’t, it is not. It is submitted that there will be few 
instances of conduct that satisfy this test. 
 
620 See: Arden LJ at paragraph [22] of her judgment in Illot v Mitson [2015] EWCA Civ.797. 
 
621 Notwithstanding what is stated at fn. 277 supra, one recent case where conduct did assume some 
importance is Wright v Waters [2014] EWHC 3614 (Ch.); [2015] WTLR 353, where the claimant’s need was said 
to have been outweighed by her conduct (She had, it seems, written to the deceased, her mother, wishing her 
dead, and she had refused to return a sum of £10,000 which she had invested on the mother’s behalf – an 
extreme case?). 
 
622 See: Arden LJ in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346 at paragraph [69]. 
 
623 See: Black LJ in Illot v Mitson [2011] EWCA Civ. 346 at paragraph [80].  She was ‘troubled’ because, as she 
says, paragraph 64 of his judgment [in which he appears to have set out some of his reasons for deciding that 
the mother’s will did not make reasonable financial provision for the daughter] the District Judge considers the 
reasonableness of the mother’s conduct and not whether a reasonable result was produced by the mother’s 
will. This represents a significant flaw in the District Judge’s reasoning. S. 3(1)(g) of the 1975 Act specifically 
requires the court to have regard to ‘the conduct of the applicant’ in determining in whether reasonable 
financial provision has been made for him/her. And, it is fairly easy, it is suggested, to make a judgment as to 
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in the District Judge’s judgment to conclude that he had taken into account the section 3 factors in 
this case.624 She then described the paragraphs of the District Judge’s judgment that she relies upon 
in support of this conclusion as ‘… draw[ing] on the findings that the District Judge had made about 
the history and the … [daughter’s] personal and financial circumstances in the preceding part of his 
judgment.’625 Yet, the ‘history’ of the dispute between mother and daughter that caused the rift 
between them concerns nothing more than their conduct towards one another, which has already 
been considered. And, as stated earlier, the daughter’s personal circumstances are wholly wrapped 
up in her financial circumstances, which have, again, already been considered. In Illot v Mitson the 
daughter did not suffer from any physical or mental disability.626 In fact, there were no ‘personal 
circumstances’ beyond the daughter’s financial need that fell to be considered; all of the 
circumstances that were considered were circumstances that created that need. In short, the 
conclusion that Illot v Mitson contains a new approach to applications made by adult children is 
inescapable; despite the observations made by Oliver J in Re Coventry deceased, observations that 
were approved in many subsequent cases, the daughter’s application succeeded purely on the basis 
of financial need, albeit in circumstances where the estate was large enough to support an award and 
in circumstances where there were no ‘competing beneficiaries’.627 
Of course, in some respects, it is not the decision of the Court of Appeal in Illot v Mitson in 2012 that 
is either unusual or exceptional, but the manner of its arrival in the list of appeals. In Illot v Mitson the 
Court of Appeal was faced with an appeal on an appeal. And, their collective view that Eleanor King 
J’s ruling that District Judge Million’s judgment at first instance could not stand for the reasons that 
she gave is perfectly justifiable. Eleanor King J clearly erred in manner in which she dealt with the 
 
whether a reasonable result has been reached in each case bearing in mind the conduct of a claimant towards 
the deceased. This is one of those ‘value judgments’ that a court of first instance must reach. While the words 
of s. 3(1)(g) do continue ’or any other person’, it is not so easy to reach a conclusion that an unreasonable 
result has been reached due to the conduct of the deceased towards the claimant. Surely, the only conduct 
that is relevant here is the deceased making the will in the form in which it was made – i.e. failing to make 
reasonable financial provision for the claimant? Any other conduct on the deceased’s part has not produced 
the unreasonable result which the court is being asked to remedy. 
 
624 In particular, Black LJ refers to paragraphs 48 – 63 of that judgment – see: Black LJ in Illot v Mitson [2011] 
EWCA Civ. 346 at parag. [84]. 
 
625 See: Black LJ, ibid. at parag. [84]. 
 
626 Which are relevant under s. 3(1)(f) of the 1975 Act. 
 
627 The charities that were together entitled to the mother’s residuary estate under her will were not 
competing with the daughter in the sense that the court was required to take into account their financial 




decision of District Judge Million on appeal. And, as regards that first instance judgment, the Court of 
Appeal was unable to say that it was ‘plainly wrong’.628 Indeed, the ‘plainly wrong’ test has made first 
instance decisions under the 1975 Act very difficult to overturn on appeal.629 The disappointment one 
feels when reading the 2012 Court of Appeal judgments in Illot v Mitson is that none of those 
judgments adequately address counsel’s submission that, absent some other reason, the court cannot 
interfere with the dispositions made by the mother’s will merely because the daughter is in 
necessitous circumstances. This observation, made by Oliver J in Re Coventry deceased,630 is repeated 
in Re Jennings deceased631 and, again, in Espinosa v Bourke,632 and has been followed in many other 
cases.633 Indeed, in Re Garland deceased634 Michael Furness QC sitting as a deputy judge of the High 
Court in 2007, on reviewing the evidence in that case, was able to come to the conclusion that, ‘[t]here 
is no doubt that the claimant lives in very difficult financial circumstances … So far as the claimant’s 
needs, she has a need for a higher income …’ and ‘… that need is a powerful factor in her favour’. 
Nevertheless, he felt unable to overturn the testator’s testamentary dispositions on that basis alone, 
where the claimant was ‘in good health and able to work’. Here, ‘the estrangement between herself 
and her father [the testator] and the fact that she [the claimant] ha[d] already had the benefit her 
mother’s estate [were] factors which count[ed] against her.’ And, notwithstanding that the value of 
the mother’s estate was only £33,000 compared with the testator’s estate which was valued at just 
under £300,000, and the beneficiary against whom she was competing (her sister) was living in fairly 
comfortable circumstances, the judge, having noted the case law referred to above, dismissed the 
claimant’s claim. Yet, the decision of the Court of Appeal in 2012 in Illot v Mitson flies directly in the 
face of the sentiments expressed in this body of case law. And, it is, therefore, regrettable that, in the 
 
628 Arden LJ – the Court of Appeal only interferes where the Judge proceeded on the basis of the wrong 
principle or it is satisfied that the Judge has reached a conclusion which is plainly wrong – see parag. [62]. 
 
629 See: CPR 1998, r. 52.11(3)(a). In practice, this requires one or more of the following: an error of law, an 
error of fact, or an error in the exercise of the court’s discretion. Given that errors of law or fact are fairly rare, 
the question is often whether the way in which the trial judge exercised his/her discretion can be supported. 
And, if the trial judge has considered, and weighed in the balance, all of the ‘section 3 factors’ in exercising 
his/her discretion, there is no real basis on which an appellate court can interfere with his/her final decision 
whether it agrees with it or not. 
 
630 [1980] Ch. 475 
 
631 See: Nourse LJ at [1994] Ch. 295E-G. 
 
632 [1999] 2 FLR 747 
 
633 Including, Re Dennis deceased [1981] 2 All E R 140, per Browne-Wilkinson J, Williams v Johns [1988] 2 FLR 
475, per Micklem J, and Re Goodchild deceased [1996] 1 WLR 694, Court of Appeal. 
 
634 [2007] EWHC 2 (Ch.) 
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2012 hearing in Illot v Mitson, the Court of Appeal passed by an opportunity to clarify the law in 
relation to the sufficiency of need alone to found an award in favour of an adult child under the 1975 
Act, preferring to focus on whether Eleanor King J’s reasons for overturning the judgment of District 
Judge Million were proper ones rather than whether the decision of District Judge Million was a sound 
one on the state of the present law. 
Why is this significant in relation to a possible amendment of the 1975 Act to allow claims made by 
informal carers merely on the basis of their caring? It is this. If financial need alone can support a claim 
by an adult child for reasonable financial provision from their late parent’s estate, then claims made 
by informal carers are likely to be defeated when in competition with claims of this nature. Some 
informal carers will be unable to establish any financial need. Yet, in the absence of such need, there 
seems to be little reason to find in their favour. To date, all successful adult child applications under 
the 1975 Act in England and Wales have relied, to some extent or another, on financial need. And, 
such applications which were otherwise meritorious on their face, have failed in the absence of any 
evidence that established that the claimant or claimants were in financial need.635 
In fact, this is not the first time that an application which seems to have been based on what some 
might regard as need alone has succeeded. In Gold v Curtis,636 the claimant, an adult son, who was 
suffered from depression and who had a dependant adult daughter with a mental disability, 
contended that his income was not sufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of living and was 
awarded £250,000 out of his late mother’s estate, which was valued at some £870,000. The mother’s 
will made no provision for her son. Instead, she had left the bulk of her estate to her daughter, who 
was aged 60, divorced, with no children, and who was someone had already had assets of £1.1 million 
as a result of that divorce.637 The mother had explained in her will that she did not wish her son to 
benefit from her estate as he had already received ‘enough’ (which is the way she put it)638 from his 
parents and he had become ‘estranged during the last few years’ (again, her words).639 On the 
evidence, the ‘enough’ referred to by the mother was a total of £1,800, part of which had been given, 
and part loaned, but not repaid, approximately 20 years earlier. In the event, the judge – Master 
Bowman – found that the estrangement had been caused by the mother’s dominating character; and, 
 
635 See: Riggs v Lloyds Bank plc, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 27 November 1992. 
 
636 [2005] WTLR 673 
 
637 Some part of the facts of this case are taken from an article by Edward Hewitt, Estrangements and the 1975 
Act, [2015] P.C.B. 172. 
 




indeed, at the time of her death, there was evidence that the relationship had been repaired, at least 
to some degree, following a stroke suffered by the mother. On the application of the general factors 
set out in s. 3(1) of the 1975 Act, but particularly the son’s poor financial circumstances, the depressive 
illness from which he was suffering, his dependent child’s mental disability and the daughter’s very 
favourable financial situation, the Master made a substantial award to the claimant. This, of course, 
was a very different situation to that faced by the Court of Appeal in Illot v Mitson.640 And, the factual 
matrix against which each application for such an award is made will often be very different.  
Here, there were at least two ‘additional factors’: one was that the reasons given by the mother for 
not making provision for her son were poor. In circumstances where her estate was approaching 
£900,000, the mother’s statement that the son had already received ‘enough’, through the payment 
of £1,800 many years earlier, represented a rather distorted view of what had happened in the distant 
past. Moreover, this view may well have been influenced by her opinion that it was he who had been 
responsible for their estrangement at the time the will was made, an estrangement that had not 
continued up until the mother’s death, but which had been repaired in some degree, although this 
was not reflected in her will.641 Yet, should these factors be seen to be factors that support the making 
of an award under the 1975 Act? If the court makes a judgment on whether the reasons given by the 
deceased for not making an award are unreasonable, that seems to be turning a negative into a 
positive. This seems to be very near to saying that, ‘if your reasons are judged to be false, we will 
ensure that reasonable provision is made for the claimant’. If that is the case, it may be preferable not 
to give reasons at all. If you go to your grave without attempting to justify your testamentary 
dispositions, how can anyone sensibly question them? 
The second factor that carried some weight in this case was the comparative affluence of the only 
other competing claimant on the mother’s bounty. The court is required to take into account the 
beneficiaries’ financial circumstances under s. 3(1)(c) and Master Bowman may well have concluded 
that she was not in any financial need now nor would she be in such need in the future. Of course, the 
lack of any competing claimants642 cannot easily be seen as a ‘positive reason’ for making an award in 
favour of an adult child claimant who is seeking financial provision from the estate of a deceased 
parent. If it were, then, without more, most claimants who have no competing siblings would be well-
 
640 [2011] EWCA Civ. 346 and [2015] EWCA Civ. 797 
 
641 And, having suffered a stroke some months before her death, it may be that the mother had not been in 
any real position to consider making a new will. 
 




placed to receive an award from their parent’s estate should they choose to make an application. At 
the first stage of the reasoning process that the court must adopt in considering applications under 
the 1975 Act, the absence of competing claimants and competing beneficiaries is more of a negative 
reason; that is to say, where there is no one who falls into either of these two categories, there is no 
reason under s. 3(1)(b) and (c) not to make an award. That will not determine an application in the 
claimant’s favour because, as we have seen, the courts have insisted that there needs to be factors 
that weigh positively in the ‘judicial scales’ in favour of the making of an award, and this factor is most 
often ‘financial need’. It may also have been the case that the size of the estate also influenced the 
court to make an award in this case. Yet, once again, that ought perhaps to be treated as negative 
reason; that is to say that, where the estate is large, there is no reason not to make an award, but 
there still needs to be something in the positive side of the scales for the court to act in the claimant’s 
favour. 
In this light, it may therefore be wrong to see Gold v Curtis643 as a case that was determined on financial 
need alone. And, if this correct, this puts Illot v Mitson more out on a limb than we first thought. 
Another English decision that appears to be based on need alone is Myers v Myers.644 This was a ‘big 
money case’ where the deceased’s estate was valued at something in excess of £8 million. The 
claimant was an adult child of the deceased by his first marriage. The deceased’s will left the whole of 
his very substantial estate to his widow and the family of his second marriage. The deceased had a 
difficult relationship with the claimant and had put shares into trust for her in an effort to prevent her 
making a claim against his estate after his death. He also left correspondence which stated that, in his 
view, he had made adequate provision for her during his lifetime. The claimant had substantial debts 
and an income of only £70 per week and therefore it was clear that she had real financial need, but, 
apart from that need, there was little else that she could pray in aid of her application. Nevertheless, 
further financial provision was made for in the form of an award of £275,000 which was to be held on 
trust to provide her with accommodation and a further £86,000 to enable her to furnish this property, 
discharge some of her debts and purchase health insurance. Of course, the size and nature of the 
deceased estate are relevant factors. But, as has already been remarked, the size of the deceased’s 
estate alone cannot justify an award in the claimant’s favour in circumstances where no such award 
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would have been made if the estate were smaller. And, in these circumstances, Myers v Myers also 
seems to fly in the face of the principles laid down by Oliver J in Re Coventry deceased.645 
Scant regard has also been paid to these principles in Northern Ireland where the courts have sought 
to apply the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) (Northern Ireland) Order 1979, SI 
1979/924, which effectively enacts the 1975 Act as part of the law applicable in the province. In the 
Estate of McGarrell deceased646 the claimant, who was in difficult financial circumstances, was able to 
obtain an award of (by agreement between the parties on quantum not on liability) one-quarter of 
what appears to be a relatively small estate (but whose value is not given in the report of the case), 
having established a moral claim on that estate ‘arising in part from her having done housework for 
her father [the deceased] over many years in excess of the housework for which she was paid, but 
arising principally from the fact that she did look after her father in difficult circumstances for a period 
of about nine months’.647 On the review of the case law under the 1975 Act that appears above, it is 
difficult to see that the provision of care for such a short period of time could ever give rise, in English 
law, to an obligation to make financial provision for a claimant under that Act. The claimant in Re 
Coventry deceased looked after his father, the deceased, in a similar fashion, but no obligation to make 
financial provision was thereby created. In fact, in Re Coventry deceased there was a significant 
dependency of the claimant on his father, given that his father, the deceased, owned the property in 
which they were both living such that the claimant was dependent on his father for the maintenance 
of ‘a roof over his head’. In contrast, in the Estate of McGarrell deceased it was the claimant who had 
taken the deceased into her home for the nine months to which Hutton J refers before eventually 
arranging for the deceased to move into a nursing home, and therefore no ‘dependency claim’ was 
advanced. Nevertheless, an award was made in the claimant’s favour in the Estate of McGarrell 
deceased, but not in Re Coventry deceased. The subsequent Northern Ireland cases of In Re Creeney, 
Creeney v Smyth648 and Re Kathleen McKernan deceased649 are also viewed as instances in which the 
courts in this province have been generous in their application of the Northern Ireland equivalent of 
the 1975 Act, but, on reflection, the former case can be supported as a case where the deceased was 
under a significant obligation to make provision for the claimant having encouraged him to believe 
that he would inherit the deceased’s business over a considerable period of time in which he worked 
 
645 [1980] Ch. 461 
 
646 [1983] 8 NIJB 
 
647 Per Hutton J, at page 13 of his judgment in the Estate of McGarrell [1983] 8 NIJB 
 
648 [1984] N.I. 397 
 
649 [2007] N.I. Ch. 6 
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in that business on  a low wage, and the latter case can be supported as a case where there was a high 
degree of dependency by the claimant on the deceased for accommodation. In these circumstances, 
this case law does little to help us overall. 
In summary, the observations made by the Court of Appeal in the trilogy of appeals under the 1975 
Act in 1998, in Re Pearce deceased, Re Hancocks deceased and Espinosa v Bourke that there is no pre-
condition that an adult child claimant must satisfy, whether in the form of a ‘moral obligation’ or 
‘special circumstances’, or otherwise, that give rise to an obligation or responsibility on the deceased 
to make reasonable financial provision for the claimant, with which the claimant has failed to comply, 
while undoubtedly correct, have, it seems, paved the way for subsequent courts to determine claims 
by ‘lame duck’ adult child claimants on the basis of financial need alone. And, the courts are now, 
following Gold v Curtis, Myers v Myers and now Ilott v Mitson, increasingly willing to determine 
applications under the 1975 Act on this basis. In contrast, there is no inclination, it seems, for the 
courts to determine such claims on the basis of ‘obligation’ alone; there must always be a need for 
provision. This has a number of consequences for adult child carers who wish to make a claim for 
compensation on the estate of a now deceased parent. Firstly, their claim will always be subject to the 
obligation on the deceased’s estate to provide for the financial need of any other applicant or any 
beneficiary because financial need alone can justify the estate being used in such a manner. And, 
secondly, their claim will be dismissed, notwithstanding everything that they have done for the 
deceased over what may have been a protracted period of time, unless they, themselves, can establish 
financial need or some form of dependency on the deceased. It is submitted that this position is wholly 
unsatisfactory in terms of a policy which seeks to encourage adult children to care for an elderly, 
disabled parent at home. And, it is also unsatisfactory as a position that will deliver ‘justice’ in a 
majority of cases. With these observations in mind, it is time for a fresh approach to the problem that 










4.7 ILOTT IN THE SUPREME COURT – MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS 
When Ilott v The Blue Cross and Others650 arrived in the Supreme Court in late 2016 it was the first 
occasion on which any claim under the 1975 Act or its predecessor had been before the highest court 
in the land. That said, the decision that the Supreme Court was asked to make in order to determine 
Mrs. Ilott’s appeal was a limited one: ‘Was the Court of Appeal correct in overturning District Judge 
Million’s decision on quantum?’651 In the event, its answer was ‘no’. It held that the District Judge had 
correctly directed himself on the law to be applied to that decision and had correctly applied that law. 
Indeed, in what appears to be a thinly-veiled attempt to discourage appeals in future 1975 Act claims, 
whether on liability or quantum, Lord Hughes JSC, giving the leading speech on a panel of seven, 
remarked: ‘The Act plainly requires a broad-brush approach from the judges to very variable personal 
and family circumstances. There can be nothing wrong in such cases with the judge simply setting out 
the facts as he finds them and then addressing both questions under the Act without repeating 
them’.652 And, that, it decided, is what District Judge Million had done at the trial, albeit the two 
questions had not been separately dealt with in his judgment. 
Notwithstanding that the issues before the Supreme Court were narrow, Lord Hughes and Baroness 
Hale JJSC did offer some general observations on the 1975 Act which are helpful if only up to a point. 
The dictum that has been seized upon by many commentators in this regard is Lord Hughes’ reiteration 
of the principle of testamentary freedom, and with that the importance that is to be attributed to the 
deceased’s wishes. Unfortunately, the significance of these wishes – or what ‘weight’ is to be attached 
 
650 See: [2017] UKSC 17; [2018] AC 545. This case was, of course, Ilott v Mitson, in all earlier hearings before 
the lower courts. 
 
651 When Ilott v Mitson, later to become, Ilott v The Blue Cross and Others, came before District Judge Million 
for trial he decided, firstly, that the late Mrs. Jackson failed to make reasonable financial provision for her 
daughter, Mrs Ilott, and, secondly, that she, Mrs. Ilott, was therefore entitled to an award of £50,000 out of 
the late Mrs. Jackson’s estate as ‘reasonable financial provision’ under section 2 of the 1975 Act.  Mrs. Ilott 
appealed the second element of that decision. And, this duly prompted the residuary beneficiaries of the late 
Mrs. Jackson’s will to appeal the first element. Both the appeal and the cross-appeal came before Eleanor King 
J and, quite sensibly, she dealt with the cross-appeal first. As the residuary beneficiaries succeeded before 
Eleanor King J, the question raised on the appeal did not arise. Mrs. Ilott, on the other hand, was not content 
with that decision and appealed the dismissal of her appeal and the success of the cross-appeal to the Court of 
Appeal. In the event, the Court of Appeal held that District Judge Million was correct in the approach that he 
adopted to the first issue before him and that Eleanor King J was wrong in deciding otherwise. That left Mrs. 
Ilott’s appeal on the issue of quantum still to be decided. That appeal was heard by Parker J who upheld 
District Judge Million’s initial award of £50,000 in Mrs. Ilott’s favour. But, his decision was then appealed by 
Mrs. Ilott to the Court of Appeal who upheld that appeal and substituted a much higher award (a minimum of 
£143,000). The residuary beneficiaries then appealed that decision on quantum to the Supreme Court who 
upheld that appeal and restored the original decision of District Judge Million awarding Mrs. Ilott £50,000. 
 




to them in the balancing process that the court must undertake in answering the questions raised by 
an application under the 1975 Act – was not further explained.653 
In their submissions, counsel for Mrs. Ilott had suggested that ‘[i]n exercising the jurisdiction the court 
is not confined to interfering with the deceased’s testamentary provisions as little as possible.’654 
Indeed, a deceased – whether setting out his/her testamentary intentions in a will or simply deciding 
not to make a will and to allow his/her estate to be distributed in accordance with the law relating to 
intestacy – cannot thereby defeat the operation of statute and fail to make reasonable financial 
provision for someone who is otherwise entitled to such provision. That said, it is difficult to sensibly 
claim that whatever relationship that existed between the applicant and the deceased before the 
deceased’s death can be ignored altogether.655 Every application will have a unique set of 
circumstances accompanying it. Yet, that is, of course, the difficulty here. In Ilott v The Blue Cross656 
Baroness Hale JSC complained that parliament has given no guidance to the courts on how the courts 
should exercise their discretion under the 1975 Act on applications for reasonable financial provision 
by adult children. But, inflexible rules make bad law. It is therefore difficult to conceive of any such 
indications, should Parliament give them, which would give greater ‘justice’ to adult child applications, 
save for what is proposed later in this thesis. In fact, greater certainty would run the risk of greater 
injustice. Yet, if there is little certainty, this only increases litigation as more and more adult children 
in difficult financial circumstances fancy their chances of success, much like Mrs. Ilott. 
Indeed, one of the most troublesome aspects of Ilott’s case, which comes out of the speech of 
Baroness Hale JSC, is that, in her mind, had District Judge Million arrived at either one of two other 
radically different – in fact, polar opposite – conclusions on the evidence before him he would have 
been acting entirely within the discretion given to him under statute, and, more significantly, neither 
decision would have been appealable on their merits. This leaves would-be adult child litigants and 
their advisers with little idea whether they might be successful or not, yet clear that in all likelihood 
 
653 Lord Hughes JSC at [47] stated, ‘It was not correct to say of the wishes of the deceased that because 
Parliament has provided for claims by those qualified under section 1 it follows that that by itself strikes the 
balance between testamentary wishes and such claims: para. 51 (iv). It is not the case that once there is a 
qualified claimant and a demonstrated need for maintenance, the testator’s wishes cease to be of any weight. 
They may of course be overridden, but they are part of the circumstances of the case and fall to be assessed in 
the round together with all other relevant factors.’ 
 
654 [2018] AC 545 at 555 
 
655 Even the conviction of the applicant for the manslaughter of the deceased in Re Land deceased [2007] 1 
WLR 1009 did not prevent the court from making an award in the applicant’s favour. 
 




they would have only ‘one bite at the cherry’. One recent and potentially significant development – 
although it was not referred to in the Supreme Court - is the diminution of the size of the estate 
available to children and the increase of the entitlement of the surviving spouse under the rules 
relating to intestacy under the Inheritance and Trustees Powers Act 2014.657 This might yet be 
interpreted as an indication by Parliament that the expectations of adult children should be lowered 
and that should be reflected in fewer successful applications under the 1975 Act by this class of 
applicant. 
Another inescapable consequence of the courts’ collective approach in Ilott v The Blue Cross and 
Others is that more and more applications under the 1975 Act may well fall to be determined on 
questions of ‘conduct’. While it is true that paragraph (g) in section 3(1) of the Act requires the court 
to have regard to ‘any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person which 
in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant’, judges in past cases have positively 
discouraged litigants and their advisers from regaling the court with evidence of what the deceased 
or anyone else said or did, if only because the deceased cannot be heard in response to this 
evidence.658 Yet, in Ilott v The Blue Cross and Others conduct was to the fore. Indeed, Lord Hughes JSC 
referred to the lack of contact between the deceased and Mrs. Ilott as ‘one of the two dominant 
factors in the case’.659 But, every estrangement will have a cause and this begs the question: ‘Who was 
at fault for causing the estrangement?’ In Ilott v The Blue Cross and Others, the evidence quite clearly 
suggested that it was the deceased. Yet, it would, the only evidence that the court had on this point 
was Mrs. Ilott’s. The court never heard the deceased’s side of this story. That, indeed, is the difficulty 
in determining any allegations of conduct, particularly in cases where the applicant and the deceased 
were estranged at the date of the deceased’s death. Often, the cause of such estrangement is a private 
matter between the deceased and the applicant. However, the applicant is very unlikely to admit 
responsibility for such an event, and therefore it is only where the deceased has made the cause public 
 
657 If the deceased is survived by a spouse and children or other issue, the surviving spouse will receive all 
personal chattels and a statutory legacy of £250,000 plus an absolute interest in one half of the residue of the 
estate above that statutory amount. Before these changes, the surviving spouse was only entitled to a life 
interest in one half of the residue. 
 
658 In Lambert v Lambert [2002] EWCA Civ. 1685, [2003] 1 FLR 139, the Court of Appeal referred to the 
‘marking’ of the performance of the parties to a failed marriage as ‘distasteful’. By analogy, any examination of  
the conduct of the applicant and the deceased towards each other must also be ‘distasteful’ – unless, perhaps, 
that conduct is of a particular striking nature, such as where there is a history of violence on the part of the 
applicant towards the deceased as in Re Snoek [1983] Fam. Law 18, or where it affects the ‘obligations and 
responsibilities’ of the deceased towards the applicant. 
 




that the court will ever hear two sides of the same story.660 Doubtless this lies behind the reluctance 
of courts in the past to attach any great weight to allegations of conduct.  And, consistent with this 
approach the courts have also paid little attention over the years to conduct which the applicant might 
rely on to enhance his/her application.661 Yet, the Supreme Court in Ilott v The Blue Cross and Others 
seems to encourage would-be litigants to adduce evidence of conduct. Indeed, in Ilott v The Blue Cross 
and Others Lord Hughes SCJ went on to contrast Mrs Ilott’s application with a case where (in his words) 
‘… a child of the deceased had remained exceptionally and confidentially close to her mother 
throughout, had supported and nurtured her in her old age at some cost in time and money to herself, 
and had been promised that she would be looked after in her will’. In doing so, Lord Hughes as clearly 
suggesting that such factors – which are all ‘conduct’ whether by the deceased or claimant – might 
provide greater reason why an adult child might expect to be provided for in his/her parent’s will. And, 
from that proposition, if such provision were not made, that an adult child who could demonstrate 
such conduct would – if he/she could also demonstrate ‘need’ – have significant prospects of 
maintaining a successful claim under the 1975 Act.  
But, does Ilott v The Blue Cross and Others now suggest that this will all be forgotten and that families 
will be encouraged ‘to wash their dirty linen in public’ because this is now how these applications will, 
in the future, be fought? As regards cases that have been heard post-Ilott, conduct appears to be of 
increasing relevance. In Nahajec v Fowle662 the applicant was a victim (or so she portrayed herself) of 
a separation between her mother and the deceased (who was her father) which occurred when she 
was but 11 years of age. Her evidence was that, at that point, the deceased simply cut himself off from 
his children (who had remained with their mother) until she, the applicant, had re-kindled the 
relationship for  a couple of years before the deceased disapproved of a boyfriend that she was then 
seeing and once more ceased contact with her. The applicant’s case was therefore that the absence 
of any relationship between her and the deceased at the deceased’s death was entirely the deceased’s 
‘fault’ and in these circumstances he could not cite their estrangement as justifying his failure to make 
reasonable financial provision for her. And, the applicant qualified for such provision, so she said, on 
other grounds, principally her financial circumstances. In the event, the court awarded her £30,000 
from an estate of £265,710, which had been left to one of the deceased’s close friends under his will. 
If the lack of contact between the deceased and the claimant was one of the ‘dominant factors’ in 
 
660 This happened most recently in the case of Wellesley v Wellesley [2019] EWHC 11 (Ch.), infra. 
 
661 See: Nourse LJ in Re Jennings deceased [1994] Ch. 286 at 296. 
 




Ilott’s case, then it had to be so in Nahajec v Fowle and the court had to have regard to the conduct 
of the parties in determining the cause of this estrangement. 
If dirty linen is to be washed in public, the deceased can, of course, always set this in motion. One 
interesting post-Ilott case, where the deceased had made his views about the applicant known to the 
rest of his family, and the court was therefore able to hear both sides of the ‘estrangement story’ was 
Wellesley v Wellesley.663 Here, the applicant relied on her straightened financial circumstances, the 
size of her father’s estate (£1.3 million), her disability and the more serious disability of her son, whom 
she was obligated in law to support as significant factors that merited an award in her favour. The 
respondents relied on the applicant’s conduct towards the deceased as disentitling her to any such 
award. In particular, so they claimed, that conduct led to a 35-year estrangement between the 
deceased and the applicant and this entirely justified the relatively small financial provision that had 
been made for the applicant in the deceased’s will (£20,000). After hearing all of the evidence 
presented to him, the District Judge who tried the claim agreed with the respondents and dismissed 
the application. In other words, the applicant failed solely, it seems, as a result of her conduct towards 
the deceased (the 7th Earl Cowley), which amounted to a wholesale rejection of the deceased’s 
aristocratic lifestyle and values, when she was in her early twenties.  In the opinion of the District 
Judge this outweighed all combined weight of all other factors in the case. 
Wellesley v Wellesley was clearly a case that was solely decided on conduct. But, the same could be 
said of the earlier case of Wright v Waters.664  Here, the events that led to the estrangement between 
the deceased and the applicant also played a pivotal role. The claimant maintained that the ‘fault’ for 
such estrangement lay with the deceased. And, it seems inescapable that some conduct on the 
deceased’s part must have led to the claimant writing and sending a letter to the deceased effectively 
disowning her. That letter led to 9 years of estrangement that only ended with the deceased’s death. 
Notwithstanding that, at the date of the trial, the applicant was wheel-chair bound, in poor health and 
in necessitous financial circumstances, the Judge concluded that, ‘When I take into account all the 
section 3 factors may value judgment is that [the applicant’s] conduct outweighs all of the factors in 
her favour.’665 In Wright v Waters what the applicant had said in the vital letter had been particularly 
hurtful and many of us might easily conclude that the applicant had thereby ‘burnt her bridges’ and 
with that any prospect of benefiting under the deceased’s will. But, this is very close to saying that the 
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deceased had acted entirely reasonably in leaving the applicant without any provision and that, of 
course, is not the test. And, the same might be said of the District Judge’s approach in Wellesley v 
Wellesley. Indeed, perhaps the only objective element in these two decisions is that it was not how 
the deceased viewed the conduct of the applicant, but how the court looked at that conduct. It just 
happened that the court agreed with the deceased in each case. Yet, that is not the same as asking, 
‘Has the deceased’s will made reasonable financial provision for the deceased in the circumstances 
that exist at the date of the trial?’ That is the test that must be applied. 
In light of these observations, a forceful case can be made to suggest that far from adding some clarity 
to adult child applications the Supreme Court has only ‘muddied the waters’ in Ilott v The Blue Cross 
and Others. Having been raised with the idea that conduct would have only exceptional relevance in 
applications under the 1975 Act, litigants and their advisers must now search for evidence that will 
cast either the deceased or the applicant in a poor light depending on which side of the fence they 
find themselves on. What weight the trial judge will attribute to such conduct is almost impossible to 
predict. What regard may be had to the deceased’s wishes is difficult to say.666 And, given the limited 
reporting of decisions of District Judges on 1975 Act applications, which is where all such applications 
must now start, there is little prospect of any coherent and consistent jurisprudence on the treatment 
of these factors on adult child applications. What is more, the positive discouragement of appeals 
under the 1975 Act that is plainly evident on the face of Lord Hughes JSC’s remarks is hardly likely to 
resolve this lacunae; nor, it is suggested, is there any real likelihood of parliament responding to 
Baroness Hale JSC’s plea for assistance in such a matter.  
For all of these reasons,667 it appears abundantly clear that the 1975 Act is not a suitable vehicle for 
applications by adult child informal carers for financial provision to recognise the hardship and 
sacrifice that they have had to undergo to provide care for a now deceased parent and that, if, on 
policy grounds, something should be done for this growing body of people, whose efforts cannot 
continue to be ignored, that must now be provided for by original legislation. 
 
666 In the recent case of Thompson v Raggett [2018] EWHC 688 (Civ.); [2018] WTLR 1027 the deceased, who 
had cohabited with the applicant for some 42 years attempted to justify his failure to make any provision for 
her, including any right to reside in the property in which they were living together, but which he owned, by 
referring to his distrust of her children, claiming that she had sufficient financial resources of her own and by 
claiming that she would in any event need to move into a nursing home following his death because he was 
her only carer. In the event, these wishes were ignored by the court and provision was granted. 
 
667 In summary, these include the uncertainty relating to the relevance and weight attributable to ‘conduct’ 
(both of the applicant and the deceased), the weight attributable to the deceased’s testamentary intentions 
and wishes, the lack of clarity in statute and in case law in regard to how adult child applications should be 
considered by the courts, and the difficulties that appellants face in successfully appealing first instance 













A claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (‘the 1975 Act’) is a 
non-proprietary claim. If successful, these claims are satisfied through an award determined by the 
court following the exercise of its discretion, and that process includes the determination of where 
the burden of such an award should lie.668  As we have seen over the course of the last chapter, a claim 
made under the 1975 Act is a post mortem claim, made against the deceased care-receiver’s net 
estate. This renders a claimant particularly vulnerable. Any claim under the 1975 Act may be defeated, 
not on its merits but merely through what one might describe as ‘circumstances entirely outside the 
claimant’s control’, such as claims by creditors and claims by other 1975 Act claimants. In this event, 
a carer claimant may well find themselves without a remedy notwithstanding that their sacrifices, 
made perhaps over many years, may have preserved the value of the care-receiver’s estate in order 
that it is able to meet those other claims.669  
With this in mind, it is necessary to consider whether there are any alternative pathways available to 
an informal carer who might be seeking financial compensation for their caring. In particular, we need 
look at whether, and in what circumstances, English courts might entertain proprietary claims by 
informal carers. The value of these claims is clear.  Not only will the asset onto which the proprietary 
 
668 The 1975 Act, s. 2(4). 
 
669 If the deceased’s estate is insolvent, no award can be made; if the net estate is small, that is a significant 




claim fixes be unavailable to meet the claims of the care-receiver’s creditors, but it will also be 
unavailable to the care-receiver should he/she wish to dispose of that asset under his/her will or allow 
it to pass under the law relating to intestacy. Moreover, if the care-receiver decides to dispose of the 
asset during his/her lifetime, the claimant carer can always make an application for an injunction 
restraining such an act. On its face, a proprietary claim has the capacity to bring a good deal more 
certainty to an informal carer’s present or future right to compensation for the care that he/she may 
have already provided under some form of bargain that he/she has made with the care-receiver. 
In most cases, the asset onto which this proprietary claim will fix will be the care-receiver’s home. For 
those fortunate enough to own their own home, this is commonly the most valuable asset in a care-
receiver’s estate.670 In circumstances where the care-receiver is being cared for at home and the 
proprietary claim is consensual in nature,671 any rights that a carer may have acquired will, almost 
certainly, be unenforceable against the property whilst the care-receiver is still resident therein.  In 
some situations, the property in question is jointly owned with the care-receiver’s surviving spouse. 
In this event, if a consensual proprietary claim exists, the agreement or understanding on which it is 
based is likely to postpone the enforcement of such a claim until the spouse’s death or at least until 
he/she takes up permanent residence in a nursing or care home.  Nevertheless, these proprietary 
claims often introduce difficult questions. What precisely was promised by the care-receiver? Was the 
care-receiver simply making a statement of present testamentary intent that might be changed at 
his/her whim at some later date? Or, was the commitment made by the care-receiver, on which the 
carer has subsequently acted, something that gives the carer rights that can be enforced against the 
care-receiver and/or the asset that has been the subject of the promise? Such promises are, of course, 
almost invariably conditional ones, such that the carer is obliged to care for the care-receiver in order 
to secure the asset that was promised to him/her. Did the carer fulfil that obligation? If not, why was 
the promise to care for the care-receiver not fulfilled? Was it due to the breakdown in the relationship 
between the two parties? Or was there a material change in the life of the carer that meant that 
he/she was unable to provide the necessary care? Or was it as a result of a need for the care-receiver 
to sell the asset that was the subject of the promise in order to pay for more intensive health-related 
care or to meet some other unforeseen emergency? 
 
670 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2574038/Average-British-person-net-worth-147-134-0-01-cent-
David-Beckham.html (accessed: 15/06/17) 
 
671 As it would be where it is based on proprietary estoppel, a contract to make a will in a particular form or on 




The analysis of the potential claims that might be made by an informal carer that is presented in this 
chapter – whether of a proprietary or non-proprietary nature – will demonstrate that all such claims 
are entirely dependent on their own particular circumstances. In this event, is it wholly impractical to 
amend or expand existing legal principles of English law in order to provide informal carers with 
alternative means of seeking redress should a care-receiver fail to reward their efforts in caring for 
him/her through appropriate provision in his/her will.  No one amendment, or series of amendments, 
could possibly cover all of the circumstances that might relate to a carer’s claim so as to allow that 
claim to succeed whatever the carer and care-receiver’s respective situations.   Moreover, even if 
sufficient provision is made for an informal carer in a care-receiver’s will, that provision is liable to be 
defeated by competing claims as related earlier in this introduction. And, in any event, such provision 
is only post mortem and does not provide any significant benefit to an informal carer during the caring 
period when it may well be most needed.672 With these points in mind, it will be submitted that a 
much more radical proposal for the reform of the present system is needed. And, this is the proposal 
presented in chapter six of this thesis. Nevertheless, in an effort to demonstrate the validity of this 
conclusion, we must now consider the nature of these alternative claims and the weaknesses that are 






5.2 CONTRACTS RELATING TO WILLS AND THE CLAIMS OF INFORMAL CARERS 
One approach an informal carer might take is to attempt to enforce a contract in which the care-
receiver has promised to confer some benefit on the carer under the care-receiver’s will in return for 
the carer providing care to the care-receiver for the remainder of the care-receiver’s lifetime.673 
 
672 In fact, any testamentary gift will automatically fail (i.e. lapse) as a consequence of the legatee predeceasing 
the testator (unless any substitutionary provision takes effect), so that, if an informal carer’s rights are post 
mortem rights they are always such to the condition that he/she must first survive the care-receiver. 
 
673 S. Nield, ‘If you look after me, I will leave you my estate’: The enforcement of testamentary promises in 
England and New Zealand, (2000) Legal Studies, Vol. 20, issue 1, pp. 85-103; and, S. Nield, Testamentary 





Logically, these contract-based claims should provide an informal carer with a readily-obtainable 
remedy in the form of the subject matter of the agreed bequest. Yet, in practice, such claims are rare. 
Indeed, even when made, they are notoriously difficult to prove in the absence of any written record 
of the contract in question. Given that the testimony of the care-receiver is not available to set 
alongside the evidence of the claimant, to either refute or support the carer’s case, such claims are 
commonly treated with a good deal of circumspection by the courts.674  
Another aspect of what is perhaps the same approach is that members of a family often act out of 
‘natural love and affection’ for each other.  In the eyes of some, this explains the care of a parent for 
their child; and, it can - depending on the circumstances – explain some care that is provided by an 
adult child to their elderly parent or parents. The act of an adult child calling in to see their aged 
mother and/or father on their way home from work, bringing some ‘food shopping’ with them, 
collected at the parents’ request, and perhaps cooking a meal for them, is ‘care’ but not necessarily 
care where there is any expectation of reward.675 In these circumstances, there is said to be ‘no 
intention to create legal relations’ between the two parties. Nevertheless, there is clearly a line to be 
drawn here in terms of the commitment of the adult child to the provision of care, what that care 
consists of and the effect of providing such care on the daily lives of the carer and the care-receiver. 
The activities of the adult child described above cannot be placed in the same category as the care 
provided by an adult child who has had to leave their job, to return to their parents’ home and 
administer intensive social care on a 24 hour basis. The ‘line to be drawn’ should not dependent on 
‘expectation’, but on ‘justice’. Yet, in reality, legal principle seems to draw no real distinction between 
these two sets of circumstances.676 
A third aspect of the ‘problem’ of enforcing arrangements that may have been made between an adult 
child carer and their elderly parent in relation to the provision of care is how to interpret what the 
elderly parent may have said. A statement made by a parent at the outset of the ‘care arrangements’ 
to the effect that the child would have the parent’s house ‘when they’re gone’ may be interpreted as 
 
674 Walton J in In Re Gonin deceased [1979] Ch. 16 at p. 32. Another reason why such actions are not 
commonly brought is, of course, that, when one is dealing with agreements made within a family, there is a 
natural inclination against such agreements being intended to be binding in law. But, see: Parker v Clark [1960] 
1 WLR 286. 
 
675 As Sarah Neild says, fn. 673, supra, Legal Studies, Vol. 20, issue 1, 85 at p. 87: ‘The line between the care 
that might be expected between relatives and friends and the consideration or detriment required to support 
an agreement or representation is often difficult to draw.’ 
  
676 Neither the degree of sacrifice, nor the amount of care, nor the affect that caring has on the life of the carer 




a mere statement of testamentary intention and not one that is intended to have any legal 
consequences. Once again, this is probably another way of looking at the need for ‘contractual 
intention’, but it does serve to emphasise that it is now surely common knowledge that a will needs 
to be in writing, and that it can be revoked and replaced by a new will at a later date.677 In these 
circumstances, any carer who provides care on the basis of an oral promise alone has no certain 
expectation of receiving what has been promised to him/her, and they may well appreciate this, but 
be willing to take the risk that they may end up receiving nothing for their pains.  
These considerations apart, it is plain from reported case law that the terms of any contractual bargain 
must be clear before those terms can be enforced.678 There is no suggestion that the courts are 
prepared to infer such terms, particularly where care is provided by a member of the care-receiver’s 
family. Equally, and perhaps more significantly, the care-receiver, as the offeror, must make a 
statement that was intended to bring about a legally binding contract once it is accepted.679 If that 
intention is not present and the statement is a mere indication of future intention, albeit made with 
a view to influencing the recipient of the statement, then no contract will exist.680  
Of course, any testamentary disposition ought to comply with s. 9 of the Wills Act 1837, but contracts 
to leave property by will seem to operate outside and perhaps despite this section.681 In addition, 
where such contracts comprise a promise to dispose of land, the contract is subject to s. 2(1)-(3) of 
the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, and will need to be made by a document in 
writing, containing all the terms which have been agreed between the parties to the contract, and be 
signed by each party or by their duly appointed agent. Given the extent of the informal social care that 
is required in many instances, and that the main asset in the estates of most care-receivers is their 
 
677 J. Mee, ‘The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel: Thorner v Major’, (2009) 21 Child and Family Law Quarterly 367. 
Even if the statement is interpreted as a promise that is to take effect before the death of the care-receiver, 
say, on the removal of the care-receiver into sheltered accommodation or into a care home, that introduces 
the question of whether the requirements of s. 2, Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 have 
been met. 
 
678 The author of Theobald on Wills, 15th edition, suggests that, from 1950 ‘or thereabouts’ onwards the courts 
‘seem more willing to give contractual effect to agreements between family members relating to will’, see pp. 
96-97. 
 
679 See: Parker v Clark [1960] 1 WLR 286; Schaefer v Schuhmann [1972] AC 572. 
 
680 Theobald on Wills, 15th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 97 
 
681 See: Mummery LJ in Uglow v Uglow [2004] WTLR 1183: ‘The testator’s assurance that he will leave specific 
property to a person by will may … become irrevocable as a result of the other’s detrimental reliance on the 
assurance, even though the testator’s power of testamentary disposition to which the assurance is linked is 




home, the vast majority of these claims for the enforcement of such contracts will be caught by these 
provisions. And, the consequence of this is that such claims are more commonly put on the basis of 
trust or estoppel.682 
Finally, where a ‘contract to leave property by will’ has been established on the evidence, the court is 
simply left to put the contractual bargain into effect. There is no discretion to exercise. The claimant 
is entitled to what has been promised to him/her. In some respects, this may serve to explain the 
courts’ reluctance to find that such a bargain has been made. The court has no flexibility when it comes 
to the relief that it must grant on proof of the claimant’s claim. And, bargains of this nature that 
remove the most valuable asset in a care-receiver’s estate from the operation of his/her will or the 
law relating to intestacy may well have a significant effect on the ability of others to make a claim 
against the care-receiver’s estate. 
Notwithstanding these observations, if there is, indeed, a clear commitment by a parent to give their 
property to an adult child in return for care services to be provided by that child, then there is no 
reason why such a contractual promise should not be enforced.683 In modern society, many people 
might well balk at making long-term, life-affecting commitments to each other, particularly ones 
affecting the ownership of one’s home.684 Equally, property owners usually are well aware that 
property transactions require the observance of legal formalities, and there may be a marked 
reluctance for care-receivers who own property to involve lawyers in their affairs where the other 
party is one of their own children. In simple terms, contracts to make wills – whether or not involving 
a substantial asset such as the care-receiver’s home – are seldom made. 
In two articles that are directed towards looking at contracts to make wills as part of a ‘solution’ for 
informal carers, Sarah Neild has looked carefully at the benefits that might be given to informal carers 
by the introduction into England of legislation along the lines of New Zealand’s Law Reform 
 
682  See: fn. 680, supra, at p. 100. 
 
683 See: Dillon v Public Trustee of New Zealand [1941] AC 294, recognising the enforceability of such contracts 
but also the jurisdiction of the court under New Zealand’s family provision legislation to make an award that 
comprises part of the subject matter of the contract. 
 
684 Since the repeal of the Law of Property Act 1925, s. 40(2),  the question whether oral contracts for the 
disposition of land are still enforceable through the continuing operation of the concept of ‘part performance’, 
albeit now operating as part of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, has been the subject matter of much 
debate. The recent case of Dowding v Matchmove Ltd [2017] 1 WLR 749 would seem to come down firmly in 
support of the conclusion that part performance of such contracts, as a means of enforcing them in the 
absence of writing, is alive and well. Whether acts typically done by an adult child in caring for his/her elderly 
parents would ever be considered to be acts of part performance is, of course, another matter entirely. See 




(Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 as amended.685 Section 3 of that Act is headed: ‘Estate of a 
deceased person liable to remunerate persons for work done under promise of testamentary 
provision’. Its effect is to dispense with the difficulties surrounding the proof of contracts to leave 
property by wills. If a care-receiver, for example, makes a promise of something in return for the care 
services that he/she expects to receive from an adult child, and that promise is then acted on by the 
adult child by the provision of care, the court can award the adult child carer a reasonable sum from 
the care-receiver’s estate having regard to the value of what was promised, the value of the services 
rendered and the other matters listed in that section. While this is a real step forward, there are a 
number of difficulties left unresolved. The Act depends on the making of a promise of reward; without 
such a promise, there is no claim. Moreover, the promise must be a testamentary one; promises of 
financial or other reward during the care-receiver’s lifetime do not qualify. What is more, any services 
that are relied upon by a claimant in support of his/her claim must go beyond ‘the natural incidents 
and consequences of life within a close family group’.686 And, further, in valuing these services, the 
court must also take into account ‘… the amount of the estate, and the nature and amounts of the 
claims of other persons in respect of the estate, whether as creditors, beneficiaries, wife, husband, 
civil union partner, children, next-of-kin, or otherwise’.687 In any event, a claim under this Act is a claim 
against the testator care-receiver’s estate; it is not a claim against any property that may have been 
the subject matter of a promise. If the testator care-receiver wishes to dispose of the subject matter 
of the promise during his/her lifetime, they may, and in doing so they may leave the carer without any 
form of redress. Equally, if the testator wishes to incur greater obligations to others, he may do so, 
and may in doing so leave the carer without any recompense for the caring that he/she has provided. 
In short, there are real constraints to this legislation, so much so that any answer to the issues that 
now concern us must surely be sought elsewhere. That said, there are some lessons that can be learnt 
from the New Zealand experience, and one such lesson is that any intervention in this area of law 
must be a statutory one. As Nield concludes in her second article: 
‘The issues presented by unpaid care giving press the boundaries of accepted contractual, 
equitable and restitutionary principles and make a statutory response an attractive solution. … 
A statutory response also tends to cut through the moral tensions presented by balancing the 
exploitation of carers against the certainty often demanded in dealings with property and 
 
685 See:  fn. 673, supra. 
 
686 Per Lord Cooke in Re Welch [1990] 3 NZLR 1 at p. 7. 
 
687 Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 (New Zealand), s. 3. 
168 
 
freedom of testamentary disposition. But perhaps most significantly statute provides a 
societal endorsement of policy.’ 




5.3 PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL 
Another more frequently deployed option that may be available to some informal carers is the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel. This may be used to make good any representation that the care-
receiver might have made to the effect that the informal carer would have an interest in a certain 
property or in the care-receiver’s estate should care be provided by him/her notwithstanding the 
absence of any contract for the same. While, on its face, this may seem to be an attractive way forward 
for some carers, the doctrine lacks any real consistency in its application to claims of this nature; and, 
of course, it is restricted to situations where assurances of present or future rights in property have 
been made by the care-receiver to the informal carer. It cannot be used in situations where nothing 
has been said between care-receiver and informal carer even if the degree of care provided and the 
sacrifices made by the carer have been substantial, if not life-changing.688 
Given the restrictions on the operation of the doctrine, proprietary estoppel has been, and must 
remain, no more than a supplement to other more universal and concrete rights for informal carers. 
Indeed, if any programme of reform is to be provided with the teeth it needs to encourage informal 
carers to give of their lives for the benefit of others, it may well be that proprietary estoppel will 
seldom be called upon save perhaps in the clearest of circumstances where a plain and unequivocal 





688 In these circumstances it is further argued that the doctrine operates unjustly as between informal carers 




5.3.1 Uncertainties and Other Issues 
In many ways, a contract to make a will and the doctrine of proprietary estoppel run parallel to each 
other. In each case, there is some form of assurance by one party which encourages the other to 
believe that compensation will be given, and care is then provided on that basis with the carer relying 
on the encouragement provided by the care-receiver.689  Brian Sloan has already done much work in 
analysing these two alternative claims from the view of the informal carer. In Informal Carers and 
Private Law,690 he acknowledges that the courts’ attitude to proprietary estoppel claims in particular 
‘… have changed in recent years and there is now increasing judicial recognition of the importance of 
the doctrine for … [informal] carers.’691  Nevertheless, the success of any claim made by an informal 
carer under the doctrine rests firmly on some form of clear and specific encouragement provided by 
the care-receiver that the informal carer either has or will receive on the care-receiver’s death a right 
or interest in an asset or assets in the care-receiver’s estate.692 While the extent of this required 
encouragement is unclear,693 it must nevertheless be clearly and distinctly proved.694 As yet, the courts 
have been unwilling to draw inferences in the absence of clear representations that compensation in 
some form or other will be forthcoming in return for care-giving. What is more, the informal carer 
must also prove that he/she relied on the encouragement contained in these specific representations 
in providing care to the care-receiver and incurred detriment in doing so. The initial part of this 
observation begs the question, ‘Would the carer have provided the care that was lavished on the care-
receiver without the promise of financial reward?’695 The second introduces a further issue where the 
 
689 Ben McFarland and Sir Philip Sales, Promises, detriment, and liability: lessons from proprietary estoppel, 
(2015) LQR 610, where the authors describe the principle as ‘the promise-detriment principle’; and, see 
further: Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18. 
 
690 Brian Sloan, Informal Carers and Private Law, (Hart, 2013), 
 
691 Ibid. at p. 30. 
 
692 See: Lord Scott in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd. [2008] 1 WLR 1752. 
 
693 Davies v Davies [2016] EWCA Civ. 463 where, at [41] of his judgment, Lewison LJ accepts the proposition 
put forward by the respondents’ counsel, that in such cases ‘… there might be sliding scale by which the 
clearer the expectation, the greater the detriment and the longer the passage of time during which the 
expectation was reasonably held, the greater would be the weight that should be given to the expectation’ 
that the claimant has been encouraged to believe the defendant would in due course fulfil. 
 
694 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18, where Lord Scott seems to require proof of a representation or assurance 
which is ‘sufficiently clear and unequivocal’ [15] but Lord Walker merely requires the relevant assurance to be 
‘clear enough’ [56]. 
 
695 The promise in question need not be the sole inducement for the conduct of the claimant - Amalgamated 
Property Co. v Texas Bank [1982] QB 84 per Robert Goff J at p. 10; and, moreover, once the claimant has 
proved that the promise or assurance was made the burden of proof then moves to the defendant to show 
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carer receives some form of benefit from the care-receiver, for example, the provision of 
accommodation and/or the payment of some of the carer’s living expenses.696 Here, one must ask, ‘Is 
the carer really acting to their detriment in providing care?’ If he/she is not, then no claim can be 
made. What is more, if ‘unconscionability’ is a separate component of the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel, this penultimate requirement may provide yet another stumbling-block for informal carers. 
If the provision of care is by adult children to their elderly, disabled relatives is nevertheless seen as a 
filial duty, the question that some may ask is, ‘How can it be unconscionable to fail to provide a person 
with compensation or reward in circumstances all that such a person is doing is his/her duty?’ And, 
finally, even if an informal carer is able to prove that all the required elements of a successful 
proprietary estoppel claim are present, one issue that remains is, ‘What is an appropriate remedy for 
an informal carer in these circumstances?’ Should that remedy be based upon what the care-receiver 
has promised to give the carer or on the degree of detriment suffered by the claimant in caring for the 
care-receiver? 
In recent times, a number of commentators have observed that the law of proprietary estoppel is far 
from clear.697 Sadly, this is all too true. The doctrine of proprietary estoppel lacks the clarity and 
precision that is needed to deliver certainty and justice to those who have been encouraged to believe 
that they have, or will obtain, rights in property that presently belongs to another. Nor does it offer 
any significant assistance to those who may have preserved the value of another’s property by their 
unselfish acts but without any such encouragement. As a mechanism through which any informal carer 
may obtain compensation for their acts of caring, proprietary estoppel operates unevenly and, 
therefore, unjustly; it allows some claims but disallows others of fairly equal merit.698  
 
 
that the claimant did not reply on the promise or assurance but was motivated to act for different reasons –
Wayling v Jones (1995) 69 P & C R 170. 
 
696 One benefit is, of course, the carer’s allowance. 
 
697 For example, ‘The law on estoppel is unclear.’ – see: M. Balen, and C. Knowles, ‘Failure to estop: 
rationalising proprietary estoppel using failure of basis’, (2011) Conv. 176. Ben McFarlane and Sir Philip Sales 
open their article, ‘Promises, detriment, and liability: lessons from proprietary estoppel’, (2015) L.Q.R. 610 
with two observations, firstly, ‘that there is some uncertainty as to whether equitable estoppel can provide a 
cause of action where a promise on which a claimant relies does not relate to any specific property owned, or 
about to be owned, by the defendant’, and, secondly, that [at least in England and Australia] ‘… there is a lack 
of clarity as to the basis on which a court should satisfy a successful proprietary estoppel claim’.  
 
698  Compare: Bannigan v Frost [2009] EWHC 2276 (Ch.) and Bradbury v Taylor [2012] EWCA Civ. 1208 with 






5.3.2 Basic Ingredients 
In essence, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is based on a rule of evidence that prevents a 
landowner from asserting his/her legal rights in relation to a ‘certain parcel of land’.699 Controversially, 
the concept has been extended from a ‘certain parcel of land’ to a more uncertain area of land, parts 
of which may have been sold off since the encouragement that the claimant was to have rights in the 
land was first given,700 and even to the estate of the landowner who has made the assurance that the 
claimant was to be given that estate (whatever it might comprise) on his/her death.  For present 
purposes, it suffices to say that a plea of proprietary estoppel is founded on three common features: 
an encouragement by the owner of an asset or assets that another person (the recipient of the 
encouragement) has, or will have, a right or interest in that assets or assets,701 some form of 
‘detrimental reliance’ on the part of the recipient of that encouragement,702 and, finally, the 
unconscionable refusal of the property owner to grant that right or interest and thereby satisfy the 
expectation that has been encouraged. In carer cases, the most demanding of these three features is 
likely to be the first. What can the carer identify as the event or events, instigated by the care-receiver, 
which encouraged him/her to believe that he/she would receive compensation for their caring? And, 
moreover, what was the form of the compensation that the care-receiver encouraged the carer to 
believe that he/she would obtain should care be provided? Clearly, claims of this nature are fact-
 
699 See: Lord Scott in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management [2008] UKHL 55 at parag. [14]; and, see: Dillwyn v 
Llewellyn (1862) 4 De G. F. & J. 517.  
 
700 See: Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18: [2009] 1 WLR 776. 
 
701 The ‘trigger’ for proprietary estoppel cases has variously been described as an ‘assurance’, ‘promise’, or 
‘representation’, but preference here is for the word ‘encouragement’, which is used by the author of Snell’s 
Equity, in his ‘classic’ description of the doctrine, which arises where ‘one (A) is encouraged to act to his 
detriment by the  representations or encouragement of another (O) so that it would be unconscionable for O 
to insist on his strict legal rights’ - Snell’s Equity, 29th edition, P. Baker and P. J St. John Langan (eds) at pp. 573-
574. Indeed, ‘encouragement’ is the word used by Oliver J in Taylor’s Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees 
[1982] QB 133 in his application of the doctrine in its modern form, at p. 158. 
 
702 While it must be reasonable for the claimant to rely on the landowner’s encouragement in acting to his/her 
detriment, the precise formulation of this requirement is a matter of considerable debate. Is it necessary for 
the claimant to establish that the landowner intended him to rely on the encouragement (see: Lord Denning 
MR in Crabbe v Arun DC [1976] Ch. 179 at 188) or is the matter considered through the eyes of a third party 
such that the landowner’s conduct that encouraged the claimant must be ‘reasonably … understood as 
intended to be taken seriously as an assurance which could be relied upon’ (see:  Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 




specific. Evidence of what was said and of the context in which the relevant statement or statements 
were made will be of the utmost significance. And, while it is still possible for the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel to operate in circumstances where no representation is made by the landowner 
but both parties act in relation to each other on a common assumption,703 there seems to be little 
room for any such ‘automatic’ common assumption to arise in carer cases given that care is readily 
provided by some without the thought of any reward.  
Carers who wish to rely on proprietary estoppel must therefore be ready to establish that an assurance 
was made that some reward would be given to them in return for the care that they were expected 
to bestow and that care was provided on that basis. With this in mind, the case authorities would 
seem to suggest that where some form of ‘bargain’ is reached, so that care is provided in return for a 
right or interest in property, whether specific or general in nature, a claim based on the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel will often carry with it a much greater prospect of success than situations where 
no such accord or understanding has been reached.704 In other words, where no such arrangement 
can be established, connecting the giving of care to some specific form of reward, the courts have 
been markedly reluctant to assist a claimant no matter how meritorious his/her claim might otherwise 
appear.705  
Indeed, what has troubled some judges is that, by implication, many assurances that the recipient will 
inherit either a specified property or the deceased’s estate as a whole are conditional because, as 
Geraldine Andrews QC (sitting as a judge of the High Court) acknowledges in Bannigan v Frost706 ‘… 
the circumstances of the representor, or his or her relationship with the representee, or both, may 
change and bring about a change of intentions on the part of the representor’.707 The example that 
follows is a pertinent one. What if the owner of the main asset in the estate, over which the 
proprietary estoppel claim otherwise operates, finds himself having to sell that asset in order to 
provide for his care in his old age? Of course, the parties to the informal arrangement will not 
necessarily envisage this event. Their minds are focussed on the informal carer providing the care that 
 
703 See: John v George (1995) 71 P & C R 375. 
 
704 See: Ben McFarland and Sir Philip Sales, fn. 709, supra, where the authors identify this class of case as one 
where ‘the assurances and reliance had a consensual character not far short of a contract’. These cases are 
also referred to by Lewison LJ as ‘quasi-bargain’ cases in Davies v Davies [2016] EWCA Civ. 463, paragraph [43]. 
 
705 See: Lissimore v Downing [2003] 2 FLR 308. 
 
706 [2009] EWHC 2276 
 




is needed in the care-receiver’s home until the care-receiver’s death. But, what if, sometime  in the 
future, the care-receiver requires specialist care? Another example illustrates the same difficulty but 
from the carer’s side. What if the relationship between the care-receiver and the carer breaks down 
and cannot be retrieved? Or, indeed, what if the carer meets someone, forms a relationship with them 
and, as a result of this new found commitment, decides that they can no longer provide the care that 
they had once promised?708  
As regards the first situation, as a promise to supply personal services the carer’s undertaking to 
provide care cannot be enforced by specific performance even if it were part of a contract. And, 
therefore, as a result of this lack of ‘mutuality’, it would be difficult indeed for any court to disallow 
the sale of property in order to raise the funds needed for specialist care. One cannot have a ‘bargain’ 
that is only enforceable on one side. As for the second situation, here, the question of ‘fault’ raises its 
ugly head. Whose ‘fault’ is it that the initial ‘bargain’ can no longer be carried into effect? This was an 
issue that was raised in Ottey v Grundy.709 In the event, the court rejected the submission that Miss 
Ottey should be denied relief on the basis that she was at fault for the breakdown in her relationship 
with Mr Grundy and had not therefore fulfilled her side of the bargain in caring for Mr. Grundy up 
until the point of his death. In short, it concluded that there was no ‘fault’ on Miss Ottey’s part. 
Nevertheless, this does serve to illustrate that there are real difficulties in using the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel as a vehicle for a rights-based’ approach to compensation for informal carers. 




5.3.3 The Bargain 
Proprietary estoppel is necessarily based on some form of ‘bargain’ between the land-owner and the 
recipient of his/her encouragement.  In what have been referred to as ‘domestic’ cases,710 this bargain 
 
708 Walton J in In Re Gonin deceased [1979] Ch. 16 at p. 32.  
 
709 [2003] EWCA Civ. 1176 
 
710 Whether a case is ‘domestic’ or ‘commercial’ seems to depend on the nature of the parties’ dealings and 





need not be explicit. In Thorner v Major,711 the House of Lords found a bargain in the somewhat 
oblique statements made by two taciturn individuals,712 but the bargain was nevertheless there. If this 
requirement is applied to informal carers, one can quickly see that the doctrine produces a very 
uneven and in many ways a very unjust response. Where the elderly care-receiver has the foresight 
to organise his/her affairs in times where their capacity to make a bargain is full, binding arrangements 
can be made in relation to their future care. Unfortunately, for some carers, the ability of the parties 
to enter into any clearly understood bargain is simply not practical. For example, it may be that the 
care-receiver needs intensive social care as a matter of urgency. It may be that their mental, physical 
and emotional health is rapidly diminishing and their decision-making capacity is being adversely 
affected; it may be that they are fighting against losing their independence, anxious about their own 
future and its limitations. In short, for a variety reasons a care-receiver may be in no real position to 
make any such bargain. For their part, the carer is not inclined to make the situation facing the care-
receiver even more traumatic than it already is. And, in these circumstances, no bargain is made. Yet, 
care is provided. If we speak of ‘justice’, there would seem to be no less a reason why an informal 
carer in this situation should not be treated in the same way as an informal carer who has made a 
specific bargain for the provision of care. 
Notwithstanding the observations made by Lord Scott in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd713 
that estoppel rights must relate to some form of present and certain interest in land or other chattels 
or choses in action,714 cases both before and since Cobbe have proceeded on the basis that someone 
who encourages another to reasonably believe that he/she will receive the whole or part of the 
promisor’s estate may bind their estate such that their personal representative will be unable to deny 
the other’s claim.715 Indeed, it now seems accepted practice that claims based on proprietary estoppel 
can be made against estates as it can against specific property that might be part of an estate.716 If 
nothing else, this is a sensible, pragmatic response.  It would seem illogical and perverse for the courts 
to distinguish between a case where an informal carer has been assured that he would receive the 
 
711 [2009] UKHL 18: [2009] 1 WLR 776. 
 
712 See: Lord Walker at parag. [59]. 
 
713 [2008] UKHL 55 
 
714 See: Lord Scott in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management [2008] UKHL 55 at parag.s. [14] and [18] – [22]. 
 
715 Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498, Wayling v Jones (1993) 69 P & C R 170, and Gillet v Holt [2001] Ch. 210, pre-
Cobbe, and Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18, post-Cobbe. 
 




care-receiver’s home on the care-receiver’s death and a case where an informal carer has been 
promised the care-receiver’s estate, in particular where that estate comprises little more than the 
care-receiver’s home.  
One element in proprietary estoppel claims that has been problematic at times is the concept of 
‘encouragement’. In some respects, modern courts have attempted to inject a measure of clarity into 
this concept.717 In particular, they have been consistent in their demand for proof of encouragement 
that relates to a right or interest in the property over which the claimant is making his/her claim.718 
Vague assertions will not carry any weight.719 What is more, silence alone cannot be interpreted as 
‘encouragement’. Indeed, in most carer cases it is easier to conclude that silence is positive 
discouragement for, in these circumstances, the carer surely has no expectation of anything. In short, 
the absence of any discussion as to whether (or not) a carer claimant is to have any interest in the 
care-receiver’s property or their estate will invariably be fatal to any claim based on proprietary 
estoppel.720 That said, there are still some ‘difficult areas’. Depending on the context of the discussions 
that have taken place, there is no clear indication from the courts as to what needs to be said 
concerning the claimant’s present or future rights in the property over which the claim is subsequently 
made.721 Indeed, in the ‘domestic’ context, all we have is Lord Walker’s well-known statement that 
the assurances that encourage the claimant in his or her belief need to be ‘clear enough’.722 In 
addition, there is a certain conviction on the part of some judges that the assurances that are made – 
vague though they might be – must be intended by the landowner to be relied upon.723 Others are 
content to take an objective view on this point and say that, if an ordinary man would have interpreted 
 
717 See: Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18; Yeoman’s Row Management v Cobbe [2008] UKHL 55. 
 
718 See: Yeoman’s Row Management v Cobbe, ibid. 
 
719 See: Layton v Martin [1986] 2 FLR 227, where the promise was of ‘financial security’ after the landowner’s 
death, something that was simply too vague to be enforceable through proprietary estoppel. 
 
720 See: James v Thomas [2007] EWHC 1212 and Williams v Lawrence [2011] WTLR 1455. 
 
721 Indeed, in Thompson v Foy [2010] 1 P & C R 16 Lewison J. was able to make a finding or proprietary 
estoppel where no witness could point to a conversation where any representation was made, yet he still 
found that the understanding on which the claim was based could only have arisen as a result of something 
said by the landowners. 
 
722 See: Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 per Lord Walker at parag. [56]. 
 





what the landowner has said as an assurance of present or future proprietary rights that is an 




5.3.4 Carers’ Cases 
Where the assurance or encouragement is clear, certain and continuing, and the claimant can 
establish that he/she acted to his/her detriment on that encouragement, the courts have acceded to 
claims made by carers based on proprietary estoppel.  In Lothian v Dixon,725 the claimants were able 
to rely on an assurance that ‘… if they … came and stayed at the [testatrix’s] Hotel up to her death on 
a full time basis to look after her during her final illness, she, in return, would leave them her entire 
estate on her death.’726 The claimants fulfilled the conditions of the bargain. Indeed, the testatrix gave 
instructions for a new will to be drawn up in these terms but passed away before she could execute 
it. In these circumstances, the judge had little difficulty concluding that the minimum equity to do 
justice to the claimants was to accede to their claim for the whole estate. In Jennings v Rice,727 the 
claimant was entitled to relief in the form of an award of £200,000, where he had cared for his 
employer, the now deceased landowner, over a protracted period of time in reliance on her promise 
that the property that she occupied would one day be his. The representation that the property would 
pass to the claimant on the landowner’s death was not enforced, but at least the claimant was 
provided for in the form of a substantial sum. Whether this sum represents the ‘minimum equity’ that 
was needed to do justice to the claimant’s claim or a sum that represented the value of his services 
on a quantum meruit basis is, on the other hand, unclear. 
 
724 See: Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18, per Lord Hoffman at [5] and Lord Neuberger at [85]. Attempting to 
rationalise these statements, it may be that the approach should be a subjective one, but that if, on an 
objective view, a reasonable man would have been encouraged to believe that he/she would have rights in the 
property in the question at some future time, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to establish that, in 
the circumstances of the case, the claimant was not, in fact, encouraged to hold this belief. 
 
725 [2014] WL 7255179 
 
726 Ibid.at paragraph [8]. 
 




Nevertheless, for some carers, claims of this nature do not work out so well.  In Powell v Benney,728 
the claimant carers ‘… purchased food and cooked for [deceased landowner]; when he was ill they 
helped him obtain medical attention; they provided him with money.’729 In return, the landowner 
informed one of the claimants that he was going to leave certain properties to them. At trial, the 
claimants maintained that they relied on this promise in organising their future lives, and in their 
relationship with the landowner. And, indeed, the landowner did make some attempt to comply with 
his promise. However, in the event, he failed to make a valid will in the claimants’ favour and 
therefore, following his death, the claimants made their claim against these properties on the basis of 
proprietary estoppel. The claim failed. On closer inspection, there was no ‘bargain’ that was ever made 
between the parties. The deceased landowner had never specified what the claimants must do in 
return for the two properties. There was no causal link between the detriment that they alleged that 
they had suffered and the assurance made by the land owner. And, in these circumstances, the 
landowner’s promise was not binding on his estate in proprietary estoppel.730 Indeed, the case of 
Powell v Benney so clearly demonstrates the need for some form of ‘bargain’ in informal care 
situations that is now seems almost impossible for a carer to maintain a claim based on proprietary 
estoppel without clear evidence of what was being promised in return for care.731 This throws the 
representations that encouraged the claimant in his/her belief into sharp focus. And, the proof of 
claims made by informal carers relying on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel may prove all the more 
difficult in the future. 
Where claimant carers have successfully negotiated the hurdle of establishing the necessary 
assurance or encouragement, they have found it a little easier to establish the second requirement of 
a successful proprietary estoppel claim, ‘detrimental reliance’. In particular, the provision of unpaid 
services by the claimant in the home of the defendant or deceased may be described as a ‘classic’ 
example of detriment.732 This is, of course, a very apt description of what an informal carer is doing in 
providing care.  And, therefore, as Sloan has remarked, ‘… the mere fact that care has been provided 
 
728 [2007] EWCA Civ. 1283 
 
729 See: Ibid. at paragraph [5] of the judgment of Sir Peter Gibson (with which Richards and Lloyd L.JJ agreed). 
 
730 In the event, the claimants were awarded £20,000 as compensation for the detriment that they had 
suffered. 
 
731 This seems to run counter to the remarks of Oliver J in Taylor’s Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co 
Ltd [1982] QB 133 to the effect that there is no requirement that the representation should be formulated in 
terms of a proprietary interest (or, perhaps a defined interest in the representor’s estate). 
 




usually means that some detriment has been incurred.’733 This has been acknowledged by Robert 
Walker LJ, once in Campbell v Griffin,734 where he remarked that:  
‘The court can take judicial notice that a live-in carer looking after a couple as frail as Mr. and 
Mrs. Ainscough [the land owners] would expect to be paid a very substantial wage in addition 
to free board and lodging and would expected to be reimbursed for all out of pocket 
expenditure … Mr. Campbell [the carer who had been promised a life interest in the land 
owners property] must in my judgment have been suffering and accepting detriment in his 
devoted care of the Ainscoughs.’735  
And, again, in Jennings v Rice,736 where he observed that:  
‘…in many cases the detriment [suffered by the claimant] may be even more difficult to 
quantify than the claimant’s expectations … [Indeed] the detriment of an ever increasing 
burden of care for an elderly person, and having to be subservient to his or her moods and 
wishes, is very difficult to quantify in money terms.’ 737 
Nevertheless, detriment must be both ‘pleaded and proved’.738 And, when proved, it must also be 
weighed in the balance with any benefits that the claimant may have received. In Watts v Storey739 
the defendant (who was resisting a claim for possession based on a plea of proprietary estoppel) had 
moved from Leeds to Nottingham, had undertaken responsibility for a number of outgoings at the 
premises that he was occupying, had incurred additional expense in relation to the move and had 
helped the landowner, his grandmother, to move her belongings to the Isle of Wight in order that she 
could be near her son. Yet, on the facts, such acts were held to be insufficient detriment for the 
purposes of a claim in proprietary estoppel. Here, the defendant had received rent free 
 
733 fn. 690, supra, at p. 53 
 
734 [2001] EWHC Civ. 990 
 
735 See: Robert Walker LJ in Campbell v Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ. 990, at paragraph [24]. In so doing, Robert 
Walker LJ was expressly following his fellow members of the Court of Appeal in Wayling v Jones (1995) 69 P & 
C R 170. 
 
736 [2003] 1 P & C R 8 
 
737 See: Ibid. at parag. [51] 
 
738 Per Robert Walker LJ in: Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch. 210. 
 




accommodation in the property that he was occupying, and this outweighed the acts of detriment on 
which he had chosen to rely.740 
The requirement that the claimant must rely on the assurance or encouragement establishes the 
causal connection necessary for the success of the claim.741 The claimant’s detriment must be caused 
by his (reasonable) reliance on the land owner’s assurances. Where the claimant is able to establish 
on the evidence that an assurance has been made and that he has acted to his detriment in 
circumstances that give rise to the inference that he/she relied on the assurance, reliance is 
inferred.742 And, at this point, the burden of proof will shift to the landowner or, if deceased, his/her 
personal representatives, to demonstrate that there was no such reliance on the facts of the case.743 
These principles are nicely illustrated in the case of Ottey v Grundy.744  Here, the initial promise was 
clear and was helpfully set out by the deceased in a letter of intent in which he directed his solicitors 
that the claimant was to have a life interest in a houseboat and an absolute interest in an apartment 
in the event of his death. The trial judge found that a copy of this letter had been given to the claimant, 
that the claimant had relied on it in staying in the relationship that she had with the deceased and 
caring for him, and that the care that she had lavished on the deceased was sufficient ‘detriment’ for 
the purpose of the claimant’s proprietary estoppel claim.  Nevertheless, the claimant did not secure a 
life interest in the houseboat, nor did she obtain any form of interest in the apartment per se.745  
Instead, she was awarded, firstly, the sum of £50,000 in satisfaction of her claim against the houseboat 
and, secondly, a further £50,000 in the event that the apartment could not be transferred to her.  
While these awards may not have any significant effect on the relief obtained by the claimant 
following the success of her proprietary estoppel claim, this does serve to show that the eventual 
outcome of such cases is very much in the court’s discretion. 
In summary, the courts have largely adopted a flexible approach on questions relating to both 
detriment and reliance, readily inferring detriment where caring services are provided and refusing to 
disallow claims where there may be ‘mixed motives’ for providing care. Sloan describes the courts’ 
 
740 See: Sledmore v Dalby (1996) 72 P & C R 196, to the same effect. 
 
741 See: Robert Walker LJ in Campbell v Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ. 990, at paragraph [19]. 
  
742 For at this point any oral evidence by the claimant that he relied on the assurance is purely self-serving and 
therefore meaningless. 
 
743 Greasley v Cook [1980] 1 WLR 1306 
 
744 [2003] EWCA Civ. 1176 
 




approach to these requirements as ‘pragmatic and sympathetic to the plight of the carer’,746 and it is 
difficult to disagree. Nevertheless, more substantial challenges for informal carers appear in relation 
to the two outstanding demands of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, ‘unconscionability’ and the 




5.3.5 Unconscionability and carers 
If all the elements of proprietary estoppel may be said to interact with each other, so much so that it 
is sometimes difficult, if not unwise, to attempt to separate them from each other,747 the element that 
is the ‘overarching’ one is unconscionability.748 In this respect, a distinction has been drawn between 
unconscionability of dealings - which focuses on the relationship between the landowner and the 
claimant - and unconscionability of outcome - which looks at the situation that is presented to the 
court and asks whether the result is ‘unacceptable to the conscience of equity’.749 The second 
approach is much broader than the first. In our ‘carer cases’, where the assurance relates to the 
provision of a right or interest in property after the care-recipient’s death, the enquiry will usually be 
made in the light of the provisions of the care-receiver’s will and in light of the claims made by others 
on his/her estate. As Mummery LJ acknowledges in Uglow v Uglow,750 whenever courts are given the 
task of determining a claim based on proprietary estoppel where a person has made a will (or not 
made a will so that his/her estate passes under the law of intestacy) so that specific property, is given 
to one person but he/she has previously created the expectation in another person that the other will 
 
746 See: fn. 690, supra, at p. 52. 
 
747 It is clear that aspects of one element will often have a significant impact on how a court considers another 
element.  
 
748 Lord Walker in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management [2008] UKHL 55 at paragraph [92] describes 
unconscionability as playing ‘… a very important part in the doctrine of equitable estoppel, unifying and 
confirming, as it were, the other elements.’ 
 
749 fn. 690, supra, p. 22, referring to an analysis of unconscionability presented by K. Gray and S.F. Gray in 
Elements of Land Law, 5th edition, (OUP, 2009) and developed by Kevin Gray, in the chapter entitled ‘Property 
in Common Law Systems’, in Van Der Valt, A.J., and Van Maanen, G.E., (eds.) Property Law on the Threshold of 
the 21st Century (MAKLU, 1996). 
 




inherit that property, the inquiry as to whether that conduct is unconscionable must a broad one. Yet, 
the broader this inquiry the less its outcome can be accurately predicted.751  And, this has 
repercussions not only for lawyers but also for their clients who will be naturally wary of undertaking 
litigation where the outcome is so uncertain given the predisposition of the courts to order that the 
costs of any such proceedings, which may well be substantial, should be paid by the loser.752 
Indeed, unlike many neighbour and one-off commercial transaction cases where the doctrine has been 
invoked,753 the provision of care over a protracted period of time brings with it its own ‘life problems’. 
Consider, for a moment, a situation where a carer may have devoted many years to the care of 
another, and perhaps sacrificed his/her career, on the faith of a promise of an interest or rights in the 
property of the other on that person’s death. When the promise was made the parties doubtless 
envisaged that care would continue until the care-receiver’s death. But, what if there comes a time 
when more intensive health-related care is needed outside the care-receiver’s home and payment is 
required for this treatment that can only be raised by the sale of the property in question? Would the 
care-receiver be acting unconscionably if he/she sold the property in question in order to pay for 
his/her care thereby resiling from his/her promise to transfer the property to the carer on his/her 
death? Would it make any difference to the outcome of the claim if the carer had retained his/her 
previous home (which he/she occupied before leaving to care for the care-receiver on the faith of the 
above-related promise) and would not therefore be left homeless as a result of the sale of the care-
receiver’s property? 
The outcome for these questions is almost impossible to predict as each would surely depend on the 
facts of each case. Sledmore v Dalby754 does much to illustrate this. Here, the occupier of certain 
property, Dalby, had been induced to believe that he would be entitled to live in that property for the 
rest of his life. As a result, he spent considerable sums on the maintenance and improvement of that 
property. The encouragement came from Dalby’s father-in-law who was one of the joint owners of 
the property and was made at a time when Dalby had recently become unemployed. This event, 
coupled with the illness of Dalby’s wife, who was the landowner’s daughter, meant that Dalby and his 
family had the advantage of living in the property rent-free for what turned out to be over 18 years. 
 
751 The ‘broad approach’ has its origins in the modern formulation of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel by 
Oliver J in Taylor’s Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. Limited [1982] QB  133 at p. 225. 
752 CPR 1998, rule 44.2(2). 
 
753 See: Joyce v Rigioli [2004] EWCA Civ. 79 (neighbour) and Herbert v Doyle [2008] EWHC 1950 (commercial). 
 




In the event, Dalby’s wife died, and so did his father-in-law, Mr. Sledmore. The claim came about 
because Dalby’s mother-in-law, Mrs. Sledmore, wanted to recover the property for her own use as 
she was at risk of losing the property in which she was presently living. On appeal, the court decided 
that it was not unconscionable for the mother-in-law to do this, and that the need for proportionality 
between the detriment suffered and the relief claimed meant that the equity that had originally risen 
in Dalby’s favour had been satisfied by the period of rent-free accommodation. On this basis, the 
mother-in-law succeeded in her claim for possession of the property. Now, who could predict the 
unfortunate series of events that followed Mr Sledmore’s encouragement? But, that is the type of 
issue that may well arise in situations where representations are acted on over a long period of time. 
And, this is exactly what happens in carer cases. Care is provided over a significant period of time, the 
parties’ respective situations change with the passing of time and the courts – which are ill-equipped 
to do so - are left to pick over the pieces when the parties cannot resolve their differences between 
them. The result is that the operation of the concept of unconscionability is wholly unpredictable; and, 





Of similar concern to carers might be the remedy, if any, which might be waiting for them even if they 
manage to prove their case in proprietary estoppel. Here, there appear to be two distinct approaches 
taken by the courts to the selection of remedies when a proprietary estoppel claim is established. One 
approach is to fulfil the expectation created by the encouragement;755 the other is to compensate the 
claimant for the detriment suffered in reliance on the encouragement.756 Given that different 
consequences may result from the selection of ‘the appropriate remedy’ by the courts, it is necessary 
to look into the principles on which relief is granted. Consider the case of Jennings v Rice,757 referred 
 
755 Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431, where the ‘minimum equity to do justice’ was to ‘perfect the imperfect 
gift’ and order the claimant to transfer the property to the defendant in fee simple; and, Griffiths v Williams 
(1977) 248 EG 947, where the encouragement was of a life interest, and this was fulfilled by the direction that 
the defendant should be granted a long lease determinable on her death. 
 
756 Gravells describes these losses suffered by claimants as ‘expectation loss’ and ‘reliance loss’ – N. P. Gravells, 
Land Law, 4th edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), at p. 565. 
 




to earlier. Here, the claimant worked for the deceased, an elderly lady, as a part-time gardener. In 
time, his hours and responsibilities increased beyond mere gardening, and he eventually became the 
deceased’s carer, even staying overnight at the property.758 At one point, there came a time when the 
deceased ceased paying the claimant. And, when he raised this matter with her, the claimant was 
given the assurance that ‘this will all be yours one day’, something he took to mean his employer’s 
house and furniture.759 The trial judge took the view that the award of the whole estate (£1,285,000), 
and indeed the award of the house and furniture (£435,000), would each be out of proportion to the 
detriment suffered by claimant in working and caring for the deceased. In the event, the trial judge 
awarded the claimant £200,000 from the deceased’s estate as ‘the minimum necessary to satisfy the 
equity’, which was, rather peculiarly,760 based on the cost to the deceased of buying in the claimant’s 
services on a commercial basis.761 The award was upheld on appeal with Aldous LJ concluding that ‘… 
the judge was right to conclude that the award must be proportionate’.762 Jennings v Rice was 
therefore a case where the claimant was denied not only what he expected to receive but also what 
the deceased had represented to him that he would get; in short, the ‘bargain’ that had been made 
was left wholly unfulfilled. The trial judge seems to have justified this by finding that, ‘… the terms of 
the offer were too vague and imprecise to amount to a contract.’763 Yet, that seems to be a strange 
form of ‘justice’. Where someone is promised either one thing or another (i.e. either the deceased’s 
house or her whole estate) in return for what he is asked to do, he performs the obligations requested 
of him and is then paid less than half of the value of the lesser of what was promised to him. 
 
758 The elderly lady, Mrs Royle, is described in the judgment of Aldous LJ as ‘increasingly incapacitated with 
arthritis and leg ulcers’ (paragraph [5]). Aldous LJ also found that Mr Jennings ‘ran errands for [her], collected 
her prescriptions, helped her to dress and go to the toilet, made sure that she had food and drink available and 
did some work in the garden.’ [paragraph [7]) 
 
759 In point of fact, it was contended that the words in question either referred to the whole of the land 
owner’s estate or her house and furniture. And, the trial judge found as a fact that ‘Mr Jennings believed that 
he was going to receive all or part of the Mrs Royle’s property on her death’ (see: Aldous LJ at paragraph [11] 
of his judgment). But, the minimum he expected was the house and furniture (see: paragraph [15]).  
 
760 It is said that is ‘rather peculiar’ because the cost of such services to the deceased is nothing to do with the 
detriment that was suffered by the claimant which included being away from his wife whilst he stayed with the 
deceased overnight. 
 
761 Paragraph [15] of the judgment of Aldous LJ – which is a reference to Scarman LJ’s comment in Crabb v 
Arun District Council [1976] Ch. 179, ‘the minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff’ (at page 198). 
 
762 Paragraph [38] of his judgment 
 




In other cases where proprietary estoppel has been successfully pleaded, the claimant has been 
afforded his/her full expectations.764 Indeed, it has been remarked that ‘the outcome in most 
proprietary estoppel cases is the fulfilment of expectations in specie’.765 The difficulty is determining 
when the court will favour an expectation approach and when it will favour a compensatory approach 
to satisfying the equity that arises when a plea of proprietary estoppel succeeds. Indeed, this has led 
one leading authority on English Land Law to remark that, ‘[t]he history of proprietary estoppel is 
marked by an ambivalence as to whether the proper role of the estoppel doctrine is to give effect to 
the expectations of entitlement engendered by the parties’ dealings or merely to protect against the 
detrimental consequences caused when these expectations are undermined by an uncontentious 
insistence upon legal rights.’766  
One approach to resolving this difficulty is to attempt to rationalise reported cases in an effort to bring 
some predictability to determining what relief should be granted by the courts. And, one 
categorisation that has been suggested is to separate successful proprietary estoppel cases into 
‘bargain cases’ and ‘non-bargain’ cases.767 In Jennings v Rice768 Robert Walker LJ suggested that the 
expectation-based measure of relief is of most relevance where the landowner’s assurances and the 
claimant’s reliance on those assurances have, ‘… a consensual character falling not far short of an 
enforceable contract.’769 In such cases, the claimant’s expectation will ordinarily ‘have been defined 
with reasonable clarity.’770 In contrast, in ‘non-bargain’ cases the court has a more flexible discretion 
and will often favour a compensation-based approach. At one level, this is good news for informal 
carers. In many cases, the bargain will be clear – ‘If you care for me, then on my death the house is 
yours’. But, this only serves to disguise a number of problems. If a bargain such as this is made, and 
unforeseen to both parties, the landowner dies much earlier than anticipated, perhaps as a result of 
an accident rather than any health-related problem, the award of the house would clearly be 
disproportionate to the detriment suffered by the claimant. 
 
764 Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431 
 
765 A. Robertson, ‘The Reliance Basis of Proprietary Estoppel Remedies’, [2008] Conv. 295 at p. 295. 
 
766 K. Gray and S.F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th edition, (OUP, 2009), paragraph 9.2.97. 
 
767 See, for example, ibid. paragraphs 9.2.102 and 9.2.103. 
 
768 [2003] 1 P & C R 8 
 






If any case illustrates the need for statutory intervention in relation to informal carers, it is the case of 
In Re Gonin, Deceased.771 Here, the claimant, Miss Gonin, an unmarried daughter, was living with the 
parents at the outbreak of the Second World War. Her two sisters had already married; but, at 29 
years of age, she was still single. In the course of the following year, the claimant obtained a position 
with the Air Ministry, which involved being billeted in lodgings away from home. Free from the 
constraints of home-life, she met a young man and became engaged, but her fiancé was later killed in 
action. She took his death badly.  At her parents’ request in 1944, the claimant obtained a 
compassionate release from her post at the Ministry and returned home in order to care for them. 
Her evidence – which was accepted – was that her parents made her a proposition, namely, that ‘… if 
she would come back home and care for them for the length of their days, she could have [their] house 
and its contents.’772 The claimant duly fulfilled this request, living at home, undertaking the domestic 
duties that needed to be done and otherwise caring for her parents from sometime in 1944 until her 
mother’s death in November 1968. 
At that point, the claimant was 58 years of age and had devoted the past 24 years to caring for her 
elderly parents. Regrettably, for the claimant, she failed to pursue her claims against her mother’s 
estate with any vigour. In the event, her claim under the 1975 Act was dismissed; it was two and a half 
years out of time and the court refused her application to extend the time for making that application. 
In the absence of any writing to support what her parents had said concerning the destination of the 
family home, she also made a claim under the doctrine of part performance.773 That claim failed too. 
The acts of part performance on which the claimant relied were not exclusively referable to a contract 
under which the house would be hers.774 In the event, all that the claimant recovered was the contents 
of the house – i.e. the furniture – which was of very limited value and certainly no ‘compensation’ for 
24 years of care given to her parents. Section 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925 was, of course, 
abolished by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 (‘the 1989 Act’) and replaced 
with the more stringent requirement, ‘that any contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest 
in land can only be made in writing’775 must be duly ‘signed by or on behalf of each party’.776 Had the 
 
771  [1979] Ch. 16 
772 Ibid. at p. 22 
 
773 The Law of Property Act 1925, s. 40(2). 
 
774 Indeed, Walton J found that ‘… there was never any intention on [the mother’s] part to make an immediate 
gift of any description of the land.’ – see: p. 34. 
 
775 The Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s. 2(1). 
 
776 Ibid. at s. 2(3) 
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claimant in In Re Gonin, Deceased made her claim based on events since September 1989, it seems 
reasonably clear that she would not have been able to satisfy the demands of s. 2(1)-(3) of the 1989 
Act. Whether the claimant may have fared better relying on the doctrine of part performance is a 
more difficult question. Certainly, a claim based on some form of constructive trust would appear to 
be doomed to failure.777 But, a claim based on proprietary estoppel might well have been more 
productive.778 That said, that this assertion is shrouded in uncertainty lends considerable support to 
the claim that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is unable to bring ‘just results’ with any degree of 
uniformity.  On this basis, it seems entirely reasonable to reject the doctrine of proprietary estoppel 




5.4 CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND CARERS’ CLAIMS  
Before moving on to consider the application of restitutionary principles to carers’ claims, it is 
necessary to say a brief word about the constructive trust as a remedy. In Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row 
Management Ltd. Lord Scott opined that, ‘[i]t is impossible to prescribe exhaustively the 
circumstances sufficient to create a constructive trust …’.779 And, case law amply demonstrates that a 
constructive trust has been imposed as a remedy in a variety of different situations. In one such 
situation, the constructive trust that arises is entirely dependent on the parties’ common intention. 
These trusts are usually born out of an ‘agreement, assurance or understanding’ that the non-
landowning party is to have a beneficial interest in the property in question.780 That party then acts to 
their detriment in reliance on that common intention. However, the cause of action is only complete 
 
 
777 See: section 5.5, infra.  
 
778 This is, of course, speculative. While there was some clear encouragement given to the claimant, whether 
she would have been found to have suffered detriment by returning home to live with and care for her parents 
in the 1960s / 1970s is another matter. In the eyes of perhaps many judges at that time, ‘women’s work’ in 
looking after the house and administering ‘general care’ to elderly parents was not highly valued and the rent-
free accommodation that the claimant had in return may have negatived any idea that she suffered any 
detriment in returning home. 
 
779 See: Lord Scott in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management [2008] UKHL 55 at [30]. 
 




once the other party acts unconscionably by denying the existence of that common intention.781 These 
‘category one’ common intention constructive trusts782 do have some potential significance in relation 
to the claims of informal carers. And, it is therefore useful to consider whether a claimant carer might 
be able to use a constructive trust claim in preference to a proprietary estoppel claim as a means of 
obtaining compensation for the caring that they may have delivered. 
On many levels, these category one constructive trusts are almost indistinguishable from claims based 
on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.  Indeed, in Thorner v Major,783 Lord Scott went on to say that 
it was easier and more conducive to principle to consider claims where promises have been made of 
a future interest in, or right over, property as constructive trust claims rather than claims rooted in 
proprietary estoppel.784 Notwithstanding this, the other members of the House of Lords preferred to 
decide that case on the basis of proprietary estoppel rather than constructive trust principles, and 
subsequent reported cases have largely followed this line. Academics too have rejected Lord Scott’s 
approach.785 Is the difference between a category one constructive trust and proprietary estoppel 
therefore mere nomenclature? Or is the distinction between the two concepts more far-reaching?  
In Lloyd’s Bank plc v Rosset,786 Lord Bridge specifically refers to common intention constructive trusts 
as being founded on evidence of discussions between the parties in an effort to distinguish them from 
category two common intention constructive trusts which are based on inferences drawn in the 
absence of such discussions.787  In contrast, proprietary estoppel needs no such basis.788  What is more, 
a plea of proprietary estoppel can be made, and may succeed, in cases where there is no intention on 
the part of the landowner that the claimant should have an interest in or right over his/her land.789 
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789 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 – here, the landowner’s reason for not putting the claimant’s name on the 
legal title was that she was too young. At trial, the landowner admitted that this pretext was only an excuse. 
Notwithstanding the absence of common intention, the claimant succeeded on the basis that the defendant 
landowner held the property in question on a constructive trust and she was a beneficiary of that trust. 
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Proof of common intention is therefore avoided. The assurances of the care-receiver are thus taken 
at face value.   
Moreover, when it comes to relief, constructive trusts in general are far less flexible than the many 
remedies available to the court on proof of a claim in proprietary estoppel. Constructive trusts are 
imposed over certain property and arise at the point the claimant acts on the assurances of the 
landowner in relation to that property.790 Proprietary estoppel claims, on the other hand, are claims 
that - whilst arising as soon as the unconscionable conduct is complete - are only satisfied at the 
discretion of the court.791 Applying constructive trust principles to the case of Sledmore v Dalby,792 Mr 
Dalby should have been successful; he plainly acted to his detriment in reliance on assurances made 
by Mr. Sledmore that he should be able to occupy the property in question as long as he wished. In 
the case of Jennings v Rice,793 Mr. Jennings, the gardener, should have received a share in his 
employer’s property and not a lump sum of £200,000 from her estate. If his claim was really a 
constructive trust claim, an award of this nature can only be justified on the basis that the constructive 
trust claim failed, but he succeeded in his alternative restitutionary claim calculated on the basis of a 
quantum meruit.  
Indeed, the introduction of constructive trust principles into a carer’s claim for compensation would 
seem to undermine the claim altogether. As Simone Wong observes, constructive trust claims respond 
to ‘the solid tug of money’.794 In these circumstances, ‘domestic services’ – particularly those, she 
argues, that are commonly provided by women – are not seen by the judiciary as ‘money equivalent’; 
in particular, English courts have consistently refused to see any connection between the provision of 
these services and the acquisition of rights in or over property. And, in the eyes of some judges, caring 
is a ‘domestic service’ par excellence. 
 If a category one common intention constructive trust is a poor substitute for a plea of proprietary 
estoppel, a claimant carer would fare no better relying on a category two constructive trust. These are 
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based on the claimant making a substantial contribution to the purchase, or to the value,795 of 
property that is vested in another in circumstances where the court can draw the inference that there 
was a common intention that the claimant would receive a benefit from his/her contributions in the 
form of an interest in the property in question. In informal caring situations where the care-receiver 
is living at home, the property has, almost invariably, already been acquired. Moreover, there is no 
design to add value to that property. Here, the focus of the relationship is between the adult child and 
care-receiver is the continuing care that his/her elderly parent needs in order to live out the rest of 
their days. Similar remarks apply to the situation where the care-receiver receives care in carer’s own 
home.  
There are, of course, other situations where the court may impose a constructive trust as a remedy 
for unconscionable or fraudulent conduct. Yet, it would be a rare case where such intent could be 
established in an informal caring situation. One can little imagine elderly care-receivers having the 
intent to defraud their carers. Of course, in some situations words of encouragement may be uttered 
without the intention of giving these words any final effect. But, again, if a plea of proprietary estoppel 
is raised, an informal carer may simply rely on what was said without the need to establish any specific 
intent.  
With all of these points in mind, it is submitted that constructive trust principles have nothing material 
to add to informal carer claims made using the principles of proprietary estoppel. An informal carer 
has nothing to gain by framing his case so that he/she claims to be a beneficiary under a constructive 
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5.5 UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND CARERS’ CLAIMS  
Some commentators claim that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel can be explained by elements of 
the law of unjust enrichment.797 The proponents of this claim contend that where a claimant incurs a 
detriment on the faith of the defendant landowner’s assurance that has or will have some property 
right in the defendant’s land, and the defendant landowner subsequently fails to make good that 
assurance, the basis on which the claimant has conferred a benefit on the defendant has failed and 
the claimant is therefore entitled to have that detriment reversed.798 Yet, in truth, this explanation 
fails to justify a number of established categories of case law where proprietary estoppel claims have 
been successful. And, in any event, it only provides support for a compensation-based remedy and 
not for the many instances in which the courts have chosen to fulfil the expectations raised by the 
defendant landowner’s assurance. Nevertheless, this analysis does serve to lay bare the limitations of 
unjust enrichment in English law. In some jurisdictions successful claims have been made by informal 
carers for the recovery of compensation for care-giving using the concept of unjust enrichment.799 But, 
in the absence of a radical reappraisal of the law of restitution, an English law unjust enrichment-
based recovery system which can provide justice for all informal carers seems to be far out of reach.800  
The English law of unjust enrichment rests on three foundations. Firstly, the defendant must have 
been enriched by the receipt of a benefit; secondly, that benefit must have been supplied at the 
expense of the claimant; and, thirdly, in the circumstances of the case, it must be unjust to allow the 
defendant to retain that benefit.801 If all three issues admit of a positive response, and there is no 
defence otherwise available to the defendant,802 the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the 
claimant’s expense. Stated thus, the doctrine appears to be of wide application. Yet, in practice, 
English courts have interpreted the jurisdiction rather narrowly. At its most simple, there are two 
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distinct categories of unjust enrichment.803 In the absence of wrongdoing - which is the first category 
- English law will provide a restitutionary remedy where the defendant has obtained a benefit from 
the claimant which he/she did not intend to confer on a gratuitous basis, provided that ‘… it is against 
conscience that the defendant should keep [that benefit]’.804 If informal carers are able to bring claims 
for compensation against the estates of those who have benefitted from their care, as things presently 
stand they will need to fit their cases into this second category. 
‘Benefit’ includes services.805 Where the defendant has requested the services that the claimant 
subsequently provides, knowing that the claimant expects to be paid for those services, the defendant 
will normally be liable to pay for those services in quasi-contract. In the context of informal care-giving, 
if a care-receiver knows that an adult child who is intending to provide care services expects to be paid 
for those services, and nevertheless requests the provision of care services from that adult child, there 
appears to be no reason why the care-receiver should not be held liable to pay the adult child for the 
care that has been provided on a quantum meruit basis. On the other hand, where the care-receiver 
knows of no such expectation when these care services are first provided, even if the adult child 
expects payment in return for those services, there is no claim in unjust enrichment unless and until 
the care-receiver subsequently knows of this expectation and then fails to reject the services.806 
While many informal carers might hope for some form of ‘reward’ for their devotion to caring for an 
elderly parent, it is surely far less common for an informal carer to have a ‘real’ expectation of 
receiving compensation for the care they are about to provide. That expectation can only arise from 
discussions between care-receiver and informal carer, in much the same way as a type one 
constructive trust can only arise from such discussions.  In those discussions, the care-receiver will 
have either encouraged or discouraged the expectation of reward. If the care-receiver has encouraged 
such expectation, the informal carer is likely to be able to rely on existing proprietary estoppel / 
constructive trust principles and the formulation of a claim based on unjust enrichment is unlikely to 
further advance his/her claim.  If, on the other hand, the necessary expectation has been discouraged, 
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the claim will fail for want of any expectation of reward. In an emergency situation, it may be possible 
to recover what one spends on the care of another, but such situations appear to be restricted to 
those where one cannot obtain the instructions of the care-receiver and there is a clear need for 
immediate expenditure. But again, that is far removed from caring for someone over a protracted 
period where there is a clear opportunity to engage the services of others in performing whatever 
caring services might be needed.807  
Moreover, the claimant carer’s case fails to improve if it is put on the basis of failure of consideration 
rather than free acceptance. Is the care supplied by an informal carer really provided on a conditional 
basis, i.e. on condition that compensation is provided in return for the care-giving on the care-
receiver’s death? Given that such care is often provided over a long period, there is ample opportunity, 
in most cases, for that condition to be made known to the care-receiver. Yet, in the very nature of 
these claims, no agreement has ever been reached between carer and care-receiver over the basis on 
which care is provided and the parties’ personal circumstances militate against the implication of a 
contract. Indeed, it is for this reason that most claimants pray in aid the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel in support of their claim for proprietary estoppel will operate where no contract was ever 
intended. 
Even where a claimant can show that he/she has bestowed a benefit on the care-receiver, and that 
the care-receiver has been enriched at the claimant’s expense as a result, the claimant carer must also 
establish that it is unjust for the care-receiver not to pay for those services. One counter-argument 
that a claimant carer must deal with in this situation is inherent in the ‘expectation’ already referred 
to. Mere expectation is not the same as right to compensation or reward. It carries with it a risk that 
the expectation may not be met. If someone ‘gambles’ on compensation being provided gratuitously 
on an ex post facto basis, and no such reward is forthcoming, haven’t they merely gambled and lost? 
The law of unjust enrichment does not exist as a form of an insurance against such losses. There is no 
injustice per se in allowing someone to lose a bet merely because you have the ability to enable them 
to win that bet. But, as already stated, it is at least doubtful whether many informal carers act on the 
basis of expectation in any event. And, in the absence of expectation, it is difficult to put a finger on 
the unjust factor in a typical caring situation on the present state of the law. In short, while the acts 
of the claimant carer may have enriched the adult parent’s estate because that estate has not needed 
to buy-in the services of a commercial carer, that does not make the failure of the care-receiver to 
compensate the carer ‘unjust’ in circumstances where care is freely given. 
 




In Canada, the law of unjust enrichment has followed a different path. In Clarkson v McCrossen,808 an 
informal carer was able to claim against the estate of her stepfather under unjust enrichment in 
circumstances where she had cared for both him and her mother whose estate he had inherited. The 
stepfather’s estate had been enriched by the claimant’s services in providing this care, and that 
enrichment was unjust given her legitimate expectation that she would inherit the family home and 
needed to be disgorged. It matter not that no contract was ever intended by the parties. In Skibinski 
v Community Living British Columbia,809 the claimant, a professional carer, had looked after a disabled 
woman for over three years after she had been discharged from the care of her mother in 
circumstances where it was accepted that the defendant was under a legal obligation to provide that 
care. She subsequently succeeded in her claim for ‘fair reward compensation’ for the value of her care 
against the defendant public authority on the basis that the defendant had been enriched in that it 
had not met the costs of the disabled woman’s care over that period. The defendant’s defence of 
‘officious intervention’ failed on the facts; the services rendered by the claimant in this case were 
‘necessitous’.810 
Law reformers will often seize on the law of another comparable jurisdiction and ask, ‘Why can’t the 
reforms made in that country be imported into our own?’ However, one ‘positive development’ in 
one jurisdiction should not be the sole reason for the wholesale reform of existing law in the other. 
Chris Hunt, in particular, has argued very persuasively against the proposition that the English law of 
unjust enrichment should follow the Canadian model.811 He claims that the Canadian law of unjust 
enrichment is confused which, in turn, leads to much injustice. Canadian courts will sometimes decide 
these cases on the grounds of ‘absence of basis’ – which is the civilian approach to ‘unjustified 
enrichment’ – while other courts determine these claims on the basis that it is up to the claimant to 
demonstrate that there is a positive ground for the reversal of the defendant’s enrichment – which is 
the common law approach.812 The ‘problem’ here, he says, is that, ‘… [a] list of reasons for reversing 
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enrichments will look very different from a list of reasons for keeping them’.813 The result is ‘a troubled 
jurisprudence’ where practitioners have little idea how one court will approach an unjust enrichment 
claim in comparison with another. Moreover, the two reported cases that appear to have unlocked 
remedies for Canadian carers are very different from the typical care situation that we have been 
discussing, i.e. where nothing is said about future inheritance rights but care is nevertheless provided 
on an extensive basis. In Clarkson, ‘… both her mother and step-father had consistently told [the 
claimant] … that upon their death the family home would be hers.’ That would seem to suggest that 
a claim on the basis of proprietary estoppel would have been the claimant’s way forward in English 
courts. And, in Skibinski the court was entertaining a claim by a professional carer who, as the 
defendant always knew, expected payment for her services; and, of course, in that case the defendant 
was legally obliged to provide the care that the claimant, in fact, provided. 
Before abandoning the idea of developing the English law of unjust enrichment as a remedy for 
informal carers, it might be useful to look at an area of law where the English courts do admit claims 
made by informal carers albeit in a round-about sort of way.  In Cunningham v Harrison814 the Court 
of Appeal held that the claimant was entitled, inter alia, to compensation, as a result of his injuries in 
a road traffic accident caused by the defendant’s negligence, to cover the costs of the care that he 
had received from his wife, which he would then hold on trust for her.815 The claimant’s wife was not 
a professional carer; in fact, she was unemployed at the date on which she began to care for her 
husband. Nevertheless, she was entitled to remuneration for her services. The decision can be seen 
as a policy one. People do care for one another on a voluntary basis. In Cunningham, the claimant was 
doubtless fortunate to have his wife care for him. But, that intervention did not discharge the 
defendant’s obligation to compensate the claimant. In the later case of Hunt v Severs816 the House of 
Lords held that a claimant could recover the reasonable value of services rendered gratuitously by a 
member of the family, but not where the carer was himself the tortfeasor. While the claimant carer is 
provided for in such arrangements, it is curious that the carer cannot force the care-receiver to sue 
for the costs of his/her care. However, where the claimant does sue, his/her ability to recover for the 
cost of informal care services does not depend on the existence of a contract between the claimant 
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and his/her carer. The care-receiver’s moral obligation to pay for the care services that are rendered 
to him/her justifies (it seems) the care-receiver’s ability to recover these costs from the tortfeasor (or 
his/her insurer) in damages.817 
Simone Degeling has analysed the carer’s claim on unjust enrichment principles in such cases as these 
in an effort to determine whether carers might be said to have proprietary rights in the trust fund that 
has been established for their benefit.818 Her conclusion is that the inference that the care-receiver 
knows that caring services provided by his/her family are not being offered gratuitously, and must 
therefore be paid for, is a difficult one to draw on the facts, even where these services extend beyond 
what may be regarded as ‘a normal incident to family life or friendship’.819 What is more, she says, ‘... 
only in relation to those cases containing a promise to pay are we able confidently to say that free 
acceptance demonstrates enrichment’ and therefore ‘… in the balance of cases in [her] study, free 
acceptance does not assist in demonstrating an enrichment’ for the purposes of a claim in unjust 
enrichment. Therefore, an ‘unjust enrichment factor’ must be established and this must either be a 
non-voluntary transfer or a policy factor.820 In continuing her analysis, Degeling rightly dismisses any 
arguments that informal care is provided on a non-voluntary basis and claims that a carer’s right to 
participate in any fund established for the care of a victim from an award of damages on account of a 
tortfeasor’s negligence is a matter of policy.821 This analysis is sound. A tortfeasor cannot sensibly be 
heard to argue that he/she should pay less by way of damages because someone else has taken over 
the care of his/her victim on a gratuitous basis. In our situation, we are not, of course, speaking of this 
situation - a situation caused by the wrongdoing of another – but of an experience that may befall 
many of us in our later years, the need for care due to old age and the infirmities that accompany this 
condition. Nevertheless, the conclusion that a legal right can properly arise out of policy alone is a 
useful one. 
In Hunt v Severs trusts, the policy out of which such trusts were born was judge-made. But, as the 
judiciary has often acknowledged, such policy has other perhaps more legitimate origins in the words 
and deeds of Parliament. In these circumstances, it seems unwise to sit back and wait for a judicial 
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196 
 
remedy that may never arrive. Howsoever these claims are framed – whether in proprietary estoppel, 
under the law relating to constructive trusts or under the law relating to unjust enrichment – there is 
no universal remedy for informal carers in English law. Parliament must therefore grasp the nettle and 
act. In the final chapter of this thesis, consideration will be given to how Parliament might shape a 
policy of encouraging compensation to be given to informal carers by care-receivers and how it might 
provide for the giving of that compensation outside of any voluntary arrangement that might be made 



























‘FAMILY CARE CONTRACTS’ 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
At present, those who pay for their own social care by meeting the costs of their own care home 
accommodation are paying substantially in excess of the market rate for what they receive.822 Local 
authorities are the largest single purchasers of care home accommodation in most parts of the 
country. As a result of cuts in national expenditure on local government, local authorities have had to 
attempt to save costs by negotiating lower prices for the care home places that they finance. Given 
their purchasing power, care home providers have largely been forced to comply with their demands 
and to seek cross-subsidisation from their own self-funding residents. Indeed, a recent survey by Liang 
Buisson has concluded that the average fee rate paid by local authorities is now ‘significantly below 
the floor’ of its modelled fair price band for care home accommodation.823 The practical result of this 
is that, as care home costs increase, the need for adult children to organise and provide for the care 
of their elderly disabled parents themselves in an effort to ‘protect their inheritance’ will also grow. 
But, as we have seen, that ‘inheritance’ is precarious. Unlike their counterparts in France and 
elsewhere on the continent, adult children have no entrenched rights in relation to their parents’ 
estates. Similarly, in contrast to their opposite numbers in Germany, adult children in England and 
Wales have no right to the reimbursement of any costs that they might expend in caring for their 
elderly disabled parents. Nor, indeed, do they have any legal claim for the costs of the time and labour 
that they expend in delivering that social care. 
 
822 Laing Buisson, Care of Older People: UK Market Report , 27th edition, at p. 204, referred to in ‘The Care 
Home Market (England)’, House of Commons briefing paper number 07463, 20 February 2017 - 





With these thoughts in mind, this chapter sets out to consider what can be done on a practical level 
to encourage adult children to care for their elderly disabled parents, so that adult children carers are 
not seriously disadvantaged in financial terms by having to administer the care that their elderly 
disabled parents require. Of course, some parents will not have the property wealth with which to 
encourage the provision of such care. And, it is here that the State’s resources must be focussed.824 
Yet, given that the UK, together with the rest of the Western world, is moving into a time in which 
people of all backgrounds, rich and poor, are living very much longer than they were only less than a 
century ago, and given that publicly-funded other benefits and services, such as State pensions and 
the NHS, will inevitably have to shoulder some of the financial burden that will follow, we cannot 
surely expect to rely on the public purse alone to meet the rise in social care costs that will accompany 
this trend. With these thoughts in mind, a solution that unlocks the property wealth that is now in the 
hands of the majority of our elderly – given the rise in the value of residential properties over the past 
thirty years or so – must be a credible one. Yet, it may not be the only solution that is needed. In 
practice, it may be that, given the extent of the funding that is required, some form of hypothecated 
tax will need to be put in place alongside the scheme that is proposed. Nevertheless, the unlocking of 
wealth that exists in our property-owning democracy is still the most viable solution. The balance of 




6.2 PROPERTY WEALTH IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
Perhaps one of the most notable features of life in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries 
in England and Wales is how quickly the general public has become a mass property-owning 
democracy. Margaret Thatcher’s idea of the ‘ordinary man’ having ‘a stake in society’ by acquiring 
some form of saleable interest in their own homes led to the purchase of some two million local 
authority properties by ‘council tenants’ following the introduction of the ‘right to buy’ legislation 
contained in the Housing Act 1980.825 What is more, the last twenty-five years or so has been 
characterised by significant rises in residential property prices across the country, albeit the sharpest 
rises have been experienced in the London and the south-east. In fact, the UK’s net property wealth 
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has recently been estimated at some £4,379 billion.826 In 2006, the same figure stood at a mere £2,644 
billion.827 Over the same period the number of privately-owned homes grew by 9% from 21.5 million 
to 23.4 million.828  As a result, the average rise in net property worth across the country between 2006 
and 2016 has now been put at £147,000;829 and, of course, this increase is very largely untaxed wealth.  
Again, using 2016 figures, pensioners alone have been said to be sitting on £926 billion of this property 
wealth.830 In some quarters it has been suggested that this property wealth should be unlocked to pay 
for the social care that this section of society will, almost undoubtedly, require as they gradually move 
into ‘older old age’.831 One mechanism that could be deployed by the elderly themselves without any 
interference from or involvement of anyone else is the funding of their own social care through the 
use of ‘equity release schemes’. Yet, this has not happened. At present, equity release is rarely used 
to fund the costs of social care.832 There are essentially three reasons behind this. Firstly, there is a 
widely-held belief that this care should be publically-funded. The State provides health care and, 
therefore, it should also provide social care. The two services overlap; in each case, some form of 
‘nursing’ by skilled personnel is the most effective way of providing such care. And, in any event, the 
distinction between the two services – if, indeed, there is a clear distinction - is not always appreciated 
by the general public.833 The dominant idea here is one of ‘deserving’. Many elderly people feel that 
they deserve State-funded social care; after all, they have paid their income tax and national insurance 
contributions over many years, and this money should be there to pay for their social care as well as 
their health care. Secondly, the elderly generation, mostly conservative in nature if not also in politics, 
feel that their own property wealth is theirs to pass on to the next generation if they should so choose. 
The fruits of their labour are represented by the market value of their property – the home in which 
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they live. Their gift to the next generation is to give them a better life than the one they have 
experienced. And, in most cases, the elderly are only able do this through the transfer of their property 
wealth on death.834 Finally, due to the complexities of the present system for determining when an 
elderly person is entitled to publicly-funded social care, equity release is unlikely to suitable in the 
majority of cases for meeting residential care costs. When an elderly person moves into a residential 
care home, the value of their property will be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the 
value of their assets, and they will be liable for care home fees until their assets are worth less than 
£23,250.835 Most equity release schemes will provide for the sale of the property in question when 
the owner permanently vacates the same.836 Therefore, an elderly person will often find that they are 
unable to both hold on to their homes and at the same time to use the value of that home to pay for 
their own residential care costs. Similarly, equity release is not really suitable for the purpose of 
meeting domiciliary care costs where social care is provided on a commercial basis. As the home is 
disregarded for the purpose of calculating whether the care recipient is entitled to domiciliary care, 
he/she will ordinarily pay the costs of such care out of their ‘free capital’ first. And, of course, once 
this capital – i.e. the care recipient’s non-housing assets – has been depleted to £23,250 or less, their 
local authority will pay the costs of their care provided, of course, that they satisfy the criteria that 
their local authority operates – i.e. their care needs are, in most cases, either substantial or critical.837 
Those who fall below this standard will find that they must meet their own care costs, seek the help 
of their friends or family or do without care. As the system presently stands, it is perhaps only this 
group of elderly - i.e. those with low or moderate care needs but who have no help from friends or 
family - who need to unlock the capital that is available in their homes to meet their social care costs. 
This brief analysis strongly suggests that the principal capital asset available in the estates of some 21 
million elderly who either need or are likely to need social care now or in the foreseeable future is put 
 
834 Transfers of wealth between generations are, of course, subject to Inheritance Tax, subject to the operation 
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835 Department of Health, Local Authority Circular, LAC(DH) (2017) 1 -
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/590707/LAC_DH__2017_1.p
df  (accessed: 24/02/18). Claimants having capital of less than £23,250 in value are required to pay £1 for every 
£250 of their savings between £14, 250 and £23,250. And, all claimants must contribute the whole of their 
income towards their fees save for any personal expenses allowance to which they may be entitled. 
  
836 As provided for by the SHIP (Safe Homes Income Plans) Code of Conduct which is followed by the sellers of 
90% (by volume) of equity release products sold in Britain – Lorna Fox O’Mahony, Home Equity and Ageing 
Owners: Between Risk and Regulation, (Hart, 2012) at p. 271. 
 
837 Around 80% of local authorities will only cover care costs where the care recipient’s need is assessed as 




to little or no use in the provision of such care. At a time when the funding of social care in England 
and Wales is already in crisis, and the future for its funding by the State is open to doubt given the 
likely increase in the need for such care as people live longer, a radical re-think of how we might use 
housing equity to provide for the care of our disabled elderly is surely required. This thesis has 
previously established the premise that merely leaving the care recipient to reward those family 
members who have spent their time caring for him/her may too often lead to injustice where their 
moral claims for recompense are either not recognised or acted on by the care recipient. As we have 
seen, family members who provide this informal care - on what is, at present, a voluntary basis - do 
not even have the ability to recover the costs of providing this care let alone compensation for their 
time and labour. In circumstances where the need for families to provide social care for their elderly 
disabled relatives can only grow, as the general public begins to live longer, the system that we have 
in England and Wales is more of a disincentive to provide care for one’s parents and remoter family 
members. Yet,  government policy ought to be encouraging the provision of this care. Indeed, given 
the evidence that there is likely to be a shortage of professional caretakers in the not too distant 
future, which will place an even greater burden on the family to take on the burden of care for an 
elderly disabled relative,838 the need for a system that will compensate family carers for their 
emotional, physical and financial sacrifices in providing that care is becoming increasingly more 
obvious. 
Some of our elderly will not, of course, have the property wealth to make any financial provision for a 
care-giver, yet they will still have a need for social care. Statistics show that, for the year 2013-14, only 
78.6% of 65-74 year olds and 75.6% of 75+ year olds owned their own homes.839 In whatever future is 
to come, as the population of the country grows ever-older, and economically less-productive, the 
State’s resources will need to be concentrated on this section of the community.  Here, there will be 
a continuing need for social care, but no housing wealth from which to recoup any expenditure on 
that need.  In the US the rate at which the elderly have been filing for bankruptcy has increased 
markedly over recent years. In almost one-half of these cases, debtors cited medical problems as a 





839 The English Housing Survey, 2013-14, relied upon by the Office of National Statistics in UK Perspectives 
2016: Housing and home ownership in the UK, - 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/housing/articles/ukperspectives2016housingandho




of instances.840 In England and Wales, the NHS should take care of these medical needs; and, social 
care costs that cannot be met from the care-receiver’s own resources must be met by his/her local 
authority.841 But, in order that the whole of the burden should not fall onto the shoulders of the wage-
earning population, there is a clear need for a system that taps into the property wealth of those care-
receivers who have that wealth. Much as this may seem, by some, to be a flaw in any proposed new 
social care system, that same flaw, if it can be described as such, is also present in our existing NHS 
which treats everyone regardless of whether or not they have paid any national insurance 
contributions. In short, this is the price that must be paid for this and any other ‘safety-net solution’. 
What social care system can we now put in place of our existing regime? Firstly, Informal carers need 
to be treated by both government and society with the respect and dignity that their work deserves. 
This demands a significant increase in the Carer’s Allowance which should be paid as a wage in all 
situations where informal carers cannot go out to work themselves in consequence of having to 
provide for the care-receiver’s care needs. Similarly, where informal carers are able to hold down a 
job notwithstanding their caring responsibilities, they should receive an income supplement that 
acknowledges the work they do. And, in each case, these payments should come from central funds. 
Yet, the introduction of these proposals must be properly costed and adequately funded. Secondly, 
the work of informal carers needs to be incentivised where it can.  The enhanced Carer’s Allowance 
referred to above will not compensate informal carers at the market rate for the care they give. 
Informal carers need to be given guaranteed rights of inheritance in return for the care they deliver. 
These inheritance rights may arise either through agreement between the carer and care-receiver or 
through rights given to informal carers under statute. In the next few sections of this chapter, it is 
proposed to look at how a scheme that would fulfil these two requirements might be funded, 
principally through a combination of guaranteed payments from the estates of care-receivers on their 
respective death and advances made by the UK Government to informal carers during the caring 
period but made on the security of a charge against the properties of care-receivers. But, first, it is 
useful to look at home some of these proposals have manifested themselves in one particular part of 
the Western world, namely, Illinois.  
 
 
840 Jennifer B Herzog, ‘”The Diamond-Studded Wheelchair”: The Health Aid Exemption in Bankruptcy and its 
Application to the Elderly Debtor,’ Elder Law Journal, 2004, pp. 385-415 at 388-9. - 
https://theelderlawjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Herzog.pdf (accessed: 08/05/18). 
 





6.3 LESSONS FROM ILLINOIS 
Section 18-1.1 of the Illinois Probate Act of 1975 states that any defined family member who 
‘dedicates’ him/herself ‘… to the care of the disabled person by living with and personally caring for 
the disabled person for at least three years shall be entitled to a claim against the estate upon the 
death of the disabled person.’ Such a claim is based on ‘… the nature and extent of the [disabled] 
person’s disability and, at the minimum but subject to the extent of the assets available, [that claim] 
shall be in the amounts set out below: 
 1.  100% disability, $180,000  
 2.  75% disability,   $135,000 
 3.  50% disability,   $  90,000  
 4.  25% disability,   $  45,000.’842   
Section 18 – 1.1 further contains a list of factors that the court must take into consideration in 
determining whether or not to reduce the amount awarded to the claimant below these specified 
sums; but, subject to these matters, someone who has personally cared for a disabled person for at 
least three years, dedicating his/her life to that task, is entitled to recompense from that person’s 
estate in these stated sums on the care-receiver’s death. What is more, this award is to be ‘… in 
addition to any other claim, including without limitation a reasonable claim for nursing and other 
care.’843 
Section 18 – 1.1 appears in the Illinois Probate Act by way of an amendment which came into force on 
the 1st January 1989. It seems to have a chequered history.844 The amendment in question was initially 
added to a bill which proposed some greater but unconnected amendments to the Act by the Illinois 
Senate. After being accepted by both the Illinois Senate and its House of Representatives, it was 
vetoed by the then State Governor, who expressed concern that proposed amendments in the form 
 
842 The initial sums were lower, but were increased in 2008. The court has a discretion to award higher figures 
and will ordinarily do so where the caring period has been greater than the statutory minimum of three years. 
 
843 See: Section 18-1.1 of the Illinois Probate Act of 1975. 
 
844 Mariam L. Hafezi Qualman, Illinois Does Not Care About Caregivers as Evidenced by the Ineffective and 
Exclusionary Custodial Claims Statute of the Probate Act, Northern Illinois University Law Review Online, 2010, 




of section 18 – 1.1 were ‘inequitable’ and ‘unworkable’.  Despite this, the veto was subsequently 
overridden and the amendments became law.845 Despite overwhelming majorities in both the Senate 
and the House in favour of the amendment, the section has come in for a good deal of criticism.846 In 
particular, the Act contains no definition of ‘disabled person’ or its various ‘degrees of disability’. It 
demands that claimants must have cared for the disabled person ‘for at least three years’ and must 
have ‘dedicated’ their lives to such care. And, finally, it requires claimants to be members of the close 
family of the care-receiver, so that any other remoter relation, friend or neighbour is unable to make 
a claim notwithstanding that they may have administered the same or perhaps an even greater degree 
of care to the care-recipient compared with the care administered by a close family member to 
another cared-for individual.847 While the drafting of the Act can be justifiably criticised, it is submitted 
that the premise on which the Act is based is sound. That premise is that informal carers are deserving 
of financial compensation from the estate of the care-receiver for ‘… the emotional stress of 
caretaking as well as the costs from lost opportunities due to the undertaking of caring for a disabled 
family member.’848 In the words of the Illinois Supreme Court, section 18 – 1.1 of the Illinois Probate 
Act 1975 ‘… serves the legislative goal of encouraging immediate family members to commit 
themselves to disabled relatives.’849 As such, the Act is an important recognition of the disadvantages 
that an informal carer must ordinarily embrace when he or she resolves to care for another individual 
who needs such care. Moreover, the legislation is supported at ‘ground level’ by the establishment of 
the Illinois Department of Aging which has set up many care-giver resource centres to provide services 
and information to informal carers.850  
Regrettably, the Act is far too restrictive in nature. But that does not, of course, mean that its original 
purpose or rationale is invalid. Research has suggested that the failure of informal carers to make use 
of the Act is likely to be due to the low number of those who qualify as persons able to make a claim 
 
845 Curiously, much of the debate on the bill in the Senate seems to relate to the recovery of money by parents 
on account of caring for a disabled child, presumably where  a fund had been set up for the child following the 
accident which caused his/her disability. 
 
846 See: fn. 844, supra, pp. 70-73 and pp. 81-91. 
 
847 See: In re Estate of Jolliff, 771 N.E. 2.d 346 (Ill. 2002) where the claim that the section was ‘unconstitutional’ 
on the basis, inter alia, that it violated due process (on the basis that it assumed the extent of any claimants’ 
losses rather than assessing them) and equal protection (because it favoured some classes of claimant and 
rejected others) was rejected on appeal. 
 
848 See: fn. 844, supra, p. 76. 
 
849 Ibid. p. 81 
 




given the requirements that the claimant must have lived with the care-receiver, must have provided 
at least three years’ care and must have ‘dedicated’ themselves to the provision of such care, rather 
than any other, more weighty factors.851  As we have seen, there is a clear need for some sort of 
equivalent, but more effective, provision in England and Wales for the same policy goal, and need for 
that goal, is as much apparent here as it is in Illinois.852 
Encouraging family care-giving would also have some common reciprocal benefits and would serve to 
promote many of the qualities that communitarians and care ethicists hold dear: honour and 
gratitude, indebtedness and reciprocity, loyalty and interdependence.  While some of these benefits 
could well result from enforced filial responsibility laws, such as those on the continent or in some 
parts of the US,853 these laws run the considerable risk of pitting family members against each other – 
parent against child, sibling against sibling – when it comes to the enforcement of those laws.854 And, 
indeed, it seems particularly harsh to place a legal responsibility on the younger generation to care for 
their parents, where that younger generation is commonly not so young themselves (often 50 – 65 
years of age) and likely to be supporting their own children, if they have had them later in life as many 
professional women do, either financially (by the payment of some of the costs associated with 
obtaining a University education) or physically (through looking after grandchildren). Even where the 
care-giving generation is younger (some 35-50 years of age), the chances are that they will have a 
sizeable mortgage to pay (and, if at the beginning of this age-bracket, they may have only been able 
to climb onto the property ladder in recent years), their own young children to look after and their 
own careers to make. With these points in mind, it seems particularly unjust to put the caring burden 
on young or even middle-aged adult children when the real unused wealth in a family is more likely to 
be locked up in the home of the care-receiver. 
The Illinois statute provides for a limited transfer of wealth as compensation for care-giving after the 
death of the care-receiver. Yet, a more radical idea would be to unlock the capital that is there in the 
care-receiver’s home during the period of care-giving so that informal carers can receive some form 
 
851 Ibid. pp. 88-89 
 
852 According to the Illinois Department on Aging ‘[o]ne in four households (25%) [takes] on the role of 
providing care to older family members and friends’ and some ‘[e]ighty-five percent (85%) of all long term care 
services are provided by unpaid caregivers.’ – ibid. at p. 77. 
 
853 In fact, these statutes are very seldom used in practice – Katie Wise, Caring for Our Parents in an Aging 
World: Sharing Public and Private Responsibility for the Elderly, (2001) NYUJ Legislation and Public Policy, Vol, 
5, pp. 563-598 at p. 573-4, available at http://www.nyujlpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Katie-Wise-
Caring-for-our-Parents-in-an-Aging-World-Sharing-Responsibility-for-the-Elderly.pdf) (accessed: 24/02/18). 
 
854 Ibid. p. 575 
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of financial provision while care is being administered. How may this best be done? The following 
section of this chapter looks at ‘equity release’ as a method of unlocking wealth that is presently tied 
up in property. This potential solution to the issue of how social care costs might be funded has been 
around for some time but has not proved popular for reasons that were explained earlier. 
Nevertheless, a public funded alternative which would provide an income for informal carers during 
the caring period could well be the answer to the problems that this and the next generation now face 




6.4 EQUITY RELEASE 
Equity release schemes have been available to consumers in the UK since 1965. In 1972, a lifetime 
mortgage known as a ‘home income plan’, which permitted the release of capital for the purpose of 
purchasing an annuity, was introduced onto the market.855 Problems beset the industry when 
providers encouraged many thousands of retired people to take out plans with variable interest rates. 
These products were sold on the basis that rises in house prices (then a feature of the UK housing 
market) would always outstrip mortgage interest rates. Retirees were encouraged to purchase stock-
market related investment bonds with the capital that they released in order to supplement their 
income. But, market returns on these bonds fell, interest rates soared and many elderly people who 
had purchased these products found themselves in severe financial difficulties. As a result, ‘equity 
release’ gained something of a bad name.856 
Gradually, the market for equity release schemes recovered, principally through regulation.  Providers 
of such schemes largely signed up to the Equity Release Council (or their predecessor) whose code of 
practice provided a number of guarantees to customers, such as the right to remain living in the 
property (which was subject to the scheme) as their main residence and the ‘no negative equity 
guarantee’, which guaranteed that customers would never owe more than the market value of the 
property. While some providers withdrew from the market following the ‘credit crunch’ of 2007-08, 
 







the market for equity release schemes now seems much more stable; and, indeed, the forecast for 
that market is buoyant with reports that equity release has become the fastest growing segment of 
the mortgage market in terms of customer numbers.857 
There are two main types of equity release schemes on the UK market: home reversions and lifetime 
mortgages. The lifetime mortgage comes in a number of different varieties. A ‘roll-up mortgage’ will 
allow a homeowner to obtain a loan (which is charged on his/her property) either as one lump sum or 
in smaller sums which may be drawn down at any time. Fixed or variable interest is charged on this 
loan. But, unlike an ordinary domestic mortgage, that interest is only paid when the property is sold, 
which may be when the homeowner dies or moves into a residential care home on a permanent basis. 
Interest rates are high in order to compensate the lender for their inability to recover the loan for 
what might be many years. At the time of writing, the Telegraph reports that the average annual 
percentage rate for new lifetime mortgages is 5.35%, but that rate has dropped from 6.55% only three 
years ago as a result of increasing competition.858 The disadvantage of these products in comparison 
with conventional mortgages is that, because interest is accruing and no regular payments are being 
made, interest is compounded. For example, the Telegraph reports one instance where a loan of 
£36,000 was taken out in 2000 at a rate of 8.25% and secured by a lifetime mortgage now requires a 
payment of £103,000 in order to discharge that debt.859 Of course, it may be that the mortgaged 
property will have increased in value in the meantime, so that in times of rising house prices these 
schemes will still appear attractive. On the other hand, many may still consider such a scheme to be 
prohibitively expensive. 
In contrast to a ‘roll-up mortgage’, a ‘fixed-repayment mortgage’ is a scheme which allows a 
homeowner to borrow a lump sum with the sum that is to be repaid, when the property on which the 
loan is secured is sold or transferred, being agreed at the outset. This agreed sum will be substantially 
more than the sum borrowed and will be dependent on such matters as the borrower’s age and life 
expectancy. Such mortgages are very much a gamble on the part of the mortgagor. If the homeowner 
dies within a short while of taking out a ‘fixed-repayment mortgage’, then his/her beneficiaries will be 






industry-secret-that-could-save-you-thousands.html 17th January 2017 (accessed: 18/01/18). This can be 







expectancy at the date on which the mortgage is taken out. Equity release schemes such as this 
therefore have the capacity to ruin the legacy that one is able to leave the next generation and 
accordingly one’s reputation with that generation. In the eyes of many, that seems to be a significant 
disadvantage of the ‘fixed-repayment mortgage’. 
The home reversion scheme is significantly different from a lifetime mortgage. Here, a lender will 
purchase either part or the whole of the property in question for an ‘agreed sum’. The homeowner 
can take that sum either in one lump sum or as regular instalments. In return, the lender grants the 
homeowner a lease at a nominal or peppercorn rent which allows him/her to occupy the property 
until they die or vacate the same on a permanent basis. The lender can only sell the mortgaged 
property on either of these two events. The ‘agreed sum’ will be far lower that the market value of 
the property, or part of that property, and will, again, reflect the inability of the lender to recover the 
loan for what may turn out to be many years. With any of these schemes, withdrawing a significant 
lump will ordinarily affect any means-tested benefits that the borrower might otherwise be entitled 
to, such as pension credits.860 Some local authorities have attempted to signpost some equity release 
schemes which are designed to release small amounts on a regular basis (largely flexible lifetime 
mortgages) that would not have any adverse effect on the borrower’s entitlement to state benefits, 
but the up-take seems to have been small.861 Alongside the home reversion plan is a very similar 
product known as a ‘sale-and-rent-back transaction’ which only differs from the former scheme in the 
nature of the contractual arrangement for the borrower’s future occupation of the property.862 Here, 
the terms of the advance that is secured on the property and the rent payable under the lease back 
are negotiable.863 
How attractive are these equity release schemes for the purpose of raising money for social care in 
later life? This thesis focusses on those disabled elderly who have adult children who are willing and 
able to provide the necessary care that they require at home. In such cases, parents could use equity 
release schemes in order to pay their children to care for them. Yet, in reality, this is rarely done, for 
equity release is perceived as both expensive and risk-laden. The ‘middleman’ - in the form of the 
 
860 https://www.gov.uk/pension-credit (accessed: 18/01/18). 
 
861 Lord German (ed.) Making the Most of Equity Release: perspectives from key players, (2012) published by 
the Smith Institute; in particular, chapter two, Rachel Terry, Asset-Rich: Income Poor, at pp 17-25 at p. 25, - 
https://smithinstitutethinktank.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/making-the-most-of-equity-release.pdf 
(accessed 24/02/18).  
 
862 See: fn. 855, supra, p. 284. 
 




lender - exacts a high price for the initial loan or draw-down facility with interest rates at least twice 
those available for ‘standard mortgages’. In practice, the disabled elderly rely on the goodwill of their 
adult children to provide the informal care that they require without any legal obligation to pay for 
that care either while it is being provided or after their death. Yet, as we have seen, this goodwill may 
be abused. What is needed is a mechanism that will allow for equity release as a means of funding the 
social care costs of the disabled elderly but without the inherent disadvantages and risks that 
accompany existing equity release schemes. 
This is where the UK Government can ‘bridge the gap’ so to speak. At present, equity release interest 
rates benefit the lending institutions; and, such rates are dictated by the market. If the UK Government 
was to provide a scheme – a draw-down loan scheme – under which it would make funds available for 
elderly parents to pay their adult children for their social care, or even pay these adult children 
directly,  and in return take an interest-free charge on the parent’s property to cover the sums that it 
was prepared to make available at any one time, it could at once provide the incentive needed for 
adult children to continue to provide this care and to earn a ‘living wage’ while doing so. Of course, 
the value of the parents’ property - as a gift to the next generation - would diminish as a result of the 
charge, but the money that would be made available as a consequence of a scheme such as this would 
go to those who were providing the care. Elderly parents would be unlikely to object to one or more 
of their children having part of their inheritance in advance in return for providing this care. What is 
more, there would be no ‘middleman’ making capital out of such a scheme as this. And, if the funds 
available for social care through a scheme such as this carried no interest, but were simply recoverable 
from the care-receiver’s estate on their death, there would be no risk of any market fluctuations, such 
as those seen in the 1980s and 1990s, destroying the scheme.  
One could argue that a scheme such as this would be costly for the UK Government. Once introduced, 
the State would have to pay adult children to provide social care that, as things presently stand, is 
provided by these carers largely free of charge to the public purse. But, the UK Government would, of 
course, have security for what it chose to make available to these carers in the form of the charge 
taken on the care-receiver’s property; in terms of balancing the country’s books, the scheme would 
initially be fairly neutral.864 It is only as and when unrecoverable debts are written off that the costs of 
the scheme would show up on the country’s balance sheet.  And, given that the government would 
 
864 One consequence of the proposed charge on the care-receiver’s residential property would be that 
Government revenue from Inheritance Tax (‘IHT’) would fall as more estates would fall into the nil rate band. 
This would require some re-thinking of this form of tax with the introduction of, say, a 20% band on the value 
of a deceased’s person’s estate between £100,000 and £325,000. This would bring IHT in line with a proposed 




be taking what might reasonably be termed ‘gilt-edged security’ for much of what would be paid out, 
it would only be in circumstances where the care-receiver had no property on which to secure any 
advances that the government might make for his/her care, that the scheme would cost the public 
purse anything at all.  The UK is already familiar with a scheme such as this; indeed, the payment of 
tuition fees in higher education is funded in much the same manner.  The costs of providing loans for 
tuition fees do not show up in the country’s ‘public accounts’ unless and until they are written off and, 
under the present legislation governing these tuition loans, that will not be for some 30 years after 
the loan is made.865  While the UK Government would have rather less control over the writing-off of 
loans made to cover care costs, which must be linked to the care-receiver’s death, such a scheme is 
surely an attractive way of incentivising the provision of domiciliary care for those in need of the same 
by their adult children. 
What is more, in practice, the UK Government is in a position to implement such a scheme, without 
the assistance of a third party, because it has its own sovereign currency. In short, it is able to 
manufacture its own money; albeit, in modern times, this may simply be figures on an electronic 
ledger .  Indeed, a scheme of this nature is just the sort of social engineering that a government with 
control of its own money supply ought to be undertaking.866 Of course, the scheme has its weaknesses. 
Those elderly who live in rented properties would be unable to provide security for any monies 
advanced to pay for their care. But, in practice, that should not mean that they should fall outside the 
scheme altogether. If any money is advanced to pay their social care costs, that money would remain 
a debt, recoverable from their estate. Should the debt not be recovered in the usual way, only then 
would it be written off. Those elderly who reside in properties whose values are low may see the 
whole of ‘brick and mortar savings’ disappear in social care costs with nothing to leave to their friends 
and relatives on their death. But, here, a ‘protected element’ of their estate of, say, £75,000 - 
£100,000, against which the Government could not claim, should leave them with something to pass 
on to the next generation, friends or neighbours.  And, their care would continue to be funded 
notwithstanding the absence of security for any monies that needed to be advanced. Anti-avoidance 
provisions would also be needed.  One would need to prevent people giving away the value of their 
estate during their lifetimes in order to escape the costs of their care being recovered from their 
estates on death. Claw-back provisions would be necessary allowing the UK Government to recover 
against the donees of any such money or assets. Perhaps, more significantly, legislation would be 
needed restricting the amount of money that could be released to homeowners under equity release 
 
865 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-45474557 (accessed: 12/09/18). 
 




schemes for any money so released would not be available to fund the homeowner’s social care needs.  
In addition, legislation might be needed to prevent people spending money, at least in part, that would 
be generated by ‘trading-down’ either as they began to approach, or during, their retirement.  There 
are, indeed, some difficult issues to resolve before the proposed scheme can be implemented. Yet, 
similar anti-avoidance provisions are contained in the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975, and these appear to work well in practice. One item that the UK Government 
would need to carefully consider before such a scheme was introduced was whether the government 
charge over the care-receiver’s home to meet social care costs would diminish the value of the 
property in question for Inheritance Tax purposes. If it did, this might well lead to a significant loss of 
revenue from such a tax as more estates would fall into the present nil rate band.  That said, the 
present UK Government were prepared to sustain such a loss in revenue when it introduced the 
residential nil rate band in April 2017. And, therefore, a paring-back of the nil rate band to, say, 
£250,000, and the introduction of a sliding-scale for the rate at which inheritance tax is charged, may 
provide the practical answer to any such loss in revenue. 
What would this scheme look like in practice? As the adult child carer would now be working for 
reward, it is suggested that a care contract would need to be put in place in order that the social care 
needed is closely defined and the sums payable for that care are clearly set out. Given that the 
deteriorating health of the care-receiver may add to the burden of the social care that is needed in 
any given case, the contract needs to be reviewable at regular intervals. At one level, there is room 
for these contracts to be freely negotiated. But, in realty, what is required, it is further submitted, is a 
default contract much along the lines of the Illinois Probate Statute of 1975 in order to enable those 
adult children who provide social care without first entering into a social care contract with the care-
receiver – and, in practice, there may be many reasons why no contract is agreed867 - to be able to 
claim some form of financial recompense for the care they have provided. It is also anticipated that a 
default contract of this nature would do much to determine the terms of any inter vivos social care 
contract that may be entered into.  
With this in mind, the following section of this chapter investigates how these social care contracts 
might be entered into and what protection ought to be put in place in order to ensure that the two 
contracting parties – the elderly disabled care-recipient and the adult child carer – have equality of 
bargaining power and responsibilities under these contracts. Later sections will then consider how a 
 
867 This includes circumstances where the care-receiver does not have the mental capacity to make a contract. 
That is why, any scheme such as that proposed in this thesis must always have either a default contract or a 
mechanism for the courts to make a contract on behalf of a person who does not have capacity to act on 
his/her own behalf. 
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‘family care contract’ – as these social care agreements will now be called – can be supported by local 
authorities, the courts and, ultimately, by Central Government in providing a solution to increasing 




6.5 FAMILY CARE CONTRACTS 
As we have seen, the Illinois Probate Act of 1975, section 18 -1.1, introduces a form of ex post facto 
statutory care contract into the relationship between an elderly disabled parent care-receiver and 
their adult child informal carer. This is, of course, no ordinary contract. In particular, there is no 
consensus ad idem on the details of any care arrangements that need to be undertaken or, indeed, on 
the consideration that is to be paid in return for these services. Nevertheless, the statute puts in place 
a form of default, quasi-contractual claim under which a claimant can seek payment from the estate 
of someone for whom they have cared in the form of a given sum of money; in other words, financial 
compensation is automatically payable in return for the care that has been received, provided that 
the requirements of the Act are otherwise satisfied.868  
Understandings are part of the very lifeblood of all social interaction in society. When unsaid they 
become wholly dependent on the trust that one party reposes in the other. The law finds it difficult 
to enforce obligations that might be said to arise under arrangements of this nature. If an 
understanding is unsaid, there is ample room for disagreement over whether there was, indeed, any 
such understanding or, if there was, the terms of that understanding. In some areas of the law, 
obligations have been imposed out of defined sets of circumstances whether or not any understanding 
was ever reached.869 But, in most instances, the courts are reluctant to interfere. The result is that 
these obligations become moral, and not legal.  
 
868 Although such compensation is described here as ‘automatic’, the courts in Illinois are able to either reduce 
or increase the sum payable from the estate of a deceased care-receiver from the figures set forth in the Act. 
In particular, the Act states that ‘… a court may reduce a[n] [statutory custodial claim] amount to the extent 
that the living arrangements [as between carer and care-receiver] were intended to and did in fact also 
provide a physical or financial benefit to the claimant’, and then goes on to list other factors that might further 
influence the exercise of this discretion. 
 




In these circumstances, any ‘family care contract’ must therefore be rendered certain from its 
inception. If an informal carer is going to be entitled by law to some form of payment in return for 
rendering an agreed set of services to the care-receiver, anyone who might be asked to determine 
whether these services were, indeed, rendered in order to authorise such a payment needs to know 
what these agreed set of services were, how regularly they needed to be administered and, if this is 
in dispute, whether they were administered.   In practice, this knowledge can only be safely gleaned 
from a well-defined, written agreement; in fact, the words ‘agreed’ and ‘defined’ in the foregoing 
sentence plainly demonstrate the need for what the law recognises as a ‘contract in writing’ between 
the carer and the care-receiver.  
The State has a duty to protect its citizens and to further their collective interests.870 The instigation 
and promotion of a ‘family care contract’ would seem to fall under either head given the challenges 
that increasing longevity will bring to our society over the next thirty years and more. While it would 
not be appropriate in this thesis to look at the possible terms of such a contract – for they would surely 
be heavily dependent on each individual care-receiver’s needs – it is appropriate to consider how the 
creation of these family care contacts would need to be underpinned. It is submitted that, in practice, 
two particular requirements would be essential to the instigation of a workable ‘family care contract’. 
Firstly, there needs to be a registration and ‘policing’ system for all such contracts. This registration 
would have to be compulsory and the registration authority would need to be the care-receiver’s local 
authority, the body that carries overall statutory responsibility for satisfying the social care needs of 
the disabled elderly in their area. Such a system already exists in a number of Australian states and 
appears to work well, albeit in a slightly different context.871 In fact, systems such as this also exist in 
other areas of UK local authority practice, for example, in relation to children in care. With this in 
mind, the development of a registration and policing system operated by local authorities as part of 
their statutory obligations relating to the provision of social care appears to be readily achievable. 
Secondly, each family care contract needs to be carefully negotiated and then set down in writing 
before it is registered. This presents something of a challenge. In some instances, there will be a 
marked imbalance of bargaining power between the informal carer and the care-receiver; and, 
indeed, in perhaps the majority of these cases, the ‘power’ will be with the care-receiver rather than 
the carer because the carer feels that he or she has a moral duty to provide the care that the care-
 
870 See: chapter three, supra. 
 
871 These registration systems are designed to facilitate the survivor of the relationship obtaining 
superannuation and inheritance benefits on the death of the first to die rather than providing a means by 
which one party to the relationship might obtain compensation for care services that are rendered in the 




receiver needs whatever the terms that might be proposed. What is needed is a neutral third party 
who can orchestrate the making of these family care contracts. It is therefore proposed that each 
family care contract must be mediated by a qualified mediator who will be able to counter-balance 
any inequality in bargaining-power between the two sides through techniques that are now becoming 
more widely understood with the rise in the use of ‘deal mediation’. 
The registration of ‘family care contracts’ would bring both certainty and accountability. On the one 
hand, there would be an easily accessible record of the parties who had entered into such a contract, 
that a family care contract had been made in regard to a given care-receiver and the terms of such a 
contract .872 And, on the other hand, the care-receiver’s local authority, who would be subject to a 
statutory duty to oversee the operation of the ‘family care contract’, would know the precise terms 
that had been agreed between the parties, which would help in any assessment of whether the care-
receiver’s needs were being met on a periodic review of his/her social care situation.  
The availability of a registration scheme which records either ‘close personal relationships’ or ‘de facto 
relationships’ is now common across almost all Australian states.873 Such schemes exist for many 
reasons. For our purposes, it matters not why the scheme is in place: it is the very existence of such 
schemes and their operation that is significant. In New South Wales, ‘close personal relationships’ of 
dependency and interdependency may be registered where the parties live together and one or of 
the parties provides domestic support and personal care to the other, regardless of whether or not 
the parties are related to each other.874 Under the scheme proposed in this chapter, the registration 
of these family care contracts would be a condition precedent to their enforceability both against the 
estate of the care-receiver after his/her death and against the care-receiver inter vivos or, more likely, 
 
872 The terms of any governing legislation would need to state that there could only be one family care 
contract per care-receiver. 
 
873 The only Australian states that do not have any such registration system at the time of writing are the 
Northern Territory and Western Australia - R. Graycar and J. Millbank, From Functional Family to Spinster 
Sisters: Australia’s Distinctive Path to Relationship Recognition, Wash. U. Jo. of Law and Policy, 121, (2007), vol. 
4. Issue 1,  at pp. 170 et seq. - 
file:///G:/Journal%20of%20Law%20and%20Policy%20%20Australia%20registration%20of%20personal%20relat
ionships.pdf (accessed: 04/02/18)   
 
874 The New South Wales’ Property (Relationships) Act 1984, as amended, s. 5; and, A. Head, The Legal 
Recognition of Close Personal Relationships in New South Wales: A Case for Reform, Flinders Law Journal, 





the State in regard to the availability of the enhanced benefits for carers proposed in section 6.4 
above.875   
As for the scheme itself, it is proposed that the informal carer and care-receiver would enter into a 
‘family care contract’ for a defined period of time under which the informal carer would undertake to 
provide the care-receiver with a set of social care services as therein defined in return for which the 
informal carer would be paid an agreed sum at periodic intervals during the continuation of the 
contract. Such a contract would be reviewable by the care-receiver’s local authority on a biannual 
basis. If the informal carer is not providing the agreed services as provided for by the family care 
contract or if the care-receiver’s circumstances have changed such that he/she requires a higher level 
of care than the informal carer is able or willing to undertake, the local authority would have locus 
standi to apply to the court for the termination of the family care contract whereupon it would be 
under a statutory duty to implement alternative measures to satisfy the care-receiver’s need for care. 
In return for the provision of social care to the care-receiver, the informal carer would be entitled to 
claim a given sum as agreed under the ‘family care contract’ from the State.876 And, for its part, the 
State would be entitled to reclaim any moneys so paid over (without interest) from the care-receiver 
under the statutory charge that would be created by the registration of the family care contract. 
How does the Illinois Probate Act of 1975 assist us in the introduction of such a scheme? The legislation 
that would need to be introduced in order to set up such a scheme would introduce a default care 
contract on similar lines to that introduced by the Illinois Act. Such a provision would allow those who 
had provided social care services to a now deceased person without having made, or, if made, without 
having registered, a ‘family care contract’ to claim compensation for the skill and labour expended in 
providing such care from the deceased’s estate as provided by the legislation. In this way, legislation 
would create a base-line for the rate at which the charges for informal social care in a negotiated 
‘family care contract’ would be set. Should a scheme such as this be introduced, it is anticipated that 
these charges would be fairly low in much the same way as the compensation provided for in the 
Illinois Probate Act of 1975 is low in comparison with the cost of such care on the open market. This 
would encourage the parties concerned to make and register their own ‘family care contracts’ rather 
than to rely on the default contract set by the State.877 
 
875 In particular, those benefits that were made available in return for a statutory charge on the care-receiver’s 
home – see: section 6.7 infra. 
 
876 In practice, there would need to be financial limits placed on the sums that could be claimed from the State. 
 
877 Although, of course, the greater encouragement would lie in the availability of enhanced State benefits. 
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Of course, the crucial feature of the proposed scheme is the ‘family care contract’ itself. As noted 
earlier, it is essential to the nature of this scheme that the parties negotiate a ‘fair price’ for the 
provision of the social care services described in the contract; one party should not be permitted to 
use his/her position, or indeed the other party’s situation, to exploit the other party in any way. It is 
therefore proposed that these ‘family care contracts’ should be mediated; in other words, they should 





6.6 THE MEDIATION PROCESS 
The conventional process that precedes the formation of a typical commercial contract is not really 
appropriate for the making of a ‘family care contract’. Ordinarily, carers and care-receivers are not 
bargaining at arm’s length. Each party has an ‘attachment’ to the other; and, that attachment is often 
born of a lifetime of ‘history’ between them. In any given situation there will, almost invariably, be 
many factors that will influence an understanding of what the caring process might entail: the care-
receiver’s needs, the time that the carer can devote to the caring process, the moral responsibility felt 
by the carer to provide for the care-receiver, the respective financial positions of each party.  And, 
each one may have a significant impact on any agreement or arrangement that might be reached 
between the two parties. 
There is, of course, a well-recognised presumption that ‘family agreements’ are not intended to have 
contractual effect. And, in practice, this presumption needs to be displaced by evidence to the 
contrary.878 However, formal ‘mediated’ care contracts which are then registered with the care-
receiver’s local authority should, ordinarily be sufficient to displace this presumption.879  Indeed, in 
Illinois there is support available from the legal professions for the making of private ‘family care-
giving contracts’ which are considered to be legal binding on both sides.880 
 
878 See: Jones v Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328. 
 
879 See: Merritt v Merritt [1970] 1 WLR 1211, where the reduction of the agreement into writing, signed by the 
parties, was evidence of the parties’ intention to be bound by the same. 
 
880 Kerry R. Peck, Creating Effective Agreements for Payment of Family Caregivers, Bifocal: Journal of the ABA 
Commission on Law and Aging, vol. 37, issue 3, (2016) - 
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In the conventional mediation process, a neutral third party assists those in dispute to resolve their 
differences by reaching a mutually acceptable solution which is then recorded in writing by the 
mediator and signed by the parties. In doing so, the mediator attempts to identify the parties’ shared 
needs and interests, to allow the parties to talk constructively to each other through the person of the 
mediator and to work with them to find mutually acceptable proposals for the settlement of their 
differences. In this way, the focus of any mediation is not on the rights and liabilities of the parties, 
but on their respective needs and interests; in short, mediation is a future-focussed process.881 And, 
of course, that is precisely what the intended informal carer and care-receiver require where caring 
arrangements are being discussed: to follow a process that sees the parties’ future needs and interests 
as paramount. Here, mediators have the skills that both informal carers and care-receivers need in 
order to enter into a ‘workable arrangement’ over the future provision of care for the care-receiver.  
While, conventionally, mediation is seen as an ‘alternative dispute resolution process’, the modern 
concept of mediation now embraces ‘deal mediation’; here, the ‘deal’ between two parties is not 
confined to the resolution of a dispute but has moved on to the creation of contractual agreements 
between parties who have no history of working together.882 Salacuse has described the role of 
mediation in such instances as covering what he describes as ‘deal-making, deal-managing and deal 
mending’.883 And, he concludes that, ‘… [i]f one defines a mediator broadly as a third person who helps 
the parties negotiate an agreement, then their use in deal-making is fairly extensive.’884 While we may 
be familiar with mediation in relation to the last of these items, this analysis emphasises that the use 
of mediation to facilitate the making of a long-term, workable agreement operates elsewhere. And, 
 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/bifocal.vol_37/issue_3_february2016/creating-effective-caregiver-
agreements.html (accessed: 17/09/18); and, K. Gabriel Heiser, Personal Care Agreements: A Must for 
Caregiver Compensation and Medicaid Planning - https://www.agingcare.com/Articles/personal-care-
agreements-compensate-family-caregivers-181562.htm (accessed: 17/09/18); see: 
https://www.agingcare.com/documents/personal_care_agreement-AgingCare.pdf (accessed: 17/09/18), for a 
precedent of such an agreement. 
 
881 This passage is adapted from the author’s own description of mediation in advertising an international 
mediation conference at Liverpool Hope University in February 2015. 
 
882 Manon A. Schoneville and Kenneth H Fox, ‘Moving beyond ‘Just’ a Deal, and Bad Deal or no Deal: How a 
Deal-Facilitator Engaged by the Parties as ‘Counsel to the Deal’ Can Help Them Improve the Quality and 
Sustainability of the Outcome’, chapter 5 in Arnold Ingen-Housz, ADR in Business: Practice and Issues Across 
Countries and Cultures, vol. II, (Kluwer Law International, 2011) at pp. 81-116, and, in particular, section 3, 
‘Deal-Facilitation: Mediation without a dispute (or negotiation with a mediator)’. 
 
883 Jeswald W. Salacuse, ‘Mediation in International Business’, in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Studies in International 






in the case of family care contracts, it is this ‘deal-making’ and ‘deal-managing’ that will surely be more 
significant than the traditional mediator’s role of ‘deal-mending’.  
Why mediation? The mediation process is designed not only to assist parties to make a deal, but to 
make the ‘right’ deal, and that will often be heavily dependent on what has gone before as much as 
what will need to be done in the future. Confidentiality is the essence of mediation; each party is safe 
in the knowledge that what they say to the mediator in private will not be communicated to the other 
party without their permission; and, much may need to be said about what has gone before. Within 
this process, mediators are experts in ‘managing the transfer of information’.885 Within the 
conventional mediation process, it is this exchange of information that is often the key to achieving a 
workable agreement between the parties. Once the parties’ needs and interests are explored – and, 
in many cases, this will involve communicating those needs and interests to the other party in a 
controlled manner through the mediator – their initial adversarial positions are often abandoned. 
Although there may be no dispute to resolve where informal carer and care-receiver are about to 
enter into a family care contract, the parties’ respective needs and interests have to be considered 
and provided for. The care-receiver may value his or her bridge-playing afternoons at the local 
community centre but may be too afraid to mention such a need in case the informal carer 
misinterprets this as a form of social rejection. Equally, the informal carer may put a high price on his 
or her annual summer holiday in foreign climes but is too worried to raise this matter in case the care-
receiver rejects the idea of a couple of weeks respite care in a local care home because they fear that 
this might lead to a more permanent arrangement. In practice, mediators can bridge these gaps. 
Where the conveying of such information might lead to conflict and mistrust, a skilful mediator will 
find a way of raising concerns in a positive and forward-thinking manner. 
Mediators also possess other skill-sets that will undoubtedly assist the making of a ‘family care 
contract’. Mediators are able to soak up any emotion that might otherwise prevent the parties – 
informal carer and care-receiver – from making a clear and ‘workable’ family care contract. Moreover, 
on receiving information imparted to them in confidence, they are able to weigh up whether progress 
– in terms of moving the parties towards an agreement – might be achieved in trading that 
information. Indeed, if information is to be traded, the mediator can assist in determining what 
information should be shared and on what basis that sharing should take place. What is more, 
mediators are able to encourage the parties to move from what may be, at least initially, a willingness 
 
885 Scott R. Peppet, ’Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should we use Mediators in Deals?’, (2004) Ohio 




to make ‘unobservable concessions’886 towards the making of practical and timely proposals in relation 
to the caring process and everything that surrounds the same. Indeed, possibly the most important 
feature of that process in the scheme of these proposed family care contracts will be to obscure the 
fact that the parties are negotiating for that is, conventionally, seen as an element of ‘dispute 
resolution’; most informal carers and care-receivers will, ordinarily, be anxious to avoid connecting 
what they are doing with ‘dispute resolution’.   
At its heart, mediation is a future-focussed process, whether or not it involves the resolution of a 
dispute. That is also the focus of ‘family care contracts’. In seeking agreement, the parties need to 
come to an arrangement that foresees future difficulties and provides mechanisms for their 
resolution. The mediator’s commonly-used ‘what if ...’ question provides the lens through which any 
proposals need to be considered.  And, in reaching any agreement on the delivery of the envisaged 
service those involved in mediation must travel through it at their own pace.887 Mediation, after all, is 
entirely voluntary in nature; a party’s journey through the process is his/her own and cannot be 
determined by others. And, that is why, for a process that may well be a delicate one in some cases, 
the proposed ‘family care contract’ should be mediated from its inception through to its conclusion.888 
Finally, mediators have the ability to take any steps that might be necessary to protect any would-be 
carer or care-receiver that might be vulnerable to abuse and to ensure that any power imbalance that 
may exist as between the parties, and which might stand in the way of such a ‘family care contract’ 
being made, is equalised as far as it can be.  
What is said above is predicated on the success of the mediation process as a way of either resolving 
conflict or, more pertinently, securing an agreement in a no-conflict situation where the two parties 
have, in part, conflicting interests. Yet, how does one measure ‘success’? Those who claim that 
mediation is a success often point to outcomes: mediation is successful because it achieves an 
outcome or a set of outcomes. Here, ‘success’ is measured from the mediator’s point of view: the 
conflict has been resolved or the deal has been done. On the other hand, if the success of mediation 
is measured from the participants’ point of view, the issue becomes much more complex. In this 
instance, one must deal with ‘satisfaction levels’ and how to measure the same.  Here, one might ask, 
‘Was each party satisfied with the process of the mediation?’ and ‘Was each party satisfied with the 
 
886 Ibid. p. 295 
 
887 Freddie Strasser and Paul Randolph, Mediation: A Psychological Insight into Conflict Resolution, 
(Continuum, 2004), referencing, in particular, the work of Carl Rogers, p. 13. 
 
888 Of course, some ‘family care contract’ will only be terminated by the death of the care-receiver. Here, 




outcome of the mediation?’ Appling a Likert-style rating to the measurement of each party’s 
satisfaction with both the process and the outcome of the mediation may well produce an answer 
from which it is nigh impossible to measure its success on any objective basis. And, indeed, mediations 
in different contexts are susceptible to other ways of measuring success. In the resolution of 
neighbour disputes through mediation for example, one could choose to measure success by assessing 
the likelihood of the parties speaking constructively to each other in the future. Scholars have long-
wrestled with the problem of how to measure the success of mediation. Studies have taken place in 
the field of international conflict resolution,889 in relation to disputes in the construction industry,890 
and, indeed, in the realm of family mediation,891 but with differing approaches and results.  Of course, 
the mediated family care contract that is proposed is a significantly different beast in comparison with 
an agreement that attempts to resolve a dispute in any of these fields. Deal mediation cannot be easily 
compared with conflict resolution. Any reservations one has over the success of mediation in resolving 
disputes cannot be justifiably transferred to the process of arriving at an agreement in a no-conflict 
situation where each party is intent on reaching some form of accord. What is more, a family care 
contract is a rolling-agreement and may be periodically reviewed by the parties not a once-and-for-all 
solution that may be re-evaluated as a ‘bad deal’ as time marches on. 
Of perhaps greater substance – at least at first sight - as an argument against the introduction of the 
family care contract is the gender-bias that has attached to the provision of social care to members of 
the older generation with a family. Wherever one seems to go in the modern world that burden falls 
disproportionally on women. Will the promise of greater income in the form of an enhanced carer’s 
allowance and the promise of capital when the care-receiver dies through the family care contract 
place additional pressure on women to provide for the social care needs of an elderly disabled relative 
regardless of whether that relative is her blood-relation or one of her husband/partner’s parents or 
relatives? We have already seen that this question has supposedly proved problematic to legislators 
 
889 Juan Carlo Munevar, A New Framework for the Evaluation of Mediation Success, [2005] Brussels Journal of 
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891 Janet Smithson, Anne Barlow, Rosemary Hunter and Jan Ewing, ‘The ‘child’s best interests’ as an 




in Japan.892 That said, there is no empirical data that demonstrates that paying cash incentives to 
women to provide social care would have resulted in an increase in pressure of women to care for 
elderly relatives given that in Japanese society that pressure is already present in a marked degree. 
Indeed, at this juncture one could well advance the argument that attaching a monetary value to care 
work such as this would, in practice, make the work more appealing to men given their perceived need 
to be seen as ‘bread-winners’ within the family.  Similarly, one might, here, advance the claim that, 
given that women are already under pressure to provide whatever social care work that is needed 
because they are perceived to be better at it than men, they might as well be paid for that work if they 
are to do it in any event. What is surely needed is not to deny payment to whomsoever takes on the 
burden of providing social care within a family but to change society’s perception that caring is 
‘women’s work’ and not men’s.  
Mediation is a tried and tested resource.  It may not be the panacea for all ills, but it is a well-
developed, collaborative process. Within the scheme that is presently being put forward, the 
proposed ‘family care contract’ would not only be created through mediation it would also be 
managed through mediation. And, in practice, this would be the key to its success. The contract would 
evolve according to the needs of the care-receiver and according to the desire and ability of the 
informal carer to meet those needs. Where the care-receiver’s need for care increases other family 
members, friends or neighbours may be brought into the ‘family care contract’ in an effort to provide 
for that need; where such people are unable or unwilling to assist, the ‘family care contract’ may be 
adapted to take into account the care that will be delivered by professional carers. On a regular, 
periodic review of the ‘family care contract’ – which will be a mediated review – the mediator will, 
where necessary, be able to bring these other family members, friends and neighbours into the 
conversation. Initially, notice of an intending review would be served on the care-receiver’s spouse 
and all his/her adult children. If a need for an increased level of care is identified, and the care-
receiver’s existing registered informal carer is not willing or able to provide that care, or wishes to opt 
out of the caring process altogether, the mediation in which the care-receiver’s needs are being 
addressed can always be adjourned for a short period in order to facilitate this expanded conversation.  
Mediation is entirely flexible; it exists to meet the parties’ needs, not those of the mediator or any 
other person or institution.  Of course, given the vulnerability of the care-receiver and his/her need 
for care, ‘family care contracts’ will require some form of regulation. In practice, this must be the 
 




province of local authorities and the courts. The following section attempts to identify their respective 





6.7 THE ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE COURTS 
If it is to succeed in the role that it is to be given, a ‘family care contract’ needs the support of the care-
receiver’s local authority and, ultimately, the courts. Local authorities are already heavily involved in 
the process of delivering social care to the community which they serve. Once a needs assessment has 
identified an eligible need for social care the care-receiver’s local authority must meet that need.893 In 
doing so, the local authority will draw up a care and support plan which details how this need is to be 
satisfied. But, if this need is already being satisfied by an informal carer or carers that is as far as the 
local authority has to go.894 Where a need is not being met, the local authority must either provide or 
arrange for the provision of services that will meet the need. Unless the local authority already provide 
a service that will meet this need free of charge, a financial assessment will then be carried out in 
order to determine whether the adult care-receiver must pay for the services or make a contribution 
to their cost.895  
All this is, indeed, valuable work without which the present social care system could not function. And, 
if ‘family care contracts’ are introduced, local authorities will need to carry an even greater burden of 
responsibility.  Firstly, they will need to operate a registration system for these contracts. If a care 
assessment reveals that a need for care and support is already being met by an informal carer or 
carers, a local authority should be under a duty to inform both carer(s) and care-receiver: 
 
893 The Care Act 2014, ss. 9 and 13(1), and chapter two, section 2.4, supra. 
 
 894 Ibid, s. 18(7). 
 




(i)  that the courts have the power to make financial provision for an informal carer from 
the estate of the care-receiver following the care-receiver’s death in accordance with the legislation 
that is proposed in this thesis; 
(ii) that the parties may make a ‘family care contract’ which will override and replace that 
entitlement to financial provision, so that the ultimate cost to the care-receiver for the care which is 
to be provided by the informal carer will be a matter for agreement rather than assessment by the 
courts; 
(iii) that, if a ‘family care contract’ is made, the informal carer will be entitled to additional 
financial support during the caring process which will be provided by Central Government to the 
extent agreed by the parties (subject to a maximum limit), albeit that financial support may be 
recouped from the care-receiver’s estate through the imposition of a charge on the care-receiver’s 
home, although a sale of that home would not be implemented until after the care-receiver’s death 
or on the earlier sale of the property.896 
If the parties decide to enter into a ‘family care contract’, the local authority would make a 
recommendation in relation to the needs of the care-receiver and would assess the weekly cost of 
meeting those needs. That cost assessment would form a guide for both the mediator and the parties 
in relation to the task of agreeing the cost of the informal care that would be covered by that contract. 
The parties would then be referred to mediation. And, one hopes, that mediation would produce a 
‘family care contract’, duly signed by the parties, under which the services which are to be provided 
by the informal carer and the cost of these services to the care-receiver are clearly stated. The ‘family 
care contract’ would then be registered with the local authority. Once registered, a ‘family care 
contract’ should be open to public inspection. In this way, anyone who may be interested in the care-
receiver’s welfare will be able to inspect the register in order to ascertain whether such a contract has 
been registered and to determine whether the principal terms of the contract are being implemented. 
In the event, that he/she considers that the terms of social care service are not being provided for in 
accordance with the ‘family care contract’, he/she should be able to request the care-receiver’s local 
 
896 The legislation would also contain provisions (i) for the transfer of any charge that is taken by the UK 
Government to secure the payment of a ‘carer’s wage’ during the caring process from one property to another 
in case the care-receiver wishes to move into, for example, sheltered accommodation instead of a nursing 
home as he/she grows older and more infirm, (ii) postponing the enforcement of the charge until after the 
death of the care-receiver’s spouse if he/she is living at the property / has a beneficial interest therein at the 




authority to investigate and, if necessary, to use its powers to review the operation of the ‘family care 
contract’ that is presently in place.897 
Secondly, local authorities would need to oversee the carrying through of these ‘family care contracts’.  
In doing so, local authorities would have the power to refer any breach of the terms of such contracts 
to the courts. And, in turn, the courts would have the power to suspend or terminate these 
contracts.898 Of course, the parties may provide that their ‘family care contract’ is time, or even event, 
limited. On the expiry of the agreed time, or on the happening of the agreed event, the local authority 
would then have the power to undertake a further needs assessment and to re-start the process that 
took place before the ‘family care contract’ was made. In addition to this, local authorities would have 
the power to undertake a periodic review of all registered family care contracts in order to determine 
(a) whether the care-receiver’s needs have changed since the’ family care contract’ was made, and (b) 
whether the care-receiver’s needs as set out in the ‘family care contract’ were being met by the 
informal care that was being provided. In the event that the care-receiver’s needs have changed, the 
local authority would have to reassess how those needs might be met and open up a discussion with 
the informal carer as to whether he/she was prepared and able to meet those needs. In these 
circumstances, the existing ‘family care contract’ would be terminated and replaced with a new 
agreement relating to the provision of social care for the care-receiver.899 If the parties were not 
prepared, or able, to do this, the courts would have the power to terminate the existing ‘family care 
contract’. In the event that the local authority’s review of an existing ‘family care contract’ determined 
that the care-receiver’s needs as detailed in that contract were not being met, then, again, the local 
authority would have the power to refer the contract to the court for termination if it so determined. 
What is set out above in relation to the role of local authorities in the performance of these ‘family 
care contracts’ has already substantially introduced the role of the courts in relation to these 
contracts. As regards the operation of a ‘family care contract’ during the lifetime of the care-receiver, 
the courts would need to be on hand in order to resolve any disputes between: the care-receiver and 
 
897 Some details in relation to ‘family care contracts’ might be excluded from the register; for example, the 
amount payable to the informal carer in return for the services that he/she is obliged to perform.  
 
898 The courts would not have the power to enforce these contracts by injunction. 
 




the informal carer;900 the local authority and the informal carer;901 the informal carer and any 
‘interested party’;902 and, the informal carer and Central Government.903 
Of course, such disputes should only come before the courts where they could not be resolved through 
a form of alternative dispute resolution, principally, mediation. And, indeed, it is submitted that 
mediation should be compulsory, such that the parties would only have a right to take their dispute 
to the courts in the event that mediation failed to resolve that dispute. As regards, the role of the 
courts following the care-receiver’s death, the courts would need to be on hand to resolve any dispute 
between: (a) the informal carer and the UK Government;904 and, (b) any claimant who makes a claim 
against the care-receiver’s estate under the default contract contained in the legislation that is now 
proposed.905 One hopes that a body of jurisprudence would be quickly evolved in order to assist the 
resolution of such disputes out of court. And, it may be that guidelines in regard to the exercise of the 
court’s jurisdiction under this legislation might be incorporated in the legislation itself. 
In addition, the courts would have jurisdiction over the operation of the ‘default contract’ along similar 
lines to those in the Illinois Probate Act of 1975, section 18 – 1.1. That Act does provide the Illinois 
courts with some discretion not only in admitting claims made under the section in question but also 
in fixing the sums payable by the state of the care-receiver if the claim is successful.  Some measure 
of discretion is entirely appropriate. That said, the legislation to be introduced in England and Wales 
 
900 It is envisaged that such disputes, if any, would largely centre on the level of service provided by the 
informal carer. In practice, the local authority would be involved before any such dispute was referred to the 
courts, and therefore the courts might only be needed in the event that the local authority refused to act and 
mediation had failed to resolve the dispute. 
 
901 Such a dispute might take place on the completion of a local authority review of the ‘family care contract’ in 
question which determined that the informal carer was either not providing the social care that the care-
receiver required or that the care-receiver’s needs had changed and the informal carer was unable to provide 
for those needs. 
 
902 Here, an ‘interested party’ would include an adult child of the care-receiver who was not providing care 
services under the ‘family care contract’ then in place, but who was concerned that such services were not 
being performed and/or that the care-receiver’s welfare needs were not being met. In the event of any 
contention that the care-receiver’s welfare needs were not being met, the local authority might also need to 
be a party to any application that the ‘interested party’ should choose to make.  
 
903 Such a dispute might, for example, centre on the informal carer’s entitlement to be paid a ‘carer’s wage’ as 
provided for under the legislation that sets up these ‘family care contracts’. 
 
904 Such dispute would ordinarily be confined to any unpaid ‘carer’s wage’ and the informal carer’s entitlement 
to the same. 
 
905 The identity of the respondent to any such application would be a matter for the courts in similar vein to 




should encourage the avoidance of litigation between any informal carer who does not have the 
benefit of a ‘family care contract’, and who must therefore resort to the statutory claim, and those 
who represent the deceased care-receiver’s estate and/or the residuary beneficiaries. In practice, this 
should be done by following the lead presented by the Illinois Probate Act of 1975 and fixing a specific 
sum as the annual stipend for informal carers which is dependent on the type of caring work they have 
had to perform. In fixing the limits of a ‘statutory custodial claim’ under the Act (which can then be 
surpassed at the court’s discretion) section 18 – 1.1 bases its figures on the extent of the care-
receiver’s ‘disability’. It is proposed that any such legislation in England and Wales should adopt the 
categories already in place in determining whether an elderly disabled person is eligible for local 
authority care services, namely, ‘critical’, ‘substantial’, moderate’ and ‘low’.906 In this way, use may be 
made of the local authority’s needs assessment in determining the level of care that has been 
provided; in effect, there will be a rebuttable presumption that any informal carer will have provided 
care services that are commensurate with the care-receiver’s needs as assessed by the needs 
assessment. If an informal carer wished to contend that the courts should exercise their discretion to 
award him/her a sum greater than that provided by the proposed legislation, then he/she would have 
to show that, in reality, the care-receiver’s needs were more substantial than the local authority needs 
assessment disclosed and that he/she provided for those needs at that greater level. Similarly, it would 
be open for the care-receiver’s personal representatives and/or his/her residuary beneficiaries to 
claim that the informal carer should receive a lower award because, in practice, they did not provide 
care services at the level required by the local authority’s needs assessment.  
Any sum claimed by an informal carer under this proposed legislation would also be calculated by 
reference to the length of time during which care services were provided by the claimant. As it stands, 
the Illinois Probate Act of 1975 requires a claimant to have provided care services to the care-receiver 
for ‘at least 3 years’.907 This has been recognised as one of the Act’s major limitations and failings.908 
Indeed, it is proposed that the legislation, if adopted in England and Wales, should reduce this 
requirement to one year and give the courts a discretion to admit claims of less than one year, in 
particular where the claimant has expended money in adapting his/her own property to cope with the 
care-receiver’s needs and has where the claimant has given up his/her job in order to care for the 
care-receiver. It is also proposed that the figures set by any legislation that may be introduced are 
 
906 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/social-care-users-will-be-guaranteed-a-minimum-level-of-council-
help-under-new-plans (accessed: 25/02/18). 
 
907 The Illinois Probate Act of 1975, section 18 – 1.1. 
 




‘low’, that is to say, significantly below the market rate for such care services as may have been 
rendered by the informal carer. It is not suggested that informal carers should be paid a ‘market rate’ 
for the services that they perform, merely that they should receive some compensation for what they 
do in the form of a regular ‘carer’s payment’ provided by Central Government which is underpinned 
by a statutory charge on the care-receiver’s property. One cannot equate what informal carers do 
with what commercially provided care services achieve because informal carers will receive reciprocal 
benefits from the caring process.909 But, they should receive, or be entitled to claim, a sum that 
acknowledges the value of their work in the context of our modern society and the challenges that it 
now faces.910 
It is not practically possible to draft the proposed legislation within the confines of this thesis. 
Consideration would need to be given to levels of remuneration, the calculation of such remuneration, 
minimum care service delivery periods, anti-avoidance provisions, the introduction of a statutory 
limitation period for claims, what to do in instances where one has more than one claimant and the 
extent of any discretion given to the courts to step outside these provisions. That is a task for a good 
deal of additional research and much further thought. For the moment, all we can do is to pull some 
conclusions together and consider where the proposals outlined in this thesis might be taken from 




6.8 JUSTIFYING AND EXPANDING THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
Throughout this thesis, reference has been made to adult children caring for their elderly, disabled 
parents and, more recently, to the making of ‘family care contracts’ between adult child informal 
carers and their parents as care-receivers. Arrangements such as these, it is submitted, are essential 
for meeting the social care needs of not only the present generation of disabled elderly, but also the 
needs of future generations of this growing section of society. Yet, in practice, there is no 
overwhelming argument in favour of confining such ‘family care contracts’ to adult children as 
informal carers and their parents as care-receivers. If there is a concern that those elderly and disabled 
 
909 See: Jonathan Herring, Caring and the Law, (Hart, 2013) at p. 59 et seq. 
 
910 See: Ibid. at p. 106, citing the views and work of Maxine Eichner on this subject in M. Eichner, The 
Supportive State, (OUP, 2010). 
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who are in need of social care might be exploited by people outside their immediate family,911 the 
registration system proposed should provide a sufficient safeguard against this possibility. In fact, the 
registration of these contracts and their supervision by the relevant local authority should allow other 
more remote members of the family to offer their services as informal carers and to enter into ‘family 
care contracts’ where the more immediate members of the care-receiver’s family are unable to do so. 
Similarly, there is no such reason why friends and neighbours should not be able to enter into these 
‘family care contracts’ where the care-receiver’s adult children, if any, cannot do so. While adult 
children should be given first option to enter into such contracts, if and when the same are needed, 
remoter members of the care-receiver’s family, friends and neighbours should be given the same 
opportunities where adult children are unable to help. On this basis, the ‘family care contract’ is, of 
course, misnamed. Its reach can extend well beyond families. In fact, in time these contracts may 
develop into ‘care unit contracts’ with participants forming care units within which the caring process 
can take place. 
The very existence of the proposed ‘family care contract’ would surely encourage the general public 
to acknowledge the existence of social care needs on the part of the elderly and the roles and 
responsibilities of both the family, care-receivers and society at large, in the provision of those needs. 
Much further thought is needed.  But, there will be a good deal of benefit to be reaped by society at 
large if such a regime is introduced.  People are relational beings. Many of us measure the success of 
our lives by the relationships we form and sustain. The proposed ‘family care contract’ will encourage 
these relationships. Informal carers will learn much from them; indeed, such contracts may provide 
an opportunity in some instances for younger people to be paid carers – albeit operating outside the 
commercial world – acquiring, on the one hand, valuable social and care-providing skills, and, on the 
other, the respect and appreciation of an older generation.   
Given that the State will need to facilitate, promote and protect these ‘family care contracts’, the 
proposals set out in this chapter will involve the State in a greater degree of social engineering than 
some would like. Wealth taxes might need to be introduced in order to provide the social care that 
those without property will undoubtedly need. The right to dispose of one’s property wealth as and 
when one wishes to do so may have to be curtailed. But, the State must surely react to repel any 
perceived threat to the protection and well-being of its citizens. And, the likelihood that the increased 
longevity of its citizens will be accompanied by greater suffering - perhaps as much as a quarter of 
one’s lifespan at the age of 65 - is such a threat. Indeed, in ideological terms, the solution that has 
 
911 Who may seek to provide a level of service that fails to meet the care-receiver’s needs in order to gain the 
financial rewards that proposed scheme will bring. 
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been put forward might be regarded as part of an enhanced social contract, one that is specifically 





































At the very beginning of this thesis, a series of difficult questions were posed in relation to the effect 
of what has been a remarkable sociological phenomenon in England and Wales in the latter part of 
the twentieth, and in the early years of the twenty-first, centuries, namely, the marked increase in the 
average human lifespan of many of its inhabitants. Of particular concern was the question of how to 
meet the social care needs of the disabled elderly in society. Is the meeting of these needs something 
for which the State must be held responsible or should the care burden carried by this section of 
society fall on the shoulders of members of the care-receiver’s family? Empirical data clearly shows 
that the significance of this question will grow markedly in the next two decades.912 Unless action is 
taken, there is a real risk that our existing social care system will be unable to meet these ever 
increasing needs.  
Against this background, this thesis went on to consider the extent of the State benefits presently 
afforded to informal carers who now bear the burden of caring for our disabled elderly. Whether these 
informal carers are the spouses of those in need of care or their adult children, their friends or 
neighbours, it is clear that, in financial terms, any State provision that is available for these people is 
extremely poor. In practical terms, informal carers are given very little in return for what they do. State 
benefits are at a level that may fairly be described as ‘minimal’ given the degree of care that is often 
needed and the effect that it has on the carer’s ability to pursue their own career ambitions and 
provide for the needs of their own family.913  In reality, these benefits are seen as ‘supplements’ to 
 
912 See: chapter one, section 1.3, supra. 
 




existing incomes, yet the State requires these family carers to work at least 35 hours caring for another 
before the carer’s allowance’ becomes payable and then there are other conditions that a claimant 
may be unable to meet. What is more, in the absence of specific enforceable promises, these informal 
carers are not entitled to any recompense from the care-receiver notwithstanding that care may have 
extensive and may have been delivered over a considerable period of time; in fact, without more, they 
are unable to reclaim any financial expenditure they might have incurred in providing this care to the 
care-receiver.914  
At its heart, this thesis is a work on law reform. If the case for law reform is made out in the opening 
three chapters of this thesis – which, it is submitted, it is – the next issue to consider is how that reform 
might be achieved. The ideas for this thesis were born of the author’s work in practice on applications 
made under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (‘the 1975 Act’).  This Act 
– and its predecessor Act, the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938 – were never designed to 
accommodate claims for reasonable financial provision made by informal carers. Had that been the 
case, one would have seen these people identified as persons who are able to make a claim in s. 1(1) 
of the 1975 Act. But, might the 1975 Act be easily amended to include informal carers amongst the 
categories of applicants who are entitled to bring a case before the courts for an award under this 
Act? The analysis set out in chapter four clearly suggests not. Not only would the essence of such a 
claim – the idea of compensation or reward for services rendered – be diametrically opposed to the 
way in which all other claimants must put their claims, namely, on the basis of dependency and need, 
and would, therefore, lack the philosophical foundations on which these other claims have been built 
as exceptions to the much-vaunted principle of freedom of testation, but claims made by informal 
carers would also compete with these other claims and be liable to be defeated by them. And, in any 
event, the prevailing judicial attitude to such claims seems to vacillate between mild concern for the 
plight of such carers and complete indifference born of a feeling that such carers are merely fulfilling 
a moral obligation that they have to the care-receiver to provide such care. 
In light of these findings, due consideration was given in chapter five to whether the law relating to 
proprietary estoppel, constructive trusts or, perhaps more feasibly, unjust enrichment might be 
adapted to provide theoretical support for claims made by informal carers.  However, it is clear that 
the first two of these ‘alternative pathways’ require some form of ‘communicated understanding’ 
between the informal carer and his/her care-receiver. And, this seems incompatible with the notion 
of an obligation on the part of the care-receiver, or even the State, to compensate the care-giver for 
 




services rendered which, in essence, is born of public policy rather than some form of express, implied 
or even imputed  agreement.915  With this, attention was focussed on the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment as a means through which informal carers might receive compensation for the care 
afforded to care-receivers, but, again, the philosophical foundation for such claims, as presently 
recognised in English Law, would seem to be against the use of the doctrine for these ends. If public 
policy suggests that all informal carers should be able to make a claim for financial redress for the 
rendering of care services, the success or failure of such a claim cannot be dependent on whether or 
not they had any expectation of receiving a reward for what they were doing. 
With these initial conclusions in mind, the task set was then to seek the collective thoughts and views 
of a group of family carers through a series of semi-structured interviews which sought to focus on 
their experiences of caring and how these experiences might provide us with a body of information 
on which any final conclusions might be drawn. Once this had been completed, this thesis could finally 
returned to the questions raised at its very outset, ‘Who is going to care for our disabled elderly in the 




7.2.            INTERVIEWS WITH INFORMAL OR ‘FAMILY’ CARERS 
The data which is drawn upon in this chapter is taken from a series of individual, semi-structured 
interviews with 21 informal or ‘family’ carers conducted between late September 2020 and early April 
2021.916 The aim of this project was to collect and review the personal experiences of the various 
participants in caring for elderly and infirm members of their families, particularly, but not confined 
to, their parents. The questions raised during these interviews were grouped around seven distinct 
themes. For the most part, these themes related to issues that were explored earlier in this work, not 
to confirm or verify what was stated therein, but to expand upon and, where necessary, to bring life 
and colour to what has thus far been presented as a set of cold, hard facts.  
The coding frame that was used for these interviews was designed to facilitate an exploration of the 
main, substantive element of this thesis, namely, what society can do in order to encourage family 
 
915 See: chapter five, supra. 
 
916 From this point on the rest of this chapter will use the term ‘family’ carers rather than ‘informal’ carers as 
this proved to be more easily understood by the interviewees who took part in this part of the project. 
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caring in an age where families are becoming more and more fragmented, emotionally and 
geographically. The personal experiences of the various participants in this project were diverse and, 
of course, unique.917 While there was no concerted effort to sample a representative cross-section of 
society in pursuing this project, the responses of these volunteers touched upon many of the 
difficulties experienced by all those who have called upon to care for elderly and infirm, parents and 
relatives in the modern day and age. And the challenges that these participants faced, and for some 
are still facing, are illustrative of those faced by many others in our society whatever their situation 
might be.  
Initial attempts to structure the project around a number of local charitable or not-for-profit 
organisations working with family carers were quickly abandoned with the onset of the global 
pandemic in early 2020 and the introduction of the country’s first national lockdown. In the event, 
volunteers for these interviews were largely collected through word-of-mouth. Nonetheless, the 
accounts provided by the participants of their experiences of family caring were not only vibrant and 
colourful, but also informative and often highly thought-provoking. Indeed, as the questions raised in 
the interviews were not confined to the personal experiences in providing care for an elderly parent 
or relative, but also asked for their individual views and opinions on a wide range of issues considered 
earlier in this work, including the merits of the social care system that we have in this country, the role 
of government in the process of providing care for the elderly infirm and the funding of such a system 
into the future. These views and opinions have much intrinsic value. As one participant put it, they, 
and all others like them were ‘the silent majority, plodding around, beavering away, doing the work 
and not complaining.’918 But their voices deserve to be heard and acted upon. No attempt to reform 
of our social care system would have any value or direction without listening to these family carers 
and deriving lessons from their own personal experiences of caring and the sacrifices that have had to 





917 On three occasions, interviews were held with two sisters who were both engaged in caring for the same 
family member – Mrs. E.F and Mrs. F.G. (caring for their aunt), Mrs. A.B. and Mrs. M.N. (caring for their father) 
and Miss H.I. and Miss O.P. (caring for their mother) but, given the uniqueness of these experiences it was felt 
that this was entirely justifiable. 
 





7.2.1 Theme One: A Family Carer’s Experiences of Commercial and Local Authority-Sponsored 
Social Care. 
‘Care in the community’ is now, and has been for the past 35 years or so, the favoured government 
approach to the provision of social care for the elderly. To a large extent, this is also the approach that 
is favoured by the elderly themselves and their families appear content to support this wish in so far 
as they are able to do so. Domiciliary care is provided by care ‘agencies’ either engaged on a private 
basis or through the local authority who will provide two weeks’ free care through these agencies 
while the elderly person who is in need of care is being assessed for local authority funding. These 
commercial organisations will often be called upon to provide three or four visits per day from 
professional social care staff to help an elderly, infirm care-receiver to get up in the morning, to 
prepare their lunch and to put them to bed in the evenings, with an optional fourth visit sometime in 
the afternoon depending on the extent of care needed and in particular the recipient’s need for 
prescription medicines which they are unable to administer themselves. If the care-receiver’s income 
and/or capital resources are below the prescribed limits, these services will be provided by the local 
authority free of charge beyond the initial two week period, but, in practice, this seems very rare 
indeed and many are left to meet the fees and charges levied by these organisations at their usual 
commercial rates. For the most part, these professional carers are seen as essential to the system 
through which social care for the elderly infirm is provided at home for family carers in employment 
have other duties and obligations to keep and, in many instances, the need to earn an income with 
which they must support their own younger families. In this way, family carers will often ‘fill in the 
gaps’ and be more heavily involved in the caring process in the early evenings, through the night and 
at weekends where they are more available. Of course, on some occasions these family carers will 
themselves be retired and able to take a more hands-on approach to caring, perhaps taking the care-
receiver into their own homes and being with them on a 24/7 basis.919 Whichever approach is adopted, 
the demands of caring often seem to be heavy and very-much life-changing for the care provider. 
As regards the provision of professional care by these care agencies, there appears to be a widely-held 
view that professional care workers are both underpaid and overworked by the organisations that 
employ them, with some resentment directed at their employers for taking the profit available in the 
provision of these services for themselves and putting little into the process in return. In some cases, 
appointments which should have involved the provision of one hour of care have lasted little more 
 
919 For example, in the case of Mrs. I.J. 
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than 30-40 minutes (or sometimes much less) with a significant part of this time devoted to the filling-
in of forms and records by the care worker rather than the provision of care. Shorter visits scheduled 
for 30 minutes seem to last little more than 15-20 minutes. The common explanation for this was that 
care workers were given schedules that were simply too tight for them to maintain. They needed to 
leave early and/or arrive late and, on either occasion, reduce the time given over to providing social 
care for the care recipient because they needed to get to their next appointment. On some occasions, 
where a care worker was unavailable to meet a scheduled appointment through illness or the like, 
either no cover was provided or another care worker arrived unacceptably late. In many cases, this 
presented the family carer with a crisis to resolve because the care-receiver simply could not be left 
alone, yet the family carer felt the need to get to work and do the job that they were being paid to do. 
For the most part, their employers seem to have accepted that family carers cannot always get to 
work ‘on time’ and have been flexible enough to accommodate their needs; but this, in turn, has left 
some family carers uncertain over what action their employer might take in the future and has instilled 
in them a lack of security in their employment that they would otherwise have had. 
These observations were reflected in many of the interviews undertaken for this project, but were 
perhaps most keenly felt in the observations of Mrs. M.N, Mrs. Q.R. and Mrs. U.V. At page 4 of her 
transcript, in response to the questions whether her elderly father could have coped by looking after 
himself, Mrs. M.N., a solicitor by profession, replied: 
“I don't think so. No, because I think with the carers coming in, it started off three times a day 
and then went to four times a day, that still wasn't enough for him because they were only 
calling in for 15 minutes. Although you're paying for half an hour, you find that you get about 
15 minutes and the other 15 minutes its them either travelling to you from the last client or 
travelling from you to the next client or what have you. So, even if you had an hour slot, which 
he did used to have, I think, once a week, he wasn't getting an hour's care. In that hour he 
might have been getting 45 minutes or something and it just wasn't enough interaction, I don't 
think for him. He wanted someone there more often. And so that's why we got to the stage 
where we felt it's either got to be full time live-in care or move into a nursing home.” 
Mrs. E.F., who was staying overnight with her elderly aunt in her aunt’s home in order to care for her 
during the evenings and overnight while holding down a job as a primary school teacher, in 
circumstances where the aunt was suffering from vascular dementia, described a dilemma which she 
was regularly faced with thus (at pages 1-2 of her transcript): 
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“…. once we started looking after Sheila, we would be taking turns, the four siblings of moving 
into the house and living there effectively for a week. So it had a very big impact. You know, 
we had to make arrangements for the children. We had to make arrangements for getting into 
work. We had to make arrangements for carers. Sometimes carers wouldn't turn up for, you 
know, for whatever reason. So it was just much more of a military operation really to, sort of, 
run our lives. And it was very, very disruptive to be honest and actually quite stressful too 
because of the nature of Sheila's condition.” 
Other participants described their experiences of buying in commercial social care with a little less 
detachment and a good deal more negativity. Mrs. Q.R., at page 5 of her transcript, said this: 
“…. I did go through a phase of paying for domiciliary care at home, but my mum had this 
‘going out all the time’, so you know, it was a waste of money. And carers were screwing her 
over anyway, because what would happen is that they wouldn't write anything down properly, 
they were supposed to do certain tasks for things, they left her unmedicated, yeah, and they’d 
write ‘no care required’. I sued one care firm and completely won, and was vindicated, 
because the neighbour said, ‘they'll come in, they'll be in there two minutes and they'll leave’.” 
Indeed, some participants took the decision not to engage any such commercial care organisation to 
provide the care that was needed.920 In particular, Mrs. U.V. managed to arrange for social care to be 
provided for her father privately albeit on a commercial basis by advertising for carers in a local paper. 
At page 5 of her transcript, she described the taking of this decision in the following manner: 
“Well, I really do feel that, in some ways, that we ought to be ploughing some proper money 
into adult social care. There was no way was I going to go for the social services’ free package, 
where you've got these people that come in for half an hour, they spend their time giving 
them tablets, form filling, to me that ….. I just didn't want anything to do with that. Even 
though it was free for a fortnight or whatever, I said ‘no’, I'm sorry my dad deserves better. I 
want him to form an attachment with people. I don't just want four faces coming throughout 
the day and putting a microwave meal in for him. I don't need that. I do feel that all that side 
of things needs massively looking at, so that there is profit. I mean some people are in it 
because it's money, even though it's poorly paid. Other people are in it because they genuinely 
care about the people in their charge, and you know I think the government really need to 
look at, you know, investing money because we have an elderly population. I'm not saying 
that care homes are the answer either, because I think a lot of people can be neglected in care 
 
920 For example, Mrs. I.J., Miss H.I. and Mrs. U.V. 
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homes. Where possible, people should be able to stay in their own homes. And I mean, 
probably for what it costs us, it would be as much as putting dad in a care home anyway, and 
yet we're getting these wonderful ladies that provide this round the clock care at probably the 
same amount of money.” 
The social care package arranged privately by Mrs. U.V. appears to have provided her elderly father 
with some 20 hours of social care attendance every day, with Mrs. U.V. providing a break for the carers 
for around four hours each afternoon. While it was costly, she clearly felt that this arrangement 
provided significantly more care and at a higher level than was available from commercial care 
organisations or, indeed, what would have been available to her father in a nursing home. 
Some participants felt that the provision of professional care through daily visits simply did not suit 
their elderly parent because the visits were scheduled at inconvenient times. And, of course, no 
organisation providing social care on a commercial basis can easily accommodate a demand from 
number of care recipients ‘on their books’ for a visit at precisely the same time of day. Not every care-
receiver can be awakened at say 8 am, washed, dressed and fed and put to bed at say 9 am following 
much the same process. This, and it’s effect, was acknowledged by Mr. T.U. at page 6 of his transcript: 
“So it was determined that he [Mr. T.U.’s father] needed that level of care and, he didn’t have 
a lot of capital, but they both …. my mum was a teacher and my dad was a civil servant and 
had decent pensions. So, they had to … they didn’t pay the full whack, but they paid what was 
deemed to be affordable. So we thought that it would be better, with our help, for them to 
organise totally private care rather than local authority based care because we were in the 
hands of the local authority determining what were, particularly for my mother, unsuitable 
times. As I said earlier, my dad was accepting of anything, he was just grateful for the care he 
got. But I think they could have had a more normal life if they could have been put to bed a 
little later, if dad was put to bed in the last slot about half eight, nine o’clock, rather than half 
seven and it’s finished then. But they couldn’t have afforded that. We were prepared to help 
pay for the private care but they never thought that it was necessary. They didn’t want to do 
that. So, they were totally dependent on these wonderful carers who came four times a day.” 
Happily, this particular view of what these professional carers did for Mr. T.U.’s father seems to be 
much more positive than most other participants’ opinions on their experience of working with 




One matter of particular comment was the pressure that some family carers were exposed to from 
social workers and/or nursing staff to facilitate the return of an elderly member of the family to their 
own home following a spell in hospital. Mrs. F.G. had this experience and relates it at page 6 of her 
transcript: 
“When Sheila was due to leave hospital, and we were discussing the alternatives for her, the 
social worker was very, very keen for her to return to her home which was completely 
unsuitable. And I assume this is generally what people are persuaded to do because it saves 
so much money, even though Sheila was funding herself. I don't know whether she was aware 
of that at that stage. But, you know, it would have been completely inappropriate for her to 
return to a large house with poor facilities, really, which hadn't been updated. So you know I 
said there's sometimes I think that it’s money we're thinking about rather than the person 
and their needs in terms of the Government I mean.” 
At this point in the process a decision needs to be made as to whether an elderly person can return 
home, but in this case the pressure to enable the aunt to return to her usual environment, with the 
family providing care at increasing levels of demand as a result of the care recipient’s ongoing 
dementia, seems to have been considerable.921 In the event, the aunt was placed in a nursing home, 
which appears to have been much the better decision in regard to her overall quality of life. As Mrs. 
V.W. put it at page 3 of her transcript: 
“I think the level of care in, as you put it, sheltered accommodation was much better. I think 
it encouraged her to eat a little bit more. It had a nice ….. well, they call it restaurant, but it’s 
a bit more of a cafeteria which was open throughout the day, which was, I think it was 
subsidized in some ways, it was fairly inexpensive. And she'd often go and have a lunch there 
and have a bit of a chat with people. So I think it was a social side of it that helped. And she 
still didn't really engage very much with the carers is coming in, but she would …. within the 
facility she had her own little flat with one bedroom, a small kitchen. But the residence had 
separate laundry rooms and they also had a bathing facility, because the room that she had 
had a shower, a bathroom and a shower. …. And, she was much happier there. We'd been sort 
of prompting her for a couple of years to consider it. And she kept saying ‘no, no, no’. But I 
think she eventually realised that she did actually need a little bit more. And my feeling is that, 
if she had actually gone into that facility earlier, she probably would have been happier, and I 
 
921 In Mrs. F.G’s case she was one of four joint owners of the property, which was occupied by the aunt, a 
property which was ‘the family home’, but which could not be sold because the aunt was in occupation. 
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think she would have lived for longer, because I don't think she'd have health problems, lose 
quite as much weight and get as frail.” 
 
‘Care in the community’ is clearly an approach which is driven by cost as much as anything else. As 
such, it places a considerable burden on family carers. Nursing and other residential homes do seem 
to have had something of a ‘bad press’ in the latter part of the twentieth century and this may have 
contributed to a common desire amongst the elderly that they would try to live at home as long as 
they possibly could, with the responsibility for providing the support which was necessary for this to 
take place being placed firmly on the shoulders of their family, often without any regard to the effect 
that this would have on their lives, their careers and aspirations. As Mrs. D.E. put it, at pages 1-2 of 
her transcript, in respect of caring for her mother who is now living with her and her husband: 
“….. we don't feel as free as we did, I suppose, and that's one of the main things. It also means 
that in the daytime. I don't, I can't, just go out without considering her and what she might 
be doing or what she might need doing or, yeah, I am not as free as I might have been so 
retirement for me has not been … it’s just, like taking on another job in a way, and that's 
probably what it means. And it's not that I don't …  I obviously want to help her. But, yeah, it 
has come at a cost for me and John in that John and I don't have as much privacy or as much 
time to ourselves. In fact, you know, we don't get very much time to ourselves at all really. 
So that's the biggest cost, I think, and the change to our life.” 
As we continue to live longer, more and more of us will experience the effect of having to care for 
elderly parents and relatives perhaps late in their careers, perhaps early in their retirement, but 







7.2.2 Theme Two: The Commitment of Family Carers 
The choice to care for an elderly parent or relative represents a significant commitment for many 
family carers. It frequently involves the giving up of time where they would otherwise be giving 
themselves the space needed to wind-down from their often stressful jobs; it interferes with their 
social life, it prevents them from going away for weekends or on holiday, it affects their relationships 
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with other family members, often young children who need their mother or father. The elderly who 
are housebound due to an infirmity need company; and this is a recurring theme in the accounts many 
family carers, namely, that their parent craved company and they were expected to provide it come 
what may. 
At page 2 of her transcript, Mrs. E.F. described her experiences of caring for her elderly aunt in the 
following way: 
“Initially we all lived in as a family because it was a big house. And so we would all be there. 
But actually what we decided subsequently, as a family, was that I would go on my own to 
look after Sheila and that Keith, my husband, and the children would carry on living their lives 
as normal during the week because, you know, the children would get a bus to school and it 
would be a particular route that was paid for, you know, and all that kind of stuff and my 
husband had to leave for work very early. So, so, actually it was so disruptive to have the 
children living at the house for that week, we decided that we would, sort of, live separate 
lives for that week, which was difficult for two small children. And in some ways it was respite 
for me, actually, to be away from them. But actually, in reality, it was, it was difficult because, 
you know, children, young children, need their mother, really, to sort of run around after 
them. And just as an emotional support. So I felt really torn.” 
One can see in this the ‘sandwich generation’ referred to earlier in this work. Those of us in middle 
age torn between caring for one’s family, on the one hand, and caring for one’s parent or relative on 
the other. 
But, in many ways the effect of caring is so very different; it depends very much on one’s own 
circumstances, the circumstances of the care-receiver and the circumstances of other members of 
the family, siblings and the like, some of whom are not able to share the caring responsibilities, others 
who do not want to do so. At the tender age of 36, Miss H.I. found herself looking after her mother 
who began to suffer from dementia following a minor stroke. The effect that this one event has had 
on her life has been quite considerable; four years down the line, she is still caring, but there is little 
or no end in sight. At page 2 of her transcript, she described the aftermath of this event in the 
following way: 
“And she's never been able to be left on her own from that point, and obviously, it was very 
tough. For the first few months because we were both in this position, you know, it was 
unprecedented to us. We didn't …. I didn't know how to deal with that. Poor mum was 
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frustrated and didn't know what was happening. And then I did have to say to my sisters and 
my brothers, there's no way this is 24 seven, I can't do this. ‘You're going to have to, we're 
going to have to, figure out some sort of plan to look after her’, and it was done. Katie lived 
in London. She said she was going to come home anyway. Maybe not for another five years 
or so, but she said, I'll sell up and I'll come back and she did and that's what happened. And 
we’re still here.” 
Having to cope with dementia in an elderly parent or relative is particularly stressful and demanding. 
But, because we are living longer, dementia in the older elderly is becoming increasingly common; 
and this, in turn, is having a greater and more prevalent effect on the lives of their children and other 
relatives who have chosen to care for them. This is particularly acute for those with demanding jobs. 
Mrs. F.G. recounts how, as a primary school teacher, she was having to balance the demands of her 
job with caring for her aunt. At page 2 of her transcript she recalls: 
“So a typical work day would be, well, often to be woken in the night because she had 
developed no concept of time (period). So she'd often get up in the middle of the night, 
basically, and start kind of either getting dressed, having a wash or emptying her cupboards. 
So, then you'd have to go and kind of stop her doing that, which she always, which she was 
never happy about. She always used to kind of fight you, kind of, from interfering and then, 
and then, I'd have to get ready for work. I would have a shower and then get myself ready for 
work, get Jacob up and ready to leave the house as well, because during the day he'd be going 
to college, and then we’d leave about half past seven. Because I'm a teacher and I like to get 
to work by eight and the carer would be coming at eight but you had to give Sheila strict 
instructions not to move from her room or her bed, which she didn't really understand, and 
I just used to hope that she hadn't got up and tried to get herself up. Normally, I mean 
sometimes, I used to find her in bed with a slippers on so she obviously have tried to get up. 
Also, she'd have quite a lot of what you might have to clean up … if she had any urinating 
accidents during the night.” 
But, demanding jobs or not, the effect of caring is often very considerable, so much so that some 
carers feel that the caring process is stealing their very lives from underneath them. In answer to a 
question concerning how the need to care for her mother has affected her life, Miss O.P. described 
this event, at page 1 of her transcript, thus: 
“Well yes, it’s changed out of all recognition. You know, I used to go to work, have a life and 
now, well now, we're looking after ….. well she can't be left alone. So how people do it on 
242 
 
their own is beyond me. So, basically, I'm here all day. Caro(line) obviously lives here. And 
that's what we do. We sit and watch the telly. I've read a lot of books. I tell my mother 
endlessly that, yes, it is her house. So, yeah, that's it, really. Nothing particularly exciting.” 
In practice, the caring responsibilities will regularly fall on daughters rather than sons, although there 
are, of course, always exceptions. On occasions, geography – the very fact that one lives near to one’s 
elderly and infirm parent – will play a significant role on the allocation of this caring burden; on other 
occasions, it’s the demanding nature, and perhaps even the earning power, of the job that one sibling 
has but not another that determines that the other will undertake the care for an elderly parent. But, 
more often than not, it is daughters who feel the need to ‘step into the breach’ and it is therefore 
unsurprising that the sample from which the present data is drawn contained 17 interviews with 
female family carers but only four with male family carers, and even then the work undertaken by 
daughters was noticeably different from that undertaken by sons. At page 1 of her transcript, Mrs. 
Q.R. recalls how circumstances seemed to dictate how she was the one who had to undertake the 
care of her mother: 
“My life’s been, or the course of my life's been, influenced by a number of events, one being 
that I lived away from home and was doing a master's degree and my mum had, or was 
diagnosed with, breast cancer. And I'd got a job to go to in London, I was going to go live down 
there. Anyway, my mum was diagnosed with breast cancer, and the first weekend after she 
had a lumpectomy, and she was at Christie's, came home, my dad dropped dead. So, basically, 
I came home because it was a week before the finals of my master's. I sat my exams, and then 
I left and I came home, and it was expected that I would look after her and nurse her. So, I 
sort of ripped up my plans of what I was going to do and I came home to live, because I have 
three brothers, a twin and two other brothers. …. We kind of got drawn into …. that that was 
another influencing factor coming back from the South, because my brothers lived away and 
I had to take over the care, and my mum became increasingly problematic because, as it 
progressed, I kept fighting with the doctors, because they said it was just natural aging, and I 
said it's not natural aging, because my mum would do things like she turned night into day, 
repeat things, her personality changed, she went from being somebody who's quite gentle, 
strong to being angry, often accusatory, telling you things, repeating herself, just a personality 




Even when living some distance away, daughters seem to be expected to help with the process of 
caring for an elderly parent, keeping them company and in contact with their family. At page 2 of her 
transcript, Mrs S.T. recalls the process of coming up to do this whilst bringing up three small children: 
“I used to come up every six weeks or so, every half term and what have you, and bring the 
children to distract her. Obviously, she loved that. But they found it very, very hard. It was 
very hard on them because it wasn’t nana anymore. And she would do things that they 
thought were funny which were actually quite dangerous and what have you, so it became 
very difficult for them, our sons. As Matthew got older he understood more. He took it on 
board much more easily and actually would care for her in a really appropriate way which was 
really good.” 
And, at page 3 of her transcript, Mrs. G.H. explained the difficulties with which she was faced when 
deciding what to do with her life in order to accommodate the fact that she was expected to care for 
her parents in their old age. 
“…. well I was living a 30 minute journey away from them. We then had to leave that because 
we rent, obviously because we don't know how long we will be here or anything. Um, we had 
to move out of there because the landlord was selling, so we've managed .. we've moved 
closer to them. I'm about a 10 to 15 minute drive away from them now, but it has meant that 
our rent has doubled.” 
Other participants described making much longer journeys by car in order to care for an elderly 
parent, with one describing a round trip of up to three hours.922 
At one point during these interviews each participant was asked how they thought their elderly 
parent might have coped without the intervention of either themselves or anyone else to provide the 
care that was required in an effort to get their parent through the problems with which they were 
faced. Almost without exception, the answer was that they would have had to be moved into a care 
home, that they would have had to have had live-in care from professional carers or they would 
simply have passed away much earlier than they did.923 The work of these family carers was therefore 
 
922 For example, Mrs. Q.R., Mrs. V.W. and Mr. L.M ( with the latter having the round trip of up to three hours). 
 
923 For example, Mr. C.D. (at page 1 of his transcript), Mrs. D.E (at page 3 of her transcript) Mrs. F.G. (at page 2 
of her transcript), Mrs. G.H (at page 3 of her transcript), Mrs. M.N (at page 4 of her transcript), Mrs. N.O. (at 
page 3 of her transcript), Miss O.P. (at page 3 of her transcript) and Mrs. R.S. (at page 3 of her transcript). The 
cost of live-in care from professional carers was seen as an option that was, financially, out of reach of all 
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seen – at least through their eyes – as essential to the continuing well-being of their elderly parents 
either in physical or in financial terms and often in both. And, yes, some participants did acknowledge 
that this work did serve to protect any inheritance that was expected to come their way,924 but overall 
that was rarely mentioned as a fact that precipitated their decision to care for their elderly parent or 
parents. More common was simply that it had to be done and, if they did not care for their parent(s) 
or relative, then ‘no one else would’.925 
That latter comment was often made in such a way that it called into question what the government’s 
role in caring for the elderly, infirm should be. Interestingly, it was also felt by many that they, these 
family carers, were engaged in work that ultimately the government bore some real responsibility for 
and a good deal of disappointment was expressed with the performance of government in supporting 
family carers either financially or physically through some form of support network that involved the 
assistance of social workers and/or health workers depending on the nature of their parent or 





7.2.3 The Role of Government in the Care of the Elderly 
The U.K. Government’s approach to the issue of care for the elderly infirm – that of ‘care in the 
community’ – has been mentioned earlier on in this chapter. And, indeed, the very extent of the 
changes that this approach has brought with it, changes to the lives of not only the elderly themselves, 
but also their children, their friends and even their neighbours, can be seen in the observation made 
by Mrs. J.K., a practice nurse, at page 4 of her transcript: 
“Something that’s just struck me while you were mentioning that – finances I’m not very good 
on but – my job is, as I have said, a practice nurse. I go out and give the ‘flu vaccinations to 
 
participants who had given any thought to that possibility, even where their parent or parents would be paying 
for such cost. 
 
924 See: Mrs. G.H. at page 3 of her transcript. 
 
925 See: Mr. C.D. at page 1 of his transcript. 
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people living alone – I know this is slightly off the track but 20 years ago I had about a dozen 
house-bound patients to go and visit, quite a lot in nursing homes, but when I trained 30 years 
ago the hospitals were full of elderly people, geriatric wards abounded. This year my list has 
been 175 patients, house-bound people and a lot of them, I don’t know how many, but nearly 
all of them have got carers. A lot of them have paid carers going in three or four times a day. 
And I am aware that those numbers have increased because now, because those particular 
patients, 20 or 30 years ago, would have either been in a hospital then or in a nursing home. 
So that the community care has got a lot better. But, of course, there are a lot of people who 
are caring for their relatives who are not being remunerated enough. But the numbers …. 
when I looked and realised just how many I’d done this year I thought, ‘it’s quite astounding’.” 
Given that so many people seem to be involved in the provision of domiciliary care for each elderly 
person who has chosen to live out their days in their own homes, it seems surely inescapable that the 
U.K. Government must take a significant degree of responsibility for supporting those who are 
involved in this process, particularly those who are not being rewarded for what they do on a 
commercial basis.  
This was emphasised time and time again by those who participated in these interviews. Take, for 
example, Mr. L.M., someone who has worked in metal health in the NHS at some point in his life, 
who, at page 6 of his transcript, was constrained to make this observation: 
“ …. there's always this assumption that there's someone else, a family member, to care and 
support this individual who's elderly and unwell. And that's often not the case. And, you know, 
just attending hospital appointments, things like that. You know, there came a stage where 
he [my father] wasn't able to drive and ‘how does he get to these appointments?’ And the 
expectation is, is that there will always be someone you know a family member to go with 
him, be with him, spend time with him while that was happening. Well there isn't. I can't keep 
taking time off work and driving hundreds of miles do stuff like that and likewise with other 
things. So I think the State, for want of a better word, makes assumptions that people always 
have somebody else to look after, to look out for them, and that isn't the case. And I think 
with society as it's changing there's less going to be less of that around. I mean, just take 
myself and my wife. We don't have any children so when we get older and infirm, probably 
not too far away, you know, quite frankly. We don't have anyone to sort of rely on in terms of 
that, and, you know, whoever passes away first, it will be the other one, all on their own, to 
do these things for themselves. It’s okay when you've got your mental and physical faculties 
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around you. That's not too bad. But when you do get old and infirm, and so on, who have you 
got to call upon?” 
So, the need for support from government agencies, centrally and locally, is surely going to increase 
as the years pass. As a society we are growing older, and the older we get the more we need social 
care and support. Equally, families are becoming more disconnected, whether geographically or 
through divorce or separation, and this produces further difficulties in the provision of family care. 
And what, indeed, is the alternative to family care? In the absence of family care, the elderly who 
cannot care for themselves become in need of institutional care which, in the absence of sufficient 
financial resources to meet the cost of such care themselves, local government must pay for. 
At page 2 of her transcript, Mrs. F.G. makes the case for government support for family carers: 
“Well, I think, … I think they [the government] should play a more supportive role and a more 
supportive role in a way for the carers because, you know, people have got to give up their 
jobs, as a lot of people do, and save the government a lot of money. In doing that, …. [family] 
carers …. should get some kind of compensation and also, you know, the care homes to a 
certain degree should be funded to a certain level. And rather than the expectation that 
people who get dementia really should pay for all their own care, because you know what 
concerns us now, with our aunt, is that if she runs out of money, what will happen? And I'm 
aware that, if that had does happen, then it becomes a responsibility to a certain degree for 
relatives to pay for care which obviously we couldn't afford. And she might then have to move 
out of where she is.” 
“I think there's a real sort of dependence on family members to look after the vulnerable 
members of their family and I get that. And I know that that is part and parcel of being a 
member of a family and, you know, looking after a relative who you love, I get that. But I think 
there just needs to be more help, you know, because it you know it's a lot to take on.” 
At page 4 of her transcript, Miss. H.I. gave us perhaps one of the most telling of these observations, 
which reflected on not only the U.K. Government but also ourselves as a society: 
‘Yes, I do think they [the government] have a responsibility for the older generation as a 
whole and the care system, which I think is just, you know. You look at some other countries, 
where they really take care of their older generation, you know, you've got China and Japan 
and India, you know, and there the families really come together and they really are well 
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looked after and I feel it looks very different over here and there are a lot of older people 
who are just left.” 
So, there are, indeed, real challenges that the U.K. Government has yet to meet. The main complaints 
seem to be that the process of claiming benefits is too bureaucratic, that the financial support for 
family carers, once a claim is made, is woefully inadequate and there are too few people to provide 
specialist support on the ground when that support is most needed.926 Nor, indeed, have local 
authorities escaped such criticism,927 although, in the main, the complaints raised against this arm of 
government where markedly less virulent given perhaps the wider understanding of the financial 
constraints that they work under.  
For her part, Mrs. Q.R. was perhaps the most vocal of those dissatisfied with the performance of both 
arms of government, but what she felt about their performance was plainly reflected in the 
comments of her fellow participants. At page 7 of her transcript, in answer to the question what she 
believes the role of government in the care of the elderly is, she says this: 
“They are a disgrace because, as you know, each government's kicked it into the long grass, I 
mean I'm probably best placed because I deal with this every day. This week I've dealt with 
that many cases to do with social care where, because of the pandemic, this week a local care 
home private provider has put their prices by 20% because they're passing on to the self-
funding, the cost of PPE and the cost of paying the national living minimum wage. So they've 
increased it [their charges] by 20%, it's unsustainable, because people go through ….. 
effectively the typical person can expect to go through about 50 to 60,000 [pounds] a year in 
a care home. So you quickly run out of money. Local authorities pay a lot less, it's very unfair 
because there's no incentive for having your own house or saving for social care because the 
person next to you is getting paid by the local authority, whereas you're paying for them, 
because you're subsidizing them, it doesn’t mean you get a better room or better service. And 
the Government …. there's got to be, because it is unsustainable, because what they argue 
about, the big thing is, it's all bollocks this, you know, we look at the person, they don't, they 
look at you as a financial asset and local authorities don't look at your need, all that they look 
at is, ‘where can we place you the cheapest’.” 
 
 
926 See: Mrs. E.F. (at page 4 of her transcript), Mr. L.M. (at page 6 of his transcript), Mrs. M.N. (at page 3 of her 
transcript), Mr. P.Q. (at page 3 of his transcript) and Mrs. V.W. (at page 5 of her transcript). 
 
927 See: the views of Mrs. Q.R. recounted below. 
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By way of summary therefore all participants appeared to believe that there was a role for 
government to play in the care of the elderly and the vast majority of them felt that the responsibility 
to provide this care lay firmly at their door. What is more, the participants’ views of the performance 
of government in the provision of such care was an entirely negative one. And, indeed, some express 
concern for their own future in such a system, so poorly has that system performed, in their eyes, up 
to this point in their lives. In short, most participants were of the opinion that the social care system 
was in dire need of radical reform and that reform needed to come quickly for the sake of all those 




7.2.4 The Effect of Family Caring on Employment 
In marked contrast to what participants were saying about the performance of government in the 
delivery of social care, many felt that their employers had been generous in allowing them time away 
from their duties in order to deal with the problems associated with family caring. Employers were 
praised for their willingness to be flexible with employees who were caring for family members in 
relation to their time-keeping, their need to take their elderly parents or relatives to hospital 
appointments and their desire to take paid leave at short notice if some sort of emergency associated 
with their caring obligations required that they should be absent from their work.928 As regards the 
demands of caring for an elderly parent or relative, some participants had to give up work 
altogether.929 Others admitted that these demands did have an effect on their ability to do full-time 
work and as a result some ‘went part-time’.930 Others, with some regret, acknowledged that it was 
difficult to hold down a permanent job and care for their elderly parent or parents and, for that 
reason, had been constrained to refuse offers of full-time employment or to turn down additional 
work when it was on offer.931 One participant, the youngest, expressed particular concern for her 
 
928 For example, in the case of Mrs. M.N. (at page 3 of her transcript). 
 
929 Miss O.P. (at page 1 of her transcript). 
 
930 Mrs. D.E. (noted at page 4 of her transcript). 
 




employment prospects when her days of caring for her mother eventually come to an end.932 These 
casualties of the need to care are clear illustrations of the effect that family caring can have on one’s 
prospects of employment, or on the nature of one’s employment if carried on in concert with caring, 
and on one’s career aspirations as a whole. 
That said, other participants, perhaps as a result of where they were in their lives, that is to say, older, 
approaching, or having arrived at, their retirement, accepted that the need to care for an elderly 
parent or relative had little or no effect on their employment or their employment prospects.933 
Perhaps one benefit therefore of the extension of life expectancy levels over the later part of the 
twentieth and the early years of the twenty-first centuries has been the ability of adult children to 
care for their elderly parents and relatives because they themselves have reached retirement age or 
at least a point in their lives where they could move to part-time work without the need to spend 
their hard-earned money on their children, their mortgages and the like. Of course, that may not have 
been what those who were approaching, or have now reached, such a milestone thought their life in 
retirement was going to be like some twenty years ago. But, this – the fact that more adult children 
are now in a position to care for their elderly parents than there were say 50 years ago – is hardly a 
justification for leaving the task wholly in their hands. Indeed, one thread that runs through the 
accounts of all those whose employment and/or career prospects have suffered through having to 
care for an elderly parent(s) or relative is the lack of support from government to enable them to 
either continue in work or to build a new career after their time caring for a loved one has come to 
an end. 
While employers were, indeed, praised for their flexibility, some participants expressed a little 
concern that their future prospects of advancement in their employment might be affected by their 
need to go to their employers and ask for ’time off’. At page 4 of her transcript, Mrs. E.F. – who was 
‘furloughed’ very early in the global pandemic of 2020-1 and has yet to resume full-time employment 
– expressed her concerns thus: 
“Yes. So I work full time for …. luckily, it's a flexible arrangement, really. But I mean, you know, 
it's full time. I work full time, you know, 35 …. sorry, five days a week. And you know, it’s nine 
to five really but there is a real flexibility there and I'm so lucky with my employer, but it was 
getting to the point where I, kind of, didn't want to be, you know, I didn't want to be taking 
 
932 Miss H.I. (at page 5 of her transcript) 
 
933 For example, Mrs. A.B. (at page 3 of her transcript), Mrs. B.C. (at page 3 of her transcript), Mr. C.D. (at page 
1 of his transcript) and Mrs. I.J (at page 3 of her transcript). 
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advantage of that situation. …. But I think that, sort of, because I was able to do stuff and take 
Sheila to activities, I think probably I did possibly more than, more than other people, because 
I could, because the flexibility was there and I think probably, in terms of my employer, I was 
probably treading a bit of a fine line.” 
Others have felt unable to take up full-time employment due to their caring responsibilities even 
though opportunities have come their way. At page 3 of her transcript, Mrs. G.H. explains her 
particular dilemma: 
“I couldn't stay in full time teaching because you can't take time off as a teacher, you know, I 
can't say ‘My mum's got a hospital appointment, I need to go’.  And I mean I could be earning 
three times what I'm earning now, if I was in teaching. So yeah, I'm earning much less because 
of the lack of, possibly, commitment to a job that I can offer, you know. I mean I’ve been 
offered teaching. I do supply teaching to fill the gaps in the translation [work] and I've been 
offered full time posts, but I just can't take it, you know. Or even part time when they say 
well you know maybe do part-time. But if one of my parents is ill, I have to go and look after 
to them because the other one can't cope. So, yeah, I would say, I'm at least …. the best I’m 
doing is earning a third of what I'd be earning in teaching.” 
But, perhaps the most keen affected by the need to care for an elderly parent was Miss H.I., the 
youngest of the participants in the project. At page 5 of her transcript, she gives her account of how 
caring has affected her life and reflects on a future without any real job prospects or, indeed, any idea 
of when she might be able to search for employment given her present situation. 
“So I worked for Merseyside Police. I was a police community support officer for about six years. 
And I was doing that because it's a way to get into the police force as a constable. So I'd done 
that for six years. And then, you know, we all make mistakes, decided to go down South. It didn't 
work out, so my plan was to come back, go and get any job and reapply for the police. And it 
just didn't happen. 
I mean, I talked about it to my sisters. I said, you know, relatively recently, you know, they're 
taking on. Should I apply again? But, I just thought, I couldn't. There's absolutely no way, unless 
we put her into a home which we just don't want to do, and she doesn't need to be in one yet. 
So that was the plan, it was to go back into the police. 
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And my worry, when all this is over, and you know, I could be doing this for ….. it's already coming 
up to four years. I'm going to be pretty unemployable after this because I, you know, well you've 
seen my use on a computer. I’m useless now. And, you know, I can feel my own brain, like 
melting, you know what I mean. Sometimes my memory is terrible just because I'm just not, I'm 
not using, I'm not training it. What I will say is ‘This is harder work than I've ever done in any 
job’. But that, that is a worry, what I'm going to do afterwards, basically.” 
Yet, it would not be impossible for government to introduce training schemes for those in Miss H.I.’s 
situation, in early middle age with no job and no real prospects of future employment, and to provide 
respite care in order that they might attend such schemes. Such training might be tied to the provision 
of support for family carers who wish to undertake work in the form of sessional or supply teaching 
in the case of Mrs. G.H. or by way of work as a special constable in the case of Miss H.I. so that they 
might be in a position to take up employment once their time caring is done. The giving up of 
employment often has a very serious consequences for family carers over what may prove to be a 
significant period of their lives, consequences that extend well beyond their time spent caring, and 





7.2.5 Carer’s Allowance and Other State Benefits 
Although heavily involved in the caring process, very few participants were able to claim carer’s 
allowance as a result of the heavy restrictions surrounding the availability of this benefit. By far the 
most commonly claimed state benefit was attendance allowance. But this benefit is one which is 
payable directly to the care-receiver as a consequence of an assessment of their needs and the 
participants in our study rarely derived any advantage from such a payment unless they happened to 
hold a power of attorney in regard to their parent’s financial affairs whereupon it might be used to 
buy in additional or respite care. 
252 
 
When asked about the restrictions on the availability of carer’s allowance, the various participants in 
the project spoke as one. These restrictions were far too rigid and, in any event, wholly unfair.934 The 
requirement that each applicant for carer’s allowance should need to undertake at least 35 hours of 
care each week was regarded as far too high. There were a number of calls for the government to 
introduce a sliding scale which would have permitted some payment to be made to those doing 
upwards of 15 - 16 hours a week caring for an elderly parent or relative.935 Similarly, the condition 
which dictates that carer’s allowance cannot be claimed by anyone who already earns more than 
£123 per week was also regarded as unfair. Indeed, the very idea that carer’s allowance only operates 
as a ‘top-up’ for those who are caring while also unable to earn or on a very low wage from part-time 
work was wholly repugnant to many participants. And, even when payable, the figure of £67.50 per 
week as the maximum sum that can be claimed by way of carer’s allowance was regarded by many 
with complete abhorrence, regarding it as a token payment wholly unconnected with what it takes 
just to live in the modern day and age. 
In these circumstances, calls to increase the availability and the amount of carer’s allowance were 
heard from all quarters. Some participants expressed a desire that it should be set at the level of ‘the 
minimum wage’;936 others recognised that this might be too much for the government to be able to 
meet, but still demanded that it should be increased markedly from its present level. All felt that it 
should be more widely available. 
As we saw earlier, there are other indeed other restrictions on what can be done with the personal 
budget paid to a care-receiver, namely, that, unless particular religious or other similar circumstances 
dictate, no part of this personal budget can be used to pay family carers for the work they do. Again, 
this was regarded as not only unfair but inappropriate given that most elderly parents and relatives 
would rather be cared for by their children or at least members of their family. Money received by a 
care-receiver for their care should be capable of being paid to relatives in return for the care that they 
provide if that is what the care-receiver wished to do. 
The justification advanced for increasing the availability and amount of carer’s allowance was often 
that the family carer was performing a role that would other need to be performed by professional 
 
934 See, for example: Mrs. A.B. (at page 5 of her transcript), Mrs. B.C. (at page 4 of her transcript), Mr. C.D. (at 
page 3 of his transcript) and Mrs. F.G. (at page 4 of her transcript). Indeed, this pattern runs right through the 
accounts of all those interviewed as part of this project. 
 
935 See, for example Mrs. A.B. (at pages 4-5 of her transcript) and Mrs. J.K. (at page 4 of her transcript). 
 
936 See, for example Mrs. A.B. (at pages 4-5 of her transcript) 
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carers and, where the care recipient did not have the means to pay for private social care, that they 
were saving the government considerable expense by caring for their elderly parent or relative who 
would otherwise be in a nursing home. Perhaps typical of this was the opinion expressed by Mrs. B.C. 
at page 4 of her transcript in response to whether she felt the conditions attached to the availability 
of carer’s allowance were ‘fair’: 
“That's like a full time job. Thirty five hours is a full time job. And that's, you know, if you’re 
going to spend 35 hours you need, you know, a decent salary, but you're not going to, you 
know, get it being a carer …. so a small, yes some, some recompense would be, would be 
ideal because it's only the likes of the family members that are keeping my mother out of the 
care home and hospital beds, leaving space for other people who don't have family.” 
Miss H.I., who claims and is paid carer’s allowance, said this (at page 4 of her transcript) recognising 
that, in practice, there may have to be some limits on the amount that government can pay out in 
the form of this benefit: 
“ …. although it's not a huge amount of money, you know, I get 67 pounds a week from the 
Government. But my personal opinion and, you know, there isn't just this huge pot of money 
and they can’t say, ‘You look after your mum and here is, you know, a normal wage that you 
would get if you were working’. I suppose sometimes I think of it because I'm doing it and …. I’ve 
lost my train of thought now …. and sometimes I think ‘They pay, yes, well, it's 67 pounds week.’ 
But I'm taking the pressure off care that she would have to have if I wasn't here, if that makes 
sense.  
So, it costs …. it's much more cost effective for them to pay me 60 odd, … you know a measly 
amount, for me to look after her, because if I wasn't here, and Kate wasn’t here, it would cost 
them a lot more to look after her. Yeah. She'd have to be in a home.” 
Indeed, in some quarters, although there was unqualified support for an increase in the availability of 
carer’s allowance, there was a recognition that the benefit should continue to be means-tested in some 
way. At page 5 of his transcript, Mr. P.Q.,  a retired academic, volunteered this opinion on the subject of 
carer’s allowance: 
“I think it should be more widely available. I think, as many of these things, there is and needs 
to be a sensible means testing for it. And I mean we regard ourselves, you know, we’re not 
fantastically wealthy but we're okay. …. I was the main bread earner but, in terms of, if I had 
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to give up, the difference between the salary I was on what you get is pathetic. And I think 
there should be some recognition that actually caring takes place not just for 35 hours a week, 
it may be a lot longer. And it may be a lot shorter. But the short term does have a significant 
cost, and you know it may well be that you end up working four days a week, not five days a 
week.” 
Perhaps the views of the vast majority, if not all, of the participants in relation to the availability and 
extent of carer’s allowance and what the government’s aims should be if it were to decide to support 
the vast army of family carers in doing a job that is vital in today’s society was most eloquently summed 
up in the words of Mrs. U.V. at page 7 of her transcript in addressing, firstly, the earnings restriction that 
has been placed on the availability of carer’s allowance: 
“I mean 123 pounds is nothing really is it? So I do feel that those people who aren't financially 
able to, you know ….. well what would I say? I just feel that the people that are on very low 
incomes or this is their full time job they should be paid a decent living wage, I do, for caring 
for an elderly …. and keeping them out of the hospital or out of a care home, you know, 
because it's demanding work ….  
 
…. caring for an elderly person is demanding on every level, every level, and they, …. and 
people should be rewarded or given a decent amount of money in order that they do that for 
a fellow human being.” 
And, perhaps the final word in this section should go to Mrs. V.W. who offered this view on the earnings 
restriction that forms the gateway to any claim for carer’s allowance and, later, the amount payable for 
this benefit. At page 8 of her transcript, Mrs. V.W. said this: 
“I do think you should be able to engage in your own job, regardless of how much income you 
get, that's your full time, paid job. If you're still putting in hours of caring, and you are caring, 
I still think you should be in receipt of the carer's allowance if you feel that you have these 
expenses and you need it. I can see it could get tricky because people might say, well, you 
need a full time carer, therefore you've got to be doing the 35 hours or, if you don't need full 
time care, why are we paying 35 hours? So maybe there has to be a bit more flexibility in the 
actual minimum amount of hours. You know, it could be two hours a day, somebody's going 
in in the morning and in the evening, but I don't really think somebody's income should be 




…. I do think it should be at least a minimum wage, because if it is somebody full time job, 35 
hours a week, which you would be doing in a paid job, you’re doing probably 35-36 hours plus 
a week. I don't really think you should be paid less than somebody that you would bring in 
from outside, that would be paid at least that hourly rate.” 
So, there are indeed significant challenges ahead for any government who seeks to reform the way in 





7.2.6. Funding Social Care into the Future 
With ever-increasing numbers of elderly infirm in society, the government will need to work out how 
the provision of social care can be funded into the short to medium term future and beyond. There 
have been many suggestions made in regard to how this might be done, from the government 
recovering any sums that it has paid out in regard to the care of an individual from that individual’s 
estate on his/her death to a flat rate tax on the estates of all members of society when they pass 
away whether they have received care or not. Interestingly, when asked about this, there was no real 
consensus amongst the participants in this project in regard to how social care should be funded into 
the future. In fact, there was some little support for all possible solutions, from continuing to place 
the burden on general taxation through to the introduction of a separate insurance, much like our 
existing national insurance, that would be devoted to the funding of social care. 
For the most part, the idea of a flat rate tax, known in some quarters as a ‘dementia tax’, was the 
most objectionable solution,937 but even this had some support.938 Placing the financial burden of 
providing social care on the public purse in the form of an increase in general taxation or an increase 
in national insurance was a solution that found favour with some.939 But, perhaps the most popular 
 
937 See, for example: Mrs. B.C. (at page 6 of her transcript), Mrs. I.J. (at page 7 of her transcript) and Mrs. J.K. 
(at page 6 of her transcript). 
 
938 See, for example: Miss H.I. (at page 8 of her transcript) and Miss O.P. (at page 4 of her transcript). 
 
939 See, for example: Mrs. A.B. (at pages 6-7 of her transcript) and Mrs. D.E. (at page 6 of her transcript) 
256 
 
solution from those who expressed a preference was the idea of some form of separate insurance 
fund dedicated to the provision of social care much as is done in Japan.940 Yet, even here, there 
seemed to be an implicit acceptance that such a solution has really come too late; if such a scheme 
were implemented now, the younger generations would be paying for the care of the elderly as they 
would be the ones who would be paying into the scheme out of their earnings while the elderly would 
not. 
One particular question that was put to all participants was whether they might support what was 
described to them as ‘the Illinois solution’. This relates to the ability of adult children who had been 
caring for an elderly parent to make a claim for payment for their services from the elderly parent’s 
estate once the parent had died if certain conditions were met. If such a claim is accepted by the 
courts, judges would have a discretion to award a payment out of the deceased parent’s estate and 
this would depend on factors such as the extent of the care that was, and the period of time over 
which the care had been, provided. While some participants could see the ‘fairness’ of such a solution, 
most took a pragmatic approach and suggested that, in practice, this would only serve to divide the 
family at a time when the family should be pulling together following the loss of a loved one. On the 
whole, it is fair to say  that the ‘Illinois solution’ did not find favour with those interviewed as part of 
this project.941 
One more popular form of provision for family carers while they were undertaking the caring process 
was the provision of ‘tax breaks’ or other ‘tax incentives’.942 Yet, such a solution would only seem to 
be useful if there were other members of the family earning sufficient to pay such tax. And, in these 
circumstances, other participants favoured some form of means-testing if additional funds were to 
be raised separately from general taxation.943 
Some ‘difficulties’ were also mentioned in regard to future funding, from the burden that any change 
in funding might bring to the younger generation to the lack of any incentives to save for one’s old 
age and, in particular, to put money aside for future social costs given that, if one didn’t save, the 
 
 
940 See, for example: Mrs. Q.R. (at page 11 of her transcript), Mrs. S.T. (at page 7 of her transcript) and Mrs. 
N.O. (at page 6 of her transcript). 
 
941 See, for example: Mrs. E.F. (at page 7 of her transcript), Mrs. G.H. (at page 6 of her transcript), Mrs. M.N. (at 
page 6 of her transcript), Mrs. N.O. (at page 5 of her transcript) and Mrs. S.T. (at page 6 of her transcript). 
 
942 See, for example: Mrs. G.H. (at page 6 of her transcript) and Mr. T.U. (at page 11 of his transcript). 
 




State would step in and provide much the same care as one would get if one were self-funding that 
care. This brought the focus of these discussions around, once more, to what solution might be 
regarded as the ‘fairest solution’. Yet, here, self-interest seemed to play a large part in those 
discussions, for what is ‘fair’ tends, for most of us, to be a rather subjective concept.944 
At page 6 of her transcript, Mrs. N.O. makes a very valuable contribution to these discussions, 
particularly in light of recent events, in the form of the global pandemic, which have hit the younger 
generations hard: 
“In general, taxation hits everybody equally. But, it's going, it's largely falling on the younger 
generation, isn't it? And a younger generation, I mean, I would say from the 50s up, if not even 
60s up, who are going to be less well off, than the persons who are being cared for and I think 
that's it. I don't feel it's fair to put too much more taxation on the 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, because 
of their financial situation at present, I don't …. It's quite alarming actually to think that say 
whatever it was, 25,000 or 15,000 pounds would be taken from everybody’s estate because 
there'll be quite a lot of people who, this it wouldn't make a dent at all and there’d be all the 
people who wouldn't have done that amount of money. 
 
So it, I think, whichever way you look at that, that's not particularly fair. That's not an answer 
at all, is it? I suppose, I mean I would feel perhaps, if people could afford it, we ought all to be 
paying into a fund which does support care when we're older, a bit like an insurance. But that 
would have to be started probably these days when you're about 20. I mean, when you think 
about the astronomical costs, which it’s going to be. Honestly, like everybody else, I don't have 
any ideas about this. Once you ask these questions are posed and suggestions may which I’ve 
never thought of, I mean they are quite frightening”. 
In this passage there is, indeed, an implicit acknowledgement that every solution will have its 
detractors for there is no solution that is going to be fair to everyone. In these circumstances, perhaps 
some form of mixed solution might be the one that finds most favour. This was the solution favoured 
by Mr. T.U. who, at page 11 of his transcript, said this: 
“So the idea that everybody should pay for their own care is obviously one view but the state 
has the problem, I presume, that it can’t afford to pay for everyone’s care going forward. I 
 
944 See, for example: Mrs. I.J. (at page 7 of her transcript, ‘…. people should make their own provision and if 
they haven’t … they should get minimal assistance.’). 
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think that a mixed delivery of care costing makes sense, building in some sort of compulsory 
insurance if that were feasible. But, at the moment, the state doesn’t help until you get down 
to about £23,500 isn’t it? I think that people should be reassured that they can keep a lot 
more, that the state should pick up a lot more of the cost without going that low, but I do 
think that some sort of compulsory insurance should be on the table so as to be part of the 
mixture.” 
The iniquities of the present system which forces the elderly to pay for their own social care until 
their own capital resources are depleted to less than £23,250 was a common source of complaint 
amongst participants. It was widely thought that this removed any real incentive to save for one’s old 
age. It was also felt that this was wholly unfair to those who had worked hard throughout their lives 
in order to accumulate wealth with a view to passing this on to the younger generation.  
This, indeed, was a particular source of anger and resentment across almost all, if not all, of the 
participants, and it was voiced, in particular, by V.W. at pages 9 and 10 of her transcript: 
“ …. it's your monthly income if you've worked, you know, for a pension and you've paid into 
a pension, you paid into that pension so that you can have a nicer quality of life, and so you 
can have those little sort of extras later on in life, and I think it's a little bit unfair that, if you've 
done that, and you need to pay for care or facilities, your pensions really are taken away 
straight away, they're just part of your income and they say all right we'll have that. I think 
that's a little bit unfair, I think, maybe it could be staged in some way that you that you still 
had a little bit of a benefit from actually making those contributions even if it was half or 
something. 
 
 ….  
You know, so, if somebody wanted to stay in their own house, but had to pay for care, I don't 
think the person who owns the house would like it, because they probably think, ‘This is my 
home and I want it to go to my children, I want it to, you know, go down the generations’. For 
lack of anything better at the moment, I do think, if you get all the care that you need, but it 
means that you've got the money to distribute, I suppose, in a way, it's sort of unfair, but I 
don't know where they get all the money from if they didn't actually do that. If you've got the 
money to pay for your care, I suppose, in a way, you should pay for it. But I do think the 
thresholds for what people would have left and also on the way that people's pensions really 
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are raided, I think that needs to be looked at to make it a bit fairer for people that have put in 
bigger contributions.” 
And, this was further acknowledged by other participants. Perhaps the final word should come from 
Mrs. Q.R. made this and other valuable points at page 12 of her transcript: 
“And yeah why should people lose all their savings till it gets down to £23,250, whereas other 
people get it for free. There's a complete inequality between certain people getting a lot more 
from the State, and they may be people who've never saved, always had everyone providing 
for them, so what's the incentive for people who've worked all their lives being prudent, you 
know done the right thing, but then it comes to the time when they need some help from the 
State and the State effectively says, right we're going to take everything from you. And what 
we give people in care is ridiculous, because they give you something like 20 pounds a week 
allowance, they say, yeah that's what you've got. It's demeaning, so I do think that it needs 
to be radically overhauled and there's got to be either a ceiling which says, right, after the 
first £100,000 it’s picked up by the State or we pay some type of tax out of our wages, and 
that goes towards an insurance policy for social care and that everybody recognizes that from 
an early age, that you're paying something you know pound a week or whatever towards it, 
but I don't think that …. it's not sustainable and particularly with how it's going up, the amount 
that it's costing for care, I mean who could afford 1500 pounds a week, because does it cost 
1500 pounds a week look up someone, when you look what they’re paying, the carers where 
the hell is that money going to?” 
So, the clear message from all participants is that the present social care system is iniquitous on 
almost every count. However, the real difficulty is, ‘What should replace it?’ This is the challenge that 
future governments face. However, no recent government has been willing to face that challenge. 
The funding of social care in this country has been a political football which the main parties have 
been content (in the words of Mrs. Q.R.) to ‘kick into the long grass’ merely because they have not 
been able to find a solution that will have almost universal support. Yet, most funding solutions seem 
to have their advantages over the present system, at least in the eyes of the participants in this 
project. And, in these circumstances, the main parties are seen to be perpetuating a system which, 





7.2.7. The Value of Caring 
There seems to be little doubt that family caring is highly valued not only by the care recipients in 
each family that carers for their elderly loved ones but also across society as a whole. Indeed, there 
were a number of instances in the interviews where friends and neighbours had rallied around 
providing support for family carers, sometimes gratuitously, sometimes on the basis of some small 
payment, but that support was often there.945 Nevertheless, what also comes out of these interviews 
is that many family carers felt that there was little alternative but to step in and care for their elderly 
parents or relatives. In the words of Mr. C.D., at page 1 of his transcript, responding to the question, 
‘how did you become to be your mother’s carer?’: 
“It was to do with her dementia which we were aware of,… was developing. She started 
repeating things a lot and she wasn't quite the person she was. And part of this was she got 
more and more obstinate in a way that she didn't ever used to be. And basically she refused 
to accept there was anything the matter with her. And she would not accept care from 
anybody at all. And the only way we could do it was by a member of the family doing jobs for 
her, which she perceived as just helping in a family way, and then eventually we got one or 
two friends whom we actually paid to go and do some of the caring and they were they were 
just her friends and she would accept that. So it was a bit of a Hobson's choice really, you 
know, we had to do it or nobody would.” 
Many participants mentioned the onset of dementia as the reason why they had to begin caring for 
an elderly parent or relative. Erratic behaviour brought on a feeling that it was no longer viable to 
leave the carer receiver on his or her own; a feeling that before too long he or she would seriously 
injure themselves if they were not cared for by the family.946 Such behaviour was often accompanied 
by obstinacy on the part of the elderly parent or relative, some became somewhat less and less 
inclined to seek the company of others or help in relation to their condition from outsiders. At page 
3 of her transcript, Mrs. N.O., in response to a question that asked her to consider how her mother 
would have coped with life had she not been there to care for her, recalls how ‘difficult’ her mother 
became in her old age: 
 
945 See, for example: Mr. C.D (at page 1 of his transcript), Mrs. Q.R. (at page 8 of her transcript) and Mrs. V.W. 
(at page 6 of her transcript). 
 
946 See, for example, Mrs. F.G (at page 2 of her transcript), Mrs. N.O (at page 3 of her transcript) and Mrs. U.V. 
(at page 5 of her transcript). 
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“I can't imagine, because she didn't like many people and she didn't accept help from many 
people. And, I don't think she might have even had an alarm if I hadn't insisted on that. So I 
suppose she could have fallen and be left there and nobody would have ever known. I don't 
know. Her neighbours, she antagonized both of her neighbours, so I don't suppose they, they 
weren't the sort of people who would check in on her each day or anything like that.” 
For some, the fact that there seemed, and still seems, to be no viable alternative to family care has 
left them feeling ‘exploited’ by a situation which they can do little or nothing about. At page 3 of her 
transcript, in response to a question that asked her whether the State or society values family carers, 
Miss O.P. puts her feelings thus: 
“No, not really. Like, whoever makes these decisions, come and live here for a week and see 
.… and live on your 67 pounds, you know. If the Government had to look after her …. because, 
if it wasn't for us, I mean, she would have to be in a home. And, you know, it is beyond me 
how people pay these astronomical amounts, five or 6000 pounds a month. How many people 
…. It's just beyond me. It fills me with horror, the thought of getting to that stage, absolute 
horror, you know.” 
 
For quite a significant cross-section of participants putting their elderly parent or relative in a home 
was simply not considered a viable alternative to family care, whether because of the very expense 
of doing so or the knowledge that the care-receiver would object, that is to say, fight such a process 
and place the ‘blame’ (i.e. hold the interviewee responsible for being in a care home, where they did 
not wish to be) fairly and squarely on the participant. For others, keeping their elderly parent or 
parents out of a care home was seen as a ‘good thing’ perhaps as a result of the ‘bad press’ that some 
care homes have received over the years. In a way which was perhaps typical of this view, Mrs. R.S., 
at page 3 of her transcript described what she was doing for her parents in the following way in 
response to the question how she thought her mother might have coped without her help and the 
help provided by her siblings: 






“We kept her at home 12 months and it just got to the stage where, because of the dementia, 
she opened front door and she would invite everyone in for a cup of tea (laughs) which is not 
good, really, you know.” 
So, being at home in an environment with which they were very familiar with family around them, 
was seen as something that was not only desirable from the care-receiver’s point of view but also 
what many family carers wanted for their elderly parent or relative. But, it was also clear from the 
interviewees, almost across the board, that they wanted, and expected, more help from the 
government in providing this care. As Mrs. E.F. puts it, at page 6 of her transcript: 
“I just think, you know, I just think, I think there's a real sort of dependence on family 
members to look after the vulnerable members of their family and I get that. And I know that 
that is part and parcel of being a member of a family and, you know, looking after a relative 
who you love, I get that. But I think there just needs to be more help, you know, because it 
you know it's a lot to take on.” 
And, again at page 8 of her transcript: 
“I just think, I think that if somebody has worked really hard all their lives and have 
accumulated money, then I don't know. It's a really, really difficult one, isn't it, because I do 
have a kind of, I think the State should support people who've worked hard, paid national 
insurance or, for whatever reason, even if they haven't been able to work, I think people …. I 
think, because we live in the kind of country that we live in, people deserve to be cared for.” 
In fact, almost all of the participants who expressed an opinion on this subject felt that the State did 
not value what they did as family carers in any real degree at all.  At page 5 of his transcript, Mr. P.Q. 
(in fact, a retired professor) felt that the problems associated with the provision of social care were 
endemic and the government’s response, whether at a local or national level, was ill-thought through: 
“I think the whole aspect of care is badly thought through by government. We only just see 
on the Wirral, for instance, the number of care homes which have diminished, and the reasons 
for why for that and it’s taken over by people who think it's a money making exercise, if it 
can't make the money claimed, it closes. 
 
And if they don't fill in the documents correctly, as we found out from my mother in law, the 
home gets closed anyway. It's not meeting the standards when in fact every person who had 
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got a mother or a father in that particular home said they were being really well looked after, 
but they still got shut by the Council. So I think you've got, right the way through, there is you 
know real empathy with people who do the caring and the people who are being cared for.” 
 
This was echoed in a perhaps more forthright manner by Mrs. Q.R. at page 11 of her transcript: 
 
“I still think there's a lot of lip service [paid] to social care. Effectively, your family members, 
your most precious person, and yet how we value carers, paying them on the worst terms and 
wages possible, and that's …. I find it disgusting.” 
 
So, it could be said that, until the State begins to properly value professional care workers, it is hardly 
likely to be able to give proper value to family carers at least until popular opinion is mobilised in their 
support. Could the government’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic be the catalyst for this? At page 
5 of her transcript, Mrs. A.B. believes that it might well be, yet she still expressed some doubts whether 
it will. In response to the question whether she thinks that the government value care work, she says 
this: 
“No, I don't, I don't think so. Although, with all the Covid crisis, I think it's become more …  it's 
more in the spotlight, isn't it? And I think that it is more valued now than pre-Covid. 
But I don't really think that's affected the amount of pay that carers get particularly has it yet. 
Anyway, I don't know whether it will do in the future.” 
What therefore does the future hold for family carers? At page 6 of her transcript, in response to the 
question whether she thinks that the government value carers, Mrs. R.S. paints a rather bleak picture: 
“I don’t think they do. I don’t think they realise. You just do it because it's your mum or your 
dad don't you? 
….  
I don't get think the government understand the situation that, you know, when your mum 
has a stroke your whole world changes. You know I can remember when my mum and …. 
You used to dread the phone call going in the evening in case ….. They don't understand. 
They don't understand. 
 …. 




All of which means, if true, that root and branch reforms are needed now from the top down if we, 





7.2.8. Initial Conclusions on the Project 
While a number of conclusions on the project will be voiced in the following main section of this work, 
one observation that might usefully be made here is that there are perhaps many family carers out 
there who do not yet classify themselves as carers. At page 3 of her transcript, Mrs. D E. relates an 
experience that she had fairly recently, yet before having this experience she never really thought 
that what she was doing for her mother was ‘caring’: 
“Yeah, I did have to do some looking after … you see, I didn't see … this is the funny thing …. I didn't 
see it as caring because she lived with us and it's been a gradual process, if you see what I mean, and 
I've never considered it as caring. I've just considered it as mum living with us and it's gradually 
become …. it's morphed, if you like, into becoming a caring role, I think, without me realizing it. And 
because I went …. you, perhaps, you don't want anecdotes …. but I went to the doctors for the flu’ 
jab, and the nurse said, ‘Oh, why are you here?’ And I said, ‘Well, I think it's because although I'm not 
old enough to have … I wasn't old enough to have a flu jab ….’ And so she said, ‘Oh, is it because of 
your mum and I said, yeah.. So she said, ‘Oh, so you're her carer.’  So I said, ‘No, I'm not a carer. She 
lives with us.’ And she just laughed, like a drain, and said, ‘No, you're her carer’.” 
So, if this is a common experience, there are, in fact, a great deal more family carers out there than 
those who actually appreciate that they are caring for an elderly parent or relative and who therefore 
regard themselves as carers.947 
 
947 Indeed, one can see this in the transcript of the interview with Mrs. I.J. where it would seem that, as she did 
not need to do ‘hands on care 24 seven’ she had difficulty in regarding herself as her parents ‘carer’ 
notwithstanding that she and her husband had put an alarm in just in case one of her parents, who were living 
with them in another wing of their house, had a fall and notwithstanding that she then went on to describe 
doing many tasks for her parents every day, such as putting her mother’s hearing aids in, washing and drying 
her mother’s hair, cleaning for them, doing their laundry, doing their ironing, providing a meal for them every 
other day, and bathing her mother twice a week (see pages 2-3 of that transcript). 
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As regards the conclusions that might be drawn from the project that were particular to the project 
itself, it is fair to say that the experiences of all participants in the project quite clearly demonstrated 
that caring for one’s parents and relatives in their old age and in circumstances where they are unable, 
or would at least struggle, to care for themselves is a very difficult and demanding job.948 Similarly, 
many participants felt the way in which care agencies deal with those in their care was very poor, 
with few getting the treatment that they were paying for as a result of care workers having such tight 
schedules to work for. Most, if not all, interviewees expressed significant frustration, if not 
exasperation, with the commitment, or lack of it, from government, particularly central government, 
to the care of the elderly.  In particular, the lack of support from the government in the form of state 
benefits was almost universal expressed as was a general concern that government had no real idea 
on how to either construct a social care system that was fair and could meet the needs of society or 
how to fund such a system. Yet, everyone felt that caring for one’s elderly parents and relatives was 
valuable work, work that simply had to be done, but that in reality they were receiving little or no 




7.3 REFLECTIONS UPON ‘THE DIFFICULTIES OF REFORM’ 
As noted earlier, the lack of any form of consensus in regard to the question of how social care for the 
elderly and infirm might be funded into the short to medium term future was one of the most striking 
findings to come out of the project referred to in the preceding section. And, ultimately, if any 
wholesale change in the way in which our social care system serves the elderly in our society is going 
to come about, the question of its funding needs to be resolved before any such reforms are put in 
place. While social care for the elderly has been something of a ‘political football’ in recent years, 
there has been little momentum for any real change in policy. Indeed, the ‘elderly to non-elderly 
spending ratio’ (‘ENSR’) of UK governments over the past 50 years or so has been remarkably low 
when compared with many other European States, Australia and Japan. Even the United States – 
which lacks any clear, concerted state-orientated elderly care policy –plainly outspends the UK in this 
 
948 Miss H.I. described it as the most difficult job she had ever done, adding that she had been in the police in 
such a way as to indicate that caring is a more difficult task than police work (see: page 6 pf her transcript). 
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regard.949  In fact, in the words of Martha Ozawa and Yung Soo Lee, while ‘most rich countries, 
including the United States, spend more on the elderly than on children … [a] few countries, such as …. 
the United Kingdom …. exhibit an apparent preference for children over the elderly in their tax and 
transfer systems.’950 In these circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that no consensus on how to 
fund future social care programmes for the elderly was apparent across those who participated in the 
aforementioned project. Until relatively recently, there has been little on-going public debate in the 
in England and Wales, or indeed in the UK as a whole, on this topic, although there are some signs 
that this may be about to change.951 
It is interesting to ask ourselves why our social care system is where it is, with no coherent plan for 
the future. We are, of course, an island race. Self-sufficiency is part of our national psyche. Not only 
must the nation be self-sufficient but its citizens must also ‘stand on their own two feet’. Our politics 
is largely based on individualism not collectivism.  In his 2012 monograph, Political Institutions and 
Elderly Care Policy,952 Takeshi Hieda provides the reader with a carefully-developed theory of how 
Japan, Sweden and the United States have developed their existing social care policies as they affect 
the elderly by connecting this development with the political institutions and constitutions of these 
respective countries. In Japan, the burden of funding elderly social care is carried by an insurance 
programme that was first introduced in 2000; in Sweden, the relatively generous provision that is 
presently in place for the care of the elderly was a product of post-war thinking that was developed in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  The common factor in these two countries over the latter part of the twentieth 
century was the relative dominance of one political party across the latter half of the twentieth 
century. In Sweden, this enabled policy makers to respond to a demographic that was ageing much 
more quickly than in most other Western countries.953 As a result, Sweden’s comparatively generous 
 
949 See: Julia Lynch: The Age Orientation of Social Policy Regimes in OECD Countries, (2001) Journal of Social 
Policy, vol. 30(3), pp 411-436. 
 
950 See: Martha Osawa and Yung Soo Lee: Generational Inequity in Social Spending: The United States in 
Comparative Perspective, (2011) International Social Work, vol. 56(2), pp 162-179. The research set out in this 
paper establishes that, across the years covered by the project, i.e. 1991-2005, amongst the larger spenders on 
old age benefits were France, Germany and Italy and the small spenders included the United States, the UK 
and Canada. 
 
951 The Liberal Democrats are now putting social care for the elderly at the forefront of their more recent 
political campaigns – see: 2019 Liberal Democrat Manifesto (libdems.org.uk) – 
https://www.libdems.org.uk/plan.  
 
952 Takeshi Hieda, Political Institutions and Elderly Care Policy, (2012, Palgrave Macmillan). 
 
953 In Sweden, over 65s already accounted for more than 8% of the total population of the country at the turn 
of the 20th century due to mass emigration, predominantly by the young. By 2005, those over 84 years of age 
accounted for 2.5% of the total population – Ibid. at p. 187. 
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elder care policy can be seen as an elite-driven process, responding to the depopulation of rural areas 
and the feminization of the work force. But, what enabled such a policy to be introduced so effectively, 
according to Hieda, was Sweden’s political and social system. This was a system that was a product of 
a society in which there were no social cleavages, a large degree of decentralization and a good deal 
of consensus politics.954 In a way, Japan, post-1945, had a similar political regime that was based on 
party-lines with multi-member polling districts and a single non-transferable vote for each member of 
the electorate. In order to become elected, politicians had to ‘tow the party line’ and therefore social 
policy was almost wholly generated by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, at least until the political 
crisis of 1989.955 At this point, Japan too had a rapidly ageing population similar in intensity to that of 
Sweden and a response was clearly needed. That response came in the form of a national insurance-
based system that required, and still requires, all citizens over 40 years of age to pay insurance 
premiums into a social insurance scheme which then allows anyone over the age of 65 to access care 
services with subsidies paid for by the scheme which are dependent on the level of care needed. In 
essence, the introduction of this scheme was a product of an alliance between ‘welfare bureaucrats 
and political parties supported by urban constituencies’.956 But, again, the ‘social care revolution’ was 
helped by the country’s social and political system. 
Hieda contrasts Sweden and Japan’s social care policy with that of the United States, where (so he 
finds) elder care is, and always has been, peripheral to health care and is essentially a product of  
‘inconspicuous and incremental changes’, which have largely been brought about by individualistic 
political competition.957 The checks and balances in the U.S. constitution have produced a system 
where policy-making decisions in relation to universal social care services for the elderly are ‘less likely 
to flourish’ which has led to each federal programme for such services having ‘distinct eligibility 
criteria, programme structures, covered services and financing methods’.958  What therefore might 
this mean for any prospect of reforming the social care system for the elderly that we have in England 
and Wales? One can immediately see many parallels between the United States and England and 
Wales that help to explain the systems of social care for the elderly that are presently in place in the 
two countries. Immigration, in both instances, has slowed the ageing of the citizenry of each country. 
The politics of the two countries is fractured with ‘the right’ winning out at one election only to be 
 
954 fn. 952 at p. 69. 
 
955 fn. 952 at p. 91. 
 
956 fn. 952 at p. 137. 
 
957 fn. 952 at p. 140. 
 
958 fn. 952 at p. 151. 
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replaced by ‘the left’ in the next. Consensus politics is rare. Social cleavages exist on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Public and private interest groups help to drive policy-making even at the highest levels of 
government. Yet, in the UK there is now some evidence of a shared understanding that a significant 
measure of reform of our elderly social care policy is needed, and is needed quickly.  All three national 
political parties have begun to place this reform at the forefront of their respective manifestos. Having 
said this, one then returns to the apparent lack of consensus over what these reforms should look like 
and how they should be funded. The disparity of opinions that were clearly evident in the responses 
given to questions concerning the nature and funding of such reforms in the interviews referred to 
earlier in this chapter clearly demonstrate that there is something of a policy vacuum in this area. But 
that is the essence of this thesis, that is to say, to generate ideas – such as the ‘family care contract’ – 
that will help to fill that vacuum and incentivise the provision of social care for the elderly by their 
families.  
Another factor that is born out by both the responses to these questions in the aforementioned 
interviews and earlier research carried out in both the EU and in Japan which is referred to by Hieda 
in Political Institutions and Elderly Care Policy is that people will only choose social care solutions that 
they are familiar with.959 In Japan, for example,  there was marked change in the responses of those 
who participated in a survey carried out in 1995, and again in 2003 following the introduction of the 
social care insurance scheme referred to earlier, to the question: ‘Given that you became frail or had 
dementia and required care, if you are taken care of at home, which form of care would you want?’ 
The more widespread introduction of professional care – or ‘formal care’ as it was described in the 
survey – in the year 2000, with the coming of social care insurance, saw attitudes to such care 
completely reverse. Less than half the numbers of those who said that they would prefer informal 
social care from their families over social care delivered by professionals gave the same response in 
the later survey. And the numbers of those who said that they would prefer to receive wholly formal 
or professional care in 1995 had doubled by the time of the second survey in 2003.960 It is therefore 
very much for policy-makers to generate solutions. And, in turn, this would seem to support a series 
of compatible policies that would take care of the needs of all those concerned with the provision of 
informal social care for the elderly. The ‘family care contract’ referred to earlier is just one of those 
potential solutions. 
 
959 fn. 952 at pp. 190-192. Such research is also supported by Steinmo’s research on tax policies in Steinmo, S. 
(1993) Taxation and democracy: Swedish, British and American approaches to the financing of the modern 
state: Yale University Press. 
 
960 fn. 952 at p. 192. 
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And the ‘family care contract’ will provide a solution for some. Imagine ‘M’, who is aged 86 and a 
widow, has an estate which is worth £450,000, but most of this comprises the house in which she lives 
which is perhaps a little too big for her needs. Imagine that she needs care, she struggles with dressing 
and washing, she cannot make her own meals, she has difficulty is getting about save with the use of 
a walking frame. If M goes into a care home, and sells the house in order to self-fund her the cost of 
her care (which she will have to do), the proceeds of sale of the house will disappear in care home 
fees at the rate of some £60,000 per year.961 Within seven years or so, M’s estate will have been 
dissipated to the point where she would be entitled to receive financial support from her local 
authority for the costs of her care. Imagine that M has one child, a daughter, ‘X’, who is recently 
divorced and living alone, and is happy for M to come and live with her. However, if she does, X will 
struggle to hold down a job and care for M. If M and X enter into a ‘family care contract’ under which 
X is entitled to draw £25,000 per year in government subsidies in return for caring for M, albeit on 
condition that this money is recoverable from M’s estate when M passes away, then X will be able to 
care for her mother and live comfortably (but far from extravagantly) while doing so. Imagine that this 
is done and that X cares for M for the next five years before M then passes away. Assuming that there 
is no increase or decrease in the value of M’s estate in the meantime (and M will have been drawing 
her old age pension to cover her needs), under the terms of the ‘family care contract’ the government 
will be able to reclaim the £125,000 paid to X over the five years in which she has been caring for M. 
That reduces the value of M’s estate to £325,000 and no inheritance tax is paid because that is the 
level at which the nil rate band operates. As M’s only child, X then takes the whole of that estate under 
M’s will. At that point, X will have received (i) £125,000 in the form of government payments over the 
past five years, and (ii) £325,000 from M’s estate  (total, £450,000). Without such a ‘family care 
contract’ in place, and on the basis of our present social care and taxation regimes, (a) X will have 
struggled, financially, over the past five years, entitled perhaps to only £67.50 per week by way of 
carer’s allowance (£3,510 per year), and (b) when M dies the excess of her estate over the nil rate 
band of £325,000 will be subject to inheritance tax at 40%, which means that X will only receive 




961 This figure is taken from the annual cost of care in nursing homes in Shropshire in 2020-21, which perhaps 
presents us with a figure that is typical across much of the country. See also Laing Buisson’s ‘Care of Older 
People UK Market Report’, 31st edition 2020, which is referenced at Paying for care and what care-home fees 




7.3 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
If English Law is going to be called upon to help to resolve the questions that were posed at the outset 
of this project, it can only do so through new legislation. Existing law cannot be adapted for this 
purpose.  As for this new legislation, much can be learnt from the attempts made by legislators in 
Illinois to deal with what has been recognised as a global phenomenon.  Admittedly, the provision 
made for informal or family carers by s. 18 – 1.1 of the Illinois Probate Act of 1975, as amended, has 
not been entirely, or perhaps even partly, successfully, hamstrung - as it is - by conditions that many 
carers have found themselves unable to satisfy. Nevertheless, the claims that have been successful 
under that Act do demonstrate what legislation can do for informal carers, given what we might call 
‘the right conditions’ – i.e. conditions that most genuine informal carers are able to satisfy and which 
are fair and reasonable as between the carer and the beneficiaries of the care-receiver’s estate who 
would be asked to bear the costs of such care.  
And, indeed, it is important to recognise, at this juncture, that there is another philosophical basis for 
the claims of informal carers for financial redress, albeit not one out of which one can, without more, 
frame a cause of action in English courts, namely, that the care-receiver’s estate has been preserved 
for the beneficiaries because it has not been required to carry the burden of buying-in care services 
at commercial rates due to the provision of care by the informal carer ‘without charge’. In short, public 
policy can justify the proposed statutory intervention on the basis of ‘need’ – we, as a society, need a 
social care system that provides for our disabled elderly – but can also support that intervention on 
this notion of ‘unjustified enrichment’ – the care-receiver’s estate is only available to the beneficiaries 
as a result of the free provision of care by the carer. 
So, in light of this, we now ask ourselves, once again, ‘Who is going to care for our disabled elderly in 
the coming decades?’ The answer put forward in chapter six of this thesis is ‘anyone and yet everyone’. 
While the solution that has been advanced is described as a ‘family care contract’ – because the vast 
majority of those who will enter into these contracts with the care-receiver are the care-receiver’s 
adult children – the suggested registration system for these contracts will allow anyone to put 
themselves forward as someone’s informal carer if they are willing to take on the demands for care 
that have been identified by the care-receiver’s care assessment. Of course, if a care-receiver’s adult 
child wishes to take on this burden, the care-receiver must choose with whom to make the proposed 
‘family care contract’. And, where the care-receiver is incapable of making such a decision through 
want of decision-making capacity, that decision may have to be taken by the care-receiver’s attorney 
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or, ultimately, the courts. The ‘family care contract’ would be mediated as indicated in chapter six and 
would be periodically open to review and renewal, again through the mediation process. And, as we 
have seen, control mechanisms would be put in place which would allow local authorities – as those 
ultimately responsible for the provision of social care to those in their community – and the courts to 
intervene and bring  the ‘family care contract’ to an end where circumstances warrant it. 
The series of twenty-one interviews that took place with informal or family carers, and which were 
analysed earlier in this final chapter provide clear evidence of the unsatisfactory status of the existing 
social care system and its need for reform. All too often the care visits provided by care agencies are 
referred to as little more than ‘fleeting’ with no time for the companionship that the elderly infirm 
often crave in order to bring warmth and meaning to their lives. Those elderly who are under the care 
of their families are indeed fortunate, in the main, to have such regular human contact. And the 
commitment of family carers who look after their needs is often great. Any support that government 
provides for these carers is plainly inadequate and goes unappreciated by the few who are entitled to 
receive it. Clearly, a significant degree of reform is required to the existing social care system. But, 
more than anything else, those family members who are involved in the caring process need certainty 
and clarity over the support that they are entitled to both financial and emotional. The availability, 
and financial value, of the benefits available from the State obviously need to be increased, and 
substantially so, in order for family carers to feel that the true worth of what they do is fully 
appreciated by society as a whole. 
At this point, it may not be entirely clear why ‘everyone’ will care for our disabled elderly under the 
proposed legislation. Everyone will support the provision that will be made for informal carers through 
greatly enhanced carer’s benefits (which will need to be re-named) because, at least in the short term, 
the money that Central Government will inject into the economy through the provision of such 
payments may well affect the real value of their income and savings.  But, that – if, indeed, this is a 
consequence of what has been suggested – is a price that society must surely pay to meet a ‘problem’ 
(i.e. the continuing provision of social care for the disabled, elderly) that is, ultimately, society’s 
responsibility and no one else’s.962 And, indeed, these remarks provide us with the basis of the answer 
to the second question raised at the outset of this investigation, ‘How are the costs of providing such 
care to be met?’  The costs of such care will be met by ‘government money’ created by Central 
Government on the back of the security provided by charging the properties owned by care-receivers 
with the costs of what it advances to informal carers for the care services that they are obliged to 
provide under any ‘family care contract’ that they might have entered into. Even where there is no 
 
962 See: chapter three, section 3.3, supra. 
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such security available, the costs of care will still be a debt recoverable from the care-receiver’s estate 
on his/her death.  In this way, any ‘balance of payments’ issue will only arise as and when these debts 
are written off as irrecoverable. 
In essence, what is being proposed is a social care system that is largely funded through recourse to 
the untaxed wealth that is presently locked away within our housing market. The solutions that have 
been advanced – i.e. the funding of these proposals, the creation of ‘family care contracts’ through 
mediation, and the scaffolding that will be required to make such ideas ‘work’ in the real world – build 
upon, and – it is submitted – significantly progress, ideas that were initially put forward by others, but 
which were perhaps underdeveloped until now.963  Much further work on these proposals is still 
required. And, in practice, these suggestions may only be part of the solution. For instance, one can 
certainly foresee that a hypothecated income tax, whether local or national, could be applied in 
addition to these proposals to fund what is an extensive shortfall. Moreover, whether what is 
proposed is a ‘one-solution-for-all’ is, of course, another matter entirely. Other countries, particularly 
those where general levels of taxation are much higher than in England and Wales and State-funding 
for social care is commonplace, may look to deal with ‘the longevity conundrum’ in different ways, 




7.5 FURTHER RESEARCH AND REFINEMENT 
 Clearly, a householder’s ability to deal with the home that he/she owns in any way they choose 
represents something of a challenge to the present proposals. A similar difficulty exists where an 
individual attempts to avoid his/her estate carrying significant Inheritance Tax liability by giving that 
home away before his/her death. Here, ‘the seven-year rule’ – under which gifts made within seven 
years of death are liable to such tax – and the ‘reservation of benefit rules’ – which are designed to 
prevent a householder giving away his/her property but continuing to receive the benefit of it – have 
largely curtailed the misuse of the right to dispose of one’s own property during one’s lifetime in order 
to avoid tax which becomes payable on one’s death. Regulations will need to be enacted that will have 
the effect of preventing homeowners from borrowing on the security or otherwise releasing more 
than a given share of the equity in one’s home through the use of equity release schemes or by 
 
963  Principally the work of Simone Wong as referred to in section 1.4 of chapter one of this thesis. 
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‘trading-down’ in an effort to generate funds that would ordinarily be dissipated. Similarly, the 
charging of one’s personal debts on one’s property as a way of diminishing what will be available to 
the Government as security for any moneys paid out to adult children or any other person in return 
for the provision of social care will need to be regulated in some way. Here, giving the Government 
priority over other creditors in regard to the recovery of such moneys from the deceased care-
receiver’s estate, much as the legislation in Illinois purports to do, may provide an answer. 
One particular area of work that needs yet to be done is on the effect of funding care services from 
the public purse in that money will flood into the economy from the ‘carer’s payment’ – i.e. the former 
carer’s allowance – that will come from Central Government funds. Some of this money will be 
recouped from the statutory charge that will secure some of what needs to be paid out by central 
government in order to fund what is proposed, but a significant part of these funds may not be 
recovered because either (i) they are paid to informal carers who are caring for care-receivers who do 
not own their homes, or (ii) the cost of the care provided by these informal carers exceeds the value 
of the care-receiver’s home. That, of course, is the financial cost of this element of social justice. But, 
it is a price that must be paid in order to secure the future of the present generation of elderly disabled 
and what lies ahead for those who will take their place as the twenty-first century unwinds. The earlier 
analysis of the quantitative-easing process that took place in the UK only a few short years ago is 
designed to demonstrate that western governments can undertake social engineering projects by 
creating and distributing wealth without adversely affecting their national economies.964 And, the 
findings that followed the concerted exploration of modern ideas relating to the roles of family 
members, society and the State strongly suggest that is, indeed, the State that is now obligated to 
take action to meet the demands that increasing longevity will bring.965 
As time moves on the proportion of elderly in our population grows ever larger. Already, family carers 
save the UK economy some £132 billion per annum, with over 1.3 million people across the UK 
providing over 50 hours of informal care each week and still many more a little less.966 But, the 
demands that will be made on this section of our society will only grow; and, the suffering of these 
informal carers can only increase unless action is taken at the highest levels of society. This thesis lays 
bare the challenge that is facing modern society as it seeks to cope with an increasingly elderly 
population; it analyses the moral responsibilities that surround the meeting of that challenge; it rejects 
 
964 See: chapter two, supra. 
 
965 See: chapter three, supra. 
 
966 https://www.carersuk.org/news-and-campaigns/press-releases/facts-and-figures (accessed: 04/10/18). 
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the suggestion that the present law might be amended in order provide some inconsistent and 
arbitrary form of provision for informal carers; and, finally, it proposes a radical new solution to the 
demands that an elderly population with ever more burdensome social care needs will make on 
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